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Abstract
The first of the three parts of this work deals with the Chinese 
identity and solidarity in China and with its expansion southwards during 
the last three millennia. Initially, this involved overland movement 
within China itself/ later, migrations by sea introduced the Chinese into 
the Nan Yang. As these immigrants have generally retained their Chinese 
identity maintaining links with China, a detailed discussion of politico- 
cultural developments in 20th century China has been included.
The second part deals with the historico-geograpkical development of 
the Southeast Asian countries with special reference to the 20th century.
The need for a separate discussion of each country arises from the effects 
of their political sovereignty, which, in some sense, enclose their 
respective Chinese communities within a specific state-culture, and limit 
the latter's extra-state relations with Chinese communities abroad. It 
thus occurs that, from a geographical-cultural point of view, each of the 
Nan Yang Chinese communities constitutes-an almost closed .cultural system 
with its proper’cultural hierarchy. And yet, some similarities in 
indigenous-Chinese relations exist in all the Southeast Asian countries.
The third part discusses the historical geography of Singapore and, 
in particular, various geographical conceptions of its character and role 
as well as the build-up of the attachment values to its territory. A 
special emphasis is given to the period of Singapore's independence with 
relation to its becoming a Chinese cultural node for the Nan Yang communltie 
ideologically different from and extra-territorial to China. This process 
occurs as a result of a popular cultural perseverance in Singapore and in 
the Nan. Yang communities, and definitely does not constitute part of the- 
official Singaporean state-Idea.
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INTRODUCTION
It is- the purpose of this thesis to analyze the extent 
to which Singapore is becoming a Chinese cultural node, extra­
territorial to China, mainly with respect to the Nan Yang 
Communities* The study is made from the standpoint of 
cultural and political geography, and it is necessary first to 
clarify some of the basic concepts involved. Many of the 
described phenomena were chosen from the cultural, social, 
economic and political life of the countries under study, and 
the reason for their inclusion stems, among other things, from 
their significance to a major concept of this work: group 
attachment to territory, or the cultural values bestowed by 
a group on territory.
The term "culture" in this work represents two distinct 
concepts. The first one, which may be called a culture of 
identity, denotes 1 the whole way of life, material, intellectual 
and spiritual, of a given society" (1), and more precisely, the 
specific traits and patterns, ideas and their attached values (2), 
which govern group identity and solidarity. Thus, "Chinese 
culture", inasmuch as it defines a group with a common identity, 
is conceived as a culture of identity. The second concept of 
"culture" connotes a specific mode of relationship between 
human groups and their environment and the kind of their social 
institutions^3)• This concept may be called a culture of 
adaptation, and may be common to otherwise unrelated groups such 
as Thai and Burmese wet-rice growers. Thus, the culture of 
adaptation of the Sinicized people of Japan, Korea and
Yietnam may be common, although each has a different 
culture of identity and. solidarity (4).
Although Huntington’s view that the physical
environment is a shaper of human characteristics may be
contested, his view that the environment determines the
character of cultures is-more plausible (5). It is
doubtful/ however, whether the premise of cultural
geography that culture is a means of classifying areas
according to the character of human groups, occupying them
(6), follows Huntington's views. The environment may or
may not shape cultures, but human groups certainly modify
Wt«r a-U'o^
the environment, and in so doing they evaluate itVfrom 
economic, strategic, artistic and locational
aspects. In addition, culture,'as a residue of the group's 
creativity involves spiritual attachment to some of its : 
manifestations. As these are territorially distributed, 
it follows that- different areas have different values 
attached to them, for the same group, and different groups, 
are differently attached to the same area.
Raumsinn, a concept coined by Ratzel from observations, 
on vegetal and'animal ecologies and extended to states, 
races tribes and families (7), is perhaps a basic notion 
implying the space consciousness of these groups in 
relation to their numerical and territorial expansion.
This consciousness becomes a mode of conception as the 
culture of the human group develops and attaches value to 
the culturally modified territory. The existence of these 
'(rtf values is evident in families' attachment to
their places of residence (8), in peasants’ attachment
, ‘ to their plo^ts of land and in the almost sanctified view 
' U j k i c l i
‘ IMf peoplesfof their states* boundaries. On the
international level the concept of Raumsinn may become
more sophisticated^ and^within an atmosphere of conflicting -
territorial values of different peoples over the same 
territory; may develop a. Lebensraum conception. In 
conflict situations, mainly on states' level, the values 
attached to different parts of the territory^ whether 
occupied, exploited or aspired for acquisition by the
nation vary in degree, The occupied oikumene, and
y - < =•
especially the area which has been historically inhabited, 
and has served as the origin of the national culture, is 
deemed the most valuable, sometimes for its material
-value, but more often for spiritual and symbolic reasons.
Within*the national area there may exist sparsely populated1 
marshlands, which could command much lower values.of 
attachment. In addition, there may exist territories, 
which the*national group or its leadership aspire to acquire, 
in spite of the fact that they are not inhabited by members
J tV *1
of the group. These constitute Erganzungsraume, mainly of 
material and/or strategic value.
The geographical .distribution of those differently • 
evaluated areas may resemble in their idealised form 
concentric cireles beginning from the cultural core area 
and continuing outwards to the cultural oikumene and from 
. there to the marehlands, while the Erganzungsraume 
constitute the outer circle,.sometimes not contiguous with 
the former. The evaluation of those areas is wholly
ethnocentric (10), and though the conception of Raumsinn 
and hebensraum has been implicitly inherent in human 
culture even in ancient times (11), the fairly modern 
sanctification of state boundaries,, and their representation 
in ubiquitous maps, may add symbolic value to the national 
territory in conflict' situations.. But the Raumsinn and 
hebensraum conceptions are only part of a more general 
geographical conception (12)., which may be termed as a 
cultural environment conception or as a geographical 
conception. This conception may be common to both kinds 
of cultural groups, while the hebensraum conception relates 
to 'a cultural group of common solidarity; The cultural 
environment conception (the geographical conception) of a ■ 
specific culture grasps, as it were, the possibilities 
offered by the territory (and the physical environment) to 
the cultural group's living conditions according to their 
actual material abilities and values, and according to the 
spiritual values attached to that territory (13). - Thus, 
nomad herders may not recognize the possibilities offered 
■by good arable land, a Chinese or an Indian trader may 
■prefer a noisy road junction to establish his shop-house, 
while a Malay or Thai villager will prefer, living in his 
remote kampong in-proximity to a running stream. Even 
states may change the. geographical conception of their 
environment after undergoing some cultural changes (14). 
Thus, Communist China included its Mongolian marchlands 
into the Chinese oikumene for politico-strategical reasons, 
and a significant change is going on in the delineation of 
the influence zones (1.5) of the three world Super-Powers.
Also, in tills category, the 1965 separate Independence
of Singapore produced a new geographical conception of its
. ' ctut . I
environment ( 16),, as Ithe recent independeneeibf the
formerly colonial states in Asia and in Africa.
The concept of human, attachment to territory has been 
partly clarified by the discussion on values,attached to 
territory. It is accepted, however, that value-wijje there 
can be no clear-cut division between the social milieu and 
its related physical environment. People may feel attached 
..to a certain house.because it is their family home, but 
there is no doubt that even after a family moves house, 
some sort of sentimental attachment to the old house still 
exists, among the family members (17). Another example may 
represent some additional difficulties in analyzing that 
phenomenon. Muslims all over the world feel an attachment 
to Mecca, although most of them may not have any relatives 
there. Also, extra-territorial minority groups may feel an 
attachment to their cultural centre and still remain abroad, 
thus definitely dividing their loyalties between their 
familial place of residence, the host country cultural 
centres (inasmuch as they are integrated into the local 
society), and their ethnic-or religious cultural centre. 
Without belittling the complexity of the problem, it is 
safe to assume that there existi measureable indices to 
determine not only the existence or absence of attachment 
to territory, but also to quantify it. Although people 
individually differ in their emotional, and sentimental 
expression, the phenomenon within a fairly numerous group 
may render significant results (18). Some of the indices
for measuring attachment to territory are: location- of the 
family home, of the job, of the capital and the 
sentimentally cherished possessions, and of the place where 
one has spent his childhood. In addition, and still 
concerning individuals, the degree of social .integration . 
to/ the milieu, of the majority group and assimilation provide 
other good Indications as.it is,assumed that integration 
into a local society signifies the. adoption of its 
territorial values and. a decrease in values attached to the 
territory of origin. Also, visits., pilgrimages, 
remittances and communication by:; letter or phone may 
constitute reliable gauges in this respect. The total 
summation: of these indicators in a group, may provide a 
fairly good measure of its degree of attachment to the 
territory in question. But there exist specific indices 
concerning the group as a whole, mainly: the perseverance 
of original institutions., educational, religious and 
social. In fact, the less the minority group-is integrated 
into the local society, the more, it keeps its attachment 
to the territorial values of origin.
It may be futile to try and construct a hierarchic 
system of cultural centres according to the intensity of 
emotions they produce. It is possible, however, to create 
a hierarchy according to the kind of "cultural service." 
offered by each place and the number of its Vcust.omers11.
This leads to linking the hierarchy of cultural centres to
an existing theory in marketing geography (19). Some 
preliminary observations must first be discussed. Many?
•and perhaps most of the cultural centres which distribute
services are fixed in.place (20), such as homes, schools, 
temples, social clubs,; newsstands and cinemas,. Cultural 
centres1 spatial distribution, - not unlike retail trade/ 
establishmentBf follows -, the .pattern of population 
distribution. The kind/of cultural--services rendered in 
one establishment cannot be easily analyzed-* while the 
'opposite: is the case in the geographical marketing theory, 
but certain services are more common than others although 
they involve-fewer "customers", and certain others are 
more rare, and involve a more numerous clientele". All this : 
permits us to. diseuss the- question of the,-hierarchy of 
cultural centres within a nation-state society.
. The most numerous cultural centresv which provide, 
similarvcultural./services and are spatially fixed are the ,-C-. 
fatiily homes, but-veach pf them serves few "customers".'
They render the ,basi c servi oe;s, whi eh enable : chi 1 dren to \ 
socialize. The 'village in rural areas., o r . a neighbourhood, in 
the., urbanrprovide less common cultural services, but care for 
more/"customers". These services include a- school, a 
newsstand, a place of worship and perhaps a social club. 
Although hierarchically this level is higher because its 
esthblishfflehis are/rarer, they seem to command a lower 
se&tiinbntal/attachment t o ’place than the home. A small 
town, or a ward in a city may provi.de /cinemas, --libraries, 
higher educational institutions, political party organizations, 
sport clubs and some facilities for mass meetings. A city :- 
may provide a radio, and television station, a publishing 
house, local newspapers, sometimes a university and a 
cultural .elite. Again^this level, of cultural .centres is
'It
r^ vv' . .- ■■".. /.■' ;■ . • \ - -\\ „ ■ . '
‘Y  ^ - *' ■
.Characterized by the high, numbers of its clientele while 
the. services it renders usually, do not command face-to-face 
relationships. Within a.nation-state* the capital usually 
constitutes the highest cultural centre. In addition to 
its various services, it usually commands a special attach­
ment, as it is the seat of the .government, of the highest v 
education and religious centres., and also sometimes is 
the cultural centre' around'which the nation-state, culture 
has'; bpen, built up. . Moreover, as a/seat of the government, 
it;/is the place from which the state-idea .is promulgate^. 
This centre also affects the cultural life of extra­
territorial. coTmmuni ties of that same culture by actually 
maintaining cultural links with them, or by "cultural 
induction" (21). , . '
' The Chinese extra-territorial cultural centres are . 
discussed at the end of part two of this work, and that 
of, Singapore fat the end of part three.
eoq .tnotes . ; introduction -'
(1) Encyci of Phil, term "culture and civilization” by . ; 
William8.
(2) following the definition, of Kroeber and Kluckhohn,
1952, p.181.
(3) following Du Bois, 194-9, .pp.- 11-12.
(4) M  Tylor, 1958 (1871) p.l disregard^# the differentiating 
character of culture with respect to human groups* USsfcT^ -^ tj 
^  this work.
(5) Huntington, 1951 (1920).
(6) Wagner and Mikesell, 1962, p.2. Also Encyc. Soc.
Sci. term "cultural geography" by Sauer.
(7) See dahnman,.1944, pp.456-457, and Buttimer, 1971,
PP.33-34* ;
(8) See for example, Sorre, 1957, pp.56, 111, and Kroeher 
1952 p.217*
(9) See its "biological and social manifestations in Y/agner,
; I960, pp.51-53.
(10) See Bidney, in kroeher (ed) 1953, p.689, on ethnocen- 
tricity as a cause of conflicts.
(11) The Ghinese traditional World Order may he. regarded as 
; an example. See' Oinshurg- in Tang TsoU (ed) 1968,
p.77 map’ 1.
(12) Already mentioned before.
(13) Bor instance, "territorial, v/aters1 boundaries are traced 
at greater distances from the coastlines as naval 
armament improves and as new techniques enable the 
extraction of oil from continenM shelves,
(14) Nation state cultures are by definition not only 
identity and solidarity cultural groups, but also 
cultural groups defined by similar modes of adaptation 
to the environment, as the former is a sub-set of the 
latter.
’ ■ . '
. (15). Which, constitute a modern form of. strategic 
Erganzungsraume.
(1.6) This will be discussed in part three of this work.
(17) This sentimental evaluation seems due to the symbolic 
’ meaning bestowed upon cultural things. See/Whyte in 
Montagu,(ed) 1962, p.41, and p.60 footnote 6.
(18) .This is due in part to "group pressure",or;"social 
climate11 withtothe group. See G-oldenson, 1970, 
vol. I, pp.521-522.
(19) See Berry, 1967, pp.13-20, 26-28.
(.20) A cultural, .service is here defined as that which enables 
a person to. socialise with its milieu, Also1, that which 
enables a person individuaily to communicate with his
; ■ culture. Those who receive the .service may be called 
"customers".
(21.) A simile from’ principles of electronics,, which, may
■ suit for qualifying-the relations of dewish communiiaes 
in the diaspora with historical Jerusalem.
PART ONE; ORIGINS
Present day Chinese culture is the product of an 
exceptionally long and continuous process of evolution# 
Geographically speaking, the extension of the culture 
transcends mainland China, to include all the extra­
territorial communities which identify themselves, at 
least in certain circumstances, as Chinese. All these 
communities share in common a sentimental attachment to 
China; in the past this was expressed in family,
■business and cultural terms, but today it involves 
national considerations as well. When we consider the 
history of Chinese expansion to the South from Chou times 
onwards, it seems that the Chinese cultural and 
organizational superiority over the Thai and tribes 
peoples, caused the Chinese settlers, whether in conflict 
or in accord with the rulers of China,to retain a 
cultural and political loyalty to the Chinese cultural 
centre# The present situation in Southeast Asia, and 
more especially in its peninsular part, seems to worry 
politically and historically aware nationals of those 
countries, as a similar cultural and geographical loyalty 
seems to pervade the cores of the Chinese minorities of 
the region. To a Significant extent this anxiety arises 
from the historical image of China as an expansionist 
power, and the related image of the Chinese as aggressive 
emigrants#
$he Chinese elaim a cultural continuity of over 
four millennia. In th^politico-geographiGal context, 
this claim constitutes a reality surpassing in 
importance both the facts and the myths of Chinese 
history (1). Moreover, the elaim sometimes emits under­
tones of cultural superiority innate in the traditional 
ethnocentrism (2) and supported by the present power of 
China.
Ihe Chinese Culture Until the Opium War.
Vigorously expansionist, the original Chinese 
culture extended from its cradle area towards other lands 
where intensive agriculture could be pursued. Wherever 
Chinese settlement'followed armies, or by infiltration 
paved the way for political annexation, this culture: 
prevailed over its indigenous counterparts. Wherever 
settlement did not follow in considerable numbers, local 
cultures, though Sinicized in their material and . 
institutional patterns, usually retained their ethnic and 
national identity. Vietnam, Korea and, to a certain 
extent, Japan exemplify the latter process of Sinicization, 
which strengthened them and made them more resistant to 
further Chinese intrusion. Central and South China, as 
well as 19th century Manchuria and later, Inner Mongolia, 
represent the former process by which indigenous peoples 
lost their ethnic and national identities.
OJhe vigour of the Chinese culture expressed itself 
not only in times of political expansion, but also in 
periods of subjugation (3). It withstood Nomad
occupations of parts or even the whole of the Chinese, 
oikumene and assimilated or rejected the invaders.
Nomad bids to conquer China and small scale foraging 
occurred also in prehistoric times but, as throughout 
history, were only occasionally successful. The steppe 
nomads-; created what Eiclcstedt has called an Unruhezentrum 
in times of drought or political upheavals, which 
clashed with the Pruckzentrum of the fairly densely 
populated Chinese culture area since prehistoric times (4). 
While the Unruhezentrum intermittently produced 
disturbances in the form of mobile military raids seeking 
Raub (pillage), the Pruckzentrum tended to expand in search 
of Raum (space) (5). a process of slow seepage*
The First Ihree Millennia. Mythical, or historical 
personages like those of the “Yellow Emperor (who) had a 
prominent place in faoism«, br Yao, Shun and Yii the ; 
legendary rulers who. became idolized by Confucianism (6), 
were incorporated into the Chinese national ethos at a 
very early period. Written language, urban settlement 
and a complicated body of customs and rituals 
distinguished the Chinese from surrounding tribal cultures 
since the second millennium B.C.. The fact that in feudal 
Chou times a unique Chinese culture and identity had 
already expanded from its cradle area to cover the Hwang 
Ho River Valley, the Middle and Lower Yangtze valleys and 
the areas between them, gave rise to the myth of an 
ancient united empire o£ the Hsia ( 7) . 3?his expressed • 
perhaps a kind of proto-nationalism by educated people,
whp recognized the uniqueness of the cultural identity 
in a feudal!stie political reality;
The cultural unity, of the second millennium B.C. 
was derived from the singularity of the cultural; atqa, 
its superiority since time immemorial and the lack of 
influence from other cultural centres (8). ,The cultural 
centre moved from its hirth place to Anyang in Shang 
times and moved by steps eastwards along the lower bend 
of the Hwang Ho during Chou times (see map I-A). This 
> was due to nomad pressure from the West as well as in 
search of a better central location to control the vassals
(9)* Further shifts of the Capital to Chang-an, Loyang 
and Kaifeng still maintained it in the same cultural- 
geographical region as was the cradle area. The absence 
of rival cultural-centres contributed to the Chinese 
strong ethno centri c view of the world (1G), which 
regarded itself as the Central Kingdom, the highest in 
the cultur©-political hierarchy; The reasons for the 
Chinese cultural superiority must be sought in the 
geographical setting of North China in the second 
millennium B. C.•
To the north of the line delimited by the later 
Great Wall there extended the steppes, where nomads had 
roamed the area perhaps ever since the horse was first 
domesticated. The area of Inner Mongolia, between the
MAP I-A
SHAKG and CHOW Capitals Boundaries 
DOMINIONS a   , Shang
1
□   Early ChoW
O  " —  Late Chow
After Goodrich, 1969(1948)
...
MAP II-A
THAI DISTRIBUTION 
About 100C B.C.
After Eickstedt, 1944.
Chinese
Miao
Yueh
Gobi Desert and the Great Wall, could support several 
millions of people depending on meat and milk from sheep 
, and horses* Effective grazing in these vast areas, a 
proper "balance "between sheep and horses and optimal 
meat consumption could presumably increase the human 
population number. However, the possession; of ^horses 
must have been culturally linked with honour especially 
as it gave power to the owner, and not unlike present 
day African tribes of herdsmen the Asiatic nomads must 
have sacrifiired economic efficiency,to consecrated 
cultural values. In addition, though the great, 
mobility of horsemen could compensate for their 
inevitable dispersion in wide grazing, areas* it seems 
that mobility as a cultural value must have been 
inimical to the creation of cities and : towns, the basis 
of civilization (11).
lo the south of the Chinese oikumene of Shang 
times lay the mountaimous and forested divide between 
the Hwang Ho and the Yangtze* Beyond those ridge^Lay 
the great river, with a swampy flood-plain and jungle- 
covered flanks* To the east extended the swamps of the 
Hwang Ho, the Hwai and the Yangtze Delta, lhai swamp- 
rice cultivators inhabited the lowlands and hill tribes 
lived on forested hills and mountains. Ihe sparse 
population of the hill tribes originated from their 
hunting and collecting culture, which is believed to 
have supported about one person per square kilometer. 
Moreover, the difficulty of communications hindered those
peoples from living in agglomerated settlements;
However, "being rice growers and perhaps fishermen, 
the Thais lived in an area which the Ghinese later, 
incorporated into their irrigated system, learning 
from the Thai the basic knowledge of rice growing (12)* 
This raises the question why the Thais themselves had\ 
not thrived culturally along the Yangtze river, and 
it seems that the answer may be sought in 
environmental, and cultural conditions. In the first 
place, swamp or floating rice cultivation, climatically 
suitable for the river flood-plain, did not put great 
demands on social organization within Thai society*
Wood and not stone was naturally the main building 
material (13) and it demanded less specialization in its 
working. The need for irrigation in the Yangtze was 
much^less than in the Hwang Ho, Wei and even the Han 
river plains (14)* Although the Thais had a much superior 
culture to that of the hill tribes and were settled 
astride an excellent fluvial route (see map IX-A), they 
did not create a Druekzentrum. it seems that when the 
Chinese reached the Yangtze in early Chou times (see map 
I-A), the Thais had not yet extended their primitive rice 
agriculture over the entire vastness of the Yangtze valley. 
Nevertheless, the Thais did not yield voluntarily to the 
Chinese, though they could present only weak resistance
(15) to them. Fundamentally^ the Thais seem to have lacked 
population pressure, and were not themselves pressurized 
by the footed hill tribes. Their low numbers were perhaps
due , to diseases which naturally aff ected the warmer 
swampy and forested Yangtze lowlands more than the Wei,
Han and Hwang Ho valleys with their longer dry seasons.
In fact, irrigation and drainage canals led to an 
increase in population by improved sanitation resulting 
from water regulation as well as by increased food 
production (16). The Chinese settlement of the Yangtze 
and the lower reaches of the Hwai and Hwang Ho seems then 
to have heen made possible hy improved sanitation (17).
.This’health problem did .not exist in North China as the 
local food crops needed shorter periods of flooding and 
the area had very cold winters. The Chinese demographic 
superiority manifested itself against theThais by 
originally occupying a healthier bikumene and later 
introducing more efficient agricultural methods, while , 
against the steppe nomads its trump card was sedentary 
agriculture which produced more food and definitely 
decreased infant and old people mortality.
Chinese population pressure was:also due, at least 
sporadically, to the northern nomads1 encroachments, which 
must have followed drought cycles in the latter*s oikumene. 
Population pressure underlay the improvement of 
agricultural techniques, which depended on a fairly 
elaborate socio-political hierarchy system. Crain surplus 
became a cause and a consequence of China*. s; hydraulic;; 
techniques. The government system, when institutionalized, 
naturally' sought power and control, and indeed all economic 
developments of importance emanated from the state* s needs,
each of them contributing to the power of the state. 
Navigation canals, drainage and irrigation works and 
fortifications (18) were the most prominent culturo- ; 
economic achievements of early China.
(i) Pre-Han North China. , Apart from the perhaps 
legendary Hsia Kingdom of the first half of the second 
millennium B.C., Chinese cultural history may be said 
to begin with the Shang Kingdom in the latter half of 
that millennium. This feudalistie state had a system of 
government officials, a priesthood and organized urban 
communities. These rested upon relatively highly 
developed agricultural activities in the countryside and 
certainly held ritual ceremonies and developed the 
calendar. Jade carvings and bronze artifacts as well as 
architecture indicate the existence of craftsmen. The 
Shang Kingdom.expanded along the Wei River Valley, the 
lower Hwang-Ho and the Hwai, but it did not reach the 
Yangtze, except perhaps near its lower end. This fact 
was due to difficulties of forest clearing in the Yangtze 
Valley, as the culture was still neolithic, bronze being 
mainly used in religious artifacts and arms.
Between the 12th and the 3rd centuries B.C., the 
feudal state, under the Chou dynasty, expanded southwards 
into and through the Han River valley towards the Yangtze
(19) (see map ITA). By 1000 B.C., many enclaves of 
barbarians still remained in the midst of the Chinese 
fiefs, especially in forested mountains and in swampy and 
jungle tracts. During late Chou times, the Szechwan
Basin as well as the entire Middle and lower Yangtze 
valleys were already incorporated: into the feudal state
(20), which thus enjoyed two conspicuously different; 
climatic regimes on "both sides of the Tsin-ling 
-mountains and their eastward extension (21).
If in the earlier Ghou era, Chinese spiritual 
culture was characterized by fairly complex religious 
rituals in worship of ancestral, terrestrial and 
celestial spirits (22), the later Chou, the so called 
Glassical Age, .saw spiritual life .flourish in;many fields. 
Prose and poetry of higher artistic, value were produced, 
the legal code was improved and philosophical schools 
appeared (23)* Material culture progressed no less: iron 
replaced bronze in artifacts and weaponry, irrigation and 
fertilization as well as craftsmanship improved.
The Confucian school approved of literature, rituals 
and music as comprising the aesthetic manifestations of 
human life (24), and asserted that society depended on the 
mutual sympathy of men. Sympathy emanated from each 
individual, decreasing in intensity through the series of 
. concentric social circles surrounding;.him. Sympathy 
created harmony among all named people of society* He 
was worthy of a name, who correctly performed his social 
duties. ’’The. sum total of well defined names, then, 
comprises a well defined system of human society in 
generalM(25). Dignity and tradition stabilized society
and rites governed behaviour. Each individual having 
a function in society (name), had his dignity in an 
appropriate sphere of rights and duties. Antiquity 
and tradition constituted a universally acceptable 
authority of everlasting value, highly superior to 
fortuitous change.
Perhaps Confucianism made the Chinese **the most 
history-conscious of all the great civilized peoples.n 
(26)} certainly it made them easily accept tradition 
and social norms. The Chinese have been known to 
cooperate effectively in their social groups by 
searching the groups* protection and by contributing to 
the groups’ power. ML'individu isole n*est rien; il 
succomberait infaillibleraent s1 il ne se joi&nait a 
d* autres individus" (27).
If Taoism was not interested in «the study of a 
fixed objective tradition, but the inward contemplation 
of cosmic conditions'* (28), and thus was the negation of 
Confucianism, the legalist School elevated the state and 
government to be ends in themselves, as it were. The 
Legalists introduced a totalitarian conception of 
government (29), which had perhaps existed in practice 
in Shang times (30), but the omnipotence the state 
involved obedience of both high and low to the law (31). 
Despotism in ancient history was not confined only to 
great states with a complex irrigation system, yet, 
under certain legal restrictions, it seems to have been a
necessary condition for the maintenance and 
development of such states. Thus in ancientChiba,; the :
philosophy of the Legalists constituted "'a -logical 
\ addition to Confueianisrag*
(ii) The EirSt Empires. Late Chou China was 
culturally and topographically well suited for the 
creation of a Centralized state. At least 60 percent 
of its area lay below 600 feet of elevation and much 
of it was va l i t i v i a 3 J ^ " l a n d - V / s u i t a b l e  for 
-navigation oyer lon^ stretches and had long been 
supplemented by roads _ and canals;^:;Hill.;tribe enclaves 
were isolated and unimportant, and the Chinese 
identity was well Established. Moreover, the greater 
; part of the population of Central China was by this I
time of northern derivation so that dialect differences 
within the siate-areV:'must have been minimal (32). In 
^ , addition, nomad pressure, from the steppe border zone^
* necessitated k;strong 'central!ze& powerrfor its
containment. Eor instance, the separate walls built 
]  ^ against nomad incursions since the 5th century B.C. had
to be incorporated into ah integrated system* This was 
achieved by Shih;;Hwang-ti the first emperor, in the 3rd 
; ; century B^C* (33), who introduced a policy of
expansionism by conquest and settlement. The Chinese,
, ■ by then already organized in extended 'families- and ;>,/■
practising ancestor worship, were not inclined to 
emigrate to newly conquered lands (34). Emigration to 
the South was enforced, while the Great Wall in the Horth, 
;,marking the boundary, between t ^  steppe and the sown,
defended the Chinese, and also delimited their -.£?/}■ 
agricultural: expanslonv -The' emperor energetically v-,; 
enforced a law code, customs, unified weights and 
A  measures, and utilized corvee work in constructing ^ ^
canals, waterways and highways. A navigation canal 
between the Yangtze and the Hsi Kiang was one of his 
■ greatest^aehievementa. (35)’. p-
The Han dynasty, which inherited the centralized 
empire;;from \ the { Oh* inextended their rule from- ^   ^ :
River delta to the upper reaches of the Sir-Barya and ; ■
imu^Barya,:*and to Mongolia, South Manchuria and Korea ; v
(bee map IIBA) * Under the Han dynasty China maintained 
overland trade-routes withthe West and. India, and its 
seamen penetrated deep into Southeast Asia ( 36) . V ; >
When the Hsiung Nu stopped direct links with Bactria, 
the Han conquered: Kweichow in a bid to open a new lahde 
route to India (37). Three hundred years of Chinese 
rule in Kweichow Sinicized most of its tribal population; 
(38)^tli®M^[ Tibet, Taiwan and Yueh remained; outside the 
. 'eifectiye.-;£ule of, the Hah ;bmpirhv ..'"3 ..
Great teelmdiogical^^ inveh^pns-Md improv 
mark the Han period* Better astronomical, observations 
about the improvement of the calendar, glazed 
pottery and bronze mirrors exhibited a development in • ‘.
known techniques, and early attempts in porcelain and 
deep drilling of wells manifested hewly acquired _Vi'
techniques. Sculpture,/‘pMntlngY'''^0^ tecturh and
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literary expression greatly improved in artistic‘value, 
and the unified language and script facilitated 
communications, education and the functioning of the 
“bureaucracy. Improvement in agriculture was brought 
~ about by "drought rbsisiant ricC; intertillage; darly 
-and late crops;improved crop rotation vrith^ heanis^ V (39) 
and hy agricultural instructions 5 The adaptation of V'uj
this unified culture and state1to^pfcypiographieal ;V,-
conditions over a wide range of latitude, from the Red !
and Hsikiang deltas m  the south to southern Mongolia 
in the north, “brought about an economic diversity, which 
in turn supported a steadily growing volume of internal t
trade. On the other hand, the inability of the Chinese 
. to adapt themselves to nomad life in the steppes, I
-.i'vy. cultural reasons, caused h perpetiaial
shortage of horses whieh entailed grave military 
consequences. Nevertheless* the cultural unitjji&and the 
 ^ t etrengtli of. the Chinese traditions invari^Iy;i,pnsured
either the assimilation of nomad conquerors into the 
 ^ Chinese culture or their eventual.rejection' from China,
Of thethree originalYuehterritorles^ M m  Yu eh 
was the most difficult to absorb, and indeed retained 
' its independence throughout Ch1 in and Han times, This
? was mainly because of the mouniainv:barrier whiJbh isolated
it from great valleys inhabited by the Chinese, whereas 
■\ Tung Yueh,: bordering on the Yangtze Delta, was easily
if accessible and Nan; Yueh, broadly; corresponding with • the ; ^  j
modern Kwwngsi and Kwangtungprovincesj was relatively 
easily conquered by the armies crossing the Nan-ling 
passes into the Hsikiang basin (40), The lowlands of 
both thebe conquered Yueh kingdomsywere/laterpopulated 
by Chinese settlers (41).
As an epilogue to this chapter it is worthwhile -
to point out the pblitico-cultura^Lifference between the
feudal and the unified empire eras of China, It seems
that the difference in geographical extension resulting
from the increase m  power of the central government
was a paramount feature of that dissimilarltyi ; In four ,
of government the Ch* in and Hah more- than
doubled the Chinese domain which developed during the
nine centuries of Chou times. This opened the/territories
south pffthe/Yangtzetio Chinese settlement, and thus,
diversified agricultural^ in turn
promoted internal trade over the extended roads and /
canals. The communications network, the power of the
central government and the non-hereditary posts of
provincial governors (all imperial achievements) guarded ■ y
against separatist cultural tend^cihs could
potentially develop under feudal rule over such a vast
area. Although during. Chou times* rich ^ cultivation had
already spread northwards, and wheat-growing southwards,
and Confucianism and Chinese customs had been/Ubiquitous,
the geographical isolation (42) of the main productive
Have <UveU»e<L/
areas of China could- epenrai?e enXijiirremr• liaa.
3Ll
feudal!sm persisted. In addition, it aeems improbable 
that ;a feudal China would have populated the South as 
effectivelyas^idid; Shih Hwang-ti^ Ihe Han conquest of 
the lands of the nomads, although neglecting to settle 
them in substantial numbers» . pushed many blphe nbmids to 
remotd ardas with poorer graizing capacities thus 
diminishing their military capabilities, The expansion 
to wards Oehtral Asia opened the way to; the silk trade -v 
through Bactria- C43), and hence to cultural exchange 
with the Romanstvt?hile the capture of , the^BSarland Red 1; 
river mouths certainly promoted maritime links with. 
Southeast ASia* .
: Rrom a^politieo-gepgraphical point of view, it seems ; 
that the .extension of the: Chinese oikumene to the South 
wasthe' most significant achievement of ear3 y imperial 
China. This brought population changes iii contemporary 
peninsular Southeast Asia by waves of Thais migrating
t h e r e > . ■ M-
The shift of the overall distribution of Chinese  ^
population into South China, which continued until the 
era of industri^Liziation is illustrated in t h %  folloiiing , 
table. ■'
Region/Bate : 2 A.I). 740 A.]3. 1102 A;B. 1491 .
N.E; Shansi, Hopei 23 ;7:i2
C.E; Shantung, Honan 
^ ^HUpei, Anhwei,
Kiangsu ■ 53 ^■'1 31 ■-':7 24 "ty/28:
H, Ws Bzeehwah, Shensi
/^ ,:;;;l^ kahsu,’.'v 16 13 ■ 22 11
S. : Brovinces South "
; ; of the Yangtze 8 ’ .7-* 27 ' 40 ' 49
percents)
(iii) prom the Bal&of the" Han to the Yuan. Between 
the 3rd ahd the 13th centuries ? periods of dynastic 
imperial rule were interspersed with spells of polltieal 
fragmentation* The ^dynasty cycle” sometimes reached its 
end when nomads invaded. North China, or when wars and 
corruption reduced the country to disprder,twhich uhder-^ 
mined the effective Control of the imperial power over its 
.territory* In such circxmisfances, one of the feUding lords, 
usually gained enough power to reestablish unity, like all 
new brooms, he. would indulge in huge building proj ects, for 
example, fortifidations, canals, and in a new capital city 
( 45), .activities which in^turh promoted economic idevelopment 
vand prosperity* But during the rule of later successors, 
neglect and corruption tended to returnV,as also did : 
enomouS; military expenditure (46) ,■ which together^ caUSed 
depression and decay of the, infrastructure, gradually 
bringing: aboutthe collapse" ofthe dynasty. Thus the whell 
came full circle. '
fhe successors of the Han, namely the kingdoms of 
Wei., Shu and Wu ( see map IT^ A); occupied three distinct 
economic a r e a s . b a s e d  oh the Hwang Ho, Hwai, Wei 
; and Han rivers, inherited the area of the longest Chinese 
cultural d;raditipny w^ in 2 A.D. accounted for about 75 , 
percent Of the population. Not surprisingly it was that 
the next dynasty, the,Tsin, originated from this: powerful 
kingdom. (DPI Shu was centered on the S ze chwan.basin, its 
main grain. production area, while fflfe Wu contibLled the
Yangtze valley as well asihehewlyecquired Hsi~*kiang 
V> and Red valleys (47),, In pultural’ terms, ■ Sbu^ahdjWu 
->/ were bythen stillpreo ceupfedwith th(^problems of
lowland and highland tribes ( 48). The Red River Delta, ; \ 
which was. not settled by Chinese peasants, was governed 1 
by isandarin&V w^ (Yueh) by
imposing upon them their more advanced Chinese instltutionsy^ 
the Chinesq^form1 of waiting and superior Chinese ; 
agricultural practices, ^iib^^thiavproeesis'- certainly 
modernized the: Viets, it could not assimilate them, i.e. 
make them lose their original identity, so that eventually 
in the lOthcentury A.. D. they regained their indepehdene e.
The Tsin uni ficationwas short lived and^indeed^ a 
period of disunity prevailed untif the rise of/the 1
' , ‘ ' '■ ■ 'tv.’'" n
-(49) *'(■ while North;vChina was again invaded by nomads. It 
would be.mistaken to think that the expansion of Chinese 
:settlemenbinto thev South^ceased _;.asa result nf the 
/ : political disunity,: The contrary may perhaps be more
true; Especially when governments changed hands and nomad 
pressures affected the elaborate irrigation system in the . 
North,internal disorders must have generated more 
migration than the foreed transfers of people experienced 
in Ch* In and Han times ('50). The essential steps of 
cultural expansion were taken by peasants, merchants, 
refugees and adventurers (51). Those people coming to
inhabit the South during the first millennium A. 1)^ , had
already known the use'Of1 paper, of coal for heating and :
smelting, porcelain and gunpowder. The mandarin officials, / 
governors of the new provinces anddlstrietseame from a 
developing system of education which prepared scholars 
for examinations.
.In the first century A.I)., Buddhism, which was M V  
introduced from India, in Han times (52), spread among 
large parts of the Chinese people. It provided spiritual 
comfort in the daily: struggle for iffe and in the hour 
; of death, and the ideas of Karma and soul transmigration 
appealed to those who did not find peace of mind in 
calnonized Oonfuciahi sm. : Buddhism was perhaps the only 
important external cultural influence which hecame widely 
accepted by the ethnocentric Ohinese. Returning Ch . 
Buddhist pilgrims who had travelled to and from India 
either by land or sea, introduced Indian culture to Ghinese 
scholars and officials. The land route to India followed ' 
the ancient Silk Road through Bactria and thenee continued 
through the North West frontier intp the Indus Talley and 
other parts of India. The maritime route went through 
Southeast Asia to Ceylont and the Bay of Bengal (see map 
m m  In a geographical sense, Buddhist pilgrimages which yy 
ceased only when India was Islamized, must have modified 
the Chinese view; of the world, which was thus forced" to 
recognize the existence of 'another highly developed 
civilization outside the orbit of the Chinese World irder (53) 
f The T* ang dynasty extended the Chinese possessions 
into Manchuria and to parts of Central Asia. .In the southern 
part of the empire, they conquered Iheh and pacified the ;
‘M-y v
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Vietsin the Red River delta, naming the area Ann am , 
the "pacified South”. However,: they did not transfer 
Ghinese settlers into that delta hut continued torule 
it through their officials and local rulers. In the 
south east of China however, the ; indigenous Viet population 
must have been totally assimilated. Elekste.dt discerned 
racial differehces-between the Sudsinider of this area 
and the Nordsinider. and perhaps the term T*ang People (54), 
which the local population use to refer to themselves, may 
also indicate a small proportion of Han Chinese immigration 
into the area (55)7,;/Tftiile the map of the territorial 
expansion of the Chinese empire in T1ang times indicates 
a shift of its geographical centre of gravity towards the <;■ 
north west and the/h%th,., the ”centfe of gravity” of the 
population, hevertheless, shifted southwards, with 40 
percent of the population in the area which, had broadly 
constituted the former Wu and Shu kingdoms. In view of
the lack of nomad pressure during the heyday of the T^ang,
this shift of the ”centre of gravity” of the population 
must have been due to the assimilation ;of Thais and Yueh 
people as well as to voluntary or government planned 
emigration from the North* She scarcity of;lowlands in 
the South, which would suggest less food production than 
in the North, was in fact compensated by a climate favouring 
multiple cropping, > , ^
The traditional view of Chinese.society recognized
: • ■ ' **• -• f ‘ '
the existence of four classes: the sdiolar**administrator (or
warring arisiocrat of former days) the farmer, the artisan
and tlie
expressed an idealised outlook on Chinese society as 
/basically an organised state of agriculturalists (56).
In fact, the mandarins were to a large extent landed 
gentry, and it seems plausible that many of the farmers,
PL.,,-™.-
in the North(jNk ItouaM, were actually landless farm hands 
or tenants (57). She farmer class was thus in itself 
hierarchically organized, and the system of tenancy tended 
to decrease the density of the rural population by rents 
passed on to the gentry. This may also have constituted 
a cause for migration to the South, although the Chinese 
were loath to leave their ancestral graveyards and family 
homes.
Social values emphasized the primacy of the family 
over the individual and even over the state or chureh^(58)f 
Filial piety was the most admired of virtues (59) . Tn a 
society where tradition was extremely venerated and old 
age was equated with knowledge and authority, normal social 
pressured, such as those originating from a generation 
gap or from a natural will for social mobility, were put 
into a strait-jaeket with minimal opportunities to vent 
themselves. Even familial life became »a regulated system 
of relations, in which the action befitting each age was 
fixed by edict11 (60). It seems then that wars, 
expansionist settlement and corvee work mobilizations 
provided opportunities for the youth to exhibit their pent 
up non-conformity. Wars, expansionist settlement, and 
possibly relations with foreign traders in cities or with
merchant. This^rder of decreasing importance
surrounding hill tribes offered some of the Chinese:an 
opportunity to come across 1 barbarians^/and to experience 
a national soiidarity^hen facing an outrgroup. The 
literati had even greater awareness ofnational 
superiority, which they must, have felt when realizing the 
poverty of adjacent cultures.
The hast Three Empires. .At the end of the 11th century, 
China, under the Sung, was an advanced country compared' 
with the contemporary European and Moslem worlds. , Some f 
of its state institutions seem exceedingly; modern for their 
age: a statistics bureau, laws nationalizing commerce, 
state loans to the needy, income tax,; conscription and a 
postal service (61). /Nevertheless, theiBung lost all the. 
territorial possessions beyond the Great Wall, immediately 
behind which the Hsi-Hsia and the Liao empires were 
pressing. In the South they lost iuinam and showed no 
interest in the Yunnan based Nan Ghao kingdom.
The decline of the Sung represents a recurring process 
in the cyclic vicissitudes of Chinese dynasties. Neither 
the people1 s welfare nor the stated needs constituted 
motivation for efficient administration in that stage. ;
The maintenance of agriculture was neglected, and tax 
collection benefited personal and local interests.
Although the Sung had no expansionist ambitions, the
;■ _ e " :. . . . "  ' -i
strong nomad states to the North compiled them to mobilize
and train an army of a million soldiers (62)* When laxity
and internal feuds brought about the breakdown of the
infrastructure, sheer distances became a factor in the /
disintegration of the government, thus paving the way /for 
th^Mongol conquest,
Kubilai inherited, the administrative and military
skills,.of his grandfather .JenghiS, and applied them to
his kingdom in China. He transferred his capital to
, v Wtb ,
Cambaluc (Peking),rintroduced Mongols and other aliens we
the/administration, for whose incorporation he had to. 
abolish the.system of examinations. The Pax Mongol!ca 
reestablished the links with, the West and with Inner/Asia, 
diplomatic, commercial and . cultural, which gave a more 
cosmopolitan character to the main Chinese cities, Mongol 
troops garrisoning Chinese cities and towns contributed to 
the peaceful administration of the country, but also :
confronted the Chinese as an outgroup. A proportion of 
the literatij who could not integrate into the administration; 
swollen by numerous alien officials, must have had real 
reasons to resent the Mongol rule. And yet, during 
Kubilai1 s rule anti-Mongol sentiments did not find 
organized expression, so that he was able to pursue some 
costly and unsuccessful campaigns. He secured Yunnan for 
China, but his;; campaigns- in Burma and Yiebnam, as well • as 
his sea attacks on.Champa and lava eventually failed.
Kubilai1s misadventures in Southeast Asia do not 
Seem to have had any Intention of opening those countries 
for Chines^4ettlement. He must have tried to reestablish 
in unequivocal terms the tributary relations of the 
vSoutheastAsian Countries with China. His strict 
regulations/-for tribute missions changed the former affable 
attitude, with wMeh the Chinese emperors had treated
•’ \ ■ N rV''v':. "■
v; '.-o- ' r • ';
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tributaries. /.He.’;'demanded that the tributary seek audience 
. /personally,'sen'&ihfgv.sons as hostages, under take a census 
ofpppulafion, provide military corvee, pay taxes and 
accept a Mongol governor (63) V These innovations added
a --'hew .diiienslon:-of. hard-headed and efficient Mongol 
.Re&ipciftlk -to the Chinese concept of the World Order (64)« 
//Resentment/against non-assimilated Mongols developed 
y-into-• uprisingduring the rule of Kubilai1 s incompetent 
, sh e c ess;ors^T¥5T)> reestablished the economy and
/.' restored law and order.. By 1430, they reduced the Mongols 
in the north to political lmpoteney from whiehthey have 
ne^Sri-re covered. She M%g^eiimlated the Mongols in, foreign 
trade relations by sea and land. The great maritime 
expeditions exhibited the peak of Ghinese seafaring 
achievements (66), which seem to have aimed at 
reestablishing the tributary system over what seemed to • 
them": as;. included within the Chinese sphere of influence 
(•^):V  ; Tlie tribute system^howeterv was 'in/sense, a ■
*' sanction for trade-/relatiohsy ■ and in this > light the ,
' maritime excursion;, may seem less extravagant*.; • The 
expeditions were suddenly stopped, marking a 'complete 
volte-face in, maritime policy rand returnlngio the pre- 
Mongol concept of tributary countries. When Considered '■%
. in terms of foreign:tradej ;the!Ghihese/policy seems^ , 
inexplicable, as during ;the second half of the Ming period 
. trade with Southeast AsidVadd.ed:;tin';from • Siam and silver ■ 'v 
from the Philippines to the former forest produce imported 
to China. Moreover,^new /pbwars -appearedih'i^
Southeast Asia in that period: Islam in Malacca and North
' ' V . v  ' ’  ’ ’ ■ = ■ ; ' - /  o '  ■ ' : V I  ■
-’ ‘ - v ,  - A / ‘ ; / -  v . ' j
i.
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yJavay Portuguese 0 atholie1sm as we 11 as the Spanish,
: all possihi.ejriyal s of - Chinese^olxtieal influence in the region. 
Y.ei, instead of supporting the Chines©traders and miners, 
z who had already, established email communities in Southeast 
Asia, the Ming made no;/attempt to protect them and re imposed 
/'earlier/ bans on 'emigration; ( 68). ;
:?/ -Thbi^ M , didS; not ^hermetically' close China to
foreign influences./ Catholic missionaries introduced .
European innovations and science, and new food drops from 
abroad were adopted, which enabled the population ghewth in 
late' Mih^/and/.Ch*ing./times (69)* ’Cotton, maize., sweet, 
potatoes, peanuts as well as tobacco revolutionized food 
production as they did not compete with rice for the better 
/•;alluviUl/sOilsy^ generously on the contemporary
non-arable uplands. By 1491, 49 percent of the Chinese 
/population lived south of the Yangtze, which area was climati­
cally most suitable foo^he new foodcrops.
/ vThe Gh1:!^/were Manehu descendants of the Jurchen, who /, 
harassed the. Ming over a long period andyfinally in the 17th
century^replacedthem/ as rulers -of China. The ChVing,,/  ;
willingly adapted themselves to the Chinese culture, in fact 
they identified themselves as* ,.0hinese''t/:shdeavburihg^ 1 to 
maintaxn orthodoxy With all the zeal of conscious converts1
W m  ;■ //;>’
(*>) Ihey reenacted the Ming ban on emigration, but the 
laws were loosely applied. Trade tricklecj, in through Canton 
and' missxonaries-eame . in /increasing numbers. It seems 
however, that the Chiing, being harassed/from the start by 
/Mih£ supporters; bas in Taiwan ^headed byKoXin^aj
abandoned real interest in thnir tributary states in ;
South east/As lav They mainly ooheentrated On conquering 
the/steppes; Of the North ai^ iib heights.;of Tibet} and. Mtt 
imposing their suzerainty over Korea. Though they; 
eventually^ captured Taiwan,. they did,nothing to contest 
the European encroachment into the East Indies, the Malacea 
Straits dr even to peninsular/’Southeast Asia.
Even, before the Opium War, the Oh* ing came to .'face 
the gravest of all problems encountered by Ghinese rulers, 
namely, the population ..explosion^ In 1794, the population 
of/China reaqhedv the\ phenomenal/figure-of 3t3i millions.
The problem seems to have stemmed from difficulties in 
collection and distribution and from disturbed production 
of food rather/than from; shortage in mbahs of production. / 
This was brought about primarily by: the high rate of 
tenancy, natural calamities, the inadequacy of the 
transportation system, taxes and banditry. The North was / 
more vulnerable to droughts and floods, but even the South 
had its share of Calamities. Upland provinces suffered 
most, as they were/less extensively.irrigated and lacked;, 
mag or waterways . The imperial grain reserves were as a 
general,rule neither; invested in efforts to extend the 
cultivated area hor to'increase yields or improve roads (71) 
but in; maintainihg armies in unproductive steppe provinces 
and toiacquire; luxuries. As famine affected rural areas, 
banditry increased and in turn contributed/to further 
deterioration of the food supply situation. This vicious 
circle metamorphosed into,a ‘flywheel^ which gained momentum
from; local rebellionsyin 1774-1813 and. culminated .in
.;■// V  / // . /^/V'/// ■ /■■"/'v
. the Taiping Rebellion, . The precarious balance between
production and consumption further deteriorated, when ,
irrigation canals, were hot maintained and land fell into /
disuse, Rostow/(72) : estimatedthat in 1.658,/there were
5.43 cultivated mou (73)/;per capita, deerea:si;ng;: to 2.49 /
in 1873. The disorders;affected social-life/iio;less.than
they affected the economic life.; peasants lost/their lands
to usurers and absentee,landlords, life in extended . .
families was maintained only by those who profited from
the /increasing pverty of others, even/nueleate^^faiiiilies
could hardly hold: together in times of famine. In those
conditions some of the /literati joined secret societies /V/;:
with an anti—Manchu character (74),, Thus^ the decaying .
dynasty became the target" for prpto-Ghinese nationalism,
who recalled/ that.- the /Gburt/were alien intruders. It is
estimated that the rebellions and famines of the second
half/bf ;the 19th/century ^ cost the/Ghinese 44 million lives
(75)> largely during the Taipihg:rebellion, • / The socio-
eepnomic disruptions in 19th centufy Ghlna,/created ,the
cohditions described; by many authors as the ’’push factor1
in Chinese emi gr at i o n. ■ '/■-./ y ■' \r
;//// The Manchu name has been linked in Ghinese history
wi th Opium . . , The/plague./of; smoking opium/began/at/ the end
of /the 17th century, .though the plant had been known as a
medicine centuries before (76);. ;"^ /When piracy/began
harassing the Chinese coasts, the Ghinese thems.elves began
/ cultivating the /plant,: but could not satisfy. local demand . _/
Europeans, Arabs, Ghinese and Indians indulged in the trade
v'y'; " M
'''^ br^ h^ -]d.eiiTXmeni^ of this"Chinese^ peoplei-^vik 1729,  ^an. ; %
imperial decree forbade the sale of opium arid in 1800, 
imporibtioh was prohibited;; (77) ^  ybt, the evil continued 
tb; iaffliet the Ohihese-in^Ohina; hs :well as ih : the-Han Yang.
: The inability of the Manchu to stop their officials from 
conniving; with opium traders and to check- smuggling also ; 
manifested the-.corruption of the;regime.
.•:V" 4- x x x  x x x
. hooking back on the development of relations between 
' vwiA/
GhinaN#m the Han Yang, as conceptually^ incorporated into 
the Ohinese:: World Q3?der, itseems that it underwent 
several phases. On the whole} China did not have a 
distinct expansionist intention of settlement* but rather 
at^  timesi showed some ir|iationallyHstrong interests in, or 
i ' ignorance of the region^^ luring the; Sha
periods, Southeast:;Asia, which had. not yet been subject to 
Indian influence, was a cultural ^ extension of tribal South s> 
Ghina. Ihis .seems to havb'been the period, i^en .heutero- 
lalayseamewith their superior material culture to 
displace the Proto-Malays from" thericher soils an^ihe 
.better c o a s t s 2 h e  limited power of the Chou and their 
interests in inland China did not produce maritime links 
of consequence with Coutheast Asia.
; Ch’ in Shih Hwang-ti was preoccupied with the area of 
the ,: and at this stage backward Southeast
Asia had no relations With;,China. (The Han invaded the Red.1 
River Be it a,, perhaps with" the intention of promoting 
settlement, but this process stopped when they!: encountered 
oppdsition. . flie Han could not or would not. deal with the 
state of Nan Chao, which from its position in Yunnan,
bio eked the; southward; land route to. India and to 
peninsular Southeast Asia. They may have maintained 
.tribute;, and trade/relatiohh^with thb' region which Implies 
that they Could he wall informed on developments, there. 
ihesey.sea ■expeditions were too costly as in return for 
:.Chinese gold and silk they brought back curios and rare 
amimals; btc> ( 78) ♦ 4, , . •*
4 ^ hepfiang improved onrthe H ^  achievementsin relations 
)with Southeast, Asia; 3?hey conquered the seafaring, Min Yueh,
; thussecuring an important coastal stretch intimes when 
Chinese shipping used to•hug the coasts.and they also 
traded with thePhilippines and; pacified Annam. The Yuan 
however, showed the most powerful Chinese interest and • 
intervention' .in the, region, "aggresively trying to impose the 
Chinese World: Order on it.. Its invasions into Peninsular 
Sputhe.ast Asia, shook Burma andVietnam and indirectly led 
' to t ^  of4the^.Ebmeis^ ;ahd'both vChampa ,hhd : Java. ;
were invaded-with the help of the-.,great Mongol, fleet. The 
failure to maintain the Chinese. becupation: Of Southeast 
Asia resulted directly from unsuccessful battles, but in 
^broadbr sense the entire Mongol effort in this, area seems 
irrational -in its conception., China had no need for 
. territorial expansion in those days, as population pressure. 
had not become a problem#and during Kubilai1s reign the 
state enjoyed internal economic -prosperityj conversely,
. Southeast Asia did.not constitute any threat to China, 
except perhaps by piracy. Ihe. Mongol war effort seems to 
ha,ve been wasted on reestablishing' trade and tributary 
..relations# a policy which was definitely irrational in terms
v of. cost efficiency. ■' - ■ -;^''4.#-- —
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theoretically, the nou"aggressive maritime 4
expeditions-of:; the Miag their growing trade with the
Nan yang4:;mi!ght|have dfvelbped" into' a Ghinese
4 monopolization;;:.pf the : tradb;with the. region* Muslim
traders hid; no; real power; to, hack them against such a
Ghinese hid, and the Portuguese were not to be seen in the
 ^area ahtil almo;st a century later# ® y  the Ming did not
engage in a maritime trade policy is a matter of .4.
speculation. # Ih seems however,, that’ China had no4similar
spice problem as Europe had in those, days, and that other
tropical prdduce/ alsoiwas marginal to its economy* In ahy
, event China' 'certainly did hot show any real knowledge o f
European; market demand before the arrival of the Portuguese
missionaries (79)# In the early 15th century(Ghina had not
yet experienced the population explosion of the 17th
century, and hence did not experience an acute need for,;.
emigration. Internal migration to South Ghina could: solve
the problems created by disorders and depression, whereas
in the 19th and XOth century, with all arable land
practically occupied, Only emigration could relieve the
population pressure! Ihe;BiLhg|hd^ver,; had at their
disposal enough people4toman; trading stations in Southeast
Asia without suffering, from;;ehrdnie man power shortage <
which bedevilled the Portuguese!;;4 By...turning inwards, China
c lost , its chance ■ to develop. as amaritime power , as a
monopoly of the trade with Southeast Asia, could; have.
initiated :reai-maritime developments and perhaps a will for
world exploration.
5c)
T lhe Ch'ing suffered from the maritime handicap . ; ' !
inherited from the Ming ari;liougli external trade was gradually 
developing (80). By the time of the Oh1ing ascentto power, 
the Spanish .and the Buteh had already heen established in u.
- the region*v/Their-navalsuperiority over, the Chinese 
in construction, gunnery, tactics aind navigation stemmed 
from their superior scientific knowledge, which^-fheChinese , 
ignored at their perii. :0?he Europeans, ^including the 
British, navigated through the South and.East China Seas, _- 
and challenged the Chinese belief of Yuan times that those 
iwere Gi£nese/-;.territori'al waters* . This,, was perhaps the 
firstfsueces^ful intervention of the West in Chinese . 
^political 'affairs^ which in-effect .did not seem to perturb 
the-Chinese Court,.; ;
Within the overall Chinese fraditionai view of the,;
7 wo^dtdfder (Si) (see map VBA)^ Southeast Asia whs divided 
.intothree 'Categories.; ^ ^re-suisably-.because of its 
7 proximity and'its related experience of Siniciaation,. the.
Red River Delta belonged to the Periphery like Korea, ; 
Manchuria and Mongolia for example*: Ihe rest .of peninsular 
■'Sou%heaBt;,^siaV‘-as^  ^ ell: as/'ndrtheas^ Sumatra, British •
Borneo;, and Palawan wereincluded- in the Inner Asian
: 2oneV pf which the Periphery formed part* They shared; the 
same status.as Bactria and sub-taiga Siberia, perhaps as 
; countries traditionally incorporated into the tribute 
system. The rest of Southeast Asia belonged to,;theOuter 
-Asidn>^one j "like. India for instance* This implies that v . 
status1 in the'hierarchy was'assigned less by the 
developmeht-ef the country,, and i|dre according to t proximity
and accessibility "to China*.'■;, Thetraditional frontiers/.
• Y-  /' Inwtr /.
of China were/ traded /between .the Iuomm and Outer Asian/
Zones, thus including the 'Straits of Malaeoa within them, ...
’.. and implying^.that/the South and East Ohina Seas y^ ere Y
considered as mare nostrumi (83)
* TIf'■ however, thd Chinese¥¥orld Order is a reality in ;
' the sehse that it may "become an ideology leading to f/■
pol^itldal and miiitary actionsthe Chine se may attempt to */-■ . ./Y
revive the claims to soyereignty pvet the/^ast and 5So;uth ", /?
China; seas, especially in view, ofthe possihi3f fy ihafY
important oil deposits may "be /found in^the continental..
shelves* Thus the Chinese World Order, though at present
:'a.;dprr^t; conception/ may he harnessed to a new Realpolitik* ;
if/step "by step China develops sufficient strength to give
:/.! effect to,;such a policy* She reeohquesf/of Tibet,-the V/:
border disputes with India and; the'/Soviet, Unibn■, as/Well as
implicit political/moves in ^ Southeast Asia and the Ryulcyus
mOy indicate such/tendencies (84) / Y-zYY’1 - 1/YY 1
Nationalism and Communism* . / . : Y  •
The profound cultura which China experibhced
, in - the iast^ i ^P ^ ars^^gradually introduced; the concept of
. '  Y Y  ' f; ; a./ -Y  - • - ' • • Y;'Y.-Y Y  VY- Y  . Y /
a=hation state as/value epramanding/a/high degree of
allegiance* In practice, this
t«ikerent ■/ y
. in thefamilial /and ; parochial levels were subject, Y / Y y
Y:; "Y/  fe riitr J / Y;Y
Y . more especially in tiiaes /of crisis» ■;to the y&gjballegiance. / // i 
" /■!/ Jrhe j 839-1894* period was/dharaeterrsed by. foreign-/ Y'/YY
Invasion and the formation of new Ideas in the minds .of Oh . Y-y / 
ever increasing number of politically award Chinese (85).
. This period maybe palled/the Hatbhing; Peripd as It
, pro due© ch the s oei o-e conomi e ./ eondi ti.bns/he ees sary for 
'mpdern^ nationalism * The period from 1895 to 1911 saw 
•progress m  revolutionary strength until the successful 
; revolution. The; internal disturbances and foreign // 
invasions' experienced during the days of the Republic^ 
and especially during the Kuo Min Tang (K.M.T.) rule, 
tended to decrease the unity of mind, which had been achieved 
before, hoyalty to. the nation-state:heOMned ds warlords; ,/ , 
and corrupt officials- exploited the: populationYiwho had Yi/
hoped, that the.change of regime would bring the end to 
socio-economic e vi 1 sii "/'Yy , ;
The.communist victory in 1949, perhaps did not
initially produce/more' posltive;p o pular sentiments than the
//usual at fhe/heginning' of a new dynastic cycle. But from 
Y-'';/'r ■sjwWfc/'.'Y ■/ -Y.Y/' ' /:,-/' k ’ • Y
/that timeNwt the countryah joyedpeaceand; unde rwent
substantial' socidieconomic developments//withln an 
atmosphere of intense party: ideological activities. -As a 
result, the great majority of the people harnessed themselves 
to/produce’ a wide/popular positive response, to a sacrifice 
demanding state-id©a. / ; ’ •
The Impact of the West. The economic deterioration which 
'‘“ItefftieleSYGhiiia before the .©piUm. War/did not essentially ■ 
differ from former periods of Waning dynastic power, and 
had/the West interfered not in Chinese affairs, the normal 
expectation would have been the ascent of a new dynasty. :
But^the seebnd half of? the 19th century was marked by an 
intense rural-ufban migration (86) which created a new. ; 
pro1etariat, 1argely underemployed,/ Which increasingly 
came Under the .spell of those literati^ well versed in
Y  Y Y .  " y  Y  ' . ; “ ’ y  Y ' Y "
, \v/r' • •: ■ '>•> :V, A’ .. < „ , - .. ’ ■ .
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modern social and p o l i t i c ? ^ ^ ’% e  ■ WestY " These - ' 
developments.exposed traditional Chinese customs to attack,, 
//and it.became clear; that traditional/superstitions^and Y 
cultural; stagnation could not match the rational
vigour -/of.the .material culture introduced :.hy. the West. As
a result, the new urbanites,/especially in the open ports 
of.Southeastern;China and the .lower Yangtze valley, became 
more, open to modern socio-economic ideas. The process was
naturally facilitated/by the. fact that many of the 
immigrants were uprooted from, their.Ytraditional familial Y 
setting and usually were young. . Y'*-'
( j) Bo j.lticalYBevelopmentsY it has been argued that 
"patriotic and loyal^evotion to the conception of an 
abstract sovereign state did not; exist until after the 
establishment of the Republic" (88). .This^  however, seems 
to overlook localized phenomena, which though largely 
.,^eiied'tiveyat;/ithe time, had important, influence on the ’ 
growth of Chinese -nationalism** The Boxer-Rebellion is a ; , , 
well knwwn example, • but even xenophobia and localized riots 
and strikes raanifested a sort of nationalist-devotion to 
the state. ,It must be remembered in this respect, that ; 
the. West penetrated China at a-time when socio-economic 
conditions were also causing growing: hatred against the
Manqhus, but that not until the first decade offthe 20th
• ' Y  & L /  ' sityn 7
century, /any alternative government -possible.,
The socio-economic changes in China must have ./• 
occurred without;the Courts Gomprehension. The self- ; 
impo bed ,Manchn; isolation from external affairs.. was. in a 
sense extended to internal matters at Ichst in respect Of
//'!=•
/pYli
: , . d
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modern social deTelopmenlis (89 ).
3-^ -P/^ heaty'cdf; opened five ports, from Canton
to Shanghai, to Europeantrade* and ceded Hong Eong to ■
/fclL© ^ritisfe.;later, low tariff schedules and extra- .
, te^itori^^ri^Hts were:Conceded.-to otHen Hu3?.opean .
./©ototr-ies,^ while .Christian missionaries received permission 
,:to^ fijeSwW^ .i^  the port cities and in the countryside, The 
concessions seemed-^  to . the Chinese unequal,: in the sense 
that they were extorted under' armed threats, yet, the 
Europeans deemed them insufficient. After the second Opium 
War (i856-186iO)ten new ports were opened in North China 
and on the Tangtsse, which., gave. the Europeans open access 
to; vast and densely populated: areas. .
Tha.two, waris lowered the prestige of China in : 
/iinthxnatipnal^ p^'olities,. andvihdirectly enabled the Russians 
to gain the Chinese territories north of the Amur and east . H  
of the Ussuri, while the prench :gained three provinces *of 
the; tributary Annanite^lands. They were followed by the 
Japanese,-, who,, having• defeated the Chinese in 1894., 'received 3 
.Taiwan, got ^ war indemnities and; established; the independence / 
of Korea, as well asVfavourabre.. trading-rights. it was 
/perhaps the Open Poor policy, Which regulated the spheres 
of;influence,tariffs:and trading rights/which saved the 
political integrity . .of China, though it continued to harm 1 
its economy (90). "■ ;/ . Vi . _ //. /-„/'-.y/
.. Thecontacts.with/ the Westaffected a wide range of 
social;classes in China." The least culturally affected/ 
i were the peasantry and/the' rural populatiQhii^gneral (911. 1
Urban- workers/were indirectly affected either by Chinese
•p\
... . ...j
: c / - ;
employers* wiio under European influenceintroduced 
Hipderh^ind;ustry intov:China,. dr by Chinese traders and '
, compradores./ /The' traders were swift* ir|^earning the 
.-mechanisms'of worldtrade, finance and shipping. Seme 
of the literati,. perhaps, through informal relations with 
Western diplomats, missionaries hr inteileciuais, 
acquired modern Western social, economic and political 
; ideas and organisation systems. The.political humiliation 
of China and/social unrest/ especially in the lower ,
*■' Yangtze and the Southeast, drove some intellectual; groups 
of provincial and national Significance to seek reform hy 
modernizing Ghina. The Japanese: model of their time,and 
^hina1 s past; cultural, grandeur suggested the feasibility . 
of that task. A group headed hy.the--Great Viceroy 
envisaged a technologically advanced China>loyal to the : 
dynasty’and to Confucianism. K!ang Yu Wei had a more 
"radioal/social and political phiioeophy” (92), hut. did - 
not/anticipate the abolition of the Court. vStnYat/Sehy " 
led a; republican movement, radical both in social and in ' 
political; ideas. - . . ' / /
■■; The/Court- in ignorance. or; contempt of the changes 1 
in the Chinese urban society and of the power of the West, 
suppressed the reformers and let loose the Boxers (93)>
; only to suffer more humiliation and more European 1 ;
penetration. Its .inability to unite the Chinese, who 
basically hated thh Westerners, spelt, itj,doom./;/:.
/(ii) Cultural Development, . Of all the.. Europeans, ? 
the missionaries had the most profound contacts and 
/knowledge >of the Chinese .and /|helr:.hulfure (94) . -
Nevertheless, European merchants, soldiers, and diplomats, 
though usually.leading - a segregated life, :brought about a- 
more -intense change in the Chinese culture, firstly-by/, 
rOpresehtihg the Westerner in his imperialist, attire, and ,v‘ 
secondly by ; actually 'thrusting Western material culture 
and custom's upon the Chinese mind. .
; :'%$?; Anti-foreignism, whether conscious or unconscious in , . 
attitude, and implicit or explicit in behaviour, immediately 
unified the Chinese in-group in--a: .political cdntext.
Another response to the Western impact, when particularized, ; 
produced the; following/reactions: emulation, rejection or 
. adaptation, sometimes distinctly separated, sometimes / 
interwoven. ‘ /";■
r/ Emulation befits the Chinese reaction to Western . 
technology,;commerce, finance,.weaponry, tactics: and 
communications system, Chinese men of action in those fields' 
responded to European initiative by a similar reaction. 
Officials, the military, scientists and|bhe private , 
entrepreneur as.well a^ the: factory worker represented the 
group who emulated the European material culture. . Their 
acquisition of hew skills and changes in attitudes brought 
about.the development of the Chinese railway system, port, 
facilities, industrialization in the larger cities and tbe 
modernization of the armed forces.-
Rejection in an extreme form was the reaction of small 
circles: cf, zealots,; but in addition a;ima:eh largeh part: of . : 
the population, rural and urban, practised it to a more 
limited extent. The former manifested their attitude in 
The Boxer Rebellion, and ih the spectacular purchase for:
its- destrufetioh;:of the first railway from Shanghai to 
Wusung;(95). Moreover,^ .the/V&t. majority of %he population^ 
who came to Imow the work of the-missionaries .totally, 
rejected their teachings, feeling' that their own beliefs, 
were superior to those \of the Westerners,
Adaptation/mainly concerned the political, social and 
economic .ideas of the Westv /Whereas technologies ^ and 
scientific knowledge had .to be copied,: social Ideologies 
had to be adapted. Modern ideas of democracy, social 
organizatidn and their underlying:; economic base became 
known to active groups of reformers. Though they were not 
incorporated into .ideologies before the early decades of the 
20th.century, they gave rise to discussions, enriched 
thinking and educated a new intellectual elite.
Imported foreign-made manufactured, goods and also the 
products of the new industries in Shanghai and;other cities • 
buimarkefed the traditional cottage industries and so 
increased rural poverty. Modern Western transportation 
coastal* riverine, and overland •reduced;Chinese owned companies' 
to secondary roles. -Foreign owned companies in services and ; 
manufacturing were net bound by restrictions against 
remitting profits abroad, while foreign.investment in general 
' kept/pouring -in (96). And it goes without saying that the • 
Westerners monopolized both the import and export trade.
The Gourt of Japan, in /Contradistinction to that of
Ghina understood the importance of and favoured^ economic
modernization. Since 1868 the former had- invested state 
capital in /building the basic 'infrastructure (97), while
the latter, in general, neither invested nor fostered
private capital investment. -In particular, the nascent 
Chinese capitalism did not get any protection from the 
government of the Manehu (98), hut it should he noticed 
that the West put much more military pressure on China than 
on Japan. It thus happened that in 1887, out of a total 
budget of 25*5 million taels the Chinese allocated 18.7 
million to military purposes (99).
-During the late Manchu period the reformists strongly 
opposed the traditional education system with its complicated 
examinations based on historical texts (100), In 1905/6 the 
examinations for officials were abolished (101), and in 1910 
there were already 52,000 modern schools with 1.6 million 
pupils (102).
Thus, China underwent the 19,11 revolution when a 
considerable number of its intelligentsia, urban 
businessmen, and proletariat had already been influenced by 
the West. Moreover, those emigrating to the Nan Yang during 
that period, though most non intellectuals, usually belonged 
to the group thus influenced.
Nationalism under the Kuo Min Tang. As European books on the 
social' sciences: were translated into Chinese by the end of the 
19th century, and young Chinese meanwhile went to study abroad, 
the radical intellectuals extended their ranks. New ways of 
organizing mass movements in political parties became 
known and popular support increased. This support came 
from urban workers rather than from rural areas, and was 
primarily based on the cities of the Southeast and the 
Lower Yangtze (103). These cities,.in effect, secondary
cultural nodes, constituted traditional centres of anti— 
Manchu activity, while the cultural core area in the 
North, and especially .Peking were traditionally pro- 
Manchu. • /'
Sun Yat Sen*s importance as an ideologist exceeded 
his achievements in actual leadership. Besides European 
political. thought, including,Marxism and Communism, he 
.was; deeply influenced by Japanese modernization and by 
their victory over the Russians. This proved that the 
Europeans were not invincible and that Asians could be 
■ more than a match for. them,' given material means (104) *.
He saw in the European intervention in China an evil no 
less dangerous than the Manchu Court itself. Expulsion 
of the Europeans wasessential for reasons of national 
pride as well as for protecting the embryonic Chinese 
industry..
The Three Principles became the official ideology 
of the K.M.T. and after its access to power, it 
.promulgated this ideology,by propaganda and the school 
curriculum both in China and. among the. Chinese communities 
abroad (105)*
According to Sun Yat Sen, the first principle, namely
Nationalism, was non-existent in China. Its absence
resulted from the Confucian tradition which did not
approach problems practically in a modern politico-
economic setting. However, Sun Yat Sen revered the .
; teachings of the ancients and-believed that 11 Chinese
nationalism; had to be based on the/old morality of China1
(106)* The Chinese constituted a race but not a nation
VUjeira boiuvd by . '
a s . . k i n s h i p ,  common language aiid livelihood, 
common 'religion, and: habits (107), but their loyalties, 
ended- at the f amily and: elan levels (108)., Thus the 
'.Chinese people- were in/Ranger of being assimilated by the 
industrialized countries* whieh not only had a higher 
population, growth fate* but also exerted a stranglehold 
upon the Ohinese .economyV Sun.Yat Sen* s conjuring up of 
a White. Pepil (109.) added -a new- dimension to the 
anti-foreignism of the Chinese (110).
/ Democracy was the second; principle of-Sun Yat Sen, 
According to him it had existed in ancient China (111) and 
meant^ahVegalitarian social system. In contemporary China, 
the/llaheku government showed no interest in the welfare •.* 
of the whole nation,: favouring a small elite group at the 
expehse of the majority. Sun Yat Sen1s criticism of 
Western democracy suggests; that he regarded the second 
principle as subordinate to the first (112)', This may have 
meant that a , strong government had to be involved i n ! 
people1 s affairs,;.and that lidiyidual rights were secondary 
to those of the state. This outlook of Sun Yat Sen is not 
at dll surprising, if one takes into account the influence 
of Marxism-Leninism on the several stages of his political 
thought (113}. His division of people into three 
intelligence and/papability categories, namely: -"discoverers
yprbmoterst .and "operators" (114), sharply contrasts with;; 
Western democratic thought,. and^anticipates perhaps a
hierarchy' - © f ;.party y lead-er s functionaries or cadres, and the
common people (115) ♦/
. : His fhird principle* Livelihood, represented the ! /
material basis of the Chinese; nation state. To realize 
•this*would involve land reform and the regulation of 
capital, "nationalization of transportations and 
edmmunications, direct taxation or income tax and 
socialized distributioip or cooperative societies" '(116).-'
:Livelihood was to he achieved hy evolution and: peaceful 
methods, for Sun fat Sen rejected the Marxist class struggle 
as "pathologi eal11: (117).
The revolution broke out on the 10th of Cx&jber 1911. 
in Wuhan* and provincial capitals followed suit declaring 
their, own independent republics. On the 1st of January 
1912 Sun Yat Sen was proclaimed president of the provisional 
Chinese republic with its headquarters in Nanking. But in 
order to prevent a threatened political cleavage between 
North and. South, Sun Yat Sen resigned- his presidency in 
favour of the traditionalist/Yuan Shi Kai, who had little ; 
sympathy for the ideas of the republic and aspired to found 
a hew dynasty of his. own. Thus in 1917 Sun Yat -Sen set up 
the first of a series-of rival, governments in Canton, as 
far/as possible from Peking, yet in a position to command 
a widely developed rural area, and in close contact with 
Hong /Kong and the Nan Yang; fro#-where material support 
could be raised. Thereafter^ the cleavage between Peking, 
the/bastion of the former Manchu/regime, and Canton, the 
centre of the radicals, increased.
While the government, in the North was preoccupied 
with. warlor,dism and f actionalism the K.M.T;/in the. South - 
began to create a modern army under Chiang Kai Shek, which 
eventually advanced northwards'to capture Wuhan and Nanking,
controlling the main Yangtze lowlands. However, within 
the KiM.T,, perhaps under the influence: of Russian'
communist advisers and Chinese officers returning from 
studies in the U.S.S.R., a communist left wing was 
organized in the early 1920* s... Chiang. Kai, Shek, who 
. meanwhile succeeded Cun Yat;Sen (118), purged the,£,M*T. 
from the communists by a bloody massacre in 1927, and 
after, continuing: his-military advance to Peking in 1928 , 
formally inaugurated a new National Government at Nanking 
on the 10th October 1928, Although in a superficial sense 
the unity of China had thus been, restored, personal 
rivalries, warlordism, and the deep enmity .between the 
K.M.T, and the Communists continued.
/ ^  Between 1927 and 1937, the-government was increasingly , 
pr'eoccupied 'on several-fronts. While it Continued to oppose 
Ithe 'Communists, the .Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931* 
Although some economic progress Was achieved during., that 
decade, an enormous army had been mobilized to fight the 
warlords, Japanese, and the communists. This strained the 
economy of China; but, the loss, of; Manchuria with-its heavy 
industrial resources was a national disaster of the first 
magnitude .<6-) ■"/
<6->:Belatedly..the K,M.T.' and ;the communists united in the: 
Anti^Japanese Erpnt in 1937, but could do practically 
no thing ag ains t a/d ap ane & e s u p  eri or i ty in armament, mil i t ary 
skill/and organization, and" but. for the outbreak of W.W.XI 
and the Allied defeat of Japan in 1945, Ghina would have, 
remained part of the Greater East Asian Co Prosperity Sphere
While during the radicals* struggle against the Manchu,
the Nan Yang ; Chinese as a\tUAW» supported the former, not 
the least as a result of the. geographical origin: of that 
movera.eht, whieh conformedvwith the parochial loyalties of 
the emigrant communitie s the K.M.T. .-f' Communist
struggle polltieally divided these communities. By the 
19 20 s nationalism had already absorbed the minds of many of 
the Nan Yang Chinese, but class differentiation which 
generally occurred in their countries of*residence, made 
•thetf^experiene'e'-adme-1 faeebs. of that crucial struggle. 
However, they tightened their racks again in 1937, when the 
Anti-Japanese Front-was- created and supported China by 
ihcreased fihaneial contributions and.by boycotts,of 
Japanese goods,
After W',W,IX, the K,M*T, government returned to the : 
better part of China including Manchuria, when both itself 
and'the Communists were engaged in a scramble for territory. 
However, since 1947, when open war between them broke out, 
the K.M.T.. lost entire armies and provinces almost at a 
stroke, and at Peking on the first of October 1949, the 
Communists proclaimed the establishment o f ,the Chinese 
PeopieV Republic,.
Ap: / .The basic socio-economic evils which had plagued 19th 
century:' China, /cbuld not be got rid of during the 
rule. Landlordism (119), high land rents (120) and the 
small size of holdings (121) aggravated the :
situation of the peasants. Military campaigns, banditry 
bver-taxation and the eorruption of officials could reduce 
entire districts to. sub-subsistence level, at least / 
temporarily. The K;M.T. could never implement-its promises
of land reform. In the first place, /large rural tracts 
were excluded fromi its effective control, being under 
communist rule (122) or under warlords,. In the .second 
place,.the revlutionary zeal of the K.M.T, officials; seems 
to have relaxed after the K*1.T.. gained control of Hthe~ 
.government-, Following the/T3iree,'lrinciples, -^ they- did 
not practise class Struggley./^duas- many of their officials 
origihated from the.wealthier classes, they had little / 
interest in capital redistributioh. In addition, the 
K.M.T. faced the Japanese Invasion and they uould not 
/afford to. creafe a further split in Chinese society.
Perhaps .ai«p^th#Jr/'imderestiinat;ed:the value of. peasants1*' 
support/ having; made their revolution mainly in the urban 
areas of the Southeast and the centre.
Migration from the countryside to the towns must have/. 
*• continued under both the Tuan Shih. Kai republic and under , 
‘the K.M.T., as thejtural areas continued to be plagued by 
/warfare of one kind or another. This and the shift from / 
craftsmanship to industrial production changed the social 
- structure of Chinese society. * /’feen/, education, be came more : 
modernized /and 'propaganda more efficient, changes in 
values also occurred. Craft guilds, secret and religious 
societies and clan associations gave place to, modern 
voluntary associations of trade unions/ political, parties, 
and students r.-associations; As a/result of .population 
mdvemehts^Into the urban sector, traditional values became 
less/operative in individdai and group behaviour,; and 
modern values and ideologies took their place• Aati- 
/impefialism, .communism,/and,nationalism became slogans of
workers: and. students, who manifested their new. values by 
participation in actual combat, riots and Strikes.
The introduction of .Pai Hua (123) into, literature '
and Kuo Yu (124) as a common spoken language improved 
communication among the youth of various provinces. The 
modernization, of the media and of the transportation 
system brought the voice of nationalism to remote parts x ;
of China, and more people into the centres of cultural 
change. In the 1920s nationalism affected almost every 
household, in/China. ,
Women, though relatively, inactive politically* gained 
from the eollapse of the,rigid traditional laws and customs. 
The civil code of 1931 stated that fa male heir was. no 
longer a vital necessity to .the family" and marriage 
required .the consent of both partners. The emancipation 
of women was a spectacular aspect of China* s social 
modernization/ /Although it only marginally affected the 
/Ghinese-overseas oommuhities, which did not I experience the 
process of modernization taking place in China
itself,, the Chinese emigrants of the.1920s and 1930s had 
all Come under its influence. , .
In striking contrast to the almost total lack of 
interest shown under the-Manchu regime, the new Republic 
sought to establish cjtfontacts with the Overseas Chinese, and
in particular with 'thoseof the an Yang. The almost 
complete diplomatic introversion:of the Manchus was replaced 
under the5Republic by active diplomatic end consular 
relations, a process whose origins can be traced to the 
; radieais* and. reformists* ,indoctrination and fund raising
missions of the early ,i9p0s. later, when financial and 
moral support from - the N a n ;Yang, combined with, remittances 
bn a familial basis, enabled;the Ghinese government to 
b alahce its trade deficit, Chine seconsulate s and 
government officials actively influenced overseas K.M.T. 
branches an^bhe Chinese education system in the countries 
concerned^. J/Assimilation of the Chinese commimities would- , 
■have served Chinais interests badly. The.split between* 
communists and K.M.T. supporters in China was faithfully’ 
reflected: in the Nan-Yang, and the Chinese" government, 
anxious to maintain the inflow, of foreign-currency from the 
communities abroad,.tried hard to maintain K.M.T. leadership 
in them. . ;To- this effect,. the. IC.M.T. government had to, 
restrain its, extreme anti-impprialist propaganda, and in 
1.932, following protests from the. British, the Chinese 
authorities supplied special text-books: to the ,Chinese 
schools in Malaya and the Straits Settlements, from which, 
anti-imperialist propaganda,; formerly included, had been , 
removed. Moreover, in its concern to maintain the inflow 
of remittances to Itselfand to decrease the communists1 
possibility, to raise funds,/the Chinese’ government 
collaborated with the British in Hong Kong against communist 
agitators.' '
Nevertheless, this reduction in anti-imperialist 
propaganda did'not the Chinese government's claim
of spyereignty over the Chinese communities in the Nan Y.angji.
they/Still maintained, their jus-sanguinis citizenship laws,
yjxiloc&Vfek
and: had a specified number.'of seats in the pariiamen¥]for 
Overseas; Chinese;(125)* ^Unofficially the Chinese government
also; sponsored any Chinese: activities in the Nan. Yang^which : 
increased Chinese awareness/and"/eonfrdntatloh with the 
imperialists, so long as this did not threaten the flow of ,, 
remittances;, in this context it:sometimes unofficially 
referred: to some;countries;in the Nan-Yang as .tributaries, 
perhaps trying to instil hopes in-the, Chinese communities 
1 spec if ic ally in Malaya 'and the Straits Settlements.
/'/:• The geographical pattern/of the struggle between the
Manchu, the K.M.T., ind the..Communists,, eaoh representing 
an ideological sub-culture endeavouring to spread over the 
ehti^^.euitur^-.area. of China by ahhihilating its opponents, 
was closely linked with extending intensive control .‘over a 
signrficanf Guitural region as a preliminary base for later' 
expansion (} 26)/. ; /
The cultural core area of the Manchu, :like those of the ;
lihgv and . the Yuan; was Peking and depended on the lower 
Hwang-Ho as a food producing area, although in, density; of ■;
population and in agricultural and;later^in industrial 
production theYangtze lowlands constituted the major 
productive area of China.. Distance and absence of 
geographical: obstacles ia'a&e- both>the' lower Yangtze and the 
lcwer Hwang-Ho basins almost inseparable although 1 '
climatically: they were two significant entities * However, 
the, remote:and relatively secluded Hsi-kiang and Pearl River
lowlands in the vicinity of Cantbh constituted, an isolated 
eultura^zone (127). This made it a traditional centre of
antirManehu movements, as were the port cities of Fukien.
The impact of the West differentially .affected these distinct/
cultural regions of Ghina in time and in mode of influence,
and thus sharpened the differences between them.
Kwangtung and Fukien felt the influence of the. West first, 
mainly as a result of commercial activities. Second, in that 
respect, came the lower. Yangtze basin in association with 
the modernization of transport, industry and commerce, and 
lastly the northern eentres of Peking and Tientsin were 
affected mainly in the form of commerce and diplomatic 
relations. Meanwhile, towards the end of the 19th century, 
the Russians began industrializing.south Manchuria, but 
were replaced in this^as in', other respects^by the Japanese 
early in the 20th century, thus creating an additional 
distinct cultural region.
As the moderate- reformers, had no intention to topple 
the regime by force, they did not need a specific cultural 
region as a base to mobilize an army, and thus they mainly 
operated in the cultural core area of Peking. Conversely, 
the radicals needed a secure base as an ‘‘hatching area*’ for 
future military activities, The choice of the Hsi-Kiang 
and Pearl River region seemed natural for its distance, 
difficult approach overland in relation to the naval 
weakness of the Manchu, the political attitude of the 
population as well as. for its excellent links with Hong Kong 
and the Han Yang communities (128). The radicals, having 
built up their strength, emulated the first strategic 
movement of the Taiping rebels by moving north and capturing 
the Yangtze basin. Although because of its proximity to 
the Manchu (and later, to the Yuan Shi Kai Government) core 
area and its lack of natural defences, the Yangtze basin 
could not have served as a “hatching centre’1, it was in fact
the main source of China1 s livelihood and the river was a 
vital artery connecting the Szechwan basin to the sea. The 
importance of the Yangtze basin was further enhanced with 
the development of modern industry, and after the creation 
of the Nanking government in 1928, the Yangtze basin became 
the core area of K.M.T. China, Chiang1s choice of Nanking 
as capital was determined, among other factors (129), by its 
central position, not too close to the Japanese in Liaotung 
and not too far from the Communist centre in the mountains 
of Hunan and Kiangsi,
Despite its control over the geographical core area 
of China i.e. the Yangtze basin, the K.M.T. regime did not 
achieve lasting success. In .brief it was faced with a 
combination of problems which it proved unable to solve. The 
K.M.T. failure to tackle the socio-economic problems of China 
undermined its political appeal. In additiion, it was under 
constant and heavy pressure from the Japanese, and also from '■ 
the communists in China, who claimed to offer drastic 
solutions to China*s socio-economic’problems (130). The 
K.M.T. failure to solve China*s problems involved two more 
shifts of their political centre from the geographical centre 
of China, The first, under Japanese pressure/ was into the 
Szechwan basin, and the second, under Communist pressure, was 
from the mainland into Taiwan, The Szechwan basinflike the 
Canton region^ offered an agricultural area encircled by 
natural defences. But in view .of the Japanese naval superiority, 
Canton was deemed unsuitable. On the other hand, the choice 
of Taiwan was governed by considerations of Communist naval 
inferiority.(131). Both the Szechwan and Taiwan bases were 
considered by the K.M.T. as "hatching areas" for a future
recapture of China. - ,
The Emergence :of Communist China, The Chinese Communist
*
Party (G.G.P.) claimed to be the sole legitimate heirs of 
Sun Yat Sen's K.M.T., which, as noted, was politically 
advised by Soviet experts. After the expulsion of the 
communists from the K.M.T. they had to reorganise from 
scratch, not unlike the beginning of Sun Yat Sen's government 
in Canton. Their "hatching area"sin the mountains of Hunan 
and Kiangsi, though the best available, was far from ideal.
It was too close to the K.M.T. bases in the Yangtze lowlands 
and too. far from the TJ.S.S.R. borders through which arms 
could be brought in. The Long March to the North'West 
brought the communists to a better base, centred around 
Yenan. After W.W.II, the Communists, outmanoeuvred the K.M.T. 
•— -partly with Russian help — but not before long^ the first 
signs of political friction between China and ..the Soviet 
Union appeared, although their common ideological and 
political affiliation seemed strong as ev*er before.
(i) Political and Economic Development. The Chinese 
Communist state, proved stronger and less amenable, than 
European satellites of the TJ.S.S.R., Instead, it emphasized 
the Chinese nature of its revolution and refused to accept. 
Russian hegemony ove^he Communist, World (132)* This 
presumably resulted from the Chinese achievement in defending 
and administering their base in Yenan, which they did 
practically without foreign aid, and from their success in 
routing the K.M.T. as well as their performance In the 
Korean War. Their administration of the,1 Yenan base made the 
standard of living in this area, not worse than in 
government-held areas during the 1930s and 1940s, According
to Communist sources, the C.C.P.-controlled areas 
contained 83 million people in 1944/45. (These areas were 
less rewarding than the government held Szechwan "basin,
"but observers agreed that inflation in them was less 
rampant than in Chungking, and that the leadership showed 
more dedication and evoked in return popular solidarity
(133). In addition, by 1949, the C.C,P. survived almost 30 
years of intra-party struggle from which it emerged more 
cohesive than ever under the leadership of Mao (Tze Tung (134) 
Even before 1949, the G.C.P. had some reasons for 
suspecting the goodwill of, and cooperation from the Soviet 
Union. .If Russian pressure on the G.C.P. to avoid 
attacking the Japanese in 1944/45 was perhaps justified for 
strategic reasons, Stalin*s suggestion in 1948, that the 
Chinese Red Army should consolidate on the Yangtze line 
before attacking South China (135), must have seemed a 
transparent move to establish a division of China by 
allowing Chiang to regroup behind the river. However, 
between 1949 and 1960 China seemed an integral part of the 
Communist Bloc. It supported the Soviet global policy by 
intervening in Korea and South Vietnam, and this attitude 
was reinforced; by renewed political introversion resulting 
partly from the American inspired diplomatic boycott of 
China, and from the American policy of "containing China". 
During this period of isolation,.China regained Tibet, 
presumably because it considered the latter as a territory
»h«ty
traditionally belonging to WWiiia, and severed its 
relations with India because of borderline disputes 
indicating that the C.C.P. followed the K.M.T. policy of ,
non recognition of territorial arrangements concluded 
under Unequal Treaties, Although'the Bandung Conference - 
constituted an interlude in China’s isolation hy seeking 
international cooperation mainly in Southeast Asia, China 
indulged itself even further in political isolation when 
its relation^with the Soviet Union deteriorated in 1957 
(though it became known only in 1960), A Soviet refusal 
to supply, or aid in developing, an independent Chinese 
nuclear arsenal seems to have been the main reason.
In its extreme isolation, Chinese Communism seems to
have been alternately: dominated by two main political force
namely, leftists and rightists. The former, driven by
spiritual zeal, tried to brush off economic laws and
political realities, when they tried to turn mass labour
into capital at a stroke during the Great Leap Forward
(G.L.F.) period, or when they made a bid to evoke
revolutionary agitation among the Nan Yang Chinese during
the Cultural Revolution (.436). The rightists demonstrated
a more balanced approach to internal economic problems and
to world politics as well as to the Overseas Chinese (137).
But however unstable the period of 1957-1973 was, toward
the end of it; China emerged.as a World Power. In 1964 it
joined the nuclear club, and in 1967 — * the "thermo-nuclear
blub" (138), and having abandoned its policy of
isolationism after the.Cultural Revolution, it replaced
Taiwan in the U.N.O., extended its diplomatic relations^.
and most important of all improved its relations with the / *
U.S.A.
it is doubtful whether this change of policy by China
lias erased its image as an expansionist power of invading 
hordes or by subversive ideology, in the eyes of the 
Southeast Asian.peoples and governments (139)- But tlie 
Nan Yang Chinese of all political shades have generally 
relished the growth of China* s prestige as it has been 
accrediting the whole Chinese cultural group (140).
Not unlike its political prestige, the economic 
progress of China has been inconsistent.in trend as a 
result of the leftist-rightist confrontation (141), but its 
overall achievements seem to lag behind its political, 
perf ormance* lanl reform and later collectivization (142) 
culminated in the creation of the communes (143). Although 
they did not totally solve the pressing agricultural 
problems of China, they increased food production, 
equalized its consumption and, produced surplus for industrial 
development (144)* The growth in industrial production was 
more spectacular than that of the agricultural sector. Iron, 
steel, coal, cement, paper and in fact all other economic 
products significantly rose.in output (145), and this was 
achieved with a growing output per capita, as the increase 
in average wage per worker has proved.. Also, government 
control slowed down price rises (146).
Industrial, hut mainly agricultural production suffered
considerable setbacks during the](c.Ii.F.) period, and
presumably during the Cultural revolution as well. The Three
Bitter Years which followed the G-.L.P. may have been an
official word coinage designated to put the blame of the. 
economic flop on a climatic force majeure. Only in 1965*
the net domestic product per capita regained the level of
1957 (147), after the "rightistbureaucracy" had taken 
over control from Mao (148).
As the massive expatriation of Chinese nationals 
from Indonesia painfully took plade during the Three Bitter 
Years, this did not tend to improve the image of China 
among the Nan Yang;Chinese, and it is doubtful whether 
China will be in a position to take in any more Chinese 
refugees, or whether these refugees will choose China but 
for the extreme cases involving life and death situations.
(ii) Cultural Bevelopments. The G.C.P. inherited from 
the K.M.T. Republic.a Chinese society whose family* clan 
and speech group loyalties must have grown in frustration 
of the soeio-eeohomic failures of the K.M.T.. This 
growing solidarity within traditional, groupings, inasmuch 
as it decreased allegiance to the state or increased 
inter-group pugnacity, had to be supplanted by the 
Communist state idea (149).
One of the main features of China*s state-idea, as 
in most of the communist countries, has been a strong 
demand for personal sacrifices for the state*s benefit. It 
has mainly materialized in demand for high production and 
low personal consumption for state-owned capital creation. 
The communists have instilled this state-idea by three major 
agents: cadres* personal example, the propaganda system, 
and formal education.
While the literati officials of the Manchu period and 
K.M.T. cadres of Chiang*s Republic were involved in 
cheating in examinations, buying official posts, 
nepotism and illegal wealth accumulation (150) thus abusing
tlie state-idea- of the Republic period, the Communists 
introduced a new leadership at all levels of society, which 
was almost completely non*corrupt. .These communist cadres 
came from a non ’’bourgeois’* origin, which increased their 
loyalty to the .state and their credibility in the eyes of 
the people. Since 1935, when lao suppressed factionalism 
and Oommintern manipulations inside the party, they all 
were of one mind as regards their loyalties to the state
(151), and would follow party directives without a second 
thought (152). Even the rightist-leftist controversy, which 
must have affected their ranks, did not corrupt them. To 
guard, against human laxity, commune cadres had to perform 
manual work in the field for 60-120 days a year (153), and 
university staff and students likewise had to do manual 
work.
Perhaps the best known propaganda means have been the
ubiquitous loudspeakers and slogan posters in China, but
the media was no less effective. Yet, propaganda was
hammered in also in small group meetings where face-to-face
relations were intended to achieve ’’automatic reconciliation
with the collective spirit’* (154). More violent means of
propaganda presumably also- existed, as already-in 1942 lao
had laid down instructions for terrorizing ideological
recalcitrants by shouting and frightening (155). This was
extensively practised during the early days of the Cultural
Revolution, when millions of youths rOamed; the country and
clashed with the army and party cadres eventually turning
the political tide in Mao’s favour. But excessive
propaganda must have .created some disbelief of charismatic 
l e a d e r s h i p  in the'eyes of the people, who at present
seem to be more inclined to accept pragmatic administration 
rather than a fanatic messiah (156).
. Cadres* devotion and constant propaganda are a common 
characteristic of communist leadership and especially among 
the Chinese communists of the Ian Yang. The prolonged and 
stubborn guerrilla activities in border regions of Malaysia 
and Thailand and the continued existence of clandestine 
urban communist groups, may be explained in part by the
qualityiof their leadership. It has been known that China 
used to train picked up Chinese and other Southeast Asian 
communists (157), and also used to'recruit communist 
activists from the Ian Yang students who had come to China
for studies. Some communist Chinese of the Ian Yang 
countries have infiltrated official Chinese organizations in 
their countries, but while this in itself is not sufficient 
to subvert entire organizations, it may keep alive a 
communist element in many Chinese key organizations..
An education system existed in Communist held territories 
since 1934, its primary role being political indoctrination 
(158). Since 1951, the Gommunists geared the education 
system towards production and ’’unity of theory and practice”. 
This required that indoctrination prevail over individual 
thought as regards many fields of study, and stressed that 
education existed ”to perpetuate the State, and serve the.
State policy” (159).
20th century modernizing China was supposed to have been
faced with linguistic difficulties in tackling technological
and scientific problems. It was said that traditional 
Chinese thinkers were satisfied with a language more powerful
in orientating action.than it was capable, of,formulating 
concepts and'theories (160).: As late as 1936, .doubts were
expressed,: regarding that alleged inadequacy," and therefore 
it was ' suggested that the Chinese learn Western .science , 
in European languages(1.61)* In that same'year Chinese 
universities had been already teaching modern science for■ 
years, proving the .linguistic adaptability o f : the .Chinese 
language., flie communists; extended .technical and 
scientific studies seemingly without encountering1 - 
insurmountable difficulties* But; the .Communists attachment 
to the Chinese script may seem anachronistic, in view of their 
genefal deprecatory attitude' towards traditional- customs 
and cultural patterns through their ^uest economic 
efficiency (162). Rftmanization or Cyrillication;of the 
Chinese written language would have shortened considerably 
the necessary period, to become literate, and would have 
brought about other advantages. Iriifact, the^ Communists had ; 
some intentions .to that effect but seem to have put them, 
off. Ihe main reason seems to have been certain difficulties 
in written communication among the differeht dialect groups 
inside and: outside China (163). Romanization in China 
would- certainly leave the Chinese deprived of a; persistent 
cultural pattern, which seems to -have . been a major factor 
in bringing about the solidarity of the Chinese cultural /. 
group inside China and abroad* . . / . .
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PART, TWO: 4 THE: B ACKG-RQIINI) M D  ; THE SQEHE. t
Ancient Cultures. -f '
•    .
^Borders encapsulate social groups with highly diverse 
primordial sentiments (1)fr seems a good qualifying phrase 
for physiographical and human conditions in Southeast Asia 
before its urban development. Compared with. China, the 
region has he eh- largely culturally fragmented throughout 
its history, and not unlike Europe, developed around ; \
s ep ar at e cul tur al: hd de s * Ag ain, compar ed wi th Chin a1 s 
history, ;Sputheast Asia is young in' human achievement; 
therefore^, centripetal as well as centrifugal socio-political 
forces still operate within its sub-regional areas and 
within its states. However, justification,' for generalising 
on such a Vast and versatile; area has been academically and. 
practically1 justified (2).
The Physiographical Setting, location and land - sea 
configuration endowed Southeast Asia with the control of 
the southern land-route and the maritime route between the 
Chinese and Indian: culture areas (see map AWL) . The region 
thus became centrally located in a sense opposite to that 
of the central location of China (3), because as a maxifeime 
route nexus, Southeast Asia1 s cultural nodes were 
influenced by the cultures of the penetrating seafarers, 
while China1s central location on land was related to its 
geographical isolation as a cultural area., : ;-:
The geomorphology of peninsular Southeast Asia has 
been dominated by the north-south foldings of Burma, Yunnan>
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the Malay Peninsula and Indo-Ghxna, which directed major , 
rivers to the shores of the region. These rivers carried 
heavy loads of silt to produce the great productive river 
plains and deltas of the region (4), and the process of 
silting is still, active in pelagian Southeast Asia as well.
This i;J in part due to the shallow waters covering the 
extensive continental shelf between Java and peninsular 
Southeast Asia. The Mesosoic foldings of Malaysia have lost 
much of their original prominence, while the Tertiary- 
Quaternary foldings of the Archipelago (and also the volcanoes) 
have not "been subdued to the same degree. It is worthwhile 
to note, that during the Pleistocene glacials large parts of 
the Southeast Asian continental shelf were traversible on 
foot. Also in connection with the continental shelf, vast 
coastal swamps have been created mainly in pelagian Southeast; 
Asia, which deny dense settlement: of those areas (5)> and 
exclude large stretches of coasts from being suitable for 
ports. -.
In. most generalized terms, the climate of the area, 
excluding very high ground, permits minimum clothing 
throughout the/year. /Sheltering from rain is ubiquitously 
necessary and/on low ground also from seasonal flooding.
With the exception of the 11 dry zones11 of Burma and Thailand, 
forests and undergrowth respond vigorously to climatic 
conditions, forcing, the ancient organized states of Indian 
cultural influence to seek location where vegetation was 
less profuse (6). In the wet areas, secondary bushes and 
low trees rapidly follow the cutting down of primary forests;, 
both these vegetation- types, however, constitute a difficult. ■
barrier to communications, sometimes more than relief 
itself (7). 01 imat e al so intiie si f i e s chemic al d e comp o sit ion
and increases leaching to render most of the asoils in the 
area poor in agricultural quality. However, river-plain 
consistent alluvium and neutral or basic volcanic soils 
are fertile and suitable for wet rice cultivation. People 
haver sought after these soils which location determined 
human settlement' distribution (8).' A wide river mouth 
opening into deep waters,
. J 2 I M M C i n  most cases closely linked with an
agricultural hinterland, provided conditions for the
development of cities. In fact, the five 11 one million 
t, odt>
cities of Southeast. Asia in 1950 were fports (9). Olimate
have affected, cultural; life as well, as hot and humid
air certainly affect physical and perhaps also mental 
performances (10), A low probability of climatic 
catastrophes renders reserve accumulation almost.unnecessary 
and, with no need^for heating nor for solid shelter, 
productive activity has been reduced (11), Traditional life 
in these .conditions may thus have created a distinct A;/ 
contrast between,the indigenous Southeast Asian and the 
Chinese and Indian ways of life. The former are ,still 
characterized by a "take it easy*1 attitude towards productive 
activities.
It has been said that during the last glacial period ,
all Of: Southeast Asia became a ugene and cultural pool", but
after the sea had transgressed, thwarts became isolated. 
However, when maritime sailing progressed about 3,000-5,000
years ago, the area regained Its, internal communications (12)
q \
This compartmehtation not only fostered isolated cultural 
life of distinct ethnic groups, but sometimes favoured 
cultural deviations from a common cultural source of one 
and the same stock. Where vegetation and relief did not 
constitute impenetrable barriers^ cultural exchange existed 
and, as Coedes (13) points out, this actually happened 
between Indochina and Indonesia in prehistoric times.
Whether this common culture of pre-Aryan Indian traits 
resulted from or produced any common group consciousness is 
however doubtful.
As in.other tropical and: equatorial lands, Southeast 
Asia has had a low population to area ratio, although to a 
lesser degree. This population scarcity, which relatively 
retarded great cultural achievements even in historic times, 
was due in part to the profusion of diseases in the area. 
Humidity and heat created optimal conditions for endemic 
diseases, which sporadically burst into epidemics (14). These 
latter must have been more devastating in big agglomerated 
settlements than In small isolated ones, thus retarding the 
appearance of urban centres. These health conditions improved 
in the 20th century; nevertheless, in I960, most of Southeast 
Asia had a relatively high infant mortality rate (15J.
Asian Cultural Influences. The oldest existing human 
stocks indigenous to Southeast Asia seem to be some primitive 
tribes of the Malay Peninsula and the Philippines. They 
are considered to be direct descendants of the 
Mesolithic hunters and gatherers, who must have had 
cultural affinities at least over the area .embracing 
Indochina, Malay and Sumatra (16). Whether Mesolithic
man of the region is a direct descendant of the hominids 
of the darly^ Pleistocene is still an open;question. The 
Neolithic’peoples;of the region are relatively newcomers j 
hut occupying the Ibetter economic niches they outnumber ’ 
the oldeh; stocks many times over. The Neolithic peoples 
brought the use 'of metals to the area; they, however, came 
from two different, huinan stocks, whose dissimilarity is 
still politically significant.
Sarasin hypothesised a;wave of ProtorMaiUys of 
advanced Neolithic culture and a succeeding one of 
Peutero-Malays of bronze-iron culture, but others maintain 
that foreign traders diffused the use of metals into the . 
area. A more recent hypothesis has suggested an 
11 over spilling11 of the two stocks, the Proto-Malays of 
Oaucasoid affinities coming through the Assam-Burma border, 
and the Deutero-Malays, of Mongoloid stock, from Southwest 
China and the Tibet border. 'Eventually, the Deutero-Malay 
. •J1 over spilling P: pro gr © s sively increased (17), while the 
Proto-Malay: one stopped. Recorded historical events 
concerning overland migration into the area give evidence in 
support of the overspilling theory.
The initial cultural diversity of these migrants and 
the geographical compartmentation of the land favoured the 
continuance of; cultural fragmentation. . However,.human, 
distribution at present shows that the Proto-Malays generally . 
live,on high ground in interior areas, while the Deutero- 
Malays inhabit coasts and river plains, suggesting that the 
latter,.by strength of their advanced material culture,
o$urpev
the better economic niches from the former.
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(i) Chinese and Indian Influences. Bntil the end of 
the i^th century, direct Chinese cultural influence>limited 
itself to the areaaAjbtf- present North • Vietnam':and eastern 
Burma, but maritime links date bade to the Chou dynasty, 
wheml^eh- trsided with "Boitheast Asia. Between 200 B.C. and 
/ , the 10th: Century A.B,, the Chinese governed the lied River 
delta, at first through local vassals, and later as a 
)( Chinese district* In the first century *A.\D.,|Chinese officials 
arrived and rapidly spread their customs, language and 
religion, as they had no indigenous counterparts to match . 
in high culture. The .Chinese introduced the metal plough, 
.which.displaced the local hoe, established schools, militia 
service, and rechnited local officials into their system of 
government^;,.with a ^disintegrating effect on the old feudal;
:-order" (18).. Early reyolts only intensified the Chinese 
hold, on the area, which became organized as a Chinese . 
prefecture. Prom the late Han period, Chinese became,the 
only learned language, pervading literature, institutions 
and intellectual life. Nevertheless, the Chinese culture 
failed to convert the Vietnamese allegiance from their 
national past yalues:, successive revolts, perhaps with the 
aid of Indian!zed Champa, maintaining the flame of the 
Vietnamese, spirit of freedom* The I*ang rulers, considered 
their temporary pabifieation 'of the area as a great success;: 
renaming the country ,Anham, the "pacified South".
With an estimated population of 95-100 thousand (19), 
the Red River delta constituted an extension of the Chinese 
culture area-but^ only in its material traits and values and y 
not in national identity.; Chinese/methods of water control*
centralized political,rule and social organization• 
adopted by the Vietnamese, provided them with an efficient
means to ^strengthen; and free themselves* : whenvbpportunity 
•presented itself in the ibth century. G-enerally speaking, 
Vietnam, at the extremity of the
Chinese cultural " expansion limit;, couidohefain its national 
spirit'although it was materially S i n i c i z e d I n  a: sense, 
the Chinese cultural expansion, which was no f;; foil owed by 
Chinese settlers created’ a ^hardened crust" oh: adjacent 
'Msefty^qultiires: situated'. on the edges of its Are al 
e x p a n s i o n T h a t  marginal "hardened crust» is. still politi- 
..'bally, significant and apparent:’-in 'the ^ Sinibized cultures of 
^oreay: Japan, and Vietnam:, providing more effective- ,  ^ •
resistance capabilities:tofurther^ Chinese intrusion, than 
the non-Siniclzed states.
.Chinese Historical influence on eastern Burma. came : 
through low cultured miners and traders from Yunnan. They 
had little influence on the Shan princes, and .except for - 
mining metals and semi-precious stones, showed little 
interest in local peoples, though they returned each year 
for very-long periods.; Several other Chinese communities 
^introduced mining practises into other parts; of Southeast > 
Asia, and although these communities, some organised in j 
Kongsis, were permanent residents, they generally’neither 
apread their techniques, nor culturally influenced local 
peoples. ' The Chinese; gold; miners, of iWpst ;Bornep,. and tin 
miners: of Malaya and South Thailand, are; the best known in 
that;rpspect, Their unintentional political-influence came 
to notice, whenthey"fought^among themselYcs or against
;;the Colonial powers and local governments. ;1
Chinese trade directly regarded only a 
thin stratum of" hi-gh/.class indigenes and ;;Cbloni alibis, and 
neither Chinese naval architecture, nor, their navigational 
abilities, nor their/ armament left any impression on the 
locaL material culture, Uninterested in intellectual; 
activities and lacking in missionary zeal, the Chinese 
traders came and left with the monsoon cycle, having to do 
chiefly, with local ‘ Chinese traders. Political Chinese 
interference in the; region generally ended, in demand for 
tribute missions whichhave left practicaily no cultural 
trace. . ■
Indian cultural influence came as early as the first 
or second centurieskAil)., and following ancient trade 
links, affected; almost all the, low-lying regions of 
Southeast Asia. Three separate dr;combined motives lay 
behind that cultural expansion: emigration due to disturbed 
"Cdnditions ;ih India; -indian trading posts attracting priests 
and literati; or Brahmans-answering o a l l s o f  local chiefs,. 
whd,;wanted ; to enhance their prestige by -the former’ s magic 
powers (20). It is beyond any doubt that the Indian 
kin^doma had no teruiibrial expansionist intentione, and 
;that thade, and. perh^s; :war spoils* could. be their Only
materi^ motivation in intruding into Southeast Asia. /
-y- • -7:" . . -■ ‘ -^'v : ’ ‘ i .,,1'- ■ -.r. V. “
::>;Cbmpared with the Chinese cuHural influence, the
Indian one was more extensive but in some respects less 
intensive. Customs, language, institutions and religion 
affected the lelitd>y;hut;'the common people* only - . - /
;superficially. Literary expression in Sanskrit was
confined to a- smaii group of literati, Princes* courts 
adopted Brahman rituals,’ yet outside , the immediate 
neighbourhood *6f the Capitals- the caste system' did not 
catch hold. "Indian law never succeeded in forming more 
than a framework within which local eustomary law was 
free to maintain itself" (21). However,: in 
contradistinction to Brahmanism, Buddhism was full of 
missionary zeal, It established monasteries and" introduced: 
pilgrimage to India. Only few princely courts converted to 
Buddhism when it appeared, but the:common people responded 
much;more favourably, especially when the Theravada 
religious- u-f^hootvappeared. That kind of .Buddhism created 
a tsemi egalitarian religious community" where monarchs 
became symbolic.members,.so that the monks had some 
re straining opbwer over the rulers, The;frugality of the... 
monies , and their daily mixing with the people in undertaking 
education and other social roles, enhanced" their, religious 
appeal, . while the Mahayana monksrretained their :aloofness
. (ii) The Ancient States. Myths and historical, facts, 
combined-to produce e modern national interpretation of the 
Apolitical history Of the Southeast Asian countries. It 
must; be taken into account that, before the 13th century 
and to a lesser ektent even afterwards, "peaceful" 
inflltratipn was more decisive in its cultural-political
effects than military conquests.. The latter usually 
involved the reduction pf provinces or states to
feudalistic vassalage, while the,former generally brought
. about, assimilation and sometimes the disappearance of : . 
state cultures. Although each of the -ancient--kingdoms 
was generally geographically and; ethnicaliy differentiated, 
somes degree of central control was maintained over the area 
by each of them. Some of these loosely controlled states! 
enjoyed, however, a long lifetime of more than a 
millennium (see''-mapilMI) • .
. Champa existed from the ,2nd to the 15th century as 
:a Hindu!zed kingdom iocated along the coast-line of present 
day central Vietnam, i t  failed to expand into a major 
deltaic area,, .where good eommunications and grain reserves 
could have brought about a strong.centrailzed form of 
government.;; Its, relief features favoured its feudal : 
hierarchyjsome of the barons showing militant ambitions 
against the Chinese in Annam (23). If its past existence 
has. any present day. significance, it is due to the 
perseverance of a,small Cham minority in South Vietnam, which
may in a remote future : reformulate- national aspirations.
■'v iHe/ ■"
Punnan also dates .from -toer 2nd century A.B. ( 24). 
favourably located in the Mekong delta* area,lit eventually 
expanded to the Cambodian basin and thence, .by easy routes, 
to the Menam delta. In its heyday it held sway over the 
area extending from the Temasserim coast to Champa (25)*
In.the 6th century, the non-Hinduized Khmers of Ghenla in 
the middle Mekong, revolted and took over the government (26), 
The Khmers became indirectly Hinduized by Runnan as regards 
irrigation techniques, art, religion and the "concept of a 
universal severeignty% and by Champa as regards 
architecture/! 27) .v \ \ . . :
Ghenla’.s history represents the pre-Angkor Khmer'
peripd, and as: such,, it i s 'polltlco^culturally significant
in the national identifieat ion of the present day Khmer s.
in';Cambodia.: Throughout .the /Chenla period, and also during 
c
the halcyon days of the Angkor period, Thai tribes 
infiltrated Into the Menam plain* They were Hinduized. by 
the ruling Khmers, but sometimes revolted though without 
significant political success.
Since|fche 7tb oentury several kingdoms experienced 
their political ups and downs in parts -Of Burma" (28). . The 
most-important was. Pagan, which extended from the " .
■ Irrawaddy delta to the Kyaiiks© pinin. This Buddhist Burman 
kingdom acquired material to irrigate the Dry Zone
. . 1 : OJ;.,
of Burma. , In-the' 11th century it expanded northwards to 
Bhamo, north-eastwards to the confines of Nan Chao had 
eastwards to the Khmer .kingdom borders. In the south, if; 
reached the Martaban Gulf:. and, in the west,, the Arakan.? The
size and;power of Pagan overshadowed the existence of the
'H - / . '
.former Mon kingdoms of Pegu and Thaton. In view offthe
present ethno-poiltical.fragmentation of Burma, it seems
that the ancient kingdoms' still influence modern political
conception's in their centrifugal tendencies.
After: the downfall of Funnan, the hegemony of trade
with China and perhapb also, with India, lay wide open to
competition, from-the Indonesian principalities of which 
Sri-Vijaya emerged the victor. Unlike the otherUngdoms,
this "Venice of the East"(29)- gained its wealth from
.maiibime trade:and,pot from agriculturalproduetion. , Its
powerful-navy lead-a sustained .series- of campaigns to keep
the maritime routes open. Situated on; the east coast of
Sumatra (30), Sri-Vijaya conquered Melayu in the same
Island, and imposed its suzerainty over the Straits
principalities, West Java7and over the west coast of Borneo,
Sri-Vi jaya. was a Buddhist kingdom, as was Java at that time,,
and ohe could expect to find vestigial temples and statues
in the area of both. But while;these regularly occur in
. Java, East Sumatra is largely devoid of them, perhaps
because Sri Vijaya’ s commercial orientation was Inimical
to a spiritual and artistic flourishment (31).
The" location of Sri Vi jaya astride the; Malacca Straits,
controlling one of the major World maritime routes., has
influenced pan-Malay.nationalists prone to. ideas of
territorial grandeur. Especially in Indonesia voices
were calling for the recreation of a state which would
include,, besides Indonesiajthe area of present Malaysia and
Singapore. The Malaysians could perhaps profit from the
•reestablishment of a state with the politico-geographical
conception of Sri^Vijaya, which would have shifted the
politico-cultural centre from Java northwards, but the
/Indonesians must hav^Lad in mind the conception of a
• Majapahit, which would have stressed the-primacy of Java
over, the Outer provinces and Malaysia. It seems that at ; 
present no political entity of the region lays claim either
to the territorial or to the cultural legacy of Sri Vijaya.
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i 3th-century Yu,an, invasions*-'into Southeast Asia, were 
extensive in area and significant,in. their socio-political 
outcome, though!they failed- as military enterprises, The 
Chinese invaded Pagan, Cambodia and Vietnam hy land routes, 
and ' Champa as well 'aslava*—  hy sea, . The Hinduized elite's 
ih; most of those countries were considerably weakened as a 
result. This brought about t he:decline of Sanskrit, 
Mahayana Buddhism^and .Brahmanism, while the popular . 
Theravada Buddhism flourished. Pagan and the Khmers, : 
nearly esddausted after the Chinese ihvasiohs, could not 
cheek the: ;emergenee of Several Thai principalities at the 
territorial expense of both kingdoms. The Thai tribes,' 
which had* infiltrated the .'Menam river plain during the 
Khmer f h ile(32)9\ consolidated into two Thai kingdoms, 
Sukhodaya in the tfpper Menam and Ayudhya in the Lower. In 
political terms, the change mainly entailed the replacement 
of the Khmer dominant elite by a Thai one, the rural 
majority being already nThaified”. In the 13th century 
Sukhodaya extended from Luang Prabang to Pegu^ It sent 
tribute to China and maintained close religious, links with 
Ceylon, the origin of Theravada Buddhism. In the 14th 
century.^,, it acknowledged the suzerainty bf , Ayudhya. The 
latter, known as the Kingdom of Siam.: conquered Malaya as 
far as Tenasserim and Malacca*_ and. ruling by then most of,;:V - "l f
the Thai people in the peninsula, introduced the concept of 
Thai1and, the land of the Thai. The Thai dominant elite, 
of common racial origin, language, customs and religion with 
the people, introduced a specific social order which became 
accepted, as a matter of course, ;by the common people (33).
She social system and the common culture thus became, 
crystallized and withstood the crisis of the Burmese 
conquest of Ayudhya in the 18th century. Shis military 
crisis was followed by a political disintegrative bid of 
several iDhai chiefs:, who established independent 
principalities. However, once the Burmese were gone the 
geographical and cultural unity of land and people, 
favoured the reintroduction of a centralized state. The 
socio-economic organization of the;Thais depended on a 
lower stratum of serfs, usually of non-Thai former origin, 
who served the Eree Men, the Thai, warrior aristocracy 
proprietors of land and serf. High dignitaries and princes 
of royal blood constituted the higher class in the capital 
and the principal provincial towns. Although non caste 
conscious, the social, stratification and. old Khmer 
influences made the Court in Ayudhya follow strict pompous 
customs, while Sukhodaya only loosely practised them C34) 
in both countrieSjhowever, corvee work and taxes made the 
government system work.
In the 14th century, the. Thai Kingdom of Ban Ch* ang 
ruled the Lao branch of the Thai people in the upper reaches 
of the Mekong* It spread Theravada Buddhism, Khmer' customs 
as well as Siamese and Burmese,^architecture into the area. 
Between the 14th and 16th centuries the state experienced 
a stage of ’‘inauguration and organization1'( 35). There 
followed a century of wars with the Burmese, after which the 
country divided into two kingdoms, with Luang Prabang and 
Vientiane as capitals.
' ■ Erom the 13th^ toTKijhe end of the.,16th century, Khmer
. history was clbsely/. linked with that of iyudhya hy ■ a 
succession of wars'. Iii the 17th eentury> the" Khmer peppier, 
.resisted, the introduction of Islam hy Malays and Javanese ‘ X 
■ through the j Khmer i Court ^ manifesting the popularity of. / 
Theravada Buddhism-and the cultural gap between Palace ", 
customs and the essentially democratic villdge. life> . Also 
in the 17th century, the Vietnamese, occupied most of the , 
Mekong delta, and the. ,Siamese annexed Battambang and 
Siemreap districts;; In. the 19th centurybefore the advent; 
of the Ereneh, Siamese and Vietnamese, armies used Cambodia1 s 
territory to wage their wars redueihg the state to political 
•.dmpotenee^. Howevery despite its low political reputation, 
Cambodia1 s old cultural influence is still. evident in Laos 
and Thailand*
. . Prom the Tuan’Invasion and until afterthe ling 
occupation of Dai Viet. (Korth Vietnam), Vietnam : was hard 
pressed by Chinese from the; north and by Ohams; from the 
south. In the mid-15th> century, Dai-Viet arrived .at . 
imposing its sovereignty over Laos and Champa, and the 16th 
X century saw the reduction of the latter into an adminisnative 
.district of Vietnam. This was achieved through continuous 
X  infiltration rather than .by an openly waged war,vpattern of 
uChinese expansion11 which resulted perhaps from-the 
Sinicized material and institutional culture of Dai Viet. In 
the 17th century, the Kguyen family ruled the. southern:
■provinces of Vietnam, the Trinh family ruled the
’ ■ X  ' • ' - - i ? "... . -
northern with the king, as a Ae jure monarch. The Nguyen
flourished, while the Trinh felt insecure.after, the Ch*ing
ascent in China (36). By; far the more politico-economically
active of the two ruling families * the Hguyen- traded with;: V-
the Dutch and Portuguese, and also extended their
agricultural basis to the Cambodian held Mekong delta;’
.here again, inftitration preceded the official takeover.
The JTguy eh political -career almost came to an abrupt end,
when"a revolt succeeded in wiping out the entire family,
except for a sole survivor who, however, eventually 1
subdued, the rebels and proceeded to conquer Horth Vietnam
and unify the .country under his imperial rule. -
As already mehtibned, the Vietnamese could regain their 
national independence perhaps as a result of their 
adoption of^bhe Sinic culture of adaptation (37), which 
enabled them to rekindle their national identity flame (36) 
after- thd Chinese withdrawal. The national revival 
intensified especially in the 15th century, when ancient 
Vietnamese laws were codified, local legends reintroduced 
and new driginal institutions,; concerning fiscal and
. '  - " S '
agrarian matters, were .established. Writers-of the he 
dynasty showed great interest in historical studies, sometimes 
manifesting nationalist inspirations.'
After the fall of Pagan, Burma remained politically, 
divided until the 16th century, when, it became reunited.
The capital of unified Burma, in Pegu, was well located to 
uontrol the maritime pbnhectiohs. in .the south as well as. the 
agricultural basin in the Dry Zone, hater, Chinese invasions
and wars against' Aralcan, Ayudhya, Laos and the Shan 9?hais, 
as well as internal.revolts, demanded the shift of the 
capital further north to; ,;AVaV/ This-; shift alienated the 
kingdom from its maritime relations and enabled the Mons . 
to,develop aspirations for;,? independence*. It,also 
distracted the Burmese attention from maritime developments., 
eventually offering the British an opportunity for 
.strategic surprise in the: fir,st Burma War. , So. the present 
day student, the.history of unified Burma reads like a 
chronicle-of successive .wars, thevmost, important of which 
..(before the ad.vent . of; coloniallsm) ,was the Burmese conquest 
of Ayudhya in 1776*“ Shey^ however, had to retreat in order 
to face a Chinese'invasion, a 'second one.; since the Toungoo •< 
times, realizing anew.the aggression of Imperial China.
Between the 13th and 17th centuries, political ; V  ; 
developments in-the Archipelago had a limited relation to 
those of peninsular. Southeast Asia.- iDwo maqor political 
events occurred in the Archipelago during that period, 
namely: the fall of Sri-7ijaya'and \the defeat ofjthe Yuan 
invasion. The former enahled kediri,of West Java to unite 
the island under its rule, and the latter Brought about a 
new centralized state with a capital in Maiapahit,. .which 
extended its rule over Madura, Bali and Melayu and perhaps, 
even farther afield. However, external trade activities, 
continued and attracted Arab, Guierativ. and other traders to 
the islands. IhlS; trade enabled the central!Bed state of 
Majapahit /to diffuse-Javanese HihduiKed culture to its'
' possessions i-hi;Borneo,*v Bali, Makassar, the' Bandas ?and the 
'Moluccas^ -|l3umatra hadL already been .Binduizedft* Also parts 
: of .present Malaysia may have * been included within Maj apahit, 
andkif this was the case (39), government control of the 
; inter-island trade, and .over, the iM’alaoca Straits, must have ’f
made it a powerful state in contemporary Southeast Asia.- . "
fMajapahit must, have ' had.; trade links with the>.Bay of Bengal, and 
fwith China on the'eve , of the European advent into the region.
rlhe internal organisation of . this Binduized state left" the: -
, r ' ' . ■’ '
highest administative functions with the royal family, who .
were- -aided in 'daily, matters by‘ a' class of officials. The 
people divided into classes according to occupations, 
reminiscent, of:Hindu caste influences.' Administrative 
regulations governed the'maintenance of the army, land tenure’, 
tax assessments, corvee labour, payment o^ifficial - 
..revenues and. gifts to officials,*- Thls: degree of organization 
and the political importance of the state would suggest a : 
long period of vital" existence of, Maj apahit, yet, for 
reasons.still unravelled, the kingdom collapsed even before 
;the'European advent. However,:Majapahit has left a 
political legaey unconeiously operative in the minds of 
the Butch colonialists, and consciously affecting'the 
j;avan.ese of independent Indonesia with regard to the 
centrality of Java in the context of a pelagian colony or 
■state.'.. k.k .
(i.v) The Spread . of Islam. The missionary spirit-of 
Islam began to assert itself in Southeast Asia after Gujerat 
and Bengal had been converted. Indian traders from these 
provinces must have spread the new faith to their
counterparts in the region. .Malacca, being the most
important principality and emporium of Southeast Asia was
the first kingdom to be Islamized (40), and consequently
directed to. and boosted the process in Southeast Asia. .
Ayudhya^*. Malaya seems to have had
neglected the spreading of Buddhism among the nations,
leaving the field open to Islam. This amplifies the
statement that the more important cultural changes in the
region have been brought about by “seepage” rather than by
military conquest and imposition from above. As the
Javanese principalities of■ the post-Majapahit period,
practised extensive trade with Malacca, princes and elites
who were directly involved in its operation,; must have come
under the influence of Arab, Indian or even Javanese Muslim
traders of Malacca.. This hypothesis concerning the
Islamization of Java and Sumatra, is contested by another
contention, i.e. the Islamization of the throne of Majapahit 
\tKe
antr diffusion of Islam through the.state*s institutions (41). 
However, facts indicate that when the Portuguese came to 
Java, the.northern coast ports had already been Islamized (42) 
constituting a- barrier between Christianity and the Buddhist 
principalities of the interior. Van leur (43)^_ maintains 
that the spread of Islam.in the Archipelago got a special' 
impetus from the Islam-Christianity■struggle in the Iberian 
Peninsula. Rumours of that strife reached Java ahead of 
the Portuguese, by pilgrims returning from Mecca; as a 
result, the Muslims deliberately accelerated the.process of 
islamization to create a buffer between the Hinduized 
interior and the Portuguese. * ■
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The diluted form of Islam in Java is attributed to
Sufism,: which, readily Incorporated local beliefs and 
usages, resulting in Adat law.maintaining Its.position
side by side with the law of Islam1 'This Javanese Islam,
• ^  ' 
which is the religion of the majority of: the people of
Indonesia, affected hot onlyiini.erhal relations between
the fervent and the moderate'muslimsy but also the attitude
of the local population to intermarriage with the local
Chinese, making It much.more, lenient than in other Muslim
communities. As the spread of Islam followed the spice-
trade routes, it reached, the, southern Philippine islands
when.the Spanish arrived in the Visayas and barred its
further expan^Gn.; This left ..the Siilu Archipelago and
Mindanao in Muslim hands, with later political
consequences significant even in these days.
(v) Some Politico-Geographical Remarks.. The ancient 
states of the pre-Tuan invasion period,: have left only a 
small impression on 20th century politics Itr the way of 
historical ^ territorial V^iMiw^and national attitudes. But, 
some-:, of these states must have directly influenced the post 
13th.century states, and through them the present political 
frame of mind in the Southeast Asian countries. The 
possibility of a future revival of .Cham culture, perhaps 
with independent territorial aspirations, seems to depend 
on the.Charn^ability to persist in their culture, increase 
in number and gain economic power. .In .view of the 
Vietnamese preponderance iny-.the7 lowlands": ahd. th-eir 
political and economic sophistication,, this does not seem, 
probable in the foreseeable future. Also, the traditionally 
tense political relations between Gambodla and Vietnam,; and; 
Cambodia and Thailand seem to be'a legacy of the post 13th
century period, The fairly'rapid territorial changes due
to wars "between these countries has left open the question
of the ’'true0 territorial "boundaries of each state. One of
the-main reasons: for. the lack of a consensus in that matter
may have resulted from the fact that the weakest of the
three, Gamhodia, was "by large the most culturally influential,
and' united under its rule the middle and lower Mekong "basins
during the" pre-Angkor period. Similarly in Burma, the Shan
states, mostly of Thai origin, constitute a traditional.
problem for unified Burma. The Burmans, adopting the
political legacy of Pagan and later of Burma, confront the
Mons,. who still exhibit strong attitudes, of dissension
aspiring to. realise the legacy of the ancient Mon kingdoms. 
s^Uo who oAti. stiLCj ,
This is'largely true of other minorities ^ opposed to the, 
official state-*idea of Burma. All^bhese historical disputes;. 
concerning territories in peninsular Southeast Asia;may be 
nowadays overshadowed by the modern political and 
ideological strife in the region, but they indicate that 
present agreements constitute superficial reconciliations 
of basic disagreements, despite:a common religion and 
racial origin. In addition, some present political divisions 
with culturally unified nations, date back for some ', 
centuries. The Trinh-Nguyen divisions in Vietnam and the 
Luang Prabang-Vientiane division, in Laos both have their 
geographical and historical backgrounds to support current 
ideological breaches.
The question of Chinese historical aggression in. 
Southeast Asia, a burning issue of present day politics, 
may seem exaggerated perhaps with the exception of its
manifestation in Vietnam."/ Chinese Invasions into Burma 
were wide and far "between/ in relation to the long,"period 
involved; no wonder that with the exception of Vietnam, 
the idea of Chinese aggression acquires its cultural 
significance through .political propaganda rather than "by: ' 
national folklore. However, Vietnam* s cultural, and national 
identity has been fortunately preserved as its Sinicized 
culture;of adaptation strengthened-and made her 
successfully resist Chinese expansionist tendencies^when 
China experienced its population explosion during Ch1ing 
times. The barriers put before the Chinese southwards 
expansion, of cultural and human character north of the 
Red River basin, and of physiographical nature northeast , 
of the ,Burma and laps boundaries with China, decided the 
Northern borders of Southeast Asia as .;a world region* . 
These barriers did not check the Chinese expansion 
southwards, although they changed its characfer arid :■ i 
direction from, overland seepage;and agricultural settlement
to maritime emigration with trade and; labour occupations.
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In the Archipelago, the plitico-geographical legacy.
of Sri-Vijaya has remained unclaimed by a distinct nation. 
Although it'enjoyed a long independent political existence, 
its mercantile character and its-fragmented area over 
several islands linked by sea' trafficmust have been 
inimical to the creation of a unified culture of identity, \ 
Distinct customs, folklore and institutions seem to have 
more efficiently developed within a single agricultural 
area.where traditions could be better developed and where 
no constant foreign influence from abroad could undermine ; 
the cultural unity. However, in'view of thevreeeut
secessionist tendencies of, the ©uter provinces of 
Indonesia, it seems that the bids to contest Java!s 
centrality may be regarded as a Sri Vijayan political 
legacy. In contrast to this legacy, there remains that of 
1 aj apahit 9
The creation of a strong centralized state- in Java, 
primarily dependent on agriculture, and only in the 
second place on trade, had no perpetual effect on the. 
pelagian peoples as decentralization preceded the Chinese ' 
invasion and followed the fall of lajapahit. It seems 
that ethnic and geographical diversity dictated the 
fragmentary nature of the political setting in the 
Archipelago. Even Islam^ which in other more propitious 
parts of the worlds conduced the creation of large states 
or empires, failed to unite politically the Archipelago.
The elevation of Majapahit to the. symbol of Indonesian 
unity and’past grandeur in the 20th century, really 
sanctified an historical exception rather, than expressed 
normal,past conditions, and was due more to modern 
propaganda than to values retained by folklore.
Oolonial Rule until the Beginning of the 20th Century.
.Until the 19th century, Western colonialism in Southeast
Asia exploited local produce, mainly spiees, exotic
products, precious metals etc., and only marginally invested,
in plantations or industry. There was no talk of profit 
reinvestment in land conservation, nor in labour conditions
improvement. The colonialist powers limited the areas under
direct .occupation to the minimum necessary to perpetuate .
control of the economically rewarding, districts. Great 
profits characterized the first period of ,the spice , trade. 
On some occasions, when profits declined, -taxes and customs 
duties helped to maintain the colonial administration.
There generally was no direct rule over the indigenes, and 
local chiefs ruled their people according to customary 
and religious laws. The greatest contributions of the 
West, during that period, were perhaps the introduction.of 
American, food crops, European organization^and security, 
which perhaps decreased inter-group wars, while missionary 
.activities introduced education and: health;control.
Since the beginning of the 19th century, economic 
activities extended in space and volume and intensified in 
variety. 1 Plantations became more and. more- profitable as , 
maritime .transport modernized its techniques and as;- .
routing became more efficient (44). Control of the 
indigenous population, if not becoming fully direct, at 
least showed more liberal signs in considering their 
problems./ . Western geopolitical ideas, of Erganzungsraume 
and colonial rivalry drove the colonial powers to extend 
their effective control over.areas, which beforehand had 
been considered as “xohes of influence”. If until the 
19th century the “true religion” provided moral 
justification for exploitation, later “progress and 
edueation” acquiesced bad,conscience. During.the pre- 
19th century Western colonial period, Chinese came to 
Southeast Asia in fairly limited numbers . They occupied 
an intermediary position between large Western: trading . 
firms and the indigenous people supplying skilled labour 
and Services, and continued in mining activities, which
they had begun before the European advent. Some of them 
intermarried with ioeal women and eventually produced the 
peranakan and mestizo groups, which lost many of their. 
Chinese traits. The'small-scale immigration, due to the 
small extent of economic activities in Southeast;-Asia, 
favoured Chinese assimilation. x
When during the 19th century, -and especially in its 
second.half, ;the Southeast Asian economy expanded,, 
immigration increased and coolies, workers and traders came 
from war and famine stricken China. The newcomers usually 
began their careers as wage earners, 'and those who advanced 
towards business occupations, generally remained in their 
new countries, leaving their former jobs to a growing 
influx 'of hew immigrants;. The increase in the newcomers
proportion in the Chinese/communities tended to slow down.
■ S  ' - . . , ' -' ' .
assimilation.
Portuguese- and Spanish Colonialism. The 16th century marked 
the hegemony of Portuguese and Spanish colonialism in 
Southeast Asia. The Portuguese “garrison empire11, 
suffering from chronic man power shortage (45), established 
fortified trading posts in the area?'being, the, principal one 
Portuguese missionary work was-even less sighificant than 
their commerce,- which latter involved a small volume - 
compared with, local, Chinese, Japanese, Indian-'and Arab 
trade (46). After the Portuguese had left Southeast Asia, 
their legacy amounted to not much more than Portuguese 
names given to their Eurasian descendants and some 
architectural vestiges.
forty years after their discovery ty l a g e U p 1*
Spanish, returned to the Philippines, but only when a 
better sailing route to Mexico had been found did the 
islands*/ importance grow^as trade increased from 6 junk­
loads in 1574 to 30-40 annually later on. The peculiar 
route of the Spanish-Chinese trade, via the Philippines and 
Mexico, .was determined by the Philippines political status 
as a colony under the viceroy of Mexico and also .by 
Mexican silver serving as a means to finance the Galleon 
Trade (47). As a result of trade considerations^proximity 
to China became important and as food shortage plagued 
Cebu,-the; Spanish shifted the capital''to.. Manila. . The 
peculiarity of the Philippine trade routes, the Catholic 
church cultural, influence (and later the American rule) 
contributed to the alienation of the Philippines from the 
general developments in Southeast Asia.
Although the Spanish rulers disappeared from the 
Philippines before the end of the 19th century, the Spanish 
legacy is still relatively strongly felt. The main reason 
may be sought i n .the intensive involvement of the Catholic 
church in rural and urban life. On the whole, backed by 
government support and blessing, the Church dominated 
education and health services and was strongly influential 
in rural social life. Its wealth was enormous and mainly 
came fromj^its extensive land ownership, which latter was a 
major factor in its influence over the peasants. In fact, 
the Church more than the administration made the Philippines
the first country to be directly ruled by the Europeans in 
Southeast Asia. . This direct European rule must have been a 
factor in the phenomenal growth of the population from
half a million in the 16th.century to seven millions 
three .centuries later (48). Thus, the real conquerors 
of the Philippines were the clergy who', with little 
reinforcement coming from Spain, increased their hold on 
the population hy mobilising and educating indigenous 
priests. Although this incorporation produced social 
problems, the. clergy achievedVa perpetuation of their 
non-reproduetive group by that unique non-^discriminatory 
approach of the Catholic Church. Already in 1536 
Pilipinos were trained for priesthood,., and in 1,750, 142 
parishes out of 569 were under] native priests; (49) . Besides 
extensive primary education in churches.at the parish level 
(50), they, introduced secondary education.before any’other 
colonial, power in Southeast Asia, and also a Catholic 
university. That system of education is. said to have, aimed
at teaching ’’moral and religious subjects through the' 
medium of Castilian language.*1 (51), yet its indirect effects 
on every walk of life had special political significance.
Chinese relations with the Philippines date back, to 
the T 1ang dynasty (52) and a thousand years later,, at :the 
end of the 19th century^ the Chinese population.MMilMliillW 
numbered about 100,000. The early steps of Chinese 
settlement In'the Philippines under Spanish rule :were, 
however,>humbler in figures involved and. in the range of 
their economic pursuits (53). ; Buring the 16th.to the 18th 
centuries, the Spaniards’ jealousy of the Chinese econoMc 
success, combined with real or imaginary fears of Chinese 
conquest and piracy, made the latter suffer discrimination, 
massacres and expulsions, Usually when their numbers
augmented were considered a security risk to the 
Spanish. f’Jhe Chinese numerical build up during that :, 
period; fluctuated therefore from several tens of thousands 
and several hundreds” (54). The Spanish hatred for the 
Chinese resulted from their inability to compete with them 
as the former avoided , commercial pursuits and 
manual occupations. Among the restrictions laid upon the 
Chinese were'head tax, tributes and tariffs to,limit their, 
trade, and a confinement to residence in the parian, the 
Chinese walled quarter, which was enforced until ,1860 (55). 
fhe Spaniards^nevertheless^needed-the Chinese proficiency in. 
trade and skilled labour, and especially their;competency in 
the latter .(56) . A summary of Chinese persecutions by the 
Spaniards may be illustrative of the Spanish-Chine se 
relationship during the Spanish rule in the Philippines. 
Expulsions were decreed in 1596, 1606, ,1620,; 163,2^ 1769 
(and in 1804 against non agriculturalists)* Restrictions oh 
immigration were enacted in 18,49 (57). During the 17th and 
18th centuries sever a]^nassacres almost annihilated the 
Chinese communities ih the Philippines, and to these 
persecutions the Chinese reacted by sporadic rioting, and 
by collaborating with the British during, the 1762“1764 
conquest Of Manila (58).
After Spain had lost Mexico-its links with .the 
Philippines became institutionally and geographically 
direct.. Some Spanish immigrants began settling down in the 
country, and discarding traditional aristocratic. attitudes, 
they engaged in,trade.- Phis long established Chinese 
occupation was difficult to penetrate for the new Spanish
in-
settlers. The government, willing to favour the Spaniards, 
encouraged the Chinese to take up agriculture hy lifting 
legal restrictions from those who would abandon trade 
occupations. Some of the Chinese responded and introduced 
improved methods into agriculture, although the majority 
remained urban and mainly occupied in trade. New Spanish 
immigrants and older settlers created partnerships with the 
Chinese using the latter1 s skills 1,59) during the economic 
expansion period after 1820. On the whole, the Chinese 
relations with the Spanish and Filipinos improved during 
the 19th century (60), Although intermarriage of Chinese 
with Filipinos occurred ever since the Spanish came, giving
j
rise to a considerable Chinese mestizo group in 1750-1850
(61), intermarriage was specially encouraged by the 
government during the 19th century when dowries were 
allocated for those who married outside their ethnic groups
(62). The mestizos were a legally recognized group apart 
and were not taxed as heavily as the Chinese. In 1810, the 
mestizos constituted about five percent of the population
(63)* Catholic in religion, and inheriting the industry 
of their forefathers, their customs were not Chinese and 
especially family relations within this group differed from 
the Chinese (64). Usually, by the second or third generation 
Chinese Mestizo families tended to Filipinize altogether (65).
During the entire Spanish rule in the Philippines, 
conversion to the Catholic faith enabled the Chinese to evade 
economic and social restrictions (66). Some of them were 
fully converted, and this generally facilitated their eventual 
assimilation^ some others converted pro forma in order to 
benefit from material advantages (67). But, throughout 
the Spanish period bribery was perhaps the surest way to
by-pass restrictions^Thus the Chinese extended their... ‘
■ buslines.s'and residence to provincial towns, where they 
built small parians in inconspicuous places ( 68), and 
generally Jeept business going without much government 
interf erehce.; The 19th century improvement in the conditions 
of the Chinese and the general economic development in the 
Philippines after the stoppage of the Clalleon Trade, 
resulted-:.-in a conspicuous overall'■ Chinese; population, growth . 
and a marked proportional shift from Manila into the 
provinces. The 30,000 Chinese of.1876, augmented to 66,000 
(official figures) or 90,000 (uhpfficial).'in 1886, and while , 
in 1849 Manila had 92 percent of the Chinese in thej 
Philippines, this proportion decreased.to,77 pereent in 
1886 and to 48 pereent in 1894 (69). At the end of the 19th 
century, the Chinese community was almost entirely Hokkien 
with a five percent proportion of Cantonese, the.latter 
constituting 10 percent of the .Manila Chinese•and residing 
in their specific places (70). ",
Dutch'Colonialism. The Dutch were driven out of the East 
Indies half a century after the'.Spanish had been forced out 
of the. Philippines, yet the former1s legacy is much less 
culturally marked than the latter1-s. This resulted - from 
the direct rule of the Spanish, who came to a country with 
much less past experience in any form of advanced political 
organization, with an intention to convert and civilize.
The Dutch Came to trade, and for at least 200 years realized . 
it throgh "buying cheap and selling dear11 (71)., maintaining 
the traditional social system and showing little, if any,
interest in civilizing the indigenes., - -
, During the early 17th century; Chinese, Japanese, 
Indian, Arab, Europeans and indigenes participated along 
. with the Dutch in the highly profitable spice trade,. As . 
this low-volume~high-value trade could easily saturate the 
European' markets ..without : central control, the Dutch East 
Indies Company (V.0.C.) introduced a policy of economic 
monopoly .spreading armed trading stations • which were centred 
on Batavia. Mobile naval forces tried to wipe -out smugglers 
and maintain undisturbed .links among the stations, while 
the. interior of the islands did hot interest the Dutch,, who 
left them to indigenous vassal rule (72). This early : 
policy; of sweeping the Archipelago of rivals,while limiting 
military expenditure to the minimum was changed^when the' 
Y.G.C. extended its monopoly over large parts of Java 
reducing. Bantam and Mataram, the indigenous kingdoms, to 
political, decay. In the mid 17th century the V.O.0. held 
stations J n  all the .prominent ports of northern Java,in the 
. Moluccas and in Macassar. In 1691, the Dutch captured • 
Malacca (73) and supporting the Minengkebau of.Sumatra, • 
reduced the danger from Atjeh. The Company imposed a 
tribute system over the, local, princes^which continued into 
the 18th century and '.extended as the Dutch expanded over/ the 
whole' interior of Java (74),♦ This tribute system, in fact, 
provided the bulk of the Y.0.0. income (75) and strengthened 
its financial standing^when the spice trade returned low 
profits. Within that geographical expansion into interior 
Java the Dutch introduced coffee plantations and as a result 
increased contacts with low-level indigenous, officials.
;;:J^^;y:rQ*Ci.jpbiiey:vmay be regarded as a political 
success, since i t ;secured the /Archipelago to Holland, but 
fas an eeonomi c failure, ?sihce :it. went/ bankrmpyafte-r 200 
■years of■ nperationh^The:reasons for' the economic- collapse 
may be sought, -inithe/;growing military expenditure due to 
::the---;e^ r^ s/ibn^ihtp Java, to' incompetence of directors (76) • 
and. corruption.-. However,/there ;existed a reason beyond 
the;- YvQ.G.;/control-.the^decline in the Spice Trade. The 
bulkier export crops of coffee and sugar- suffered : 
compietition in the European markets, and were still 
:Unec6nomical^/;despite the shortened way to .{ the East :Indies 
;through the Roaring forties. H a d t h e  Dutch not impoverished 
Java by decreasing its,; pur chasing power, ships from Europe 
could return -ladenvwi'th Eurqpe'an manufactured goods to 
balance the: freight fare of the export crops.
The British interregnxim in Java was too short to leave 
a significant / imprint; of its/.liberal economic approach, 
except perhaps in its unintentional influence on the' Dutch 
pioiicy.K In facfV before .1811, some isolated voices in 
'Holland demanded improved conditions for the indigenes in 
the East Indies , not as an end in itself but - as a means .to 
develop ava1. s market, capacity: (77). However, in 1830, the 
. But eh po licy to war d s the Eas t Indies' change d when they 
introduced the Culture: System, its essence lay in the 
shift from/land-taxes, the revenue off-which consisted of 
rice (and this had little value for/the Dutch), to export 
■crops,. . The Dutch envisaged that the peasant would have to 
contribute as tax a fifth of his working time instead of 
,f^ °; fifths °f his ferop,. In fact, the, realization of the
plan abused much of its preconceived merits, as the 
peasants had to cultivate.20 percent of their land with 
indigo, sugar or coffee, and were remunerated by a eertaiii 
percentage of the value. This was in contrast hc^Che 
originally unrealizable plan, according to which the 
peasants'would have cultivated government land, in addition 
-. local.headmen colluded with the Dutch to decrease the 
peasants1 share in the revenue, in order to induce them to 
increase the proportion of land under export crops.
The Culture System proved an economic success for 
the Dutch, but it affected local food crop production •
. during 1830-1860, a period during which the population of 
Java increased from 6 to 9.5 million. In some districts 
famine spread, following the negligence of sufficient rice 
production (78.). local chiefs, Chinese and European 
contractors, as well as the Dutch authorities squeezed a 
large share of the profits from the peasants, disorganizing 
the Javanese traditional social order and introducing a 
"plural character of the social order" (79).
In 1848, the East Indies-ceased to be a Crown ■Monopoly,
:and private enterprise was allowed to participate in the 
colony1s economy. This change followed a growing public . 
interest in the administration of the Archipelago demanding 
a liberal approach/to the local people (80). The effects 
of/Dutch liberal.public opinion brought about the gradual 
abolishment of ordinances concerning the obligatory culti­
vation- of export "crops and labour services. Between 1860
and 'thejendL of the century, the Culture System gradually 
faded■away.: But, the liberal benefactors.of the Dutch East 
Indies, did not anticipate the outcome of private enterprise
encroachments into Java’s economy, which coincided with 
the appearance of the steamship, and which rendered export- 
crop production even more profitable than in the first 
half of the 19th century. In 1856, the government'sector 
exports amounted to 64.4 million guilder and the private 
sector to 34.3 million, hut in 1’885 the respective figures 
were 16.3 million and 168.7 million. The emphasis on 
export-crop production reintroduced the evils of the 
Culture System hy endangering food supplies and hy 
exploiting ignorant peasants, many of whom lost their land 
titles to usurers. Land alienation spread so fast, that 
the government had to restrict ownership hy, and leases to 
non-indigenes. But, on the entire colony level economic 
expansion prevailed as the steamship transport increased 
its efficiency by bigger and faster vessels and by 
shortening the route through Suez. As a result, coal and 
other minerals became economically exploitable and the 
Dutch, reconsidering the new conditions, decided to spread 
their effective rule over the entire Outer Provinces. This 
brought about a long sustained war with Atj.eh and a campaign 
against piracy,, which eventually almost cleared the 
interpelagian waters from that plague (81). Also, in the 
context of the general economic boost of the second half of 
the 19th century, the harbours, sea and land transport, 
mining and general technology were modernized. The 
following figures of external trade amply illustrate the 
economic boost in Indonesia: in 1870, it amounted to 152 
million guilder, but in 1900 it rose to 434 million.
Although Chinese settlers and traders preceded the
Dutch in the 4^ekip.elago, ?the/:advent of the latter, 
attracted man^nore.Qfthe %ormer;to Java and the Outer 
Provinces../{Already Goen found/'builders' and craft Omen : 
among the Chinese,when he: decided to make Batavia the 
prime city of the East indies.. By. then, other Ghinese 
lived^iu the interior.operating sugar imills and arrack 
dls tiller if s,:;( 82.).i- In/general, the V.0.0.1 s policy of 
noh^inte.rvention, /in’ indigenous- internal affairs was 
extended to the Chinese minority.'..This community, was ; 
headed hy -a Kapitan China, who/served. asadministrator 
and/judge1/for Ghinese internal affairs
Besides trade
and. the crafts, ■/Some Ghinese practised usury^ becoming7 
absentee landlords, others bought:.monopolies of tax and 
produce collection; both, these. ,occupatioiyy which involved/ 
f acevto-f ace relationships of exploiter )and/iexploited, 
aroused,/indi^genouf , hatred, for the- Chinese.- ih; 1733, there 
were;. 80,000' Ohinese in th^atavia district ajone, and in 
1740 they revolted fpr unexplained reasons, but were soon 
crushed. As a result of that bloodshed. ethnic groups were 
confined to specific residential wards, but these 
regulations were never rigorously observed.
, The Ghinese newcomers; usually, were young bachelors 
’and before the.community began bringing in Ghinese women, 
they used to: marry local women, the:offspring being 
oeranakans^ (84)« These usually lost active command offc 
Ghinesejby.the third generation (85) /and graftfd many local 
traits bh their Ghinese "cultural trunk". ..They even
performedAdrama and; bp era in Malay language though in a 
Chinese setting(86)y/ The ■ peranakan ‘society of late 17th 
century, :iust:iaTeriad little ethhi-c:solidarity with the 
Chine se: newcomers, as they:put ’ pre ssures on - the V.0.0.; to 
restrict■further Chinese immigration, hut the; perahakans 
never fully dominated the Chinese society, as newcomers
a-a  ' " .a - . ; . " ,  ■ ■
constantly flowed,in,and as not^M. veterans adopted ,
/ Indonesian cultural: traits,. . /
The Chinese of the Outer'Provinces also antedated the 
; Dutchvarrival and, similarly to those of Java,, increased 
fheir/numhersyduring/f^ rule, in the. 18th
centuryy.: some> Chinese communities in West Borneo engaged in 
gold mihihg,;:vpepper:- /cultivation,' fores t' 1 extraction
and Subsistence agriculture.' They' were organized in 
kongsis, a s o r t ; of"^ysemi-demoeratic society derived from ■' 
Chinese village/life, -and for. some time; became So powerful 
;as to defy the authority of//local chiefs. :.ln 1830, there 
were , 150^000 Chinese in Borneo, of whom 90,00.0 are supposed 
to have liVed in kongsis controlled a r e a s L a t e r  .in the 
19th’ century, when the.Dutch extended;/their effective rule 
over the ehtire/.Outer‘ i?rovinces, they put an end to this 
kongisisi semi-independence..; The kongsis of Bangka, and 
Billitonv consisted/of Chinese indentured labourerp hired 
: by the mining compiany, and thus, both islands, greatly 
increased their Chinese population during the economic 
ekfahsion yehrs: of the late 1:9th century. Bangka, in 
' contrast- th/Billiton, developed a variety of Occupations 
besides mining: pepper growing, market gardening and trade.
. S i m i l a r  . e c o n o m i c  d e v e l o p m e h t s / i n c r e a s e d ;  t h e - C h i n e s e . / ; ; , ,  '
population:'of the Outer Provinces, which in 1900 reached 
250,000., .while .that of - Java and Madura was ’ 277,000.
Of all the Chinese occupations trade remained the. 
most characteristic during the 19th century, and it gave 
them; a ■specific1 econo.mic niche between the broad base of 
the indigenous primary-producer and the apex of European 
merchants. However, they infiltrated every other, occupation 
except rice growing, which they only marginally practised. 
The energy and acumen of the Chinese in each of their 
economic pursuits, gave rise to several generalizations 
concerning their practices (87). Usury, pilfering, 
profiteering and all sorts of exploitations were attributed 
to them in the late 19th century, despite the fact that by 
then the majority of them were wage earners and labourers. 
Inasmuch as they used.dishonest methods in dealing with 
the indigenes, it must have been true for-only a certain 
proportion of them. But;with all their business acumen, 
they failed • to displace the Europeans from business in 
Indonesia and this has been attributed to their inability 
to. manage large anonymous companies due to their familial 
solidarity (88). Remaining in small and intermediate 
trading businesses^they constantly confronted the indigenes 
in daily face-to-face business relations in urban and rural 
Java. This resulted in ViAltetfVidA-iAAMl allegations of their 
dishonesty and in increased Indonesian hostility against 
them, while Dutch big business hid behind anonymous .
companies and thus evaded that hostility. .The small and 
intermediate scale of the Chinese businesses was:also
determined,'- by;- the- Dutch.' political .’dominance ^ whici•:'^kntM' 
the end ••••of • the 19th century restrictedyin principle y  .
Chinese residences in. Java to ghettoes, and kept the 
indentured labourers in.: the tin;"mining islands*- Had not 
these restrictions existed^ Java would have been commercially 
dominated by the Ghinese (89), as the indentured.labourers ‘ 
would have moved to talce up trade , in that island.' This 
situation contrasted with the conditions in Indochina and 
the;Philippines where a higher percentage. of the Ghinese 
population pursued trading occupations.: Neither in: Java 
nor in the: Outer Provinces;did the Ghinese assimilate. .
The peranakans of Java lived their lives apart,;and ;.
5 though the- culiural Indonesian traits they had■■ adopted 
enabled them to communicate easily with the indigenes, 
there did not follow full, assimilation .or, identification 
of. the Ghinese with the Indonesians (90). The Ghinese 
newcomers (totoks), as well as those incorporated into 
kongsis, lived even more, segregated from the Indonesians 
than did bhe: peranakans. The widespread; labelling of the 
entire Chinese community as dishonest businessmen^and a 
Ghinese -aloof attitude towards the Indonesians, brought 
about a. fair degree of suspicion between these groups*
Ghinese superior airs were exhibited during their political 
campaign to come under the jurisdiction of European courts; 
a privilege :ienjoyed by the Japanese. Until 1824, Chinese 
divii.; affairs constituted a matter for European courts of 
justice, and criminal cases for courts of natives. Between 
1824 and 1855, all matters returned to the courts for" natives. 
After the latter date and following.Chinese protests, the pre- 
1824 arrangement was reestablished. Marriage .and inheritance
remained subject to Chinese laws during the entire period.
British Colonialism. Until the mid 19th century, British 
colonialism in Southeast Asia limited itself to the defence 
of the Bay of Bengal and Assam, and the security of the 
trade: with China. There was only marginal interest in 
economic exploitation of inner areas through productive 
enterprise/' In the third, hut mainly in the fourth quarters 
of that century, British economic interests augmented as 
maritime transport rendered the area more economically 
efficient, and as potential European rivalries added their 
weight to the economic ones. Thus, the first / j
Burma War'*)Vas well as the establishment' of the stations in 
Penang and Singapore may be said to have had officially only 
secondary economic motivations, while Intervention in 
Malaya and the full conquest of Burma seem to have been 
brought about primarily by politico-economic reasons. The 
period'until. the mid 19th century, has been labelled as • 
"reconnaissance and retreat" (91), the following half 
century, concerning. Southeast Asia, may be defined as "true 
colonialism".
(i) Burma. King Bodawpaya restored unity to turbulent 
late 18th century Burma by indulging in endless campaigns, 
at the end of which he conquered Assam and Arakan. The 
pugnacious self-assertive Burmahs used to send punitive 
missions into. British held Bengal, in order to retaliate 
against Bengal based Arakanese guerrilleros. The East India 
Company (E.I.C.)' tried to negotiate a modus vivendi, but 
when the Burniese prepared to capture Chittagong, the British . 
struck in the rear, captured Rangoon and defeated the
. Burmese army. Peace terms;concluded in 1826,, accorded 
the British Assam, Arakan and Tehasserim. However, tension 
still remained during the second quarter of the 1,9th century 
which saw deteriorating relations between British and 
Burmese'along the newly created borders. Army chiefs and 
bandits roamed.Burma and sporadically clashed,with the 
British, , who in retaliation captured Pegu in 1852, and 
linking Arakan and Tenasserim created the province of 
Lower Burma.
After.the second Burma War, King Mfndon of Burma, a 
Buddhist by conviction and manners, tried to recover Pegu 
through,understanding with, the British. But^the British 
refusal weakened his position vis a vis Burmese dissidents, 
especially when the British declined his request for arms 
supply for his;loyal supporters. Thus., army leaders and 
Buddhist monks,; who had traditionally been among the
t
influential groups in Burmese history, and most of these 
were extremely anti-British, increased their political 
influence, and welcomed the successor of Mindon, who shared 
their political views. Consequently^the British found a
Burmay declaring It
a province ox British India in ib»b,
Prior to 1866, the British administered Lower Burma by 
indirect methods, leaving intact the existing social order. 
After that, "the old policy of laissez-faire was 
abandoned and new forms of governmental interference, 
aiming at improved.efficiency or social welfare, were 
invented" (92). The five years following the conquest of
trivial excuse and (ventirelyTconqu.ered
Burma, passed in an atmosphere of pacification of guerrilla 
hands led by former district-offiofals. These lost their 
.former authority under the;.new British direct ;rule, and 
were indignant about the abolition of the kingdom and the 
imposition of foreign rule. In that delicate situation the 
British made an administrative, blunderI^as British and 
Indian civil, servants in Burma ^ belonging to the Indian 
administration, saw their .future careers in India, they 
underestimated the importance of Burmese rural social 
organization^ when they abolished the authority of the 
myothugyis, the traditional "circle" chiefs. These had . 
owed services to ;the king, mobilized and commanded army 
units at wartime, collected taxes and settled;disputes (93). 
The British conveyed 'authority, to newly appointed village 
h e a d m en  with a view to holding a community responsible for - 
crimes committed on its tract. The township officer became 
a civil servant, and thus a traditional hierarchical sy&em 
of authority was' replaced by a foreign system-at one stroke. 
Another,effeet of British direct rule regarded the 
tremors affecting-the clergy, the, Sangha.. Thefavada 
Buddhism had been the religion of the state and the 
ecclesiastical organization received its/authority from the 
king; and though the Sangha had no hierarchical organization 
similar to the Catholic church, there was no strict 
differentiation between clergy and political power. The 
king appointed a monk to preserve religious discipline and 
the purity of the; faith (94). The British denied the head 
of the Buddhist monks practical authority over the 
priesthood (95), who represented the "embodiment of moral
order", and thus foreigners brought about conditions of 
moral deterioration among the clergy, and the disappearance
of discipline towards a central authority (96)., The poliby .
tkc
in Burma entirely contrasted with that of East
-■ - ' f *
Indies, Which left the traditional, social order fairly 
intact; and though the British administrative changes were 
no, more drastic than those introduced by the Spanish in the 
Philippines, the Burmese were more socially developed than 
the Eilipinos of the 16th century.
The British also shifted the economic centre of Burma 
from the Dry Zone and its,capital Mandalay to Lower Burma 
and its new administrative centre in Rangoon (97). The 
process actually; began after the second Burma War, and in 
its conception the British envisaged a change from a 
subsistence economy to cash crop production, providing for 
Lancashire textile purchases. The realization of the plan 
Involved the opening of the Irrawaddy delta to rice 
cultivation by government-built navigation canals^ 
distributaries and embankments erected with the help of 
Indian labour. Prospective cultivators were allocated 15 
acres per family and, by clearing their plots, became land ■ 
/owners. Rapid Immigration to the delta followed and, by 
1901, the Delta rice exports reached 1,416,000 tons, the 
Dry Zone with its variety of subsistence crops losing its 
former economic primacy.
During the long history of Sino-Burmese-relations, 
there has never been a real danger of Sinioization (98) of 
BUrma. The distance, the. physio graphical nature of and 
ethnic diversity along the land route between the economico- 
,cultural effective areas of both-cultures, a priori
excluded, such .aiYpgsaitaa^ty* ‘' -As,: hi story showed, wherever 
Ghinese settlers could not gradually advance^creating;a 
continuous Ghinese cultural cikumene, no real indigenous 
assimilation followed. Sinioization, as occurred in 
Vietnam could be effected by Ghinese literati officials, 
but neither peasants nor literati came to settle in Burma.
Until the 19th century, "land-route" (9,9) Chinese 
lived in Horth Burma^mainly traders in Amarapura and 
Bhamo. Yunnane se merchants came to trade with th e Shan 
principalities and. miners came to buy temporary mining 
rights in Mogaung. As a result of the Panthay rebellion 
and-the Burmese royal monopoly on cotton,. many of the 
'seasonal '"land-route" Ghinese traders failed to come, 
decreasing trade with China, while Burmese-British trade 
increased since mid. 19th century,. Chinese traders shifted,, 
as a result, to store keeping and trading in British made 
piece goods (100). "Sea route" immigrants came via Rangoon, 
following the' .economic boom due to the opening, of the 
Irrawaddy delta.. These were coolies, agriculturalists and 
traders and some of the latter moved north with the hope 
of reopening the caravan route to Yunnan. In 1891, there 
were 37,000 Ghinese in Burma, "more than half of whom had 
come by sea routes" (101).
Until 1900, the Ghinese in Burma, though very distinct 
in life style from the Burmese, had good, relations with the 
latter. Their low numerical power^as compared with the 
Indians, made them relatively inconspicuous and accorded 
them only a;'second, place in socio-economic standing among 
the Asian minorities. Thus, geographical proximity to, and
familiarity with .the administrative system of Burma, as 
well as 'a-better starting point of ;well established clansmen 
gave, the Indians the economic upperhand. As in'Malaya the 
Chinese reversed: their relative economic position in regard 
to the .Indians, it seems that among the three, abbve mentioned 
factors governing the relative economic position of 
immigrant ethnic groups, a superior starting point was 
.dominant, in view of the specific kinship ties in these 
groups .(102) Ihe Chinese initial superiority in the Dry 
. Zone and northern Burma, was annulled when the British 
.shifted the economic centre of gravity to the Delta and 
Rangoon.
(ii) Malayan Ihe pivotal location-of the Malay 
Peninsula in .relation to the Bast - West trade, historically 
concerned parts of its western coasts and some off-shore 
islands, and perhaps also, but certainly to a lesser extent, 
the Kra isthmus (103) . Physiographic .conditions spelled the 
political backwardness of that area "until mid 19th century.
In 1850, its population numbered:an-estimated,300,000, and 
its increase to 2-,670,000 in. 1911, suggests immigration as. 
the.malbr'factor,,' Immigrant Indonesian Malays easily 
integrated .into the indigenous society as they had common 
ethnic and racial affinities. - Sultans ruled over local 
chiefs and petit rajahs, the latter governing small isolated 
economically, effective areas, separated b y 1 swamps, and 
jungle covered highlands. This pre-colonial political 
setting fitted thus into the grain of the country. Within 
Malay society there existed a gulf between aristocracy 
and, the common people. !,lhe latter existed only to serve
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and obey the former and\> administer, to their comfort" (104).,
Local chiefs and rajahs paid tribute to the sultan, but kept
.private armies and maintained some political independence 
in. many instances. Sultans had the power of life and death
over the people, and besides tributes they also imposed
corvee works. Religion was all pervading but adat law
sometimes attenuated it, though certainly not;-'in the case
of debt-slavery, which had its origin in eariy Hindu customs.
The common people living in' kampongs, grew rice as dbaple.
food, and adding Muslim fatalism-to Malay easy going., they-
seem to have accepted their U  with little.or no social
strife. The Chinese miners and traders usually maintained
business contacts with rulers., without making social
contacts with the commoners, perhaps with the exception of
occasional traders in rural areas, and in Malacca.
The E.I.C. acquired Penang, made it a Presidency, and 
the admiralty installed there a shipyard and an arsenal.
It was meant to.become a port of call, a trading post and 
a strategic outpost of the Bay of Bengal (105). Malacca, 
first taken by the British from the Dutch in 1795, and" 
again in .1824, was consequently stripped of its 
fortifications and its merchants were advised to move to 
Penang. After the establishment of Singapore in 1819,
Penang1s merchants were likewise advised to shift to 
Singapore, again to reduce mutual competition. During the 
first three quarters of the 19th century,, British policy^ in . 
principle, avoided interfering with the inner politics of 
the Malay sultanates. Some intervention occurred however, 
when the British tried to pacify intransig:ency among the 
latter and keep Siamese political influence at-low ebb.
More, intensive .intervention was * enforced in 'the fourth 
quarter of the 19th century, when the British installed 
residents in the sultans1 courts and, extended protection 
to the sultanates. This initiative by the governor of 
-the Straits Settlements came without first consulting the 
Colonial Office ( 1 0 6 ) perhaps under pressure from British 
merchants in Singapore. In 1896, the Malay states, under 
British' protection, federated to create the Federated Malay 
States (P.M.S.), while lohore and the four northern states 
constituted the Unfederated Malay States (U.F.M.S.) (107). , 
The reasons behind British Intervention were similar'^ 
to those driving Holland to extend its effective control 
over the Outer Provinces, as well as pressure from 
Sihgapore’s .meiehant'community. This latter pressure .. 
signified that M a l a y s  tin had been a valuable commodity 
even before .British intervention, and- indeed, the most 
important economic activity of* late 19th century was ., 
distributed along the ,.Tin-Belt of western Malaya (108). 
Thoset^PW^ engaged ^ weremdstly Ghinese, who constituted the 
majority in the mining and urban centres of that belt. The 
existing mining activities, justified British investment in 
infrastructural projects in this area, which eventually, 
as Fisher pointed out, 'attracted rubber plantations into 
the same developed belt. This developed area, was -within 
the. F.M.S., .which political creation had a distinct 
economic raison d1etre i.e. to enable British capital and 
Ghinese entrepreneurship to be expanded (109). 1
Ghinese communities in Malacca and in mining:centres 
.of the :Tin Belt date back to the 15th century (110). This
is established from Chinese sources, and as regards 
Malacca also from Portuguese sources* There exists a gap 
in knowledge about the Chinese in. Malaya almost' until the 
19th century when the British increased their contacts with 
the area. ' During that period,.there occurred a phenomenon 
specific to the special links of the Chinese and Malays in 
Malaya and Indonesia, namely, the creation of the 
reranakan. or in the case of Malay$^the baba society. This 
was' typical to Malacca and not to the mining kongsis, the 
latter, living in isolation from the Malays. The babas were 
offspring of- Chinese and non-Muslim or Malay slave women. 
This hybrid group lost most of its Chinese cultural traits, 
spoke a Malay patois and practised Malay and some Chinese 
customs (111), but kept their Chinese names, a fact which 
later had a great significance in the group*s reassimilation 
iiptro the Chinese society.
The babas of the Straits Settlements and locally 
born Chinese who did not adopt baba traits, and were known . 
as Straits Born (112), lived culturally apart from the mass 
of Chinese society. In the 19th century, . they were 
urbanites of the Straits Settlements, Anglicized to a 
certain degree,..and British subjects by status.!; Those 
newcomers who remained in Malaya as coolies, miners, 
cultivators and petit traders, kept their original Chinese 
cultural traits and retained specific characteristics of 
the .Chinese immigrant society; These characteristics 
consisted of a very high proportion of young balehelor 
males, and their socio-economic organizations consisted of 
huis and kongsis. which usually,were secret societies 
divided according to district of origin in China, hence
according to speeeh-group. The: kongsis had specific mining 
or plantation rights over a certain tract usually near a . 
river (113)# The major secret societies contained several 
kongsis, and had extensive hut patched geographical areas of 
influence. As there always existed rival enclaves in the. 
areas of influence^and as more mining sites, were discovered, 
the secret societies often warred.against each other, some 
Malay rulers taking part in these wars (114). Kongsis and 
huls usually bought monopolies for opium, spirits (115), 
and pore supplies and operated gambling houses within their 
territories, while their main income came from, mining and 
some plantation enterprises. Also, the Chinese kongsis and
huis provided social services for their members and. for 
newcomers. Besides providing a social milieu^they acted as 
labour exchange offices and employers. Labour conditions 
were, however, very poor and the Chinese entrepreneurs 
(towkays) usually exploited their labour to the extreme.
When in 1880, the British introduced the administrative 
post of. Protector of Chinese, they linked the Chinese closer 
.to the government and extended protection to them in matters 
of labour conditions (116).
Liuring the 19-th century Chinese formal education was 
traditional in form and small in extent. Chinese communities 
supported and administered it through local boards. With all 
its shortcomings it perpetuated an important facet of the 
Chinese culture. (117).
Ethnic relations in Malaya during the 19th century may 
be defined as Malay rejection of the Chinese mainly on '
religious'grounds, while the Chinese felt culturally aloof, 
yet these., relations -lacked the acerbity which was 
introduced by nationalism in.the 20th century,.
French Colonialism. During the better part of. the 19th 
century, the Vietnamese court at Hue exhibited.a ’negative 
attitude•towards French missionaries and traders, which
■continued even after the former.became aware of the Opium War
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sequel. In 18^9,. thefl^conquered Saigon, and later also/bhe
entire area of Co.chinchina and Cambodia, and in order to 
.reduce Siamese feats, conceded the Siemreap district to them. 
During the 1860^s, the French^emulating the British in Burma, 
unsuccessfully tried to find, a navigable avenue to the 
interior of China through the Mekong. The failure to find 
.this fluvial route was one of the reasons which diverted 
French attention to Tongking and th e R e d  River. In 1873* 
the,French temporarily captured Hanoi, and in 1882 they 
' came back, to stay. ■ There followed three, years of 
"pacification wars^against natives, Chinese and Thai 
.refugees of the Panthay Rebellion, as well as against Ghinese 
troops who had come to suppress the refugees at the request.' 
of the Vietnamese. The French encountered popular resistance 
also in Cambodia. This popular involvement in combats made 
the occupation of Indochina perhaps the bloodiest of all 
colonial conquests in Southeast Asia. The reasons for such 
an involvement may be sought in nine centuries of national 
Independence of the Vietnamese, rather than inj.5religious 
fanaticism, like that encountered by the Dutch in Atjeh.
When French rule over Indochina had been established, 
Sinicized Vietnam and HinduizCd Cambodia: and Laos came under
a single political entity blurring the fundamental division 
between both cultures (118),
Latecomers to the region, the French energetically 
undertook the development of the Mekong delta,'- The newly, ' : 
openbd lands consisted of large..estates rented by 
indigenous absentee landlords (-1.19) to peasant families for , 
40:percent of the crop. The opening of the Mekong Delta
'for efficient rice production increased rice exports from.
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284,000 tons to 747,000 per annum.during 1850^-1900 (12), but.: 
the main share of profits went to Annamite'landlords, to 
•money lenders and to Ghinese dealers, as rice collection, 
.transportation, milling and trade had been monopolized by 
the.Chinese even before the French arrival. Besides rice 
growing, the French introduced, coffee and rubber plantations 
before the end of the century, . diversifying the grain 
monoculture of Gochinchina. Still in the 19th century, the 
French developed coal and mineral extraction i n 'Tongking, 
and making use of the dense population h n  the area, began 
industrializing the region. In addition to developing 
water conservation'in the Red River delta, the French also 
developed the communication and transport network in both 
deltas and improved port facilities at Haiphong and Saigon. . * 
Having laid the basic infrastructure in both economically , 
effective deltas, they undertook to develop land communication 
between these two regions. These economic activities laid 
down the. basis of the future economic development of 
Vietnam, in comparison with which Hinduized Laos and Cambodia 
remained largely undeveloped,
The Chinese minority in the Annamite kingdom were
traditionally traders, rice-millers and craftsmen. . In 
1778, they built Cholon, strategically situated to facilitate 
their control of the-rice trade and procession. By a 1814 
edict.of the Gia long, they were organized in bangs (121),
;or communities, which enabled,,them to live socially apart 
from the indigenes, and which (existence seems to have J . 
.preceded the^ edict (122). The bang headmen, nominated by 
the Annamite authorities, maintained order, collected taxes, 
settled litigations and authorized residence of newcomers.
The Gourt exempted the Chinese from corvee work and from 
military service, and only interfered in Chinese life to 
banish defrauding traders or opium dealers (123).
The French,discriminately heavily taxed the Ghinese (124) 
restricted their travels in the country and. ordered them to 
carry identity cards. This almost stopped coolie immigration 
and’decreased Ghinese commerce in Haiphong, and as a result, 
in the 1890’s, European plantation owners complained of 
labour shortage, and French.merchants*-— *of collection and 
distribution difficulties.; consequently^ the restrictions 
were almost altogether lifted. The French interests in. 
Ghinese residents in Indochina, was expressed, by a 
contemporary Frenchman: "Hous aurions besoin d 1agriculteurs, , 
nous n 1 avons que des eQmmer.cantstt (125). This deplorable
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situation for the French, was brought about by their 
failure to. recognize the rapid socio-economic mobility of 
the| Ghinese in the presence of which a continuous inflow of 
coolies had to be maintained to fill the low-paid jobs. 
Although the French imposed direct rule over indigenes in 
Indochina, they maintained the bangs renaming them 
congregations, and left their headmen the same.rights and
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responsibilities they had enjoyed under the Annamite and 
Cambodian rule (126). The congregations managed traditional 
schools, temples, cemeteries and hospitals. Usually there 
existed one congregation for each town, but where larger 
Chinese communities in cities justified it, each major speech- 
group had its own congregation. Under French rule, the major 
occupations pursued by the congregation members were general 
commerce and the rice procession and trade. In addition, some 
Hakka rice growers lived near the Chinese border, and pepper 
and mulberry-tree growers lived near the Gulf of Siam, while 
market gardeners cultivated plots near cities. The Chinese 
usually did not own estates in the Terres Rouges area, nor 
were they coolies in plantations (.127)* Chinese traditionally 
monopolized the fishing rights in the Tonle* Sap, which they 
used to sub-lease to Vietnamese and Cambodians. They also 
practised deep-sea fishing, avoiding competition with native 
coastal fishermen. In the urban sector, Chinese craftsmen and 
skilled workers provided indispensable services for the whole 
population and the government.
Between 1880 and 1900, the Chinese population of 
Cochinchina doubled, while the indigenes increased by about 
40 percent (128). In 1896, there were 72,454 Chinese in 
Indochina and in 1902 there were 108,598 (129). This growth 
may have resulted largely from the increase in rice 
production in the Mekong delta, which trade and procession 
was dominated by the Chinese. The system,of rice collection, 
procession and distribution demanded the employment of 
kinsmen or at least Chinese agents, ramasseurs, millers and 
distributors. On the lowest level of the system were the
ramasseurs who used to ply the delta .distributaries and 
canals, collect the rice and also sell imported goods and 
serve as "news chroniclers". This system of. rice trade 
must have provided the. Chinese with a high income, which 
was naturally unevenly distributed among them. A 
calculation of a speculative nature may be interesting. By 
assuming the population of Cochinchina to be 90 percent 
indigenous, and/80 percent rural dwellers before 1900, it 
may be safe to conclude that half of these gained their 
livelihood from rice growing. The Chinese, according to 
contemporary sources, constituted 5 percent of the 
population of.Coehinchina. Assuming that 25 percent of the 
Chinese earned their bread and butter through occupations 
linked with rice trade and procession,- it remains only to 
decide the added value on rice after its harvesting, to 
compare the average gross ineome of the Chinese and 
indigenes occupied in the rice industry. If the added value 
was 50 percent, then about 36 percent of the population 
received through production twice as much as about 1.25 
percent of the population received through collection, 
milling and distribution., This means that, on the average, 
a Chinese family occupied in the rice business got about 
14. times more ineome than an indigenous one. If costs are 
to be introduced into the calculation, then the average 
peasant had to pay 40 percent in rent and. additional sums 
to money lenders, which could not be higher than the 
costs incurred by the Chinese. This calculation is based 
only oh average figures, and.totally disregards profits of 
European exporters. In any event,, the rice monopoly must
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have, provided the Chinese with the capital for the further. .. 
M
economic enterprises they pursued in the 20th century.
Siam Until the 2Qth Century. During the 17th century, the
Dutch had some trade privileges/in Siam maintaining two
factories, one in Ayudhya and one in Patani, while
Portuguese, Japanese, Chinese and British competed with
them (130), Later, the Japanese dropped out of the scene ..
and the Europeans had their ups and downs in their relation
with the Court; trade was accordingly affected. In 1680,
the French, invited to counterpoise the Dutch position,
came with an intention to drive out European competition,
which they achieved, and with an aim to convert the Court
and establish bases in Bangkok and Mergui, which they
failed to achieve. Later, the French became the object of
anti-European hostility and riots, which made them leave
the country. The 18th century saw no substantial change in
the Siamese negative attitude towards the Europeans*"!^
almost until 1855, when King Rama IV reopened the country
to Vthemifttilito^  The .Bowring Treaty accorded the British
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trade .prerogatives by fixing aNjT^percent duty limit on 
imports and by the permission.to sell opium. In addition,
' the British got extra-territorial rightsj European
countries and the U.S.A. later signing similar treaties 
with Siam. Rama IV1s decision followed his conviction that 
Siam could;not'remain backward in the modernizing world,
Consequently he invited European advisers and administrators, 
t o  p/ ; W
reorganize!; the government and produce# plans W  buildf^ :
a modern economic and educational infrastructure. Rama V
improved on his predecessor by abolishing slavery, corvee • 
service and gambling houses. He also reformed taxation, 
the military organization, the customs and revenue 
departments and, in 1901, introduced the first state budget. 
These measures only relatively improved on the old system, 
as officials lacked modern education and Western type 
efficiency values (131). In the past, before direct 
taxation was introduced in 1892, the provincial administration 
used to enrich itself by farming out monopolies .on tax 
collection a n d o n  some commodity distribution. It was 
estimated that^out of annual taxes to the value of five to ■ 
six million sterling^only,just over one million reached the 
treasury before 1892 (132).. The reorganization of the 
provincial administration also involved a new geographical 
administrative sub-division, and reformed judicial and 
police systems. Also within the plan of modernization^the 
transportation network improved and extended under 
European planning and by Thai and Chinese labour, the latter' 
supplying low and medium entrepreneurial initiatives,. The - ■ 
urban sector enjoyed modern education in primary and 
secondary levels, traditional Buddhist schooling losing 
much of its former position^, while^ under European 
supervision, technical schools for law, medicine, survey and 
military arts began operating in the late 19th century.
After the mid - 19th century, Siam became involved in-, 
a British - French rivalry in peninsular Southeast Asia, 
both powers endeavouring to secure the flank of their 
respective future land-routes into China.1 The British 
extended their rule over the Shan .States and eventually -
over the northern states of Malaya, while the French ' 
conquered the Kingdoms of louang Prabang and Vientiane, 
by then nominally under Siamese sovereignty. It was only 
the-Entente Cordiale (1904) which put an' end to that 
rivalry and saved Siam from an imminent colonial occupation.
Until mid~19th century, the Chinese in Siam had trade 
preferences especially when anti-European feelings were 
high (133),. but from 1855 onwards, the Europeans acquired
t
preference at the , expense of the Chinese (134)» pwttic W«
especially in engineering, the Chinese undertook construction 
works under European planning. Before that year^the 
Chinese served as contractors to the king in the China 
trade, by then, under royal monopoly. They provided 
transportation, necessary connections in China, and knowhow 
in profit maximization. Besides their domination in the 
rice trade, the Chinese also pursued the crafts, agriculture.,
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mining, smelting and petit trade (135)♦ .Some, owned pepper, 
tobacco and sugar plantations, the produce of which was 
processed also by Chinese (13.6) . During that period, 
economic activity was low, and the Chinese population was 
fairly small, maintaining a low rate.of immigration. This 
relative stability of the Chinese .community, and inter-' 
marriage, brought about assimilation into the receptive 
Thai society (137). The offspring of Chinese males and 
Thai women, Dukchins, usually beeame:completely absorbed by 
Thai society after,two or three generations; absorption 
being defined as the inability to speak Chinese, negligence 
of ancestor worship, and change of surnames (138)*
The economic boost of the second half of the 19th
.Mr
century saw a great increase in Chinese immigration and
population numbers. Chinese became builders, construction
workers and servicemen and vegetable growers (139) near
the expanding Bangkok and other urban centres, inside of
which they increased their occupation in retail trade.
GtneroU.il
GtosteetowUAji speaking, the growth of the urban sector in 
Thailand was closely linked with Chinese new-immigrant 
activities. The 19th century Thai and Chinese population 
numbers developed as follows:
1823 1850 187Q 1875 1890 1900
Thais 4.73 5.20 5.95 7.32 in millions (140)
Chinese 230 300 383 497 608 in thousands (141)
The ’’puli'* of economically developing Thailand
coincided with that of the other Southeast Asian countries,
and likewise augmented towards the end of the century. Also, 
as elsewhere in Southeast Asia, it was European high level 
initiative which created the conditions, for the increased 
influx of Chinese (142). The-latter, when they came, did. 
not fail to find an ’’economic niche”, lying between and in 
symbiosis with the high commerce of the Europeans and local 
nobility, and the low basis of indigenous primary producers^ 
(143).
The organisation of the Chinese society in the 19th 
century, followed speech"group, guilds and secret society 
patterns, which socially meant a vertical rather than a 
horizontal grouping, cutting across economic standings and 
classes. Solidarity, loyalties and social services followed 
these vertical structures (144). Concerning the Thai- Chinese
relations in the first half of the 19th century, the 
Chinese were subject to a special taxi, which exempted them 
from corvee, labour and from military service, but- tax rates 
could be changed at the whim of the monarch or provincial 
governor. Gn such occasions, secret societies usually 
reacted by rioting, which, in. turn entailed Thai retaliation. 
The years 1830, 1847, 1889 and 1895, recorded Chinese-Thai 
riots, generally localized events, which did not create 
very serious and lasting anti-Chinese feelings.
Southeast Asias So cio-Cultural. ffabric on the Verge of the 
20th Gentury. With all the. shortcomings of historical 
generalizations, one- cannot dispense with them when o n e ^  
concern extends over long periods of human activities 
spread over a'vast and versatile geographical space.
Lacking quantified evidence, one should evaluate 
undisputably qualified facts in relation to general 
principles governing human relations and interests in every 
society.
The extension of colonial rule over the entire 
territories of the4r) former ’’zones of influence”, which 
occurred in the second half of the 19th century and 
specifically during its last few decades, 
brought more Europeans and Chinese into contacts with the 
indigenes. The economic boost, which followed the 
introduction of the steamship, mainly developed the urban 
sector of the Southeast Asian countries, the plantation 
branch of the rural sector, and also rice production as a 
cash crop in the Irrawaddy and Mekong deltas. The
indigenous peoples of all countries, or at least the 
lowland dwellers, increased in number, diversified their 
occupations, enjoyed improved education, formal and informal, 
and came* closer to Western techniques, institutions and 
ideas. These phenomena constituted necessary conditions 
for the appearance of indigenous educated people, who could 
think of their countries in terms derived from the political 
thought of the West, thus consecrating the political unity 
imposed on the area by the colonial powers.
The Philippines with its extensive education system 
produced the first modern anti-colonial movement. During 
the 19th century, Burma and Vietnam did not lose their 
anti-colonial feelings, though they, perhaps failed to 
realize them in terms of modern organization. The political 
unification of the entire areas corresponding to 
contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia under effective 
colonial rules, produced at. least the.setting ,in which 
future national aspirations could define themselves in 
geographical terms.
The development of the urban sector, the increase in 
Chinese immigration and the improved knowledge of modern 
socio-economic mechanisms by the indigenes, must have lit 
the Chinese problem from a new angle. In addition to 
localized friction stemming from low-level/competition and 
basic hostility towards out-groups, some of the 
indigenous people must have considered the problem of the 
special socio-economic position of the Chinese in its 
general context, i.e. in relation to the colonialist - 
indigenous political setting. If there was no political
expression of these considerations, there at least existed ■- 
the conditions for such thoughts, though perhaps not the 
social organization for making them public political issues. 
Two social prerequisites were ostensibly lacking: an 
attitudinal change in.the existing traditional elite, or 
the creation of an unsatisfied educated element essential 
to social revolutions. The development of this latter 
characterized the early decades of the.20th century.
During the later part of the 19th century, the Chinese
enormously Increased their rate of immigration into Southeast
Asia; for example, between 1881 and 1901, more than 3
million Chinese arrived In Penang and Singapore alone (145).
Though many , of the immigrants returned to China, a large
proportion.still stayed. The majority of the newcomers
became labourers and skilled workers, but some went up the
ladder of success to become entrepreneurs. However., during
that period, the traditional vertical structure of the
Chinese society remained unchanged, with speech-groups,
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guilds and secret societies dominating the social scene. , The 
failure, of the Ghinese to cooperate with the indigenes on a 
class basis^ stemmed from, among many other reasons, the 
high proportion of Chinese bachelors among the coolies, who 
having failed to stabilize themselves by marriage or business 
occupations, usually considered their stay as temporary..
Thus, the growing proportion of new-comers and their 
relatively short stay increased the ftChineseness” ofjthe entire 
community in each country of Southeast Asia by counterpoising 
local cultural influences affecting the established Chinese 
residents. > •
Nationalism and Independence*
Generally speaking, the nationalists of Southeast Asia 
inherited from the colonial governments a new politico- 
geographical conception of the territories, which had been 
politically established by the late 19th century. In essence, 
it boiled down to the consecration of the extended and 
demarcated boundaries of the colonies, and to the less 
conspicuous system of direct rule. The territorial and ethnic 
vassalage of minorities and the open raarchlands of olden days 
were gone forever. This new conception was in striking contrast 
not only to past experiences, but also to the contemporary 
traditional elite outlook, which still thought in ethnic-group 
solidarity terras. The Nationalists (14-6), at least in theory, 
considered all the indigenous ethnic groups as constituent 
parts of the nation; however, both the nationalists and the 
traditional elites excluded the non-indigenous minorities, 
eminently composed of Chinese, from the national multi-ethnic 
entity. The changing socio-economic conditions of the period 
and education opportunities^ favoured the "popular acculturation 
or "political socialization" (147) of the indigenous groups.
This facilitated the political work of the nationalists and 
acted against the traditional .elites1 political conception (148) 
Western political thought directly influenced the 
intellectual nationalists, and liberals from the West gave 
support by political pressure in the metropolitan capitals. 
London, The Hague, Paris, Madrid and later Washington became 
the scene for political lobbying by local liberals and 
Southeast Asian students and leaders, but Western political
1 0
thought also came indirectly, in Asian attire. India’s Swaraj 
party had close links with Burmese nationalists. Japan’s 
modernization was naively taken by the nationalist leaders to 
be merely a natural outcome of its independence (149), reassuring 
them of their own ability to lead their countries independently, 
Chinese nationalism afibcted. Southeast Asia mainly through its 
influence on the Chinese minorities ifa. These
communities became strongly anti-imperialist as a result of 
European intervention in China, and later developed a considerable 
stream of leftists. But, the leftists’ nationalism expressed 
their allegiance to China more than to their host countries.
This increased the breach between the Chinese minorities and 
the indigenous nationalists, not because China by then had 
a menacing expansionist image, but rather as a result of the 
Chinese immigrants’ traditional economic power (150), their 
increasing inner solidarity and their cultural aloofness.
Thus, the Southeast Asian nationalism, was in part stimulated 
by xenophobia before fully expressing its positive ideas, a 
common characteristic of various nationalist movements (151).
The supreme ethical principle of the nationalist 
movements became the progress towards self rule and independence. 
The questions of the strength of the local economy, its 
dependence on metropolitan markets, danger from other colonial 
powers, and the indigenous leaders’ ability to administer a 
country in a modern world, were usually disregarded. Also, 
special rights to minorities were deemed evil as they tended 
to perpetuate the ethnic diversity of those countries.
Increasing dependence on export-crops^. and^as a result, 
on imported goods, which continued into the 20th century, changed
the taste of local consumption. Besides dealing a severe blow 
to cottage industries, imports and exports naturally increased 
the share of trade in the national.incomes, privileging the 
Europeans and Chinese at. the expense of the indigenes. The 
landed elite did not protest against that economic development, 
neither did they invest capital in industry nor in commerce.
They had no real interest in nationalism, as those who first 
committed themselves to that cause were largely urban dwellers, 
and as their .economic interests did not suffer from Chinese or 
European encroachments. Moreover, both latter groups 
supported the indigenous elite's hold’ on the rural areas, the 
Chinese by providing essential trade, the Europeans by 
perpetuating the elites' economic position through denying the 
Chinese large-scale land ownership. It generally was the 
indigenous middle-class which first became aeculturated to 
nationalism. Indigenous traders, in direct competition with 
the Chinese, naturally became supporters of this movement, as 
did the religious leadership. The latter usually had little 
economic assets but preceded even the nationalists in raising 
the people against the oppressing groups (152).
The indigenes* relations with the Ghinese minorities in 
Southeast Asia during the first half of the 20th century was 
largely dominated by'the former's uncompromising nationalistic 
geographical loyalties, and by their lower economic position.
In terms of mutual group feelings, this definitely manifested 
itself in a growing suspicion. In the second half of the 
century, when the Southeast Asian countries got their independence, 
the status of the Chinese worsened by economic indigenism and 
citizenship laws. The Chinese, nevertheless, improved their
economic position from the abyss of W.W.II., and the wealthier 
among them even arrived at adapting themselves to space left 
open through the meshes of the legal net,' sometimes enlarging 
their freedom of activity through collusion with corrupt 
officials.
. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Thailand 
' was outstanding in its independence, and the Philippines was 
experiencing a "Filipinization" of its municipal and provincial 
governments. On the^other extremity stood the Malay states with 
a very low degree of national consciousness. Within that range 
each Southeast Asian country constituted a particular case.
The,-. Philippines. The disintegration, in the 19th century,, of 
the Spanish Empire in Latin America led the Spanish to use the 
direct route to the Philippines, and entailed an economic 
development in the islands after the 1820$(153). This led to 
the appearance, of a Spanish, mestizo and Chinese middle class, 
of which the two former groups had received good Catholic 
education. This catholic education was available in Manila 
at all levels- and provided various provinclanos with a common 
language (Spanish) and with a possibility to exchange modern 
political ideas. Catholic education had been fairly extensive
I
also at the parish level, and the dispute between Spanish and 
Bilipino clergy over the administration of parishes, especially 
aggravated after the return of the Jesuits in 1952 (154), raised 
anti-Spanish fe&ings among the lower classes as well. Thus the 
Philippines led.all•th^other Southeast Asian colonies in their 
political acculturation.
The Catholic nature of Bilipino education made it 
racially tolerant, at-least in principle, and European
political thought influenced the Liga Bilipina, created by 
Rizel. Thus, it aimed at the remedy of political injustices,
- of agricultural exploitation, and at the creation of a unified 
policy, for the entire archipelago (155); by then, however, 
the Spanish had only nominal control over the Moro Province. 
Later, in the 1890s, the Katipunan secret organization 
initiated a subversive war against the Spanish. It is of
great interest to note that the Katipunan political plate-forme
corning tish
contained some anti-Chinese statements grip
on the economy (156).
(i) Political Developments. Commodore Dewey promised 
Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, future independence for 
the Philippinesj yet the U.S. senate only affirmed progress 
towards municipal and district self government, sympathetic 
legislation and administration, a just settlement of disputes 
concerning land owned by religious orders, and free primary 
education in local languages. The breach of. promise led to 
the continuation of the Bilipino armed struggle until 1901. 
However, between 1901 and 1908, many Bilipinos were incorporated 
into local governments, and the same process also progressively 
developed in the central government; a Bilipino Popular 
Assembly was introduced, and Bilipinos were incorporated into 
the Commission (an equivalent.of a government) . In 19.14, 
there were 2,148 Americans and 7,283 Bilipinos in the 
administration, and in ,-19 2 0 ’—  582 and 12,651 respectively (157)..
In 1916, Congress unanimously voted an "ultimate 
independence" to the Philippines, which only diverted the 
Bilipino-American political strife over the final aim to the 
timing. In government, the Jones Lav/ of 1916 gave the
executive power to the American governor general, legislative
power-to the Bilipino senate and chamber of deputies, and
judicial power to the supreme court. The governor general
could veto acts of Bilipino legislation and held responsibility
to the U.S. president, with whom remained ultimate financial
control. In the first -cabinet, Bilipinos held 5 out of 6
governmental departments.. During the. early 1900s, two
political parties exhibited real difference in political
conception. The Bederalists- aimed at an ultimate federation
uAdb./ uroyj
within the framework of the TJ.S., the Nationalists iusimtOL&&
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the first elections and for long remained the major political 
facior, and, since 1923} when it became practice to elect cabinet
, " T *  I
members from the majority, party, they even increased their 
importance.
During the first two decades of the 20th century / the 
Americans pacified th^Moro Province—(Sulu and Mindanao), and 
following punitive missions, construction of a transport 
network and education opened this frontier area. When the 
Sultan of Sulu abdicated his sovereignty rights in 1915^- 
retaining only his religious function, the road was paved .for 
the extension of the. modern state-idea over the area, not as a 
vassal entity but as an equal constituent part of the'.state (158)
In 1934, the Philippines achieved its independence act, 
which envisaged a i:0 year period of Commonwealth beginning in 
1936. Defence and .foreign affairs had to remain under U.S. 
control during the 10 years period, after which tariffs would 
be imposed and Bilipino- immigration stopped. This 
Commonwealth period introduced women's suffrage, independent 
armed forces, and a commission for the safeguard of honest
elections. The Nationalists were in full power during that 
period which passed fairly peacefully. Only some communist 
agitation in Central Luzon aroused intermittetitj/public interest 
from 1924 onwards.
During the Japanese occupation, ani ,findependent,r 
government, under Laurel, collaborated with the Japanese. The 
administration largely remained in their posts (159), while the 
majority of the population viewed the Japanese occupation with 
disgust, as atrocities, (wwasmtty inflation, forced labour and 
commandeering of goods were ubiquitous. Passive resistance and 
guerilla warfare marked the attitude of the population, more 
than collaboration. Japanese slogans such as "Asia for the 
Asiatics" and a Filipino equivalent; '(The Philippines to 
Filipinos,,^ however^aroused/|nationalist feelings bringing about 
the expansion of Tagalog learning (160).
The independent republic held elections in 1946, and the 
Nationalist* party, by /then divided on the collaboration issue, 
lost to the Liberal Party of Roxas,'who himself had allegedly 
collaborated. Both the Liberals and Nationalists have had 
close ties with reactionary land owners and they definitely did 
not constitute a two-party democratic system.(161), but rather 
two groups of different personal loyalties. Theaew republic 
signed a treaty with the U.S. according the latter military 
bases and rights in exploitation of national resources equal 
to those of Filipinos, in return for an eight year period of 
free Filipino exports to the U.S., and another 20 years of 
gradually increasing tariffs. Generous U.S. grants supported 
the post-war Filipino economy and maintained the traditional 
mutual sympathy between the two nations. It is no wonder, that
the Philippines almost fully aligned itself, with the American 
policy in Southeast Asia and the 'Tar East, becoming a staunch 
adversary of the People’s Republic of China and the Communist 
Bloc. She Philippines participated.in the Korea War, signed 
a peace treaty with Japan in 1951, maintained cordial relations 
with Taiwan, and became an ardent member of S.E.A.T.O..
Moreover, Macapagal anticipated that in the event of a U.S. 
recognition of the People’s Republic, the Philippines would 
still maintain relations with Taiwan (162). He also silenced 
Eilipino voices demanding the opening of trade relations with 
Mainland China.
In addition to S.E.A.T.O., twdmajor political issues 
linked the Philippines with Southeast Asia during the two decades 
following W.W.II., namely: Maphilindo, and Confrontation with 
Malaysia. The former has never culturally appealed to the 
Pilipinos, who regarded it as a political combination of a 
temporary nature. They must have been surprised to learn of 
the rel^ious Muslim overtones of the original Malay racial, 
solidarity (163). Concerning the Malaysian issue, the 
Philippines tried to leave open the question of Sabah (164), 
overtly claiming for themselves the rights of the Sultan of 
Sulu over the territory, and actually trying to gain an outer 
defensive post for themselves.
The post W.W.II. years were characterized by the 
Hukbalahap rebellion. Ideologically motivated by communism, it 
expressed social unrest created by oppressive tenancy conditions 
in central huzon. The Huks fought a gufrilla warfare against 
the Japanese, and when in 1946, their elected leaders were 
denied their seats in the House of Representatives, they took 
once more to the hills with their arms. Roxas and Quirino tried
to solve the problem by force and later by amnesty, but failed. 
Liberal legislation concerning land tenancy rates could not be 
realized through the medium of the .corrupt administration.
Only Magsaysay took effective steps to eradicate the social 
®vil, personally by-passing the administration (165). Luring 
his term of office the Huks, resistance was declining.
(ii) Social and Economic Developments. The cultural
diversity'of the Philippines is represented by its over 80
■xCo^ sbtute.
dialects and languages in current use (166), w h i a  major 
criterion for regional diff erentiation (167). Spanish, English 
and Tagalog are the official languages, the latter, a "demotic 
lingua franca" (168), is increasingly suggested for official 
use. In 1939, 25,4 percent of the population read and spoke 
Tagalog, while 26,2 percent read and spoke English. An 
estimate for 1966 showed that the proportions were 46 and 40 
percent respectively, while in I960 only 2.1 percent read and 
spoke Spanish (169). However, when Tagalog was introduced 
outside Luzon, strong opposition to its acceptance followed, 
especially in the Visayas. The d;hnic diversity of the Philippines 
is held together by the cultural matrix of Catholicism to the 
extent that the religious divide in the South is politically 
more meaningful than are ethnic borders (170). The mestizos, 
largely of Chinese descent, unlike the Eurasians in other 
countries, politicized the Indios, and constituting a large 
proportion of the middle-class and elite, became a cohesive 
force in.Bilipino society.
American educational.activities improved on the Spanish 
achievements. Between 1905 and 1939, schools increased in 
number from 5,500 to 11,000, and to 22,000 in 1951-52. Pupil
enrolment went up from 300,000 in 1905, to 1,250,000 in 1935 
and to 4,000,000 in 1950-51 (171). In 1962, there were 
4,500,000 pupils in schools comprising 16% of the population 
(172). The Philippines’ investment in education was relatively 
high, however^ the 1961 figures showed that only 72.7 percent 
of the primary schools male graduates and 34.6 of the female 
were employed. For college graduates the figures were 76.0 
and 50,8 percent respectively (173). In view of the social 
dangers offered by a high proportion of educated socio­
economically unintegrated persons, the 1960s conditions in the 
Philippines were rapidly leading to political instability.
The process has been In progress within a society, whose 
education sysbem resembled the totalitarian countries’ in Its 
predominant emphasis on moulding the national character (174), 
and must have had a strong influence on the hostility towards 
the local Chinese, community.
The improvement in health services, brought about mainly 
by the Americans, constituted a major factor in the rapid 
population growth. However, the annual growth rate was 
geographically unevenly distributed as is shown by the 
percentages below (175).
Period. "1903-1960 1903-1939 1939-1960 1939-19.48 1948-1960
Luzon 2.13 1.87 2,61 2.16
C
M•DO
Tisayas 1.75 1.92 1.54 1.48 1.72
Mindanao 3.66 3.36 4.24 3.24 5.57
Philippines 2.24 2.06 2.51 1.91 3.06
Population pressure in the Philippines has been enormous, 
especially in the Yisayas and Luzon, where. practically all the 
arable land is cultivated. Mindanao has provided an outlet for 
pressure-relief during the 20th ©ntury, yet immigration seems
to have filled most of the vacant areas, and the late Muslim 
riots may prove that Mindanao, is soon becoming overpopulated. 
Urban squatting has become the second major plague of the 
Philippines after Caciquism. and socially seems more damaging 
than corruption of officials. This problem Is directly linked 
with that of economic progress and income distribution. in 
1938, the G-.U.P. per capita was 88 U.S. $, in 1946 it was 
reduced to 43 as a result of the war; but the growth to 99 In 
1954, and to 112 in I960, represents a 1.12 percent annual 
Increase in real terms between 1938 and I960, a 3.18 percent 
increase between 1948 and I960, and only 2,70 percent in 1951- 
1960 (176), As income has been unevenly distributed, the per 
capita averages disguise a serious problem of economic 
stagnation or deterioration for a large sector of the Filipino 
society (177). The danger of that process in inner politics is 
enhanced by the presence of. the Chinese minority largely 
occupied in'trade, and quite well off.
The ascent of the mestizo elite In the 19th century, 
introduced nationalism into the Philippines, as they could 
overcome the language barrier existing between other, groups by 
means of Spanish or English (178). Being incorporated Into the 
administration in the Spanish era, but more so during the 
American rule (179), the mestizo leadership usually allied 
themselves with the Caciques and the oligarchy, who controlled 
the peasant vote by economic pressure (180). The Intimate 
alliance favoured both parties, and though "Filipinos do not 
expect their public men toye^saints" (181), corrupted 
administration did much to perpetuate the unbalanced distri­
bution of wealth in the country. Limitation of suffrage to
literates and idolizing of the mestizo national heroes, may 
he interpreted as a means undertaken to perpetuate the^nestizo 
elite dominance (182).
During the Japanese occupation, the Philippines, not 
unlike other Southeast Asian countries, experienced a cultural
confrontation with the Japanese. She latter had no experience
c
in ruling non-Sinisized countries before 1942, hut came to 
rule "Malay cultured" countries during W.W.II. The Japanese 
could not transcend their own Sinicized culture which had 
inherent efficiency values. Wartime needs were pressing and 
the Co-Prosperity,Sphere policy must have induced them to act, 
as "to the Japanese mind, there was a prime need of a forcible 
’moral, cultural and spiritual rejuvenation’ of the Pilipino 
people"(l83)* Ihey tried to change the Pilipino traditional 
attitude towards work, industriousness and regimentation, by 
introducing their own primary education values and vocational 
training. Mass singing* and group calisthenics were 
introduced as morale boosters (184), and the value of manual 
work was propagandized. In order to improve and control 
popular response, the Japanese introduced neighbourhood 
associations of 5-15 families, which came under local headmen 
and were incorporated into bigger associations, having 
responsibility for production, criminal offences and mutual aid. 
Besides an inherent cultural antagonism, the Japanese found in 
the Pilipino society also an aversion for the Japanese war 
machine and its ends.
PromjmLd 19th century and onwards, but mainly during the 
American rule and post W.W.II. years, the Philippines experienced 
an increasing trend of external trade in their economy. In 
1938, for instance,■about 75 percent of the exports and two
thirds of the imports were traded with theW.S. The increase' in
export crops caused a continuous decrease in the home produced 
share of the national diet. Rice production increased mainly 
hy expanding the cultivated area, hut per capita production 
was decreasing. Maize and root crop output increased chiefly 
through better yields (185). However, with 27 million dollars
worth of rice imports in 1965, it seems that sugar
\
may lose its competitive position against rice for suitable 
lands, when in.1974 tariff agreements with the U.S. expire, or 
when world market prices fall down.
The,problem of the Filipino economy is social in nature, - 
as the country has maintained an above average rate of economic 
development within the frame of Southeast Asian standards.
Major economic evils are: the high rate of unemployment, the 
low efficiency of agriculture, where 60 percent of the labour 
force generate about one third of the G-.H.P., and the 
traditional system of land tenure (186). lining and industry 
are the more efficient sectors of the eoonomy and as they 
develop with American, Filipino and local Chinese investment,
they may alleviate social pressures.
*
(lii) The Chinese Minority. Figures of the Chinese
community in the Philippines have been confusing, but the
problem of this minority has been as acute throughout the 20th 
ever)
century asfbiefore. By the end of the 19th centuryf there were 
about 100,000 Chinese in the Philippines, and an estimate of 
1909 quoted their number as 120,000, The 1905 census, however, 
returned 45,000 for some unexplained reason, while the I960 
census quoted 181,000 Chinese nationals and 120,000 naturalized 
(187). However, the estimates used by researchers to measure
ifeL.
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the extent of the political issue raised by the Chinese 
identity, in the Philippines are the 450,000 given, by Willraott
and Williams, 300,000 quoted by Taiwan, both figures for
1965 (188). A 400,000 estimate of 1968 (189) may be as good a 
guess as the 600,000 for 1972 (190). It was estimated that in 
the 1940s, about 0.75 million Bilipinos had noticeable Chinese 
facial features (191).
The spread of Chinese nationalism in.the Philippines 
resulted from political influences from China and from common 
grievances experienced by that'minority in the Philippines,
This experience definitely strengthened the Chinese identity and 
solidarity even during the period of the American rule.
Although jus solis was adopted for citizenship considerations, 
the Exclusion Act still aroused Chinese resentment and 
consequently they boycotted American goods until 1907 (192).
The Hokkien preponderance in the community, made it practically 
homogenous and^the high concentration in Manila, although by 
then on the decline, facilitated this Chinese concerted reaction 
to discriminatory laws (193).
By the early 20th century, the Chinese Board of Commerce 
was crelbed and undertook, besides Its natural functions, to 
support social welfare, education, hospitals and cemeteries, 
organizing the Chinese cultural life and providing for itsci 
perpetuation in an atmosphere of Pilipino nationalism. By then, 
the Chinese mestizos were generally losing their uniqueness as 
an ethnic group and were shifting towards Pilipino society. 
Chinese immigration practically stopped, and the community was 
faced by a dangerous situation concerning its^ cultural 
perpetuation. The Chinese community organizational framework
offered the Reformers and the Radicals of China a suitable 
arena to try and attract sympathy, funds and followers (194).
There appeared two distinct groups with different approaches 
to Chinese polities, in the second decade of the 20th century.
The K.M.T. group, which seemed perhaps too extreme to the 
second group of Chinese traders controlling the Board of Commerce;, 
in 1914y both these groups constituted the two political 
factions of the community (195). In later years, the Chinese 
Consulate General undertook to activate politically the Chinese 
community. It helped administer modern Chinese education, 
diffused current information on China, raised funds and 
reported the, local Chinese grievances to the Chinese government.
The liberal economic policy in the Philippines under the 
Americans enabled the Chinese to shift easily from manual 
labour to trade and services. This economic mobility left 
vacancies in th^lower paid jobs, as no Chinese immigration was 
albwed, and as the Bilipinos were slow in filling the vacancies; 
as a result, some voices in Bilipino public life and in the 
American congress recommended the resumption of Chinese 
immigration (196).
In 1932, the Chinese owned 75 percent of the retail trade, 
but in wholesale trade their proportion was much lower. In 
1938, Chinese assets in the non-agricultural sector amounted to 
180 million pesos out of a 1,278 million total, in commerce 
they held 149*5 million out of a 588 million total, and in 
manufacturing—  26 million out of a 356 million total (197).
These figures show that 14.2 percent of the non-agricultural 
assets were owned by Chinese, but whereas their share in 
commerce was about 27 percent, in industry it was only 7.2
percent. The Chinese urban concentration explains their 
overall share in non-agricultural assets but not the high 
concentration in commerce. This latter must be interpreted as 
a cultural pattern specific to Chinese minorities in Southeast 
Asia (198), Indeed, when restrictions on Chinese trade and 
commerce later followed, Chinese capital flowed into industry, 
as a sign of a cultural readaptation to new environmental 
conditions, without affecting their urban concentration (199). 
However, the Chinese control of the retail trade and their 
remittances to China brought about their being labelled as 
dishonest traders and as damaging to the economy; in actual 
fact, remittances to China during 1937-1941 amounted to 6 
million dollars, and their profits from the rice industry were 
not excessive (200). However, this label tended to obscure an 
important Chinese contribution to economic development, which 
did not receive appropriate recognition; their follow-up of the 
Americans into the Moro Province. A Chinese tienda keeper 
would usually settle down in a village supplying goods, 
advancing loans and collecting the produce in a region devoid of 
communications, transport and credit facilities.
The grudge against Chinese traders provided a political 
issue diring 1921-1936,' when the Bookkeeping Law eventually 
reached the American Congress. The sequel was a compromise 
authorizing a translation of account books instead of using 
one of the.official languages. The long debates over the issue 
and the appeal to the Americans exposed the Chinese to much 
public criticism and introduced Chinese trade into the limelight. 
This helped the landed Caciques and their supporters in diverting 
public attention from the agricultural problems.
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The liheral: American approach to the Bilipino economy 
facilitated the Chinese relative progress in their economic 
standing but not their socio-cultural integration into the 
Bilipino society. Chinese nationalism and Bilipino resentment 
could not compromise in an atmosphere of economic liberalism, 
as “dependence upon and inability to compete" (201) still 
characterized Bilipino - Chinese relations. Thus, with a 
growing Chinese solidarity facing, the economic discriminatory 
laws ,after 1936, the Chinese continued to improve their (E/M) 
sex ratio from 0.012 in 1903 to 0.76 in I960 (202). This meant
of peeptej
that their proportion/integrated into families (See Appendix A) 
rose from about 0.24 percent to 86; this presumably in pure 
Chinese families. However, the Chinese solidarity of the 1930s 
was not complete, as in the 1930s, there appeared a Chinese 
leftist group, which numbered a mere 1,000 at the end of the 
decade. This small number, in Comparison with Indonesian and 
Malayan Chinese communists, may be explained by the small 
proportion of Chinese labourers 'in the Philippines, in contrast 
to countries where Chinese immigration proceeded-unchecked well 
into the 20th century. A more recent social breach will be 
discussed later.
The. post-independence economic discrimination against the 
local Chinese continued although Philippine - Taiwan relations 
were improving. In 1948, only 38 percent of the retail trade 
remained in Chinese hands (203), in 1961 rice and.corn-trade 
became Bilipinized and more than 100 bills restricting Chinese 
economic activities were enacted (204). In the late 1950s, the 
Chinese held only 13 percent of the retail stores and 37 percent 
of the assets in the trade. This brought about a shift 
Chinese capital into manufacturing. In 1961, the Chinese -owned
UT­
IL, 068 large industrial enterprises out of a total 4,085 (205),
mainly producing textile, tobacco and garments (206).; The 
shift of Chinese' capital from trade to industry was not 
voluntary, and yet it must have increased the attachment to the 
Philippines of those thus involved as a preliminary step in 
their social integration. As capital invested, in industry is 
less liquid than that invested in trade, and. as owners and 
managers must have close and frequent contacts with officials 
for the smooth operation of their businesses, this group of 
the wealthier Chinese must be economically conduced to 
increased Filipinization. Had the Filipino.economic indigenism 
been unique in Southeast Asia, Ghinese capital would have been 
smuggled out of the country, but with nowhere to emigrate and 
economic indigenism being rife throughout the region, the 
Chinese capitalists are led to closer integration with the local 
higher classes.
Discrimination against the Chinese occurred also in 
citizenship laws. The1 Commonwealth, ancJjLater the republic 
governments, actually regressed to a jus sanguinis policy, which 
seemed in a way not to effect Chinese reaction. Children of 
Chinese and Filipinas could choose their nationality when they 
reached legal maturity, but the China, born were discriminated 
against by the distinction between a ”native born Filipino’1 and 
a naturalized citizen. In the fifteen years following 
independence, only 2 percent of the Chinese petitioned for 
naturalization. This resulted perhaps from the illegal entry 
oj^many Chinese or of their parents (207). Other reasons for 
the Chinese reluctance to naturalize were perhaps the mutual 
suspicion and hostility between them and the Filipinos (208), 
the disappearance of the mestizo class (209), the growth of
Chinese consciousness (210) and the strong diplomatic position
of (Taiwan in the Philippines until the early 1970s> Also, 
the naturalization procedure became a means to extort large 
sums of money from the applicants and only wealthy Chinese 
could afford it, hut citizenship could be easily/repealed (211). 
Relationships between Chinese and. Filipinos were smoother in 
rural areas and assimilation has been there easier than in 
Manila (212).
In absence of new immigration Chinese education seems to.
be one of the. major factors in 
is amplified by the statement
[perpetuating the culture. (Phis 
that n(Phe minority of Chinese 
who attend or have attended non-Chinese schools are affected 
most of all fry Western and Filipino cultural traits)” (213).
(The situation in'; 1963/64-, when 57,000 Chinese pupils attended 
about 137 vernacular schools on primary level alone (214)? 
indicates a strong hold of the Chinese education syd^em on the 
community. In proportions, it means that for an estimated Chinese 
population of 425,000 about 13.4 percent attended vernacular 
schools, which means that almost all the relevant age-group 
received Chinese education.
Virtually beginning after the American conquest of the 
Philippines, Chinese education eventually adopted Mandarin 
as a means of instruction, and in 1926 added English into 
its curriculum for pragmatic reasons. In 1936, under the 
Commonwealth government, the schools had to be registered, but 
by W.W.II. only 23 complied, although in 1935 there already 
had been 52 schools (215). After W.W.II, Chinese education 
flourished with 154 registered schools and 52,395 pupils 
attending’in 19.59. A Chinese teachers , college also functioned t 
yet out of 1,882 teachers only 126 had Filipino citizenship (216).
The syllabus divided into /an English section under the 
superivision of the ministry, and a Chinese section.controlled 
by the Taiwan embassy. This followed a post W.W.II. Sino- 
Philippine treaty; later however, under public opinion pressure, 
the entire syllabus came under the control of the ministry.
In addition to formal Chinese schooling, Chinese daily 
newspapers appeared in the 20th century, with more than 23 
printed until the 1920s. Discussing Chinese specific subjects, 
they contributed to ..strengthening Chinese identity/and 
solidarity. In 1932, there were 28 daily newspapers in the 
Philippines with a total circulation of 208,000, and in 
addition, 5 Chinese dailies, with a circulation of 32,000 (217),; 
served the Chinese community. In 1968, there were 4 Chinese 
dailies In Manila, only, one having a nationwide circulation (218).
In the present atmosphere of economic indigenism, and
with the waning political power of Taiwan, Chinese businessmen
tend to cooperate with Pilipino officials in economic and social
<v
matters. Many of the weaLthy Chinese moved to suburbia and . 
Increasingly alienated themselves from the Chinese cultural 
core, in the Chinatown (219). This class differentiation tends 
to divide the Chinese community, but the wealthy still keep 
their official leadership in the community.
The cultural centrality of Manila in the Chinese community 
life is apparent from the high concentration of the Chinese 
population there. Por instance, in Cebu with 1,333,000 total 
population in I960, there\jyere less than 9,500 Chinese nationals, 
while in Manila with 1,139,000 total population, there were more, 
than 69,000 Chinese nationals. While historical reasons were 
operative in this concentration, it is evident that the
r*o
centrality of Manila in Philippine economic life., has 
provided special attraction for the Chinese. In addition to 
the highest complex of Chinese cultural institutions in Manila, 
there was the Taiwan embassy and easy links with both Taipei ' 
and Hong Kong. If both latter cities lose their cultural and- 
economic importance,-and political conditions still alienate 
. the Philippines'-’from Peking, Manila,- as a Chinese centre may 
find in Singapore a. non-communist Southeast-Asian centre of 
culture and business. Cultural and-, economic links with an 
overseas Chinese centre, where no restrictions are imposed on 
the Chinese, is essential not only for education and trade, but 
perhaps more for maintaining international links for Chinese 
companies. These links enable the Chinese to shift capital 
from one country to another as a means of overcoming economic 
indigenism in their countries of residence.
Indonesia. Pour major peoples and tribes inhabit Sumatra, five 
live in Kalimantan, three in Java, seven in Sulawesi, four in 
the Lesser Sundas and one each in the Moluccas and West Irian, 
besides many, "lesser" peoples (220). Howe v e r t r a d e r s  of 
the coastal areas could communicate with their' counterparts 
in various islands by the common demotic language,'which later 
developed to become Bahasa.Indonesia. In addition, there 
^ exist* 200 "provincial languages" (221), and perhaps more, as 
Borneo is linguistically largely an.unknown territory (222).
"On Java for instance, Bahasa Indonesia in different varieties, 
Suhdanese and Javanese are often spoken within one and the 
same household" (225), which emphasizes the extent of the 
ethnic diversity; of Indonesia.
At the end of the 19th century, Indonesia definitely *
, lagged behind the Philippines in national awareness. Both 
were ethnically variegated, and each had' a common;major 
religion. Differences, however,.mainly concerned the extent 
and level of education, which had been favouring the Philippine 
the degree of urbanization, which at a 10 percent level was 
lower in Java, and.the political attitude of the mestizo group.
. In Indonesia, they fuljj identified, with the Dutch, in the 
Philippines they constituted the avant-guarde of independence. 
In both countries the big land owners depended on the 
colonialist who in the early stages: of.nationalism, did not: 
express any enthusiasm for that urban originated phenomenon. 
Again, in both countries the- indigenous clergy served the 
cause of nationalism: in the Philippines, through the dispute 
over controlling the parishes, in Indonesia through a 
religious. revival involving an increased pilgrimage to Mecca and 
through a sharpening" of Muslim.consciousness.
■ By 1900, the Dutch/clearly discriminated against the
'Muslim Javanese ethnic majority in. education, as Jhva' with
■. " •••..
. over 2 6 -million inhabitants had 562 primary schools, while the
Bataks had 200 for a population of 321,000 and Menado had 366 
for a population of 423,000. Indonesia with 36 million people 
had only 1,501 schools. In the European primary and secondary 
schools, most of the students were Eurasians v/ith some Chinese 
and Europeans. The enrolment■of indigenes;in.these schools was 
1,545 on the primary,level, and 13 on the secondary (224)*
Two schools provided higher education: the School of 
Administration, which had branches in several provinces, the 
students of . whieh were of- the rural elite class and could
expect government jobs upon graduation, and the Medical School, 
to which students came fibm all the provinces, usually from 
inferior classes. This latter school spread nationalist ideas 
from early 20th century.
The Dutch favouritism towards Christianized,indigenous 
groups did not affect the position of the Chinese, as it gave 
preference to the former groups in fields ’which■the Chinese had 
voluntarily abandoned, su,ch as administration and .Dutch 
education. . But, the Dutch', attitude-towards the Chinese could 
not be interpreted .as indifferent. In fact, cUring the .
Ethical Policy period, influential Dutch expressed hostility 
towards the Chinese exploiters of the indigenes and the Dutch 
press and officialdom in the Indies continued in the same view. 
(225), without however restricting their occupations or 
immigration,
(1)- Political Developments. Early political party 
organization in .Java, included the Budi Utomo, the Indische 
Partij and Sarekat Islam (S.I.). The first one, founded in 1908 
by graduates of the Medical School, aimed at improving education 
for the indigenes. The second fought for legal equality for all 
races and for an eventual' separation from Holland. The third, 
the only one to have a significant-popular appeal, originated 
from Muslim traders1 reaction to Chinese economic activities 
under the Simulation of Chinese socio-economic organization.
In 1914, the S.I. had a.membership of 367,000 (226) and, 
spreading to .the Outer Provinces, lost its original economic 
and religious raison d'etre adopting the common objectives of
a nationalist■party. The Dutch, beccming aware of this 
growing political consciousness, conceded to the indigenes a
i n
suffrage to municipal councils, and created a Volksraad with 
advisory, status to the Governor General. This.Volksraad had 
some elected and some nominee members, and enabled the new 
political elite to express themselves and train side by side 
with the rural traditional elite in parliamentary activities. 
But,' the haughty airs of the Governor General towards that 
advisory body frustrated the moderate Budi ITtomo representatives 
X 227).
In 19.23, a left-wing group within the S.I. broke away to 
create the Indonesian communist party (P.K.I.). . This new 
movement advocated international class-struggle and 
popularized .communist militancy among coolies, cultivators and 
poor shopkeepers, but stern Butch reaction soon follows (228). 
Still in the 1920s', Indonesian students in Holland created a 
political club with liberal Butchmen1s support, and advocating 
a complete separation from Holland, they introduced the name 
"Indonesia" as a substitute for the. ."Butch East Indies". Both v 
the S. I . and the P.K.I. considered this group to be chauvinistic 
(229). But, the, group went further to found the nationalist 
Party (P.N.I.), and their leader Sukarno, tried to unite both 
the P.K.I. and the S.I. with his own party under "the slogan, 
"Nationalism, Islam and. Socialism". In 1927, the parties 
federated proclaiming their common-ideal of independent 
Indonesia. However, the political aCculuiruration of the masses, 
undertaken by the political,parties, had only a superficial 
effect, Each party centred around, personalities and a small 
circle of intellectual supporters, thus enabling the Butch to 
paralyze party activities .almost completely by arresting the 
leaders. This mainly'occurred during the depression years,
By then^however, Sukarno abandoned his policy of political non­
cooperation and shifted'his. activities to the Volksraad.
. Between 1931 and.1938,•. about one third of the - Volksraad members 
belonged to the extremists, left and right, and two thirds 
.constituted the moderates, who favoured the preservation of 
close'.contacts with Holland (230). These latter directed their , 
efforts to promote economic and cultural activities:.the creation 
of an Indonesian bank, cooperatives, farmers’ unions, native 
schools and the spreading of .Bahasa Indonesia (231). In 1936, 
the Volksraad unanimously petitioned the queen for a reform 
looking'1 towards self-rule within a commonwealth'with Holland 
(232). The rejection of this plan disappointed the moderates 
and brought; them closer to the extremists; they also adopted the/' 
ideal of free Indonesia.
-While in the 1930s, the political scene consisted of 3 
main blocs., these contained more than 20 parties. This.
fragmentation resulted from the nature of loyalties to
dj
personalities rather than to ideals, and. by 1'940.'enabled the
T ' . •
/Dutch, to suppress :party, activities by, the imprisonment of 
leaders, thus the total ^ membership t^o 81,000, with
about 200,000 politically aware but. uncommitted people. By 
then, 287,000 Indonesians were literate in Dutch,'while over 
6 million were literate in indigenous languages. It seems that 
"on
independent movement did hot- constitute a threat to the colonial 
government" (233)f .and so, Holland remained adamant to 
Indonesian demands for reform even after it fell prey, to Germany.
During the Japanese occupation, the conqueror paid no 
heed to the demands of the nationalists, who had cultivated
theoutbreak of the second World War, the Indonesian
political hopes for such an eventuality. As early as W.W.I., 
Japanese expansionist intentions towards Indonesia were '
its conquest (234); this/must .have: been 'known-to the Indonesian
Indonesia into 3 military commands in 1942'(235), and did not 
-promise: any future independence., unlike the political status 
they accorded Burma and the Philippines. Yet, Sukarno and 
many other local leaders totally harnessed themselllves to the
of the., people. "H Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere
prestige and power, exercised by;local leaders, was. more than
Justice and. Paith in One. Cod, and achieved an all-party consensus
for his ideology (237).
In their efforts to increase Indonesian'production to 
help the war machine, the Japanese sponsored a regimented 
popular movement. At first they turned to the nationalist 
leaders for support in' harnessing the rural. population, hut 
those had- only limited - influenee there . The Japanese then tried
to .appeal to the rural nohility and corps of officials, and 
later to the. Muslim leadership for similar support. They: 
created - a Muslim volunteer army with Indonesian command .up to- 
batallion-'level. But the. efforts did not meet Japanese
. 1 , 1 • . f ' *- '
expectations, either in Indonesia or in other parts of Southeast
puhliehed-in the Japanese press, suggesting the desirability of
nationalists. After the occupation, the .Japanese divided
Japanese cause. By thus committing themselves, Sukarno and/ 
other prominent lenders became established as recognized leaders
promises were, three years of anti-colonial propaganda and
..anything else ever allowed or enjoyed by the nationalist 
leaders1 (236). Sukarno, in-., the meant ime , drafted his Pantja 
Slla of Nationalism, Humanity, Popular Sovereignty, Social
Asia, where the Japanese faced a similar Malay cultural 
attitude towards production' (238). Initial .enthusiasm could 
he high, hut the indigenes lacked the .capability.'of sustaining 
it for long periods in their daily activities.
When the tide of the war changed in favour of the Allies, 
Sukarno* s ■ popularity de ere ased^ mainly. among , the youth 
organisations (239); still, his oratory power enabled him to 
maintain the leadership. This became evident when the youth 
demanded th&v declare independence just before the war ended, 
while he preferred to await the Japanese consent for the new 
constitution. The opposition manifested itself even more 
strongly, when between‘Japanese surrender and the Allies* 
landings^ Sukarno/b y ,then president of the republic, had to 
concede some of his constitutional but dictatorial rights and
accept democratic limitations to the'pre si/i dent s' power.
/
The hutch return in force proved a failure as did the 
talks with Indonesian, representatives in Holland. The 
colonial s;ydtem, where few thousands of Europeans relying on 
minorities could rule ma,sses of exploited people, became 
outdated after W.W.II.. In the meantime, young Indonesia 
overcame a communist rebellion in 1948 (240), and officially : 
amalgamated its states into a unitary republic in .1950. The 
1951 distribution of parliamentary seats did not show any 
party predominance, and*the 1955 elections gave representation 
to 27 political parties, with almost equal power tcjMuslim and 
non-Muslim groups (241)-. The MASJUMI party which suffered, . 
since its appearance in 1945, from schisms and splits, had a 
traditional and a Western educated groups of leaders, and with 
other Muslim parties, got .45 percent of the votes (242)..' The^
melections clearly proved the deeLine of the traditional 
official leadership by its inability to control the rural vote.
In the 1950s, the Outer Provinces and their array garrisons 
fomented against the central government in Java. In 1958, a* 
nftmnftr rebellion in Sumatra necessitated Intervention by loyal 
troops'from Java to restore unity to the Republic. As a 
reward the army under Hasution got 35 seats in the parliament 
thus becoming an important political factor. The centrifugal, 
.tendencies of the Outer Provinces did not express themselves 
under. colonia,! rule, yet they, had been inherent in the 
Indonesian - setting due to human and geographical diversity, and 
the artificial centrality of Java.
After the expulsion of 45,000 Putch citizens in 1957, 
following;the unsuccessful talks over West Irianand the 1958 
revolt in the Outer Provinces, and in view of the increasing 
economic difficulties, the 1945 constitution was reinstated
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in 1959. Sukarno, dissolved the constituent assembly and
governed with the legislative aid of his ardent followers. He
tried time and again to instil in the people an idealistic
spirit and improve the economy suppressing Chinese trade in
rural areas, and accusing the parties of undermining the
principles of P.antja Sila. When in I960, parliament ;seemed. to
reject, the proposed budget, he dissolved it. Thus, during the
1957-1965 period of G-uided Pemocracy, the array and the
communists (243) emerged as the only politically effective 
groups. The Muslim bloc, by then divided, over the education
issue (244), could not produce a common political front, as it 
lacked the discipline inherent both in the army and the P.K.I.. 
The two latter counterbalanced each other's influence by their 
rivalry. While the army enjoyed a favoured position, inflating
its lanks to half a million, and modernizing with Russian arms,, 
the- Communists, who did not participate in the .government, held 
.no responsibility for the deteriorating economy and thus 
‘enjoyed a favourable public opinion. . They agitated the. 
peasantry, to which the army harshly reacted.. In 1964, they 
gained control over the propaganda systems^ consequently, a 
clash with the army seemed inevitable. Yet, both Army and 
Communists supported Confrontation (245).
The communist coup, in anticipation of a, possible army 
takeover, failed,and led to the downfall of Sukarno (246). . 
Suharto'the successor, changed the Indonesian policies towards 
Malaysia, the U.H.,0. and the West leaving relations with China 
to deteriorate. Thus, Indonesia stepped out of its political 
isolation in relation to. Southeast Asia and the world. However,, 
in inner politics Suharto' showed, no'liberalism towards the 
Papuans or.the Chinese-minority (247)- Ike army takeover 
destroyed the political power of the P.IC.I. as well as the 
non-communist Left and the Centre (248)ahd, indeed, the army 
emerged as the dominant power in the country (249).
Luring 1.945”'1965, Sukarnofs leadership dominated the
political scene in Indonesia. He seems to have been driy.en by
a messianic belief in his personal role as|saviour of Indonesia
(250). His astuteness in manipulating, leaders of lesser calibre,
and in casting his spell over the masses^’ must have made him
believe in the power of the word,and in the importance of 
emotive confrontation situations. He maintained his oratory
power through long years of actual separation from common
people’s lives, yet, remained linked to them by ”mytho-mystical .
common experience,” ( 251) . Together with some other Asian 
leaders he was misled into believing that the people could share
his own devotion (252), or perhaps that'he couldchange. their 
basic attitudes, towards sustained service^ to the state.
Though his regular direct appeals to the masses, by-passing 
the administrative hierarchy, must.have arisen from his . .
personal aptitudes, there is no reason tojdiscard the opinion 
that the lack of backing by. a loyal unified elite class made 
him resort to those means (253). Yet, his inability or 
reluctance to deal with details, and his over consciousness 
about his.image, perhaps drove away valuable assistants.. His 
frequent travels abroad; (254), where, respect and honour could 
■be more easily, gained than in confronting burning internal 
issues (255), represented perhaps spells of escapism, no less 
■ than his unexplicable semi-apathy during the. 1965 rebellion.
His charismatic -personality made- him disregard the value :of 
tradition in political institutions, hence1 his constant .; 
constitutional changes and undemocratic handling of rival ;
parties. This may have brought about the conditions for the 
advent of the military regime or, if luck had not turned its • 
face from them, to a communist government.
(ii) Social and Economic Developments. The 20th century 
demographic development of the Bast Indies has been characterized 
by a fast population growth, and by a deciaase in the 
proportional preponderance of Java’s population. In 1900, Java : 
had a population of 28.7 million, while the Outer Provinces 
had only 7.6 million in 1905, but already in 1930, the 
proportion declined to 41.7 million in Java as agan.st 19 million ■ 
in the Outer Provinces (256). In 1962, it stood at 63.1 million 
in Java and 34 in the Outer Provinces, with a national average 
growth rate of 2.3 percent per annum (257). By then, 72 percent
"fgo
of Indonesia’s population wore occupied in agriculture, which 
generated 55 percent of the national income, and the average 
per capita income was 46 £ per annum (258),.. In 1970, the 
population rose to 122 million and is projected to reach 155
million in 1980 (259). -
a . ." ' .1
Java is still mainlining the centres, of government,
education, industry and commerce. Though lacking in natural
resources, its, marketing possibilities and its .relatively
developed infrastructure still economically justify its
centrality. Nevertheless, historical centrifugal tendencies iii
the Outer Provinces still exist,' and the integrity of Indonesia
is largely maintained by the strength, of a central government
and the centripetal force of developed Java. It seems that
within the- ethnic and economic diversity of Indonesia, the
maintenance of a developed, centre and less developed outlying
provinces increase^ the cohesivity of the state', whilemulti-
centre development on a basis of equality may strengthen the
centrifugal forces.
Until the early 1900s, class stratification in the East
Indies was fairly rigid, and 'in the urban .sector it followed
an ethnic division. The Europeans' constituted the apex of the
pyramid in government and big business. The Eurasians occupied f
high and medium administrative , posts ■ and,, the Chinese,, the
majority of the Foreign Oriental group, constituted the. middle-
class of traders and the skilled working class. The indigenes
largely remained at the base of the pyramid. The rural sector
from base' to summit wa's largely indigenous. The nobility.
dominated the peasantry, through, the hierarchic system of
indigenous officials (prijaji). The common peasants divided 
into four classes distinct by their land ownership1 or rights of
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tenancy (260). The lowest of the four were mere farm hands, 
while, the clergy and religious teachers, the ul am a constituted 
• a class apart. \ This traditional classification.'must have. been 
quite rigid for long periods,' as is apparent .from the f .. . 
elaborate linguistic ’sets of pronouns expressing soelaii , '
distance between inferior and superior (261). traditionally, 
the peasantry showed negative' attitudes towards trade . 
occupations and consequently the field was left open to the ;• 
Chinese, .For the;indigenesyah appointment .as k pri ,jaji -was 
considered a desirable social status change,. families sometimes 
making great efforts to enable one of their members acquire, : ■
.education and qualify for the post,. Expectations on. their 
part, to be accordingly rewarded by the nominee seemed thq$ only 
. natural. In the.Outer Provinces, hov/ever,; the indigenesf showed 
more individualism and had. a knack for vtrade^.!(262)i ahdythus, 
rich farmers., and traders demanded social.status similar to that 
enjoyed by Adat, chiefs, and could expect to marry into their . v ’\,' 
families (265). ' 2
In the 1920s the rate, of social change within' the 
indigenous society-’-^aa, ine.re asing,- the, trend cdntinuing until 
the presents day. lore indigenescentered government' service f 
until 1958, when almost 99 percent of the low ranking government 
personnel, 60 percent of the low-medium and 38 of the high- 
medium ranks were occupied .by fndigehes; hot to mention’ 6 ,
■percent; of the high officjgls (264)-:. The;-, indigenous government 
officials used to-, communicate, with the public in .Bellasa 
Indonesia, and thus helped"'to spread the language over, many.- 
urban centres. Ibis increase in, indigenoustofficialdom as v/ell
as changing attitudes towards trade occupations achieved 
early S.I. activities, improved education, and’ruraiyurban
migration^ due to agricultural land•overfragmentation, 
increased-the numbers of urbanites.
Formal primary•education in .local vernaculars', and 
.informal agricultural training had been introduced by the Dutch 
as a result of their Ethical Policy (265). In 1900, there' were
75,000 pupils in local vernacular, modern schools. The number 
rose to .266,000, of whom 50 percent in the Outer Provinces, in 
1907*. Primary education increased the demand for higher 
education, where .Dutch was'a prerequisite, and this, handicapped 
the indigenes,, .who only after preparation could enter higher 
sbhools. . In 1900,. there were 17,025 Europeans and Eurasians 
in the More Extended Lower.Instruction schools, but only 1,615. 
natives and.352 foreign (266) orientals. In 1930, the numbers 
were 38,236; 71,618; and 2’4,807 respectively. The numbers, 
relatively, small as they were,. produced more than the government 
service could absorb and so many of the educated must have 
.produced leadership for the new urban associations, sucli as 
political parties and trdde-unions.
The Japanese occupation revolutionized the social status 
of the ethnic .groups reversing the relative position-of the 
indignenes and the Chinesei In addition, wartime conditions 
caused a geographical ■ shift of millions of young men,, some 
leaving villages to serve, in labour units, youth organizations 
ahd auxiliary military formations. The military units 
officered by those indigenes,: who had been considered as unloyal 
during the Dutch period, constituted-not only a striking ,. 
contrast to the former units, officered by Dutch_and.Eurasians 
(267), but .the .kernel around which: the army of independent 
Indonesia was organized. All this social and geographical.. ;
mobility decreased the .authority of the rural nobility, the 
ulama and the prijajis. The early days of; .in^endence saw 
another increasing social mobility, when the hew--political, 
military and administrative'elites overshadowed- the traditional b 
elites. Some of the new elite, mainly, army officers after 
1965, became absentee landowners by acquiring land from 
impoverished peasants (268). ; . :
Until the Guided Democracy period, the private.sector of
o ' - • \ " * > ’‘I " b- r ■
the economy operated fairly freely. It was alleged.- that the 
Foreign Asiatics, a euphemism for, the Chine se/ produced more - •' 
speculation than real economic development (269) during.that 
period* This must be taken with a grain of salt, as by then a 
large part of the economic entrepreneurs were Indonesians of 
former prijaji origin. The Guided Economy of that period created, 
a huge government sector of the economy, whose efficiency must . 
have been low. Expenditure on armed forces was tate# high and 
government extravagant show-off. expenditure in general, brought 
about a rampart inflation and a flight of capital from the country 
The 1965 army takeover introduced a more liberal economic 
policy, which favoured traders and entrepreneurs, for whom array 
officers became protectors, figureheads or partners. General 
economic development increased as Indonesia*s political . 
isolation faded away and foreign investment began, flowing in. ;
The stabilization of the currency and increased oil production
(270) represent that development-, -which manifested’ itself in 
other fields as well. The state of agricultural production in
Indonesia was sometimes the subject of conflicting reports.
For instance, rice production in 1950-1965 increased from 11.6 
million tons to 19.4 million; in yields: from 20.3 quintals per
hectare to 26.4 and in per capita output from 150 kg.; to 181
(271). Another source reporting on the- total agricultural, 
production in 1954-1968, shows a compound annual growth, of 0.5 ’ 
percent per annum in yields., and 1.9 percent in-output for 
1954-1969, the lowest in Southeast Asia, which averaged 4.5 
percent (272). In fact, the Indonesian budget of; 1967 allocated 
70 million dollars for rice imports (273)’. in,196.0-196.7, the.: 
aggregate output increased 2 percent annually i.e. less than the 
•population rate of growth, but in 1966-1969, it increased 4.3- •••. 
percent annually and an increase.in gross capital formation.was 
also reported (274).- Economic progress i s •still precarious and 
difficult to .sustain owing to.corruptionj inefficiency of the 
government and unpredictable, and arbitrary national d¥:i;ves (275), 
The projected compound annual growth rate in d.E.P. for 1965-. 
1980 is 3.8 percent, the lowest in. Southeast Asia, except for 
Laos and South Vietnam (no figures for Burma)(276). . In 1966, ,
the per capita G.E.P. . stood, at; 91 U.S.,.$ (the., lowest excepting ; 
Laos) and the population growth, rate was ' 2. 5--percent, per annum 
(277). However, In educational’ achievements, the 2.5 million 
pupils of 1942, trebled in 1959, and surpassed 16 million in * 
1966. The 800 university, students of 194? increased to 109,000 
in 1961 and to 278,000 in 1965. Yet, the estimated number of 
agricultural faculties graduates in ;I9’67-71, was only . 2., 545.. , .
The above, mentioned, socio-economic conditions and the , 
authoritarian nature of the government neither exclude future 
■nationalist drives against, the Chinese as a scapegoat for 
economic difficulties, nor i d o they prevent future Collusion 
between Chinese entrepreneurs, and corrupt government officials.
(iii) The Chinese Minority. ■ In the 20th; century the.
Chinese were • relatively less concentrated-fin Java .and Madura 
than in the Outer Provinces, in comparison: to tlie demographic 
distribution of indigenes in Indonesia. In ,1900, 277,000
Chinese lived in Java,, while 260,000 lived in the, other provinces 
In 1930, the relative numbers were/ '582,000 and 651,000 
respectively. The total number of Chinese rose .from 537,000 in 
1900, to 809,000 in 1920, and to 1,233,000 in 1930 (278). An 
estimate for 195Q, quoted their number as 2,100,000, from which 
figure Purcell deduced that in I960 they numbered- 2,500,000 (279) 
This figure implies that the Chinese, constituted about 2.6 
percent of the total population.and;for- a fairly short span 
of time their proportion does not seem likely to change 
significantly. Chinese immigration to the /East Indies averaged
28,000 in 1900-1930 and 17,000 in 1932-1938 (280), while from 
1940 onwards, Chinese immigration showed a net loss (281). The 
pre-1940 rate of immigration exceeded,that of the 19th century, 
and yet in 1930, 79 percent of all the. Chinese In Java were 
locally born (282). Purcell estimated that 750,000 of the 
Chinese population of 1930, had been locally born and '500,000 
of them had Indonesia born fathers, while-450,000 were new 
immigrants (283). It was said, that whereas the Chinese 
immigrants rapidly moved, into peranakan society prior, to the. :
20th century , where 1 an active:., command of Chinese - was. generally 
lost by-the third generation", the situation must-have changed
afterwards (284). .
The Chinese population distribution of 1930., is described
\y/-6 \  wb b
by map ifiMWI. and the-general urban distribution by map tlflH® *
The urban nature of the Chinese.settlement in Java in comparison
with the. Outer Provinces is-immediately1 evidentV. .\lbiie 
practically every urban centre, of the East indies-, with 10,000 .
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people and over was inhabited by a Chinese community, only few 
rural Chinese concentrations of 7,500-15,000 existed in Java, 
mainly in the West. Chinese rural concentrations of importance 
existed in West Borneo, Bangka, Biliton and on the east coast 
of Sumatra. These concentrations, constituting a semi-circle 
south of Singapore (285), were Brought about by the 
attraction of the gold mines of Pontianac, the tin of Bangka 
and Biliton, and the Dutch estates on the Sumatran east coast. 
There is no supporting evidence that proximity to Singapore had 
a significant relevance to this pattern of distribution, though 
some trade relations have long existed between those rural 
concentrations and the port city.
About 1900, the Dutch abolished the Chinese monopolies on 
opium, gambling, and salt and restricted land alienation in 
Java. They also gradually lifted the residential confinement 
imposed on the Chinese declaring, in 1910, that the Chinese 
were subjects of the Crown (286). This.coincided with the 
Chinese government adoption of the jus sanguinis principle 
bringing about the problem of dual citizenship. The new Dutch 
policies opened up rural Java to Chinese permanent settlement. 
This .decided the pattern of the Chinese distribution in Java 
until the late 1950s, when restrictions on. Chinese trade in 
rural Java, must have changed that pattern again. A vivid 
description of Chinese domination of the economic life of a 
town of 20,000 including 1,800 Chinese is given by Geertz (287). 
This relates to the 1950s but seems also to illustrate 
conditions in the 1930s.
The speech-group distribution of the Chinese community had 
been influenced by historical factors. The Ilokkiens were the 
first to come to Indonesia and constituted the largest speech-
group. . In 1930, only 2 2 -percent of them were. born outside 
Indonesia, while 66 percent of the Cantonese and 62/ percent of 
the.Teochiu were born outside the country (,288) . In 1930, there 
were 550,000 Hokkjtetos in the East Indies, . constituting the 
majority of the community in Java and Madura, and also In ; 
Sumatra’s West Coast Division. In West Borneo,’ East Sumatra, 
Bangka and Biliton, the Hakka and Teochiu constituted ' the; 
..majority (289). . -The Hakka numbered 200,000 in West Borneo,
45,000 in Bangka and Biliton, about 14,000 in the,East Coast of 
Sumatra, and some 65,000 in East Java. : There were also 135,00,0 
Cantonese, fairly evenly distributed over the Archipelago,. but 
slightly more numerous In East Sumatra, South Borneo,. East Borneo 
and Celebes. Of the 90,000 Teochius about 32,000 lived in the 
estates area of Sumatra's east coast, and almost 22,000 In the 
northwest part of Borneo. Djambi and Riouw also had Teochiu ..
concentrations. , .
In 1930, the sex ratio of the Chinese community in the 
East Indies was (E/lVi) 0.642, with; a low 0.385 for the Teochiu, 
and a high .0.795 for the Hokkiens (290). This corresponds with 
88 percent integration into families (or a stability index, see 
Appendix A) for the Hokkiens,. 55 percent for the. Teochiu and 
about 78 percent for the entire Chinese community. The specific, 
geographical distribution of these groups indicates that Java 
and West Borneo had long established permanent Chinese residents,, 
while the permanent residents’ proportion among .the tin miners 
and the Sumatran east coast Chinese, was lower. .This was due • 
to the specific low-paid occupations as well as to the ■ 
contemporary increase in immigrants into the latter areas.
Indigenous resentment against the Chinese, which resulted 
from ethnic and economic reasons until the beginning of the 20th u
18o
century, later^ acquired the modern dimension of nationalism; 
While the Christianized indigenes, who exhibited more loyalty 
to the Dutch were still considered as having geographical 
loyalties to Indonesia; the Chinese were considered as having ■ 
extraterritorial loyalties. This, and Chinese nationalism/ 
'tended to decrease the differences^ between Chinese speech- 
. groups as well as between totoks and peranakans. ■ But . as late 
as 1930 there still existed a significant occupation difference, 
between these latter groups. /-.Only half a percent of the foreign 
born Chinese pursued agriculture, as compared with about 11 
percent of the locally born, and 59 percent of the asli , 
Indonesians. About 65 percent of the newcomers and 52 percent . 
of the Java born Chinese were engaged in small and medium trade, 
and 21 percent of the former and; 10 percent of the latter were 
occupied in Industry, as well as about 17 percent of the asli. 
Indonesians (291). The peranakan society of the 1930s,: were 
thus culturally and occupationally situated between,the 
..Indonesians and the totoks. In fact, the core of the peranakan 
society were not only locally born Chinese but’ those of mixed 
marriages, who spoke an Indonesian language although without 
being totally , assimilated. By this definition many of the 
locally born Chinese were considered totoks when their, mother 
tongue was Chinese (292). As new-comers b.raght Chinese 
nationalism to Indonesia and naturally spread it. through;.:the 
totok society, and as the latter were considered by the 
• peranakans to have retained all the virtues, which pure .Chinese 
blood could inherit (293), the peranakans slowly became 
acculturated to Chinese nationalism. Thus, peranakans and'
totoks drew closer together during the first half of the 2,0th 
century (294), because of their new common ideology and of , .
Indonesian anti—Chinese feelings. However, some peranakans 
still made common cause-with Indonesian nationalists, through, 
their Indonesian Chinese party,, which did not/collaborate with 
the Dutch (295). At the other extreme, some Chinese, .mainly 
.totoks, became active P.K.I. members (296). .This, and the. 
non-discriminatory .policy of the' P.K.I* towards the Chinese 
damaged the party’s image \ among :'the Indonesians;;. On the .whole, 
however, Chinese political activity mainly confined itself to v . 
Chinese .organizations. This naturally followed from.their 
being labelled as '’capitalist and European” (297) , the first; 1 V  
label alluding to their economic position, ..and the. second - to 
their alienation from the Indonesian nationalists.
Chinese education under Dutch rule virtually began in,the . 
19th century. In 1899, there , were 217 Chinese schools In Java, 
with a total enrolment of 4,452 pupils. There were also 152 
schools w i t h ’2,170 pupils in the Outer Provinces. Beginning 
in 1901, the modernization of Chinese education took place, 
and in 1908., there were 75 modern schools with 5,500 pupils 
(290). The numbers rose to 3.0,000 pupils in 600. schools in 
1931 (299). These schools,.were supported by Chinese . 
'organisations, and English was, taught as a European language 
instead of Dutch. The Chinese also attendedjthe European 
schools and the Dutch-supported schools, where: higher education ■ 
was available. The Dutch policy.aimed at moderating the 
nationalist spirit, which had been brought to the Chinese schools 
by the totoks. They had some success in that moderating policy, 
a s t h  ereader ship of the peranakans passed into the hands of 
the ;V/estern educated and reinforced .pro-Western attitudes among 
them (300). This, however, neither contradicted peranakan new 
interest in Chinese, culture nor undermined the process of
mincreasing .solidarity.
With increasing Chinese and Indonesian nationalisms, 
Indonesian animosity towards the. Chinese can he definitely said 
to have grown during the Japanese occupation and during 
independence days (301). Indiscriminate Indonesian violence 
during the Japanese occupation drew the peranakans and the totoks 
even closer together, alienating the former' from the Indonesians. 
Peranakans and totoks realized that they had to fear the 
Indonesians more than the Japanese (302), and after the fall of 
Japan, during the revolution days of 1946, anti-Chinese riots 
proved |agadr\this .^ Later, the Republic of Indonesia■ declared 
that all the Dutch subjects °of Chinese descent were Indonesian 
citizens, while foreign born totoks remained aliens. However,
300.000 peranakans chose Chinese nationalitywhile 1,200,000 
became technically Indonesians (303). This mu^haveleft about 
1,000,000 Chinese aliens in Indonesia. While unselective riots 
against the‘Chinese increased their solidarity, selective 
economic and citizenship discrimination slowly began undermining 
that solidarity. This process may be illustrated by the post 
W.W.II. state, of the Chinese education, which flourished with 
800-1,000 schools and 250,000 pupils attending, while only
50.000 were enrolled in government schools. This reached a
peak of 1,600 Chinese schools and 300,000 pupils in 1957.
Hollowing the discriminations of the G-uided Demo or acy^ these
numbers dwindled to 490 schools and 100,000 pupils, mainly
totoks (304). In addition, the differential discrimination
between totoks and peranakans introduced a tendency among the
latter to Integrate into the Indonesian society^ and^to this end^•
a,
many of them officially adopted Indonesian mies. Also, the
peranakans became again, involved in Indonesian 'politics,, some 
being elected to .the parliament thro ugh local parties in the ■, 
early 1950s. Many more were members' of the B.APERKI peranankan 
party. Established in 1954, the party, collected.145,552 votes, 
in the 1955 elections, a 63-74 percent of the peranakan votes 
(305)* The peranakan regression from their former idealistic 
return to Chinese culture aroused consternation among the totoks. 
yet;from a rational point of view, that is* weighing sacrifice 
against results, they could do little good to themselves or to 
■fche totoks, to China or to"Taiwan by declining Indonesian 
citizenship. Neither China-nor Taiwan, (with whom ..Indonesian 
relation^had been broken...in the early 1950s) could protect them, ' 
protests being the only counter measures taken.by‘both. The '
situation changed considerably in respect to expressing Chinese 
nationalist feelings in common with-the totoks, the hutch,
rule. There was no longer a government, independent of public 
opinion providing not only full protection and economic
opportunity also enabling the Chinese to eat their cake and
. . .
haveit. During.the Japanese occupation, ■ there was no alternative 
but to stick together and hope for a better future. : But the 
1950s Indonesian nationalism provided an alternative: one could 
become legally Indonesian. •
The situation changed, however, when a new distinction ;
was introduced: a non-ethnic citizen. The peranakans as well
as the alien totoks had to-take pure-blood Indonesians as 
partners or figureheads for their businesses, in order to get., 
government credit and to overcome administrative difficulties. 
Although the indigenization of the retail trade in Java cost
the Chinese 25,000 out of 83,738 businesses they had'previously 
owned there ( 306) , and thus must havehit. the- to bok aliens^.
'’VvuAe, . ‘ .
$xanhh©Q3 than the per an alean citizens, unofficial. and unselecfive 
discrimination later developed and disillusioned.the peranakans 
(307). In 1963, anti-Chinese riots broke out and put Sukarno’s
protective measures to safeguard Chinese lives under heavy 
strain of .popular pressure,. Also, during .the months, following 
the 1965 P.K.I. coup, .anti-Chinese riots broke, out in At3eh 
and. other parts of north Sumatra, in Central and East Java and' 
in Celebes (308). Anti-Chinese riots .occurred in Borneo in 
the late 1960s* These riots and danger to life strengthened, 
the Chinese solidarity more; than the unselective economic 
discrimination. The exodus of 1960-1961, did not solve.'the 
problem of the alien Chinese, as those remaining do not want 
to return to China, and China does not seem'-over enthusiastic to 
take any -more in. -  ^ - -
In" the Suharto period, the. legal situation of the Chinese 
was perhaps even worsened, though actual conditions might, have, 
been no worse (309). The liberalization of the economic sysbem 
and the involvement of military personnelin management, and 
ownerships, may indicate that the Ali-Baba (310) partnerships 
and collusion with corrupt army officials, still enable the
Chinese to remain in business^ Suharto reinforced anti-Chine.se
\ 4flLAvvtec^
laws wherever they were loosely applied. He totally 
Chinese education (311) and .the use of the language in public 
communication, and the Chinese were accused of Mephistophe'lian 
machinations,- for'instance, of a ”silent cultural imperlalismH • 
(312). Thus, at present, there.is.still real danger that the- 
community may.become scapegoats in.case,.for some reason, 
public attention, is intentionally directed to them.- Notwith­
standing all these difficulties, ..the -Chinese in the urban
centres of-Java still enjoy, a higher-standard of living, have-,
a-higher income, receive,, a better education and; master Bahasa
• . & / 
Indonesia in a greater proportion than the indigpies X 313) •
The political attitude of. the Chinese in/Indonesia towards i,
extra-territorial Chinese centres during.- the 1950s :was summed
up as follows: 4-0 percent opted for local citizenship, 30
percent lined up with the people’s Republic of China hoping for
its protection, 10 percent continued to support Taiwan,' a n d -20
percent were fence-sitters (314)-.. The failure, of China and of
Taiwanr to protect the .Chinese, in' Indonesia lowered the . '
credibility of both countries and especially of the former. In
the 1960s, the Chinese could not but adapt themselves to the
situation by seeking whatever arrangements:they could, find to '
remain in business. Their;current precarious situation.in the
cantry suggests that with nowhere to emigrate, they try'to send
part of their capital abroad,•where it can be better secured.
Also^withno Chinese' education officially .available^ some sort
e, * . -
of arran^pient will be devised- tomaintain cultural links with
a Chinese cultural centre outside Indonesia*.
Burma. . In 1900, many of the- Dry Zone Burmans,. still had fresh 
recollections- of their independent kingdom, but there were no 
signs of any future change--in the contemporary colonial status 
of the country. The disappointment of the traditional elite was . 
especially profound as they, lost their power to' the new . 
administration of British, Indian- and newly appointed Burmese. - 
Only the Buddhist clergy, the sangha, retained some of its 
authority (315.) by operating 17,000 vernacular - schools throughout
f %
the country (316). However, the sangha largely detached 
themselves from.mundane problems and from modern political 1... 
thought and . there fore / could not rekindle old national sentiments, 
by use of modern apparel (317) . Contemporary modern education., 
available for the Burmese consisted of missionary schools, some \;y 
primary and secondary government schools, technical and normal .• 
schools and the Rangoon College. This latter prepared students 
for an external degree in the Calcutta. University. . ; '
(i) Political: - Developments. The secularization of 
monastic education, the repercussions of the Russo-Japanese v/ar, 
and Burmese soldiers returning from service abroad after W.W.I., 
had. great effects, on the modernization of Burman' nationalism.-' ■, :
In addition, political developments in adjacent India also . ■ ■
contributed, to the process., In -1917, Burmese nationalists ,;v 
organized the Young. Men's Buddhist Association (Y.M.B.A.) and 
demanded a political separation from Indian administration (318).
In 1920, the University, act concerning educational standards, ;: 
became a national ^ .political issue, involving student strikes and 
political reorganization. The nationalists tried to mobilize 
the Chinese and Indian minorities1 support at that stage, v.
exhibiting ,a naive disregard of the political'.power innate in . . . 
ethnic hostility; however, when nationalism' spread to wider • 
circles of the Burmese society, the antagonism of Burman . ’ ■ i;:
nationalism and the national minorities1-Interests reappeared., 1 
sometimes in violent form. Bor instance, the issue of the . 
minorities’ representation in the Legislative.Council^discussed .. 
by the Whyte Committee had only mild-effects on relations ■ :  
between the Burmans and the minorities, but Burmese resentment . ’ 
of Indian and Chinese economic exploitation sometimes' caused ’ >
serious clashes. - S.-'
The political acculturation of the villages resulted from
the '’political pongyis" (319) activities,■•who followed a. • 
fanatic leader and gave, a religious-touch to their xenophobia,. •
Also the G-. C.B. A. (320) operating in' th.e • villages emphasized . - 
the ethnic Burman nature of nationalism by calling their -,
organization: "own race" associations.. : The -G-. C .B . A. and the ,: 
pongyi-led group boycotted the. 1922.. elections, only .the "21 'g
group", which defected from the G.C.B.A., participated. The. '
93 percent boycott proved that the public' Supported .these 
groups, even after-due allowance had been given:to administrative 
imperfections and to public disinterest. ’'-The dacoity and 
rural unrest of -the 1920s, manifested nationwide resistance to . 
tax,collection, and hostility to Indian economic activities,1 .
mainly to Chettyar usury,. It ended up In the anti-Indian and 
anti-Chinese riots of 1930-1931, which were limited ,to Lower 
Burma.with its Indian- and Chinese concentrations. By then, v
assured of vast public support, the nationalist' leaders, 
abandoned the policy of non-cooperation with the.British.
The Anti-Separationi'st League won the 1932 elections. I
It made a complete volte' face when it supported a separation 
from India and direct dependence oh: the British Parliament
(321). The new Constitution, to' be implemented ill 1937,
aimed at alienating from Burma the ethnic minorities areas: . .
Shan States, Karenni and the Tribal Hills, which;{comprised 43 : 
percent of Burma's territory and 1 6 :percent ;of its population
(322). The bi-cameral legislature had a senate of 36, half of
them elected by the-House of Representatives and half - .
governor's nominees. Of the 132 -members of the latter House,
9.2 had to be elected by territorial. and the
remainder,-.to represent special interests (323) .
Burmese internal politics manifested1 inefficient, 
indigenous administration and factionalism. Ba Maw's government 
(1937-1939) tried to solve burning agricultural problems, but 
faced an agitating opposition from the Thakins party/ but 
later he himself joined the Thakins.in the "Breedom Bront" to 
oppose his successor’s bid to solve, the same problems. The , ■
Thakins made early contacts with the Japanese and', before 1942,
; created the Burma Independent Army (B.I. A.) in;.,Thailand, and 
after the Japanese occupation, = the' Breedom Br.ont■ established 
a civil government under. Japanese sponsorship.. Ir 1943', ■ the 
Japanese accorded"Burma full independence Over- its entire 
territory including the ethnic minorities areas. However, in 
.1944, in view of the .changing tide in the '■ war Aung Bah created' 
a secret political front to oppose the Japanese,. and' got full 
recognition from the Allies as a resistance movement (324).
After liberation, Aung San founde.d the Anti-Pascist
People's Breedom League (A.P.P.R.L.)i and adopting a, socialist
Ideology, gained a vast popular -support. When left, out of
government by the, British, he agitated amongst, his supporters
and practically paralysed public services; the British-had no.
choice but.to give him government. In his turn, Aung San
faced communist agitation -and opposition,' to - which he reacted
by expelling them from the A.B.P.P.L.. . In 1946, he received- .
British consent to independence-, within .one year, . and .-.secured the 
Ikt) t ^ V - 4
Karenni andfShan States for Burma. . 1
Prom 1948^ and7almost incessantly,, until the present day, 
Burma has experienced national ethnic group and communist . ' .
rebellions (-325)* The Burmese army became the only organization
Ifi
which really tried to impose' the Burmese state-idea over the • ' ' ;
entire area hy military operations' as' well •astb-y serving as a'' y
political elite among the rural people. 'The ^vicissitudes of
the civil war sometimes left U Hu's government in control of
merely ,the urban sector, and .sometimes extended government rule
well into the rural, areas, he Win replaced IT lu'in 1958, and ■'■■''■7;
introduced military administrators into the central and ' : ■
provincial governments, for some time. reducing .subversion to/.a.
minimum. The military administration proved more effective than
the civil one, and he Win finally deposed TJ Nu. lacking U Nu*s ,
Buddhist tolerance he rigidly handled the ethnic minorities,/
only to increase -their militancy. In 1966,. he 'Win.admitted ;
that the situation in Burma was1 worse than in 19.62 (326), and'
showed no signs of future improvements. ‘
In external politics Burma has'maintained strict- . .•
neutrality. In I960, it signed a -treaty , of amity with China- ; ■
conceding a small disputed territory (327). Apart from this,
Burma became increasingly Introvert from the'political point of
view.. In the politibo-geographical context, its location rnay
constitute a Chinese avenue of approach towards the Indian - .'
Ocean, by-passing pelagian Southeast Asia, or' it may offer a,
route .e v i d e n t ^  not to the- conquest of China, but to arousing -. - a
the ethnic minorities in Yunnan'(328) and Tibet. In-this sense
Burma is aware of its buffer state situation, and yet .its' ' ' - ' -v V>
introversion may reflect a stage of over anxiousness (329).Tfc/i
ectMOwvuL JLd^ \u \JL) aJU<o jtU  ^vwnonJXj <1 A g jh iu y* >
(ii) Social and Economic Developments. The Opening of . . .
the. Irrawaddy delta to rice cultivation involved immigration and
the creation of new villages within an atmosphere of "scramble
for land". ■ The cultural centre, of Burma also moved to the South'
as a result of thejnew - educational' facilities a^ailalle,: i n ; 
Rangoon, the latter1 h] .political centrality and' the increase of-, 
its population.. . in-the delta, rice acreage, rose; from 1,3 
million to 9.9 between 1860 and 1930 (330).; ‘ The increase - in ' 
production concurred' with a:-deterioration of peasants’ • • 
welfare, who' fell prey to Ohettyar, Burmese and Chinese money 
lenders. Indebted peasants lost their land, titles- while rents 
were rising. In 1925-26, more than a quarter of the occupied ■ 
land-in Lower Burma: belonged to absentee landlords, and ' 
following the depression-years, that proportion rose to 47 
percent in 1937-38 (331). . " " - ik
During the;British rule, European firms owned most of 
the industrial enterprises, but medium size rice mills and saw 
mills belonged to Indians and Chinese, and the import and export 
trade
European goods damaged Burmese cottage industries, and-the 1 
’’laissez faire” policy clearly impoverished the Burmese peasant, 
who faced, unprotected, alien mercantile and financial.skills.
In 1931, the Burmese constituted. 36 percent'-of large -town 
dwellers, 73 percent in medium towns and 94- ■ in' the .rural areas, 
indicating their socio-economic handicap.
The rural indigenous administration left much-to be ' " V" 
desired as regards preparation for self rule.' "Natural contempt', 
of urbanites to rural people.(333) augmented .the intellectuals1 
disapproval of British policy as "the allocation .of onerous 
administrative responsibilities, without official direction, to 
elected ... local bodies.,,., lacking in experience, while 
dyarchy denied’ to the more competent Burmans in the legislative 
council, control ... over.'.’finances , .1; :hEspecially:-disliked;;were'
s ■wer^mainly in Indian .hands ( 332). Competition of cheap
the repeated affirmations '.-I. that . , . Bur man performance 
in local self ■ government ■ would be the criterion for their
priority over administrative or economic .development, and so.
political .accultiration of the. masses, high."schools and the
than technocrats and businessmen (335). But, wfer the' socio­
economic conditions before W.W.II., clearly showed a gradual^
alien urban sector, one growing number of .educated Burmese "j 
urbanites could not integrate into the socio-econOmic rewarding
se , „___ constituting ;a frustrated social layer ripe for
the country was .twice'overrun by armies using ''scorched earth” 
tactics, during'1942-1945. ■ Had the; British landed in-Rangoon : 
instead of re conquering the country overland,, the development of 
Rangoon's port would, have contributed to the economy of the 
land* (336) ,. '.Burma had thus an enormous economic reconstruction 
problem at the end. of f.W.II.
After independence the government nationalized the major,, 
economic enterprises as well as land, with a view to putting an 
end to landlordism and to encourage collective farming. The..,. 
Byidwatha plan .envisaged a-welfare state with .a’system of 
community self-help (337). However, the results were poor, as 
the country suffered from constant civil wars, high military
fitness to enjoy a larger degree of self government in the. 
future" (334) . Bor .Burman. nationalists, independence had
for them,Burmese performance in government, local or Central 
was irrelevant to the question of independence.
Besides primary schooling, which enabled the modern
university of Rangoon produced more officials and'■politicians
impoverishment of the rural areas, and the enrichment ofthe
political a.Ctmty. In addition to the unfair economic system,
expenditure, administrative incompetence and a primitive i
inf astructure (338). : - ■ ; . "•
(iii) The Chinese Minority. An estimate of the mid-1960s’ 
Chinese population 'in .Burma quoted their number, at 300,000 
with a trend of increase (339). In 1931, they constituted
1.3 percent of the total populationyand in 1962 - 1.8 percent, 
if Skinner's estimate of 400,000 is accepted. ’ •
The Chinese played a secondary role in business and 
trade to that of the Indians, who.outnumbered and preceded them 
in settling in Lower Burma. Both the Chinese and-Indians 
mainly resided in urban centres, and in. 1.931, the Chinese ; 
constituted ' 6.7 percent of the big. town-population., 3.5 percent 
in medium towns•and 0.9 percent.in rural areas (340). The , 
occupationsjdistribution of racial groups in 1931, was as follows
Table. B^ -| Occupations. Distribution by -Racial Group,. 193.1 (in $)
‘ . Burmese Indians Chinese All races.
Agriculture and
Raw Materials. 75-3' 27.3 16.0 70.2 .
Industry and Commerce 19.3 \ 55.7 77.2 ’-23.-3
Public Services. 4.1 ■ 7.3 2.6 4.4
The table depicts a situation which•. echoes the Burmese 
unacquisltlveness, and their disdain of trade and business "
occupations (342). It definitely. proves the- .adoption of
opposite values by the Chinese and Indians. 7 •
Chinese — Burman social relations were thus defined:
"There has never been a 'Chinese Problem', in Burma, and there.;
is not one today" (343). Also, the readiness of the.Chinese to 
learn Burmese, in contrast to the Indians led., to the;following
fc>3
generalization; they. "came to regard -■ the - country" as their, ' 
own’* (344). Yet, the Chinese community organization was said'. 
to be "a major danger to rape relationships” (345) * -.These ’ 
organizations included . chambers of. commerce , trade unions,' 
schools, temples .and hospitals (34.6).. In trade the Chinese 
could rely on a network of economic information- .and on 
-.financing through Chinese banks. However, their system of 
education had a low_ reputation^, and^ as a. result^ only 3, 308 . 
pupils attended those schools in 1937 > while.-.the age group of-.
5-10 consisted by 1935 of 12,707 Chinese' children (347)
It seems that Chinese nationalism,; agitating the Chinese f
r
communities in Southeast Asia during the fitst half of the 20th 
century, only, slightly, affected. Chinese social -life in Burma.,
■ Some Chinese played.a part in local politics, though K.M.l. 
branches.existed in Burma and even two seats in the■Chinese 
National Assembly Were allocated for representatives•of the 
Chinese minority in Burma (348), In.its first years, independent 
Burma left much latitude to the Chinese education system. ; in 
1962,- 39,000 pupils attended 259 Chinese schools (.349), but as 
these schools reflected a tendency of political shift to the y. \ 
left, following the|improvemenf of relations ..with China, the 
military; government later put restrictions on them'; (350) . ..
■Until the early post W.W.II. years, the Chinese community 
leadership was pro-IC.M.T., and had close cultural, contacts with 
China, When, however, Chinese Nationalist troops retired from >, 
China and occupied some border areas inside .Burma,5 the Chinese 
minority leadership exhibited a pro-Burmese attitude, and '
shifted its loyalties towards Communist China. This shift to : 
the left greatly increased during-the 1950s and 1960s to the
extent that Chinese youths openly demonstrated; in sympathy with
the Red. Guards during the- Cultural Revolution, to which the'” ' .
government and . the Burman public violently reacted (351).
Rumours .quote many dead Chinese” in the 196.7 Rangoon riots.
Economic indigenism in its initial phases in Burma ■
favoured a shift of . private ownership from aliens to Burmans,
and later it changed to nationalization.(332). Remittances 
outside thejccuntry became illegal and immigration stopped
altogether. Banksinsurance-businesses and pawn shops were
nationalized'or closed to non-Burmans, When the Chinese tried.
to move into; the professions, they found that..ethnic Burmans .
had preference in government services. Burmese indigenism
imposed difficulties also on naturalization^practically .
adopting-the jus sanguinis principle and discriminating between
naturalized Burmese and ethnic Burmans. This .'‘more radical and
xenophobic" (353) indigenism may prove .that afte^all there still
exists a Chinese problem in Burma. >;
M al ay a - and' M al ay s 1 a. • Spatially linked to peninsular Southeast 
Asia, Malaya culturally belongs to its pelagian component.
Its political development into Malaysia has- further emphasized 
..its pelagian traits, yet subversion on its northern borders is 
an ominous reminder, of its. inseparability from -peninsular . 
Southeast Asia.' . ,■
The plural nature of its society antedated the British , 
rule, , yet was intensified by their-preference., of Chinese and 
Indian labour to that of the Indigenous Malays (354). However, 
this ethnic, problem resulted, in a sense, from the distribution 
pattern of tin mines in Southeast Asia and .would have-'affected • 
Bangka and Biliton-had they constituted a-separata political
entity from Indonesia. In this .sense, the tin."belt Of' :
Southeast Asia (355) "being divided "between three producer 
states, attenuated this ethnic problem,' yet left Malaya with , 
the main political bur d en . * 1 ^ 0 ifiUii '
. (i) Political Developments. Until W.W. I I three 
administrative entities existed in Malaya, namely:the BM.S., ■ 
the U.P.M.S. and the Straits Settlements. The three v/ere 
economically, culturally and politically hound together. 
Nevertheless, the administrative disunity facilitated the 
neglect of a responsible policy towards a possible unified , 
independent indigenous state.-. In fact, in the 1920s, the 
British considered a suggestion to decentralise:.govemm ent in 
the P.M.S.; the sultans favoured it while, European and Chinese 
businessmen did not ( 356)* and in the 1930s, a ..similar plan . 
was also discussed. Paradoxically enough, in a geographically 
divided country (357), the major ethnic disunity" was man made, 
and intensified by British economic preoccupations, which 
entailed an enormous Chinese- population inflow. Later , in the 
1930s, when the Chinese had already constituted a large 
proportion in: the population, restrictions, on Chinese and 
favouritism towards Malays, could not merge the two cultures, 
"cultural pluralism" being the inevitable outcome.
; The sultans griphold on the Malays,was the major reason 
for the social, economic and political stagnation of that 
people, in a .country which was;, economically developing since 
the last decades of the19th century. Only in 1884; debt : 
slavery was abolished and corvee replaced by. wages and a land 
tax, indicating that money economy in the Malay rural sector 
was a fairly new phenomenon. As late as 1947,-three quarters 
of the Malays, were agriculturalists - and two thirds of these
were rice planters ( 358), Tjhus; the. underdevelopment of the 
Malay urban sector delayed the appearance of a middle-class ■• 
and of modern'education leading to a "political' somnolence." of
the majority of the M a l a y s T h e '  physiographic' , conditions and 
the. fairly equal power, of the sultans also hindered the 
development of. a state-idea. However, traditional peas.dnt life, 
and.customary leadership and practices seemed a.safeguard against 
the destruction of the Malay cultural identity ( 359) .;, Thusf when 
the Malays encountered- Chinese nationalism they were in no 
position to react (360), but had to rely on British support.
The latter, aware that a culturally. Chinese Malaya would 
constitute a threat- to their interests;more than a Malay 
independent state, suppressed Chinese nationalism.
After W.W;T1., the British scheme towards self-rule 
envisaged a Malay Union, excluding Singapore. This .conformed' 
with their thoughts of a Malay Malaya, through the exclusion .' 
of the strong' Chinese element of Singapore, and would have. left, 
the Colony•within a" festoon of bases extending from Gibraltar to 
Hong. Kong. The.sultans would have lost their political-power 
under the Union, retaining only honorary status. .The scheme' 
was perhaps conceived under the fresh recollection of the 
sultans’ cooperation with the Japanese, though without 
acknowledgement of the part played by the M.C.P. during. the Y/ar. 
The Malays resented the scheme, and the traditional Chinese 
leadership, by then, largely attending to their private, businesses 
showed no' enthusiasm for .it. ■ ■
In 1948, federation nvas introduced., over entire .Malaya 
excluding Singapore, the governor in Kuala Lumpur becoming a.
High Commissioner, and the ,-legislature, of Malay predominance, 
coming under, the Conference, of Rulers, (the sultans) ... To
maintain a'Malay majority, rule, Immigration ahd naturalisation 
laws discriminated against the Chinese, the majority of whom 
remained non-citizens. this seemed a breach of moral 
obligation to the Chinese as a'whole and to ,the: ;communists in ' 
particular^ andyasa result^the latter took up arms in 
rebellion, which lasted during 19.48--1960, and revived in the- 
early 1970s. This rebellion emphasized to the Malays that the .■ 
Chinese were ready to use force for achieving their political 
ends and thus it sharpened the Malay hostility towards the 
Chinese,/and also their political, awareness in general. In 
practice, the Malays began to fill the new and old administrative
posts dominating the executive agencies of the government, and
enjoying special treatment in education and agricultural 
development. - ■ '
The creation of IT.M.N.O. In 1946'and that of 'the MC.A.
in 1949 (361) produced an opportunity for moderates, in both' 
the Chinese and Malay ethnic groups, to coalesce against the - :L 
extremists in the 1951 elections. In 1955,. both parties and 
the Indian M.I.C. again cooperated creating the Alliance party'
amR. $di'UA.vci / "
1iNMAg*ai^ ya sweeping victory in the Federal elections. In 1957, 
Malaya beb.ame-'independent> with, a constitutional monarch 
elected every five years from, the group of sultans. The 
legislative became bi-cameral and" each state retained
i
re.sponsibELity over "land, agriculture, forestry and local 
government as well as Muslim law and custom" (362). The 
Alliance, retained its majority in the 1959, 1964 and 1969 
elections.
Malaya avoided participation, in S.E.A.T.O., relying on a 
defence agreement with Britain. It did not recognize the 
People’. sRepblic of China, and in regional politics did not
Mcommit itself to the Maphilindo projected federation ofjthe
Malay world. When it undertook tobecome the -cornerstone of •
Malaysia, Sukarno and:. Macapagal immediately showed their
hostility to the plan* The merger with. Singapore;,'. Sarawak and ;
Sabah improved Malaya's political'standing in Southeast Asia,
and when Singapore seceded, Malayasia significantly increased
the Malay proportion in the population of the country,
Sarawak with 229, 200 Chinese , out of a total of 744,5.00 people in ' .
I960 (3 63), adddd about 48,000 sq. miles-' to the-.federation, and
Sabah with 137,500 Chinese out of a total population' of
635,600 in 1969 (364), added 15,380 scp. miles to the federation. .
Both territories had a lower.Chinese proportion in the population
u •
than Malaya proper; but it is dahtful whether the indigenous . 
tribes . really consider themselves as ‘ethnic 'Malays. The very 
low population-to"resource ratio of both Sarawak .and.Sabah and 
the backwardness of their peoples ensure,- at least for the near 
futureyno political difficulties in administering a federation 
of an uncontinuous land configuration.
In 1972, the prime minister of..Malaysia visited Peking 
after increased trade activities between - the:two countries had 
taken place. -It-seems that the British military withdrawal, ■ 
the increasing detente in-Southeast Asia in general, and the , 
improved relations between Malaysia, Indonesia and-Singapore 
in particular, will bring about a more independent external 
policy by Malaysia. . •
It may be interesting to add a comment on Maphilindo.
Without ’ rejecting the idea as a possible future political 
situation,’ it seems that, the Malay elite who had envisaged . 
irdle pendence and enjoyed the power and freedom it conveyed,
preferred to coexist with' the Chinese problem, rather than 
be reduced- to a status of- an "Outer Province."..., Indonesia, 
especially .under the leadership of Sukarno, had an image of 
a centralized.administration in overpopulated Java trying: to 
exploit the Outer Provinces. It also had a low economic and 
administrative reputation, which definitely was inferior to 
similar Malay institutions.
,(ii) Social and Economic Developments. During the British 
rule, the "plural .society" of Malaya had a clear economic 
expression. While the Malay economic system was agrarian,, non­
commercial and directed towards a subsistence economy with a 
preponderance of wet-rice' cultivation, the Chinese and also', 
partly the Indian systems were.directed towards primary . , 
production of tin and rubber. These.systems were urban in part, 
commercial and trade oriented (365). -
Until 1913., the Chinese dominated tin production with, 
about:three quarters of the output, but by 1930, the Europeans- 
produced-54 percent and, in 1961, they increased their share to 
65' percent (366). Labour, entrepreneurship and trade in tin 
remained non-Malay even after independence, when production 
rose from 52,000 tons in I960 to 69,000 in 1966•;,( 367).
Rubber planting began in British financed, estates with 
small holdings following the initial success. The geographical 
expansion.of rubber usually followed into the areas already 
developed by the infrastructure laid for tin transport.. Between 
1910 and 1930, Malaya's share In world production rose from 
6.7 percentto over 50, but it declined to about 'one third in 
the 1940s and the...1960s (368). ,In 1953, about 70 percent of
i\o
the plantations were. European owned, the. Chinese, and the 
Indians owned. 23 and 6 percent respectively. . -’Ownership of 
the small holdings divided . between the Malays,. Chinese and ■ 
the. Indians with-47,40 and 9 percent respectively (369)* ...
labour in estates was largely Indian. " .
Palm oil production'increased after W.W.II., reaching 
345,080 .-tons in 1969 (370), most of it from estates almost 
exclusively owned by Europeans (.371). Coconut cultivation in 
small holdings, a traditional Malay occupation1,! easily'competed 
with plantations as copra producers. Since the 1950s, iron' ore. 
extraction rapidly increased with a 1.5 million tons output in 
1955 reaching 7..3 million in 1963. .Ownership .was almo*st 
exclusively European.and exports went mainly to Japan.
Malaya has been a deficit■ country in rice.., but.it 
improved its production- from 26 percent of the local consumption . 
in 1926-1930, to 54 percent-in 1961 (37-2); |^ et/yields. are- still 
low and there is little incentive for double cropping. Although, 
in I960, 65 percent, of the area under paddy was linked, to 
government irrigation pro3ects,land.tenure, among'other factors, 
remained inimical to-increased production,.as only between one 
third and one half of the paddy- growers were, land owners, and 
as rents were fixed proportionally to output^ varying between 
one and two thirds of the crop. In addition, leases were.often ’ 
short termed and went to the highest' bidder, creating ’inefficient 
mobility and insecurity of lease renewals, As paddy growers 
often became indebted through 1 extravagance in poverty’1. (373)p 
even governmentjcredit could not eradicate usury,, which often 
charged '100 percent interest -per. annum.. Malay landlords and 
money lenders thus exploited the- status symbol-of 'a paddy grower, 
which attracted the Malays to this occupation and tried to.
V  ■ - : :  ■ ■■; ZI1
.perpetuate the situation by opposing the introduction of.
English education to Malay peasants,;,and-by obstructing Chinese - 
rand Indian infiltration into that ,sector, : ' - - -
■ The occupational distribution of the racial groups in "■ 
Malaya began to lose its extreme,, characteristics; during the 
1929-1932' depression/years, 'when/.Chinese turned/’to.-foodcrop . , 
cultivation, and also during the. Japanese. Occupation when the 
same phenomenon recurred.- In post Yif.W.H. years,- a new trend 
.in Malay society appeared,- the shift to government service 
occupations.' The following table:--summarises the situation:
•Table B * . %  Ethnic Occupational Distribution (In thousands) (374)
Sector , - Malays Chinese Indians - Total
Primary. ; 760 - / 350'. \ 181 * , 1,293-
Secondary 48 / 130 • \ 22 201 .,
Tertiary 190 269 101 561
Total 998. , , 750;; ' 3 :: . 505 ' 2,053
The Chinese seem to-be the best occupationally balanced 
among the- three ethnic groups', as is apparent from table 
but taking into consideration the.-specific characteristic of 
the' country as a primary producer, their share in the tertiary 
sector of the economy is indeed high^especially-when their small 
numbers in the administration is. taken-into account. This Is 
even, more apparent in the secondary sector,: where it' seems that 
they dominate the majority of the industrial' enterprises. ■
In 1957., as ,in 1947, the Chinese sector- of the economy 
generated 60 percent o jjthe national Income : and the Malay only 20 
percent. This was the economic reward of the Chinese for leaving 
-the political dominance to-the-Malays, implicitly agreed up011^  
when the M.G.A. joined TJ.M.N.O. in the Alliance. However, income
distribution within each industry was uneven, as is apparent 
from land holdings of 3.3 million acres underpeasant crops and
2.2 million in plantations (375). The following table portrays 
the economic standing of the population, where the Chinese 
proportions among the middle-class was twice that of the Malays • 
and almost fivefold in the upper classes.
fable Class Distribution within Racial, Groups. (376).,
Malays Chinese Indian Others
Upper Class 4,778=0.5# 17,798=2.3# 4,979-1.6# 3,185= 5-8#
Middle Class 58,144=5.8# 89,414=11.8# ■ 27,841=9-1# 11,822=21.4#
Lower Class 937,659=93.7# 643,662=85.8# 273,471=89.^ 40,304=72.9# 
Total 1,000,581 755,834 306,291 55,311
Although the class distribution within the ethnic groups 
(table B*3) shows a clear Chinese advantage, the majority of 
them still belonged to the^lower class.
Table b J» Ethnic Proportions in the Urban Sector, (in percents) ; .
.-------- -----  -------------------_ — -----— ------------------- - (377).
Year Malay Chinese Indian Others
1931 19.2 59.6 17.8 3.4
1947 21.1 62.3 13.8 2.8
1957 20.0 67.7, 8.7 3.6
It is significant that the urban attraction for theMalays, 
largely due to administrative occupation^just enabled them to 
hold their ground, while the Chinese,largely attracted by 
industrial and service occupations^ increased their proportion at 
the expense of the Indians. It must be noted however, that 
between 1931 and 1957, the urban sector in Malaya greatly 
developed in numbers.
I;t is -interesting to compare the proportional strength . 
of the cultural blocs in the ’’plural society” of Malaysia 
before .and after Singapore1 s. secession.
Table B^ riT Broad Communal Blocs (in percents) (378).
Pre-Separation-' . Post' Separation 
, \/42. 3' . ,35.7
' 41.6 ■' ''47.0 - ■
' '9.9 ! ; 10.1 ■
3.2 . . 3.7
■- 1.8 . 2.2
1.3 1.3
The net decrease in Chinese proportion-is spectacular. 
Moreover, the change ' especially* .favoured the'. Malays; as small 
minority blocs generally tend to coalesce, 'with' the dominant 
majority, thus decreasing even further, the. Chinese chances of 
gaining political dominance. ■
The Malayan government considered education a means to 
improve the status of the Malays' vis , a vie the , Chinese and 
Indians, and .also an implement' to decrease • the\j.ieterogeneity of 
the population. To that effect, the Malayan govHernment. 
increased its expenditure on education-fourteen-fold between’. 
1947 and.1962, and since 1969 restricted■secondary education to 
English and Bahasa Malaysia. The post W.W.II'.- figures for 
school attendance are shown in the following table. Still in.
1957, within the, 10-15 .age group of all races, -the literacy- 
level was two thirds for males and one third f.or .females.
Chinese Bloc
Muslim Bloc
Indian Bloc
Iban dominated bloc
Kedazah dominated bloc
Others
Table School Attendance (in. thousands) • ."( 579) .
Language 1947 1952: :. .'19 .54 . 19.62
English 71 123: 231/ - 1 .407
Malay 171 ; 311 ■ 428 - 489
Chinese 189. 239 ’ 592 ; 390
Indian‘ f  36 39 - ■ ; 62
Professional ‘ 2 6 , ^ ..11 37
Total 468 717 1,111 . . 1,385
The Malay schools * enrollment improved in relation' to 
that of the Chinese schools as Is -apparent for the figures of 
1947 and 1962.
With a pro jected-population/of.14. ^ million in 1980> of. 
which.12,7 million in. West Malaysia (380)^ a.3.7 million 
increase for Malaysia during the current decade^ the resource . 
situation of the country and the :rate,of economic development 
seem satisfactory and promising.. • • '
(iii) The Chinese Community.... The activities o f  K ’.ang .
Yu.Wei and Sun YUt Sen wound up in the' creation of K.M.T. 
branches in Malaya in 1912,. and further political acculturation 
directed the loyalties of the Chinese from their parochial 
loyalties to China to.the national level (381). These 
geographical loyalties■were only one manifestation.of the 
reflection of China's internal politics on the Chinese in 
Malaya. Thus, the leftist radicalism #if I M M !  reflected itself 
in Malaya almost as soon as it appeared in China affecting 
mainly Hakka and'Hainanese workers. .They'organized anti-British 
riots and boycotts and, as- a result, the British out-lawed the’ 
K.M.T, in 1925. The left wingers tried to spread their
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international communist ideology to the-'Malays, but to no avail,./ 
the Nan Yang Communist' Party of pre-1’930 years, remained 
mainly of Chinese membership and kept control of the communist ; 
parties in Southeast Asia (382). >
. The break between the K.M.T. and the communists in China . 
mirrored itself in the Chinese community* in Malaya, the leftists' 
generally finding supporters among labourers,.and the. rightists 
among the middle-class and.- entrepreneurs. Both parties, 
however, exhibited -strong anti-British feelings, and when 
suppressed always reappeared under new guises (383). This 
Chinese - British /confrontation in Malaya was mainly concerned ■ 
with Britain - China politics; it however-, reflected older 
friction aroused by British intervention in/Chinese' communal ' 
life in Malaya, which involved the reduction of the secret 
societies to secondary social importance; andveventually to- 
their abolishment. In addition, British policies hit the Chinese,:
/ vJULS .
economicfprimacy in tin mining (-384), restricted, immigration 
the depression years ^ 4 ^  and introduced educational
discrimination. With fairly little contact' with' the politically/ 
"unconscious" Malays, the only other political power the Chinese 
met in the political field was British’ colonialism. Prom the 
Chinese point of view, Malaya was created as a modern-,, country . 
by Chinese labour and entrepreneurship, and. particularly the*, 
leftists had strong convictions about their rights in Malaya 
to the point of planning a Malayan insurrection against the : . ; 
British in 1935. Although direct memberships in' the K.M.T. and 
in the M.G.B, was never very high (385), both parties had a- * . 
large number of supporters,. Yrhich made their public demonstrations 
spectacular and effective. This was.especially manifest during
t h e  U n i t e d  B r o n t  p e r i o d  o f  1 9 3 7 - 1 9 4 1 ?  v/hen/. b o t h - p a r t i e s *  d i v e r t e d
"their- political agitation against' Japan,-
Before Chinese national!smyeaifle to Malaya, the internal 
division within thejcomm unity was much more variegated than ■ 
afterwards. Hostile relations Between rival guilds, secret ■ 
societies and speech-groups became less politically significant '• 
after the advent of nationalism. This latter period was 
characterized hy a dichotomy of- alignment according to 
Kuomintang - Communist,, later of M.C.A. - M.C.P. "and the more 
recent dichotomy of English educated'and Chinese educated" (386).. 
fhe cultural Background of this dichotomy pertained to class' 
origin, wealth and-education, though in'later years it tended 
sometimes to relate to political convictions.
Speech-group organizations in Malaya, seem to have played.-
\CkhieAfc-
less important roles in Chinese'.social organizations than didxBatot; 
speech-groups in other countries.- This is, implied from the ■ 
lesser speech-group awarenessj which existed-in Malaya (387).
The speech-group distribution of.1947, revealed that the Ilokkien 
constituted 31.6 percent of the’..Chinese Community, the Cantonese - 
24.6 percent, the.Hakka came third with 16;7 percent, the 
Teochiu - 13.9 and the Hainanese constituted only 6 percent of 
the community. (388) . ■ The Hakka were much.-stronger in numbers v' 
in the P.M.S. than in the Straits Settlements,. and in 1911, their . . 
proportion in the E.M.S. Chinese' population made them the v, '; :
strongest speech-group there, with the. .Cantonese immediately 
following; but in 1921, the Cantonese overtook them (389). This 
resulted perhaps from the Hakka agricultural and extractive . 
occupations, with, a proportional lesser participation-in trade 
and other employment-producing pursuits. :This assumption may. 
be strengthened by the Hakka’s 0.83 (B/M) sex ratio, tending
more to ' equality than the Hokkien's (in 19.47) ' ( 390). /As in 
Singapore, the Cantonese -had the test ‘balanced' sex ratio of 
all speech-groups, though numerically they were placed second 
to the Hokkien. As a whole however, there, •wass&/positive 
correlation between numerical strength and the sex ratio, in 
Malaya as well as in Singapore (391)* The Chinese .unbalanced, 
sex ratio indicated a low proportion of permanent.residents 
among their numbers, and this statement is'amplified by the 
figure of 19 million Chinese arrivals, in Malaya and the. Straits 
Settlements between the early ,19th century and W.W.II.>. most of 
whom were bachelors who returned to China (392). The following 
table may provide an insight into the question of the 
attachment to Malaya and: the Straits Settlements of each of’ 
the ethnic groups through the correlation of sex ratio with 
integration into families (see Appendix A), and hence to 
permanence of residence. It seems incontestable, that the Malay* 
group and not the Chinese or the Indians initially saw Malaya 
as their homeland, but both latter were improving, in this ■ 
respect.
Table iW^ Sex Ratio of Ethnic Groups-, . (393)
Malaya'and the Straits Settlements (figures in 10,000)
Malays
Chinese
Indians
1911
Total IVi ¥
142 72 69
92 74 18
27 .21 : 6
19.21
Total . M ¥
163 .. 83 . 79 
118 85 33
47 34 14
■ 1931
Total I
.193 98
171 .113 
, 62 ,, 42
p
95
58
20
. In terras' of integration into families this table indicates 
that the Malays had 98, 95,: and. 98.5 percent integration
respectively^ for the . above mentioned' years, while /the . Chinese had
. . .  2.1‘i
59,56 and|57. 5 percent respectively. ■ This’ ..shows a remarkable ■ 
trend of increasing the proportion of permanent residents and- 
thus, an extension of. attachment to . Malaya and' the Straits 
Settlements by the Chinese. The table is significant from the-* 
aspect of the Chinese "threat" of dominating Malaya by force, 
as besides nonstituting the majority in the urban centres, the, 
Chinese males outnumbered their counterparts in thejjMalay group.
In their society, their male . age^group,, distribution must hare 
had a higher proportion of potential fighters.
During the Japanese occupation, the Chinese .community 
as a whole suffered, persecutions and hardships. Some of the. 
Chinese were particularly singled out'for. execution ( 394)>' some 
collaborated, the|najority complied with Japanese orders under 
Ipressure^ all, however, developing an "ever growing hatred 
•towards ft he Japanese]" (395).- The M.CiP. organized- a guerrilla 
army (M.P.A.J.A.) with some 5,000-7,000 active.; fighters 
• supported by the working class and Chinese' peasants.. Being the, 
only organization actively opposing the Japanese, the'M.P.A.J.A. 
drew plans'for ' liberation of Malaya from, the;'British .by the end; 
of the war (396). Immediately after the armistice, the 
M.P.A.J., .A took the law into its hands talcing vengesince on 
Chinese and Malay collaborators. In 1946, • the 1VI-.C.P . managed-to 
(organize a strike of 150,000 workers in.protest of food- shortages 
and of economic difficulties..- This was much larger in scale, than 
the M.C.P. had achieved in form of strikes during the 1930s 
and reflected the- Chinese support for the M.C.P. Even though 
the M^P.A. J.A. had been officially disbanddd' by.-, the British 
after the war, the l.C.P. still could'organize underground units 
with active or passive support of the Chinese masses, as the
traditional anti—communist elite was still preoccupied witli
restoring their "businesses leaving the political field operrto 
leftist dominance. This was the situation in- towns., hut 
Chinese support, and very active at -that,; came also .' from half 
a million subsistence- peasants squatting on the fringe, of the. 
jungle (397). rural has is,, th e- ^suc cess of the communist
takeover in China, and the Indonesian'resistance to the hutch 
underlay the M.C.P. determination to try and forestall by armed 
rebellion the creation of the federation, Although the '
rebellion officially lasted for twelve years,-the British 
found an appropriate strategic counter-measure as early .as 1950, 
when, according to the Briggs Plan, about a million people, 
squatters and peasants in isolated hamlets were resettled in 
guarded nnew settlements”-, This denied food and'information . 
from the rebels, but also involved the creation-of 357 new 
villages, 399 of which were Chinese, 147 ox.-Hokkien. predominance 
and 136 of Hakka (398). In addition to this "denial of rural 
■support, the British attived- at neutralizing the labour unions 
as potential urban supporters of the G-uerilla (399). ’ Irlboth the
\ • ■, I
rural and urban sectors theu.mproving eoonomic conditions in... 
post W.W.II-.- Malaya helped the British tojachieve their goal.
This gave a respite to the traditional Chinese, .leadership to 
assume its functions and cooperate with 'the• modera.te Malays i n ’ , 
the spirit of the federation’s Constitution. v . :
In 1949, the M.C.A/, which was originally founded as a- 
welfare organization (400), tried to image-of the
Chinese as coiimunists*trtl eUtted By 1948, ■ it .
is said to have' had already 100,000 members ( 401),' but as, 80 
percent .of .its leadership were members of the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce or guilds (during 1949-1965) it. alienated, itself from
workers and trade unionists ( 4 0 2 ) the latteriexpecting a less 
compromising attitude on the M.C.A. part in Chinese.affairs 
and social policies.' The M.C.A. adopted, nevertheless, what 
appeared to them as an acceptable policy of coexistence between 
the .Chinese and the Malays in a plural cultural setting.. Trying 
to change the 1948 citizenship laws, and getting the support of; 
/^general Templar, they achieved their goal and; enabled the, 
community to increase the number' of citizens from. 375,000 in-
1949, to more than a million (403) .' The Constitution of the 
M.C.A. included among other objectives.: to safeguard the . "rights 
of minorities”, "to preserve and sustain the use and study of 
■ the Chinese language” and to act "for the well being of the 
Malayan Chinese Association generally” (404). '
The political coalition between U.M.H.O. and the M.C.A. 
implicitly compensated the Chinese in economic matters.for 
their secondary role in politics. The conformism of the - M. C.A., 
primarily served the interests of the1 Chinese middle and upper-" 
classes, but. seemed to fall short in protecting'national 
interests .and the welfare of the working class (405). These 
shortcomings did not -escape ^ t^he' M.C.A. leadership itself as 
well as. that of U.M.N.Q., but the compromise worked well in 
other respects. This did not prevent the|p.A.P-.~Sponsored / 
party (D. A.P.) -to contest the M.C. A. leading role An the Chinese 
community just before' merger and during the: 1964 elections.
The D.A.P., in the absence of organized left-wing, ideology, 
provided an image, of a party keen on the welfare; of. workers,.
.and though non-nationalist in its communal approach its' Chinese 
character was evident. After the ]>. A.P. failure-in the 1964 
Malayan elections,- Lee Kwan Yew shifted his attacks from the 
M.C.A. to, U..M.N.0. "to make sure of at least their £the GhineseJ
community’s- support” (406). After secession,, with no real ' 7- 
threat from the P.A.P., the president, of the M.C.A. advocated 
cooperation with Singapore not only in "defence matters alone”
(407), reflecting the general line-’of the Alliance, policy.
The conformist leadership of the IvI.G.A. acquiesced, though
under protest, to the abolition of Chinese secondary schooling.-
from the official education system. Also, the constitutional ■
favouritism of Malays in scholarships, professional licences,
public services, business permits and the land reservations
(408) aroused dissatisfaction within the Chinese community. In 
the 1969 elections the Alliance got 66 seats out, of 104 in 
West Malaysia, with 49.1 percent of 
however, seem* to have lost some of its seats to the P.A.P.
(409). Phis seemed to the Malays a Chinese treacherous, handling 
df the Alliance, and the $0f May 1969rriots which ensued seem to 
have resulted from the intereommunal suspicion following the 
elections. Phis' intereommunal fear , on the Malay side‘.from a 
Chinese domination by collusion of the Malaysia and Singapore 
Chinese with the help of China, and on the part, of the Chinese*, 
from a pan-Malayan union with Indonesia, is said to be one of 
the factors keeping Malaya together (410). However, fear is 
often likely to express itself in violence, which is precisely 
what happened in 1969.
The history of Chinese modern education in Malaya, began 
after 1917. The schools in great measure served as centres for 
promulgating Chinese nationalism and anti-colonialism, but when 
the British became aware of that development, they imposed ; .
official control over the Chinese system of education (411). 
Enrollment in Chinese schools, as a percentage of the population 
■rose from 1.5 in 1931-32 ^0 9 percent in 1949, and'to 14 percent
)yote. The M.C.A.,
in 1956, and stabilized around 16 percent in the 1957-62 period.
(412) Enrollment in Chinese primary schools slightly increased
from 291, 200 In government schools,:.' and 40,500 in private ■
schools in 1956, to 383,600 in government and 4,900 in private ■
schools in 1969 (413).“ Secondary schooling went, up in 1956-1961,
from 27,000 in government schools and 3,100 in private schools'
to 56,800 and 17,900 respectively. .Since 1962, there remained
only private. Chinese secondary schools with .34,400 ' pupils in
that same year, decreasing to 18,500 in 1969 .(414).
The education problem may prove more hard pressing for
the M.C.A., than the social welfare and labour issues. The
leadership has kept down any Chinese nationalist'expression, and
refused to raise the' issue of elevating Chinese to official
language status (415). It also dismissed the proposal to
establish a Chinese university for the Chinese Educated,
recommending that they mix with the Malay and English Educated.
Only feeder colleges .for preparation to university were deemed
necessary (416),
With all its shortcomings the MC.A.-h.M.N.O. alliance, has
proved a reasonable solution to a highly sensitive political
situation. Its precariousness until the- present days has been
due to;external forces, i.e. the.Chinese in Singapore and .Malay
extremists. With increasing M.C.P. activities, the equilibrium
may deteriorate, but this is no less a Malaysia government
problem .than it is a,.Chinese problem.
Vietnam. Vivid memories of past independence still existed in
Vietnam in 1900 as they did in Burma, but this was not th^only
resemblance. There were the socio-economic similarities: a ■ 
gradual impoverishment of peasants and workers' within a general
economic expansion, .and, to some- extent, the displacement of 
the ,traditional elite by colonialists' favourites;■;This latter 
phenomenon was particularly true of Cochinchina, as in Annam 
and Tongking. the traditional 'administrators maintained their 
positions alongside'the .French civil servants. ' In 'addition, 
a consultative National Assembly, elected from a limited group 
of trustworthy indigenes, made- French, rule more palatable to 
the natives.- Again, not unlike-Burma, Vietnam had experienced 
a shift southwards o f t h e  " geographical - distribution of' its 
human activities. . This was less marked than in Burma, since ,. 
mining and industry as well as. agriculture were , developing jnt 
in the. densely • populated North,1'and the shift of the 
administrative centre was only partial;, in ■ f a c t i t  was Hue ... 
which suffered;more than Hanoi in this-respect. . The shift 
southward's,: which opened the Mekong Delta to rice cultivation .
' and the region of the Terres Rouges to-plantations, favoured . 
capitalists and traders in exjnrt crops more than it did the 
primary producers The capitalists were mainly French in 
anonymous companies and Chinese in daily confrontation with the 
indigenes. It followed that the hostility of the indigenes
became direct^ against, the • Chinese., when in the- 20th century '
modern socio-economic ideologies became operative in their minds^ 
tkj feosa'itU .tkc F>i£AuJ-) u-, ^ucfuJuZ .
(i) Political-Developments. .. "French colonial policy in, 
Vietnam moved.between two extremes of 'assimilation*, which 
meant the cultural and institutional G-allicization of Vietnam, 
and 1 association',. which implied the maintenance of traditional 
Vietnamese institutions as. legitimizing props for French rule" 
(417)'. ..The'-'application of these'two policies suffered also. •
from the • rapid succession of Governor Generals (23-"between 
1.902 and 1945 (418) who had to interpret the changing policies 
Of laris. . ' ,. tV-- ■ ■ '
.. In the early 20th century, guerrilla resistance to the 
Prench, which had intermittently continued between 1858 ,and 
1896,. had already subsided, and'the traditional mandarin elite 
increasingly; collaborated; with the' Prench. ■However,'during the 
. first three decades of this century, a new,. modern educated, 
...elite rose and gradually resumed political opposition to the 
colonialists. Not-- until 1930, :had the moderate collaborationist 
■party or the younger radical elite any popular response. Ihe 
ambivalent political scene may be illustrated by the situation 
i n -1923, wlien: the Constitutionalist Party of moderate literati 
promotedt'Pranco-Yietnarhese: collaboration, -demanding free press,; 
greater opportunities for Vietnamese in the Administration, and.; 
an increase, in local legislative authority, while .the new ; 
intelligentsia groups: operated underground and later produced 
the Vietnamese .communist party.. -.Although in 1930—1931, the- 
communists tried to'lead a "bourgeois and democratic'1 rebellion 
against; the Prench (419), the Prench policyr. against communist 
and nationalist groups, during the 1930s, fluctuated from 
legalization (420) to suppression,■according to the current 
attitudes of the governments in Prance. Ihe communists In 
Vietnam, however, thought it. wiser never to abandon their 
clandestine organization, while th.^popular support they 
received made them- the prime movers in nationalist resistance 
to the Prench. ' ■
"in 194Q, the Prench gradually gave way t o  Japanese . 
political demands and, in 1941,... Indochina-became, practically
. harnessed into the Japanese Co-Prosperity,; Sphere, though still 
under' Prench nominal rule. The. Japanese, inline with their 
anti-Western indoctrination policy, aroused anti'-Preneh' 
subversion-of: politically active Buddhist sects (421),'hoping. 
to attract Sympathy from the majority of the, population. The 
communists, who did"-not collaborate, .founded in the meantime 
the Viet-Mi nil military, organization, which ..established its 
bases in the hilly"area adjagent to China, with full support 
of the latter.
After Japanf s surrender,: the Viet-Minh proc1aimed the 
independence of:-Vietnam; in, Hanoi. and, together with other 
nationalist groups, also in Saigon. The Potsdam Agreement, 
however, authorized" the Prench to. return and control the’ country 
south of the 16th parallel, while Chinese troops controlled the 
area north of it. The Chinese finally left the country after 
the Prench.had formally abandoned their rights in some Chinese 
ports. The -Prench consequently concluded an agreement 
.recognizing the independence of the Indochina federation within 
the Prench Union. The neo-colonialist intentions of the Prench 
popped' out of their '’disguise as they had created the Cochinchina . 
Republic, and an autonomous. region-in the Annamite hill-tribe 
area,,, even before the P.ontainbleau tails began...
The Prench"nominated Bao; Dai m  emperor (to which he 
accorded his consent only in 1949) but his.government of 
landlords and collaborators had no success in.rallying the , 
anti-communist nationalist leaders. 'Popular support for the 
Viet-Minh;was especially strong in the industrialized North, and 
:;there, .-with Russian and Chinese: armaments • they, defeated the 
American supported Prench. In 1954-, the'Prench left , the
country, and the G-eneva Treaty .kept Vietnam separated as it 
had been during 200, years of feuds between the/Nguyen and the 
Trinh families. ■
The decolonization of South -Vietnam progressed since-the 
Prench returnfprimarily as the civil- service became Vietnamized, 
and as.- ah indigenous army under .Prench supervision was created.
The West recognized, the independence. of Vietnam, Cambodia and.. . 
Laos, and the Russians and Chinese’ recognised North Vietnam.
kf
Thus, with a rudimentary administrative machinery South Vietnam ' 
began to'jfunction as wholly independent in 1954, 'Ngo Din Diem 
replacing the; former, upopular regime. • Ngo was a Catholic, anti­
communist and nationalist,., shrewd in politics and keen on 
nepotism, (.422)■ in 1955, .he proclaimed Vietnam' a republic"and 
himself president, restricting personal '.liberties tojoppose his 
.government^-and centralizing authority; but .later he had to 
decentralize his direct grip on ■ the,-executive agencies ..of the 
government.. American aid was-keeping- the- country,economically 
afloat and sustaining the armed forces. Ngo .'emerged the victor 
of the 1961 elections, after having le,d‘ a. campaign of intimidation 
against the opposition, which included’army.officers, many of 
the middle-class, the peasantry,. urban workers (423), and the 
Buddhist clergy. .. His assassination-brought an .end to 9 years of 
autocratic rule, ..which had introduced some improvement in land 
reform and-in foreign aided/public, works.
Between 1963'and 1968, ten successive governments ruled 
Vietnam, none of which enjoyed real public support. ■ In view of 
the major preoccupation of the government in the- war against the 
•Vietkong. and. North Vietnam, a military control of the government ", 
■seemed an inevitable -solution in a country suffering from
mInternal subversion and external military invasion... The army, 
how ever, 'Without strong'"ideological supervision by a party, 
continued Its rule, alongs i d e - f and in collaboration with a 
.. corrupt'administration. When American public- opinion began • 
earnestly expressing its disgust with that war, :a hasty plan- 
of "Viethamijsation?1 of the war was;implemented. The precarious 
peace of 19.73, with'almost a total American withdrawal may 
prove, the .first stage in' a profound change: in the American 
policy in Southeast Asia and the Far East.
■•After the French left Hanoi in 1954, Ho Chi Min had 
greater problems of economic rehabilitation in the North than 
there were in the South. He, however, faced no real political 
opposition, save, for a revival of new Buddhist sects in the 
post W.W.II. years (424). The.land reform, in emulation of 
the . .Chinese..;(4.25), annihilated the landlord class. Heavy 
labour investments in economic projects and restricted; private 
consumption produced economic-development, but also created' 
dissatisfaction;among peasants, workers and intelligentsia.: 
Party cadres and- army ..officers . became the dominant elites, and 
introduced a policy of the■ reunification of Vietnam through 
■support of the Vietkong and by a costly direct military 
iitrveniion. It-seems plausible that the implicit policy of 
North.Vietnam has envisaged a total reunification of French 
Indochina under North Vietnamese communist hegemony, supporting
to that end^ the, Bathet Lao (-426);. and the Khmer Issarak.
Excepting direct sufferings from military 'activities,
living conditions in South Vietnam have been better- than those 
of the North, This resulted net only from the-massive inflow 
of American dollars.,-through military and economic aid, but also
from the basic geographical facts of overpopulation in longkihg. 
This adds a major economic consideration to the political and 
cultural ones, which govern the North’s efforts tojreunite 
Yietnam. -fhe .Vietkong .in the South "constitutes an ideological 
avant-guarde not.only of the communist North, but alsoof the 
reunification policy. Besides controlling patchy areas in .the 
countryside, the Vietkong leads a symbiotic underground 
existence in the.. urban' sector (427) with tentacles spread in 
many institutions. In view of the Vietkong’s strength, and 
, notwithstanding the South* s* Sinicized culture it -is doubtful' 
whether . the latter will be able to achieve .what South .Korea has 
achieved in. similar political andycuitural circumstances.-
Ihe change in .the. American = global policy of 1972, and 
that'of the -Russians'- since the-1960s, hate affected the political 
situation in the Ear East, in Southeast Asia and. particularly 
in Vietnam. . It seems that a quarter., century' of American policy- 
.'of containing China is going to be substituted by a more 
peaceful one.- fhe Russians, however,! with their strengthened 
navy, intensify their, involvement in Monsoon Asia., perhaps with 
a view to-weaken China.on its margins opposite to the Russo- 
Chinese boundary. ..It seems, plansible that a strong unified and 
culturally Sinicized Korea and Vietnam under communist rule . 
could resist the Chinese much more effectively than corrupt . 
ps.eudo^-de.mocratic regimes. This policy, following a n ;ancient 
political, maxim that "my enemy's enemies are my friends”, may 
underlie Russia’s support to North Korea, North Vietnam and 
- India, it follows then, that it is a Russian natural interest 
.to support North Vietnam's aspirations for.-unifying and 
controlling the South and even entire Indochina, which will give 
them'control, of almost the entire Mekong basin... Adopting that
: s am e^politi Go-geographical principle,-,it is the . interest of, 
China td leave Vietnam separated, in view of' their historical 
■mutual strife. It seems, however, that China, at least . 
''.explicitly,! supports the unification of Vietnam, as it cannot . 
reverse ita declared policy of the, 1.950s and 1960s, when the 
Americans had military hases close to its "borders; nevertheless, 
China’s contemporary. policy-may represent an intention to 
crystalline the present political situation in Vietnam. In 
■ addition,•the road it built.from Yunnan, to Laos, and the 
refuge they accord, to. Sihanouk may that they will oppose
: a Vietnamese. 'bid. to conquer -the entire' area of Prench Indochina.
(ii) Social and Economic Developments.. While the entire 
population of. Indochina was about 25' million in 1936, the - 
anticipated population of.1980 of South Vietnam alone is 23,7 
million (428). The population of North Vietnam was 14.2 million 
in 1955, and that of the•South was .18 v 3 million-in 1970. The 
proportion of Chinese, Khmers and hill tribes in the 1962 
^population of South Vietnam was. seven percent out of a 14.8- 
•million total. ; -. ' .
' The. Prench colonial policy of confiscating temporarily 
abandoned lands'and of distributing newly opened lands to 
-'collaborating landlords and to Prench colons, increased . the 
.landless peasant c l a s s " In 1930, the average peasant holding 
was smaller than•before the Prench had come, though'riceland 
area quadrupled (429). The newly Prench-created landlord class, 
practised money 'lending but did 'neither invest in agriculture 
nor in industry (430). Also, the Prench agrarian- policy 
preferred export-crop estates to rice exports, and as a result 
the average share of ' rice in the general export value' fell
21)
from 65,3 percent' in 1913-1917 to 35,8 in 1938,' while that of 
rubber went.up from 0,8 percent to 21,8 during the same period 
(43I). This did-not mean;thatdpice production fell but, clearly, 
that the developing agricultural sector was that which least 
■remunerated the workers. ,
- .Extreme poverty made the., landless-peasantry receptive to 
.communist ideas which'represented -anti-colonialism as well- as 
-nationalism, \fork in, plantations. and mines did not attract ' 
labour for permanent jobs, as labour conditions'.were extremely 
exploitative. 'The underdeveloped Vietnamese middle-class 
consisted.of a. surprisingly high,;,proposition of professionals ; 
in .comparison to traders and. businessmen, the latter being . 
mainly Chinese.- Excepting the(landlords, no Vietnamese class 
.or. major group materially gained, from the Erench rule; as a 
re suit} the Erench-speaking intelligentsia had no, loyalties to 
Eranc e . The Prench thornselves, perhaps with the exception, of 
Some companies -and individuals:, did not greatly profit from 
their possession.of Vietnam, figures of 1822-1913, show that 
Vietnam! only very marginally;,,affepted'.the..--external trade of 
Erance ,(.432) . . ■
The Vietnam .war has'brought a younger, leadership to the 
fore.- She Erenc.h educated intelligentsia and the . Buddhist 
clergy\ were replaced-by the1 military and. party cadres elites. 
These, sometimes showed more .character■'than judgement and 
■understanding 'in their leadership,, lacking experience in human 
relations, In the North, in contradistinction,to the South, 
the dominant elite . remained .uncorrupted and has shown no sign, 
of relaxation in its extreme,,ideology and .sacrifice demands.
There seems to have existed-three pressure groups- in North
Yietnsm. of-'the 195Ds: the ih.te.lle.Qtuals, the.urban labour .force, 
and the peasantry (433) • fheir.;.political significance, however, 
..must have remained low in a  continuous atmpsphere, of ,a national 
crisis, whieh' has existed throughout = the entire independence, 
period of the country.
Since 1963., the army has become the most powerful, 
political group1 in. the South, ■ This body ' cannot be-.considered 
as a one minded entity, yet its economic position in relation.' 
■.to. the.war economy of the country, which was acquired by power^ 
may conduce its- development into .a'soci6.*-economic class^. (434). 
The Buddhist clergy has lost muehhof its political influence, 
which it had enjoyed until I960.' (The middle-class, which has 
developed., since the mid 1950s in connection with the war 
economy, largely support,-the present economic and political 
policy as they are its, direct beneficiaries. Peasants and 
workers, have little political inf luenc e- and seem to be 
preoccupied with survival rather than with politics.
The social disruptions of the Yietnam War constitute a 
direct' continuation of the--conditions 'existing • during the Prench 
bid for neo~c01Onialism. Internal migration ton North to South, 
•from Yietkong tobgoverhm.ent^Eeld territories or vice versa, and 
dislocation of hill tribes broke down community solidarity and, 
family ties. The rural migrants suffered much more than the 
urban population of the. South, who usually remained under the 
government' s continuous rule-. Some, resettlement programs; got 
gnder way; during the 1950s end 1960s^ with remarkable success, 
yet^ the fluid nature .of the campaigns,• must have, lately damaged 
much of the former achievements. /The 1973 spatial .distribution 
of the-government and Yietkong held territories, and the
:  : ' . b - ; ' : - v ' , ■ .-■ ' : ' ■. w
retreat-, of the Portia Vietnamese army, leaves the country- in a 
precario.us situation, "which is. hound; to. stabilize perhaps, by 
another partition of the South, changing the patchy pattern-of 
- the,.present territorial possessions. Also, combats may still-' ' : 
continue as the government .endeavour* to .keep open the 
communication arteries between the .urban centres, and ■ as the 
. more active- communists; may try to extend their .
; .With better agricultural potential and with foreign aid 
the South has perhaps; better chahces of economic development.
She•Borthj' however, is endowed with more extractive resources 
and with more efficient government.. .The South-, with American 
• aid, developed its formal./education enrolling 78 percent of its . 
related age groiups in primary schools.. ■ In 1968, there were 
471?'000 high schools', students J' of /whom only: 3 percent .were in . ' 
technical schools. University attendance was 32, 600 (4.35) • .The
■ figures should, be, considered’'with some/criticism, as school, 
attendance. in insecure, areas, was declining-, during the 1960s. 
llbwever, a. steady increase., was achieved in. primary .and high 
school attendance .(436). ; The•low proportion of formal 
technical education, must ..have been supplemented by informal 
education-in agriculture by government officials, by technical
. skills, acquired, in war-time conditions and by developing 
entrepreneurial- skills in that atmosTJhere of intensified 
activities/.and., easy money'malcing., . / /. ..
.The war/.changed South Vietnam from a rice exporting 
.country to a net importer. ..Other export crops also declined, /
■ and-'only: the/.massive economics aid and- military expenditure of 
the Americans- kept" the /country's economy going.-' / Vietnam’s 
total agricultural pro duction increased by 2.9 percent annually 
between 1954. and 19-69, the lowest'rate -but one in Southeast .
Asia ( 437.) . The Cl. f -.P.. ' annual " increase between■1965 and 1970 
was 2.5 percent, the lowest in Southeast Asia (438). With more 
American aid coming during..the presently concluded .peace, it 
remains tobe .seen whether.South- Yietnam will follow the South ; 
Korean example, or the ■ Indonesian- oneX
(iii)' lhe Chinese Minority. Estimates of the.Chinese 
population in South Yietnam for the year 1965 vary, "between
500.000 and 1,200,000 (439). ' This wide range was due to the 
ladk of a census as well as -to difficulties in defining a Chinese 
During the Erench colonial period figures were, more reliable, .
in 1908 the Chinese, of Cochinchina numbered 90,000 among .
117.000 foreign Asiatics (440).. Xn 1921, there' were 32,000 and 
7,000. Chinese in Tongking and Annam respectively, and in 1931 
their numbers rose to 52,000 and'-10,000 (441). Ihe 171,000 „
Chinese in Cochinchina, in 1937, more than doubled their "number 
reaching 380,000 in 1940 (442)', presumably because of "push" 
factors existing in China during the Japanese aggression. Most 
of this immigration, was illegal, and seems to have ;come through 
land routes, $^-The" better part, of the influx settled down in 
Cochinchina'which offered more;?economic opportunities-, than the 
congested - forth. ■ . .
Purcell (443) remarked that circa 1937 four fifths of 
the-;.Chinese in Yietnam lived south of the 17th. parallel and 
that this proportion does not seem to have changed since then." . 
But,., the communist government- -in the forth and its political 
affiliations with China, may have produced a drastic■change in 
the. economic position of the Chinese minority in forth Yietnam, 
which makes the problem of,those:who, still remain in the 
country uncharacteristic in respect of the Chinese',minority 
problem, of1 Southeast Asia. It thus follows that the'
Chinese concentration in Gochinchina becomes■even more 
representative of their conditions in South Vietnam in view of 
their .small proportion' in .Annam. post W.W.II.
information on the Chinese population mainly concerns, those 
in South,Vietnam and its 'development went as follows;. (444)
’ ' -:V 1951 1952 .19,53 , 1954 .1955 1958.. .
Saigon; - Cholon ' 583 542 429 ' 421 .440 107 . (in .1,000)
Other, Provinces '95 116 -115 112 181 17,. ■”
Total 678 657 544 '541 621 124 " .
... These figures, pertain to' Legale et • Gontrolee Chinese 
population, buthgo Dinh Diem and Taipei quoted the number of . 
Chinese in the 1950s as one million (445). The table also 
fails to show .the 40,000- Chinese who-crossed, the 17th parallel 
after the.Drench, withdrawal in 1954, and thus it may.serve■only 
as an indicator of the Chinese shift:from Saigon'Cholon to the 
provinces:. The- 'astonishingly small figure of, .1,958 is due to . 
the naturalization lav/ of 1956, which., does not signify any 
considerable change in the Chine se' identity of the naturalized 
persons, and is .thus irrelevant to/our study. .The more 
reliable figures of 1955 quote 800,000 Chinese in South Vietnam 
distributed as follows: 573>0C>0 ^  Saigon-Cholon and 227,000 in 
the 21 provinces. There.were/only five provinces with 20,000 
Chinese or over, and 11 with 10,000 or less, and the overall 
number of village dwellers was 131,500, while townsmen 
numbered. 95,700 .(-446) . • •
Par excellence entrepreneurs, the Chinese not only 
practically control the rice industry (447), except for 
cultivation, but. also to a large extent the crafts, retail
trade, commerce and banking; they have usually avoided, or 
.rapidly moved ■ fr om plantation lab our 'and agriculture (448). 
l\heiridiligence., ;■ skill and clannishness, made, them snatch the 
-wide qpportuhitlea offered .by the-post W.W.II.' war economy by 
moving; into manufacturing-industries and searvices. In 1951? 
out of- 70,698.-enterprises of all sorts, 66 percent were 
Vietnamese owned and 50 percent belonged to "legal Chinese", 
but about one third of the Vietnamese enterprises really 
belonged; to Chinese,■increasing their proportion to 50/9 
.percent (449). In the 1950s, about 37 percent of the Chinese 
enterprises;in Saigon-Cholon produced and traded in foodstuffs 
and 15 .percent in textile, the; absolute numberswere 3,543 and 
■1,439 respectively; in addition, .949 Chinese enterprises dealt 
in foreign trade and 862 in scrap metal (450).;'. Many of the 
Chinese .enterprises come.Under,the supervision of the Chinese 
Chamber of“Commerce which was established in the 1900s. It. 
maintains close ties: with its. counterparts outside the country 
not only for - business, purposes,. but also to mobilize their 
support- when the - government 'exert®' economic pressure on the 
Chinese (451). ' v
•In 1956, the.government issued economic and civil-rights . 
restrictive acts.discriminating against” the Chinese, with an 
official aim of integrating them'into the. Vietnamese society.
.Vietnamese citizenship was automatically, imposed on all the. 
Vietnam- born Chinese ( 452)n . The ■ non-citizens could not enter 
the retail and rice trades, and', scrap-metal dealings. Those . 
already thus occupied had-to cease .their, activities within a 
6-12 .months period. The Chinese, generally did not comply with 
these regulations,' and boycotts‘on'Vietnamese rice in Hong Kong 
and Singapore sufficed to .bring about face-saving changes in
■the .government policy (453) . In 1958, the line against the 
Chinese hardened again,when-the government restricted Chinese 
, education and, reacted against those who'had declined Vietnamese
■ citizenship b y ‘refusing to accept identity cards. In 1963, when . 
Vietnam .became a rice deficit Country, and when the, army took .y
■over the government, the aggravation in the war situation
■ became a justification fox* the anti-Chinese hard-1 ineys to . ’•
stiff eh discriminative enactments.. ’ Restrictions on Chine.se ■ -
- education became more conspicuous, but in the economic field, 
Chinese ,-businessmen could unofficially compromise with army 
officers and civil servants, without too much publicity.
The Chinese speecli-groups in South Vietnam :
still have • a strong significances inthe socio-economic life of 
the., entire group/ .This is - manifested in occupational 
specialization, in speech-group labour recruitment and in the. 
specific labour .-relatiohsjof the still existing - guilds; all this 
in addition to' the . specific speech-group socio-cultural 
institutions,.such as hospitals, temples (454) , cemeteries and. 
Welfare organizations. - This., phenomenon, relatively more . . 
emphasized than in most other Southeast Asian Chinese communities,/, 
presumably stems from the congregation system, which was based 
on ' speech-group; membershipt |tnd-.although it was formally changed 
into' a/territorial system -by China's formal request in 1946,
. in'practice the ■ traditional system remained'as in the past (455).
In 1950, Skinner produced the following figures concerning;.
the speech-groups in S^ ubb Vietnam:
. ‘ (in 1,000)
Cantonese . .; I.eochiu Hakka:" ■ '' ilokkien Hainanese
337. 5 45/1 ;:225 y30# 75 ’ 10$ 60 8fo 30 4$
The distribution in Saigon Cholon in 194-8 was as 
follows (456):
(in 1,000)
Cantonese Teochiu Hokkien Hakka Hainanese
1-28-’41.3% 114.4i 36.9% ,24.2 7.8% 32.9 10.6% 10.6 3.4%
Although the Cantonese .are only margiimlly more 
numerous -than the Teochiu, their dialect
in Saigon-Cholon;- . The Teochiu are linked with
those of Cambodia by fish imports from the fonle Sap, and they 
also specialize- in the sugar industry and transport. Hokkiene.se 
specialize as traders in villages and in scrap metal dealing( ; 
and the'Hakka predominate in.the bread, textile and leather 
industries. The Hainanese' specialize in restaurants, but their 
chefs . who are^SDmetimes lessees are Cantonese (457).
Besides' the several speech-groups of the Chinese
community there exists in Yietnam a Chinese mestizo- group .
(Minh Huong), which dates back to. the pre-colonial times. it
seems that this group has lost its Chinese identity as it had
been a,legally. separated group, differentially taxed from the 
Chinese., and generally classed by the French as subjects of the 
'French Empire in Asia, while, the Chinese remained aliens (458).. 
The Minh.Huong mostly live in and this increases ■
the possibility of . their assimilation. TheyM#$^ numbered -
73,OpO in Cochinchina in 1931 (459) ?• hut their number in I960 
wa,s estimated at 150,000 - 300,000 (460), although Chinese 
.intermarriages with.indigenous.women.must have decreased in 
number during the 20th century.
. French colonialism being,, in some sense, less tolerant 
to the Chinese in 20th century Indochina, than other
colonialist powers to the Chinese in their respective domains, 
denied Chinese nationalism from politicizing the. Chinese 
communities^, and^ as a result, to a certain degree/also, .from 
introducing Chinese ./.modern education. It .ensued that: literacy 
-in Chinese in-Yietnam was the lowest among the ITan Yang 
communities (-461) .■ Also, the congregation system and, the low 
proportion, of labourer's unintegrated in guilds reduced Chinese 
radical nationalism .during .the, French rule.: After,W.W.II., 
the' K.M.T. political activities were less attractive than ever' 
before^, and Chinese’ communist activities could endanger the 
lives of those who'practised thdm....The. net result of ■ all this 
was the. explicit .political disinterest of the Chinese community 
in Yietnam (462) and its low literacy,in Chinese.. For : '
example,, in 1955. there were 13.860 book's in the Chinese 
library, of Cholon, but the - number of loans for that year was 
only 2,-375 ( 1) (463).. There arefloWever'11 Chinese daily 
newspapers and 5 weeklies, the former,with a .62,000 circulation.
The first modern "Chinese school was established in 1910, 
but a bilingual high school had existed in 1907.. By 1937 ,' •
there were 137 schools and 7,000 pupils all supported by ' 
Chinese associations and -private' individuals. Kuo Yu was the 
means of instruction and French ,was a’ secondary language. In 
1953, there were 35,000 Chinese pupils in South' Yietnam, and 
in 1955 -' ■more than 62,000,.. In’ 1963,■ Chinese language 
instruction was restricted to 6 hours a week and compulsory 
instruction'in Vietnamese was stepped up (464).
Cambodia. . Cambodia and Laos, constituted the backward region of 
French Indochina, and the recent internecine;!war in both
damaged. much, of the progress achieved ever since. -The land- 
locked^position of Laos,' its ethnic diversity and .extreme 
economic.underdevelopment as well-as the tense political 
situation, all combine to render doubtful theviability of this 
state (465). Cambodia has been economically better endowed, 
and -with a commanding location on the G-ulf of Siam as well 
as a higher ethnic homogeneity, but still politically divided/ 
perhaps owes its viability to its "buffer state position" (466). 
Although this state of affairs was‘geographically true when 
Cambodia filled the gap between Vietnam and Siam. In the pre­
colonial era, its position (and that of Laos) at present is 
more related to the China-Vietnam-Russia power relations.
(i) Political 'Developments. Throughout the French rule, 
Cambodia retained a pro forma monarchy, but a. "resident general" 
held real government. The Vietnamese nationalism did not 
produce any resonant vibrations among the Cambodians, -and even 
successive concessions and reannexations of provinces in 1887, 
1904, 1941 and 1945 passed virtually politically unmarked, as 
Cambodia lacked a "nationalist movement of any consequence" (467). 
In 1945, the Japanese made Sihanouk declare Cambodia’s 
independence within the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and.when the 
French returned, Cambodia became an autonomous kingdom within . 
the French Union. In anticipation of a growing nationalist and .. 
communist sentiments in post W-.W.II. years, Sihanouk became 
the leader of a group demanding full independence. In 1949, 
the French accorded "the first prerogatives of internal 
independence" (468) , but Sihanouk,- unsatisfied with it, went 
into exile in protest ofjthe slow transfer of administrative 
power.
Meaningful political public 'life'began in Cambodia in 
1946, when a Constituent'Assembly was elected and-drafted a 
Constitution. Tile Democratic Party won the first elections, 
and having had close links -with the Khmer Issarak^obstructed 
legislation sponsored by the king. In 1951, the party again 
emerged the winner of the elections, and began replacing the 
civil servants with its own followers. However, Sihanouk took 
a royal mandate "to restore order and security" in the country. 
In 1954, Cambodia became fully independent, and Sihnouk's 
Sangkum party carried the 1955 elections, and indeed every 
single seat in the 1958 and 1962 assemblies'.
Though Sihanouk abdicated in 1955, Cambodia becoming a 
republic, the Sangkoum party besides manning the Administration 
and practically every important economic and social post, 
introduced a personality cult of Sihanouk. -This brought about 
an atmosphere of a "guided democracy" with party officials 
ensuring popular support to Sihanouk’s policy. Sihanouk’s 
personal abilities in handling political and.factional leaders, 
as well as the masses, was second perhaps only to Sukarno's.
He created a split within the Khmer Issarak rebel movement.
The non-communists of that movement joined Sihanouk and were 
integrated into the Khmer army (469)', as they resented the 
Vietnamese influenced communist faction in the Khmer Iasarak, 
and Vietnamese activities In Cambodia in general.
The Communist Party of Cambodia began its activities among 
the Vietnamese minority group, which constituted the principal 
labour force in Pnom Penh, a large proportion of the rubber 
plantations labour, as well as the group of fishermen on the 
Toftle Sap. Since 1950, the communists operated a political 
school within Cambodian territory under effective rule of the
MVietkong. The Vietnamese influence in the Communist Party 
brought about much of its own unpopularity among the Cambodians, 
who regarded Sihanouk as the real national leader opposing the 
French and later the .Americans and the Vietnamese.
During the 1950s and.early 1960s, Cambodia chose a 
neutral line in foreign politics. . As a result, both the U.S.. 
and China economically aided the country; the U.S. share, 
amounting to 228 million dollars between 1954- and 1959 and the 
grand total reaching 335 million. However, when the Vietkong 
and leftist guerrillas infiltrated large rural areas, Sihanouk 
requested that the American aid be stopped in 1964? and 
severed diplomatic relations, with the U.S. in 1965.
Capitalizing "on the strength of the Khmer tradition of 
ruler worship" (4-70), Sihanouk underestimated the American 
evaluation of the strategic importance of Cambodia to the 
Mekong Delta region of Vietnam. Thus^ the military coup, aided 
by the Americans, established an anti-communist and anti- 
Sihanouk regime, which exhibited its chauvinism by a massacre 
of thousands of Vietnamese residents. However, the army 
remained injpontrol mainly in the larger urban centres leaving 
most of the countryside to Vietkong and free Khmer control (471).
(ii) Social and Economic Developments. The traditional 
division of-the Cambodian society followed an occupational line: 
bureaucracy, clergy and peasants. ..Families of royal descent and 
nobles usually became government officials and clergymen^ and/ 
indeed, clerical life provided a respectful solution to social 
mobility needs of. the peasantry as well. During Sihanouk’s 
period, the royal.family and the old.nobility held high 
government positions, and the educated Khmer s..- served as civil
servants and professionals. The- clergy held its popularly 
venerated position and.the Chinese; minority;and to some extent 
the Vietnamese, with some proportion of Cambodians constituted 
the middle-class. After W.W.II., the army with its 
hierarchical structure provided’ an outlet to social pressure 
and leabrship expression alongside the temporary and the 
professional priesthood. In this sense^the Khmer Issarak 
provided similar opportunities.
The rural society of Cambodia has.been favoured by an 
abundance of cultivable land, absence of-landlordism (which 
suggests minimal 'class distinction), and until the Vietnam war 
soci’al stability. However, when war hit the 
Cambodian soil, stability gave way to social and spatial 
mobility, in post W. W; II. . years, the ..Cambodian economy 
developed,'not the least, because of its adjacent location to 
the Korean and Vietnamese war-zones, which promoted Cambodian 
exports. With internationaljaid agricultural and industrial 
projects were'constructed and the infrastructure developed.
But when the war invaded Cambodia itself, many of the projects 
were damaged, and overland as well as riparian transport 
greatly ,.s£rinke^.
,.v .■_ ^ •'
Education in Cambodia, experienced a rapid progress, and in
1962, about 10 percent of the population attended primary
schools (4-72), but high schools attendance-reached only 0.82
percent and university students amounted to 27 per 100,000 (4-73).
This, nevertheless, represents more than a tenfold, expansion
of modern education in 12 years, while in that periodthe
proportion of pagoda schools sank from 50 to 12 percent. As in
most other- Southeast Asian countries education mainly affected 
the urban sector. ■
. In the 1930s, agriculture provided livelihood for 85 
.percent of the Cambodian population, and produced ah annual 
surplus of 200,000 tons of rice for-export, while corn, sugar- 
palm, tobacco, k.apok, oil seeds, rubber and pepper constituted . ' 
the. other major export crops (474). Animal husbandry provided 
...all needs in meat, and fishing.in rivers and the Toule-Sap 
produced about 250,000 tons per annum, much of the catch being 
exported to Vietnam. In post W.W.II. years, . with foreign 
■economic aid and cultural stimulation, several'measures were 
introduced to increase: agricultural production, -However, the . 
Buddhist peasantry.did not>-respond in a favourable way. A 
possible explanation for the negative attitude of the peasantry 
may be -their lack of-cultural values;of acquisitiveness.
Prestige- in rural society still could be acquired "by means of 
righteous conduct and faithful .service to the Pagoda" (475).
Also, the physiographical conditions; of Cambodia have never 
demanded the accumulation of surplus,, and although "extravagance' 
in poverty" has been a traditional Cambodian characteristic, 
peasants'preferred to indebt themselves to Chinese money lenders 
rather than produce surplus, as laws against land alienation 
to foreigners assured them of the means for their subsistence., 
G-overn'ment, credit provided loans only for economic investment, 
while the Chinese lent cash for any purpose. Also, government ■ 
irrigation projects sometimes came to nothing, when peasants 
neglected to maintain' the distributary canals.
Since independence, the industrial sector and public 
services have constituted the more advanced sector.of the 
economy, but government policies- and.especially their application, 
and also the political situation, did not provide
the necessary conditions for commercial foreign investment in
the economy. The economic projects, initiated' hy foreign aid 
were government owned, the hanking and insurance were 
nationalized in 1965, and the “guided economy1' of Cambodia 
adopted -a policy of, indigenization of trade, and services. Since
1963, both external and internal trade became monopolized by 
state-* agencies, . and national minorities, directly suffered from' 
that and from restrictions on some commercial, transport and 
other skilled occupations. Public services 'experienced perhaps 
the highest rate of developmentin education, civil service, 
defence and transportation.' The creation, of .the port of 
Silianoukville and the road linking .it to Pnom Penh, had an 
ostensible value as a national enterprise, and a politico- 
economic justification for trying to-become independent of the 
port of Siaigon for external trade. In 1966, however, Cambodia,, 
with a population of 6.3 million, was outstanding in Southeast 
Asia in having a decreasing G-.D.P. rate in absolute and in per 
capita terms (476). The situation does not seem to have changed. 
: until the present days.
(iii) The Chinese Minority. In contrast to the trend in 
Cochinchina, the Chinese in Cambodia tended to concentrate in 
the capital during the first.half.of the 20th century, thus 
increasing the proportion-of their community in Pnom Penh from 
11 percent to about 33 (477). Between 1908 and 1963, the 
.Chinese population grew from 90,000 to 425,000 (478), but this 
growth was unevenly distributed over the. years, '.as in 1936/37 
there were only 106,000 Chinese in the country,(479). It has 
been said that at the beginning .of the century 40 percent of 
them lived on agriculturef and, were more attached , to the land 
than In any other part of. Indochina (480:); In 1963, about 77
percent of the community was Teochiu, and'their congregation 
social organization would imply ev.en a higher homogeneity in 
1900. ;; "
Ibe congregation constituted the highest organizational 
institution in the Chinese community.. In 1935., there were 70 
of them in Cambodia, 39 of which included more than one. speech- 
group^ as by law, if more'than-100-members of ;one;speech-group 
lived in the same -locality, they were entitled to create a 
congregation. Prom'the speech-group"point of view, this was 
highly beneficial,'as the' chefs de congregations, besides 
collecting taxes and reconciling disputes, had the authority 
to accept-- or reject new immigrants by issuance of permanent - 
resident permits', and to issue laissez passer to their members. 
The congregations administered the social functions of the 
Chinese society: the school, cemetery, temple, welfare and 
dispute reconciliation (481), and. cooperated among themselves
in social and religious matters (at least as reported from
■ ^ . .
Pnom Penh). The Cambodian congregations had ties with those
of Saigon-Cholon? the Teochiu' fishing monopoly holders on
the Towl^ Sap exported their catch to’ their counterparts In
the former cities, and ftia many Chinese businesses in Pnom Penh
were affiliates of Saigon-Cholon companies. . Thus the
homogeneity of the., congregations, which was culturally
.preferable fo^comniunal life,, was also perpetuated by the
authority it had over the acceptance of new immigrants, and by
the practical control of the speech-group. members over the
employment producing enterprises'. Two additional points of
politico-geographical significance are n o t e w o r t h y T h e  first
one was the importance of the colonial boundaries of Indochina,
which'minimized■the links between the Teochiu groups of
Thailand, and Cambodia and enhanced those of Cambodia and 
Cochinchina. The..second was'the Sdcio-geographical nature of 
the congregations, which were determined by speech-group as well 
as by place of residence. This later caused difficulties in 
maintaining the system when large numbers of new' immigrants 
settled down in Pnom Penh,
Although the government system of the congregations .seemed • 
democratic, it was.only apparently so, as traders and business- . . 
men, who provided .employment, usually controlled the votes. Offf
W.l.II., the congregation organization . 
eroded, though the chiefs gave up office, only in 1958. This 
came as a result, of an inflow of .100,000 Chinese during 1946- 
1949, most of whom were coolie refugees, who went to live 
outside the Chinese ward of Pnom Penh. The geographical 
dispersion, ^  the inability of the chiefs.; to impose selection on 
the. newcomers,' and also the introduction of direct taxation in* 
1955, brought about the decline In the chefs de congregation 
authority and practically led to the dissolution of the system. 
With less authority they could not reconcile, the differences 
regarding political convictions of the more radical coolie 
newcomers and the old established middle-class, and also the-*..- 
more acute problem of the generation gap within the.- long 
established society, which could' not remain unperturbed by the 
post W.W.II, changes in China. ;-
In the 1950s., v/hen Cambodia improved its relations with . 
the People’s Republic-of China, the former leadership, which 
was pro-K.M.T. by nature of its economic occupations, lost 
ground to a- new leadership, mainly of non-businessmen, who 
sprang up in the newly created,'voluntary associations. Chou
' m
En-lai’s'visit to Cambodia,speeded up the change in political • 
loyalty of the Chinese' community. Sport clubs and mass daily 
calisthenics in emulation of China, became popular, in a bid to 
revive a new. Ghdnese nationalism of the communist version. This • 
certainly could; occur only under a. government with a pro- 
Communist China policy. In internal Chinese affairs, the 
revival materialised in a pi'osperity of 'Chinese education, which .
i
increased school enrollment from 1.5 percent of the Chinese 
population in 1931-32, to 11 percent in 1959, and to 12 percent 
in 1963 (4-82). However, the government also imposed on the 
Chinese schools'12-15; weekly hours of Khmer language 
instruction. The Chinese schools divided in political 
affiliation .to pro-Peking and pro^Taiwan, with books printed 
in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Peking.
The marked swing to the- left of the Chinese leadership, 
did not bring about a total breach in relations between the old 
and the new leaderships. Chinese solidarity in an.alien and 
discriminating environment, and the practical financial support 
that conservative businessmen could donate kept the community- 
together. As a consequence, in 1956, the Teochiu mutual aid 
association undertook to -aid the newcomers who were denied the 
pursuit of 18 occupations. This "economic Indigenism"- was 
imposed during Sihanouk’s rule, who#speaking of the Prench, 1
Vietnamese and Chinese (perhaps only of the post W.W.II. newcomers) 
said: "Cambodia is not their homeland, we don1 k have minorities, 
only foreigners" (4-83). The Chinese did not openly protest 
against the restrictions, they usually preferred "unofficial 
arrangements" to public resistance-, especially as Chou En-lai - 
advised them to cool off.their political agitation when he was
visiting Cambodia (484),
At present, the Chinese situation in Cambodia is extremely 
insecure not so much because of war risjcs, as because of the 
possibility that Cambodia.would become communist, To the 
Chinese workers this would mean the loss of a chance to move 
socio-economically into the middle-class and thus to lose the 
raison d’etre of their living outside China. The Chinese big 
businessmen, who had begun their businesses as family, enterprises, 
each family member contributing to profit maximization-, by hard
successes into firms and companies, ■ would find difficulty in 
expanding and may even lose their property. However, it is 
likely that besides sending tentacles outside the country to 
find safer places to invest and live, they actually connive with 
the military and civil servants in by-passing economic
restrictions. It is worth,-noting that by its essentially 
trading nature the interests of the Chinese community in 
Cambodia, and in Southeast Asia in-general, are against 
communist., governments.
Thai1and. Fisher* s suggestion that Thailand may be studied as 
a control for the Southeast Asian countries which experienced 
colonial rule (486), is academically stimulating and may 
.produce practical benefits as well. Total generalizations may 
miss the suggested point, but the study of particular phenomena 
is. likely to produce valuable results., One of these may be a 
comparative study of the difference in attitude of:the 
indigenes towards the Chinese minority. Historical evidence 
exists, which supports the opinion that the colonialists 
intentionally sharpened the. hostility between the indigenes and
work and who transformed their initial
the Chinese minorities. However, as the colonial legacy 
"becomes a remote recollection, and as by feedback the Chinese 
problems in Southeast Asia tend towards more uniform solutions, 
Thailand may lose its unique position among the countries of 
the region in relation to its Chinese community.
(i) Political Developments. British and French
reluctance to confront each other on a common colonial boundary
may have constituted themajor reason for Siam’s independence.
It thus happened that the slowly modernizing country had been
governed by the traditional elite until the early 1930s.
However, cuts in civil servants’ salaries in the 1920s (487),
resentment among army officers from the promotion system, and a
\ik
more general dissatisfaction in' depression years of the 1930s, 
increased the ranks of a "small group of foreign trained young 
intellectuals’^  488), who hoped to reform■the government of the 
country.
In 1932, army officers staged a bloodless coup with a 
view of breaking the political power of the arrogant royal 
princes and nobility without, however, creating a representative 
government, fhe Peoples’ Party, representing the intellectuals, 
which comprised a circle of left-wingers headed by Pridi, 
allied itself with the officers and drafted a constitution. 
According to it, the king, jointly with the Assembly, appointed 
the cabinet, but the Assembly could be dissolved by the king.
In 1933, Pridi promulgated a plan aiming at nationalizing 
the economy, but communist agitation having existed in the 
country (489), made the government seize the opportunity to make 
Pridi resign, outlaw communism, impose censorship, and restrict 
political activities. Later, Pahon became prime minister and in
1934, he nominated Pridi and Pibun (the latter representing 
the army)'as ministers, while Pahon. himself acted as a 
moderator between the two factions. Pibun’s ambitions increased 
his popularity in army circles, and made him prime minister in 
1939. frying to emulate Germany and Japan, he endeavoured to 
introduce a popular patriotic drive. Renaming the country 
Thailand, which suggested perhaps some territorial claims, he 
tried to change the popular attitudes towards production and 
loyalties to the state.
In 1941, Pibun aligned himself with the Japanese war 
machine, and Pridi had to resign from the wide cabinet, which 
had been created in anticipation of the patriotic-drive 
initiated by Pibun. In foreign politics Pibun had little scope 
for independent manoeUvering during W.W.II., at the end of which 
he resigned. In 1946, with the world political atmosphere ' 
influenced by the collaboration issue, Pridi became prime 
minister. He liberalized political activity and received 
enthusiastic popular support, but the new constitution he 
drafted actually aimed at consolidating and perpetuating his 
party’s hold on the government (490). In 1947, however, the 
army^dissatisfied with the minor,political role it had played 
since 1944, reestablished itself in government by a coup.
Pibun became prime minister in 1948, when the Gold War was 
already in progress, and when his premiership could be accepted 
by the Americans. During his second rule, Pibun enjoyed much 
less authority than he had during his first premiership. He had 
to reconcile the army and the police factions and. suppress two 
navy coups. This strife among armed forces factions was a 
typical phenomenon in Thailand-where holding government office ■ 
provided the officials with opportunities to enrichiheraselves.
This political unrest, supported by Pridi*s followers, brought
about the reintroduction of the 1932 Constitution.
Since 1948, Thailand became increasingly aligned with 
the American policy in Southeast Asia, suppressieej <b*40 
communists inside the country, and supporting American policies ■ 
in Southeast Asia and the Par Past. Thailand joined S.E.A.T.O. 
in 1954, perhaps more in anticipation of American aid than as a 
result of anti-Thailand policies manifest in the creation in 
China of the Autonomous Thai State in 1953. However, during 
the Bandung Conference Chon En-lai assured the Thai delegation 
that the autonomous Thai government in yiinnan had hot been 
■created with aggressive intentions.towards Thailand, and as a 
result a rapprochement policy towards China was adopted. As 
by that time no American troops were stationed in Thailand, 
and as U.S. aid to Thailand, in per capita figures, was less 
than half that accorded to neutralist Cambodia' (491), it seems 
that the Thai move towards China had perhaps an original 
intention of increasing the American involvement in Thailand. 
However, personal animosity of Pibun towards the Americans, and 
a sort of Asian solidarity on his part or a loss of his 
prestige in army circles, may have been the real causes for 
that rappro chement. In practical policy, that period (1955-1957) 
manifested itself in the resumption of trade relations with 
China, in cessation of suppressing the Thai communists, in :
lifting economic restrictions put on the Chinese in Thailand,
: and in open criticism of the U.S.
In 1957, Sarit removed Pibun from his office by a 
military coup, and realigned the policy of Thailand with that- 
of ,the U.S., receiving a 100 percent raise in economic aid. In 
1958, Sarit took.dictatorial authority suppressing the
communists, free press, Canning political parties and labour 
unions. Trade with and travel to China were prohibited, but no 
further restrictions on the Chinese community were imposed. in 
regional politics it seems that events in Laos between 1959 
and 1962, justified Thai efforts to bring about American 
intervention in the former state. In fact, Thailand's committ­
ment to S.E.A.T.O. exposed it to communist reprisals, and 
without active American intervention.it would have rather 
become neutralist (492). The net result of the American 
involvement was the stationing of American troops in Thailand 
in 1962, without real American intervention in force in Laos (493) 
The 1973 truce in Vietnam may give Thailand a temporary ., 
respite from subversive activities 021 its northeastern borders. 
Yet, by the general nature of communist subversion, underground 
activities will, gradually rebuild up, unless socio-economic 
conditions in the Northeast will produce a society immune to 
communist ideology and infiltration. Communist harassment 
also exists in South Thailand, where Muslim Malays and communists 
defy Thai government authority, and where the M.C.P. of 
Malaya maintains an active force of 800 guerrilla fighters, 
which can eventually grow to 2,500. These insurgents identify- 
themselves as Malays, and the Thai policy against them is of 
aggressive vigilance, having no willingness to solve Malaysia’s 
problems at their own expense (494). In mid 1967, there were
2,000 estimated active communist guerrilla fighters and 10,000 
supporters in the Northeast, who played on secessionist themes, 
such as a union with Laos for the Thai-Lao of the Northeast.
The insurgents of the SoUth^ try to activate the Malays of 
Thailand by the same themes, advocating a-reunification of the
South with Malaya (495).
(ii) Social and Economic Developments. Thailand ranked
third among the most populated states of Southeast Asia in
1970 having 34.152 million inhabitants (496) and an annual
population growth rate of 2.66 percent. But, while the Central.
Region rate of growth was 2.31-percent, that of the Northeast
\tk
reached 2.95, and both those of'Nonth and South nearly matched 
the state's average with m 2.70 (497). From the ethnic point 
of view Thailand has long been a fairly homogenous country with 
80 percent Thais, about 10 percent Chinese, and.the rest Malays . 
and hill tribes.
Rural life in Thailand has been dominated by rice
cultivation and its annual life cycle. Social life is not
clannish (498) and the usual household is of a nucleated family;
this enables young families to nettle in other villages without
great difficulty, as rural life in rice growing communities is
similarly patterned. Family ties are easily broken when young .
Thais migrate to the urban areas (499). Women have equal
inheritance and ownership rights as men, and village life is
pervaded with equality (500); there is little ambition for
social mobility. Values are still attached to religious merit,
official position and old age.. For example, the average cash
expenditure on religious practices in a rural Thai family
reached 8 percent of the cash income, excluding food and labour
contributions (501). Leadership in the village is held by an
elected headman and an unofficial but influential council of
elders. Loyalties to king and country constitute current
popular values, which however, have-not been put to test under 
circumstances of crisis. The decline in royal authority and the
%S5.
,change in the dominant; elite, which followed; the 1932 coup, 
and also market economy and lay education,' gradually produce 
changes in values and in traditiional patterns of life.
In the urban sector, personal ambitions and expectations 
concerning'socio-economic mobility are usually greater and the 
gap between them and their fulfillment is usually wider. The 
specific inner political conditions in Thailand brought about 
:the building of political parties around personalities rather 
than on different ideologies (502), when political organization 
was not forbidden.. The restriction on political organization 
on ideological or territorial basis, and the extreme 
centralization of government, with fairly low iDrovincial 
initiative, has intensified the long established exceptional 
political and economic importance of Bangkok. In addition 
Bangkok sets an example in style, customs and attitudes, which 
is imitated.by the provincial elite. All other conditions 
being equal, residence in Bangkok conveys additional status in 
comparison to provincial residence.
The- social classes observed in the 1950s, divided into 
5 categories (503). The Aristocracy were a closed class of 
royal descent and old nobility, in the veins of some of which 
flowed a certain proportion of Chinese blood, but ho ethnic 
Chinese belonged to them. Their wealth had originated from land 
ownership, but they had invested little In trade and industry 
and.' t as a result f tended to lose their economic primacy. Some 
of them held high government positions, some were devoted to 
the Thai cultural tradition and some added their names to 
boards of big companies. As-a class they were generally on the 
decline. The active dominant elite consisted of high .ranking
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army officers, government officials, and of outstanding
businessmen, and. industrialists. They wielded together wealth
and political power and were largely influenced by Western 
material values. Chinese entered their ranks by intermarriage
.and by creating partnerships .with high officials. The pure
Thai bureaucratic elite of this group has since 1932 increased
its closure to furthermobility by allocating scholarships in
foreign universities for its. own class'members and also enhanced
its economic standing by cooperating with Chinese business (504)
The higher middle-class were more differentiated along ethnic
lines.' While the Thai component of this group consisted of
"white collar men" in business and government service, the Chine
component-was’mainly mercantile and business oriented. The 
JwL)
latter -have Cclose connections with Chinese counterparts in other 
flan Yang communities, and modeled their lives after them rather 
than after their Thai colleagues. The class as a whole, 
constituted about 50 percent of Bangkok’s population (505), 
demonstrating the high degree.of socio-economic centrality of 
the capital. The lower middle-class was overwhelmingly Chinese 
and consisted' of craftsmen, skilled labourers and shopkeepers. 
They exhibited a constant drive to move socially upwards. The 
lower class consisted of unskilled labourers and vendors, and 
was mainly preoccupied with providing for their, daily needs. 
Lately, some occupational organization has been introduced into 
it, and leftist ideas have begun to infiltrate the labourers’ 
minds. The Thais constituted the majority of this class, which 
generally repi*esented fairly recent rural urban migration (506) . 
In 1963, there were. 1.3 million urban workers, who since 1958, 
could not organize in labour.unions (507).
In 1962, 14.2 percent of the population attended primary
schools, but only 8.5 percent "academically". survived through 
the first 6 years of their schooling. One percent of the 
population attended high schools (508). In 1969, the proportions 
improved with 5,675 million .pupils in primary and 44-9,000 in 
secondary schools, more than half of the latter were in private, 
schools (509). University student enrollment was 45,763 in 
1969 (510), but "Education in Thailand is still regarded as a 
means to a job rather than as an end in itself" (511)* This 
is a natural and legitimate drive,'though it practically crowds 
the humanities and social-sciences faculties with potential 
job seekers, leaving vocational schools and science faculties, 
fairly unoccupied. Vocational education marked, however, . 
.steady increase in the 1960s.
Thailand has been economically developing throughout the 
20th century. Between 1952 and 1965, the share in G . D . P .  
generation of agriculture fell from 44- to 33 percent, transport 
increased from 4- to 7.5 percent and commerce and services went 
up from 35 to 41 percent. Mining, manufacturing and 
construction kept their share in G . D . P .  generation (512). Tin 
extraction rose in particular from 10,364 tons in 1950, to about
30,000 average in 1966-70, and a new smelter was established in 
1965 (513). The trend in GvD.P. and G-.H.P. per capita 
continued to increase during 1966-1969 (514). However, since 
the 1950s, the G . D . P .  distribution by sector marked an increase 
in the share generated by occupations generally strongly held 
by Chinese, and. mutatis mutandis specific Thai occupations 
decreased their share.
In 1957, the manufacturing sector consisted of 16,000 
establishments, 300 of which had more than 50 workers. In I960, . 
3.4 percent of the’labour force were engaged in manufacturing*
In 1964 (515), there were 3,584" establishments with more, than 9 
workers, totalling 154,956 workers. Total wages and salaries 
in these amounted to 967,050,000 Baht, costs totalled 
'6,453,615,000 Baht and total receipts - to 11,277,174,000 Baht. 
There were also 16,707 establishments with less than 10 workers, 
totalling 66, 259 people. Their wages and salaries amounted to 
.165,100,000 Baht, their other costs to 724,163,000 Baht, and 
their receipts - to 1,237,560,000 Baht. 'The efficiency of the 
bigger establishments and the better.wagen they, paid is 
remarkable^ consequeiitly) it seems that capital investment in 
Thailand is highly rewarding. In such conditions, the relative 
lag of Thailand behind Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore in 
industrial development seems to stem from its late starting 
point. The relatively slower development may have resulted in 
part from the government policy of economic indigenism, which■ 
has favoured government enterprises (-516) by administrative 
regulations. In addition, Thailand’s population has largely 
lacked industrial skills in the low level of production, the 
medium level of management and technical planning, while Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore have enjoyed a longer - history of 
industrial skill improvement, vocational education and management 
experience. There exists another decisive factor: the Sinic 
attitude towards regimented work in factories, which is a matter 
of fact in the ab.ove mentioned countries, but is uncommon among 
the Thais.
Since the 1950s, strategic and socio-economic considerations 
combined to give priority to the development of the Northeast 
region. A road and railway systems enabled the agricultural 
development of the region, but the road network lay-out still 
reflects the nodality of Bangkok (which is augmented, by the
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grain of the country). Consequently, it .seems that the 
provinces, with their primitive industrial development, can 
maintain separate existence from the capital only on a 
"subsistence levelft, which affects Thailand’s . strategic position.
(iii) fhe Chinese Minority.. Between 1917 and 1955, the 
ethnic Chinese, population of,;Thailand rose from 0.9 to 2.3 
■ million, positive net immigration contributing to that increase 
throughout that period, except between 1936 and 1938 (517).
An estimate for the 1960's quoted their number at 2.5-3.0 
millions (518), while Skinner's estimate of 1965. was 2,609,000. . 
The Chinese Economic Yearbook,estimated the number as
3,799,000 (519). It seems then, that a 10 percent proportion " 
of the total population of the country represents fairly well 
the ethnic Chinese population, though the I960 census admitted, 
only 461,695 Confucians and 409,508 Chinese nationals (520) in 
the entire population of the country.
Chinese nationalism in Thailand, not unlike that of other 
Southeast' Asian countries, revived the Chinese awareness of 
the community. It Introduced a new dimension to their parochial 
-attachment to China, to a country which was bound to regain 
its past political glory. It also added modern social 
organization, which transcended clan and speech-group barriers. 
This new organization became important after while
y between the beginning of the 20th century and IHWiif 1917,, clans,
■ speech-groups and secret societies, representing a horizontal’
social organization were still dominant. This is not to assert 
that clans and speech-group organizations disappeared .since 
7. then, but that the political activities in K.M.T. branches^
V IgiiW in communist circles and labour unions became significant
and- in.many instances prevailed over traditional cultural^
an
activities. But, the significance of these new associations 
undoubtedly resulted also from the Thai political reaction they 
had produced. This was due to Thai suspicions over Chinese 
loyalties to Thailand, which perhaps were first published in 
the anti-Chinese pamphlet allegedly written by the king (521). 
Also, European merchants seem to have instigated anti-Chinese 
riots in order to decrease Chinese competition (522), spreading 
the image of a. Yellow Peril. The political aspect of the Sino-
V (iAKA'i "thoUA^
Thai -friction was thus only a 20th century creation,\\4^ito J 
sporadic anti-Chinese feelings, which stemmed from the Thai 
attribution to the Ghinese of social and economic vices (523), 
had existed even before.
In 1910, the- year the anti-Chinese pamphlet was published, 
the Thai government imposed a capitation tax on the Chinese,in . 
protest of which the. latter closed their businesses in Bangkok 
(524). All this did not stop Chinese .immigration to Thailand, 
although in 1927 the Thais increased, taxes on newcomers in a 
bid- to limit their numbers. On the one hand, Chinese labour 
could not be dispensed with for economic reasons, and on the . 
other "push" factors in China were too strogy immigration
practically stopped only in 1947. The Thai measures to suppress 
the Chinese generally failed and made the latter turn on 
themselves "in search of strength through unity" (525). If is 
very improbable ‘that the Thai anti-Chinese enactments of the 
first half of the 20th century contributed to more rapid 
Chinese assimilation. The Chinese unity, referred to by Skinner, 
must have been due'also to the growing nationalist solidarity 
as well as to restrictive Thai measures. Erom the beginning of
the, 20th century Chinese immigrant women also contributed to the : 
revival of Chinese consciousness ( 526)by increasing the number
of families where both parent s^ /spoke Chinese and, consequently, 
where offspring did not speak Thai as a mother tongue.
Chinese modern education in Kuo-Yu, an attribute of 
Chinese nationalism, developed from 1917 onwards until official 
restrictions diminished its extent. School numbers rose from 
48 in 1925, to 271 with 8,000 pupils i n -1933 (527). After 
Pibun rose to power, he introduced stiffer restrictions than 
those imposed following■the 1932 coup. Por instance, the 193 
Chinese schools of 1934/35, consisting of 291 teachers and,
4,742 pupils (528), increased to 230 schools and 16,711 pupils in 
1937/38 but, in 1940, only 16 Chinese schools functioned/and in 
1944 - only 2 (529). This reduction in Chinese schools 
resulted from. Pibun1s policy of enhancing Thai patriotism (530) 
rather than from a Japanese intervention in Thai affairs. After 
W.W.II., Chinese education upsurged within an atmosphere of 
elation over the Japanese collapse and the political status of 
World Power which China had acquired. As some of the Chinese 
schools became a source of leftist agitation, the Thais, 
especially since the second Pibun regime, reimposed their 
restrictions. In 1947, the last of the Chinese secondary schools 
was.’closed down, but not before 450 Chinese schools had existed - 
in Thailand (531). In 1962, there were only 211 Chinese primary 
schools with a' 83,606 pupil enrollment and with 3,958 teachers, 
most of whom were Thai; M l  the greater number of the schools 
taught only 6 hours of Chinese language a week. It has been 
said that after 4 years of studies the pupils cannot practically 
use- their Chinese. However, night classes and tutorials are 
still operating- in Thailand for Chinese language studies (532).
As regards Chinese economic occupations in the 20th 
century, rice procession and trade was practically dominated by
the Chinese until W.W.II., production, a traditional
occupation introduced by the Chinese in the 14th century (533), 
was strongly 'infiltrated by European capital which employed. 
Chinese labour. In the rubber industry the Chinese have 
maintained a strong position, though Malay and Thai small holders 
have increasingly participated in that field. In 1954, 42 
percent of all holdings of 20 acres or more were owned by 
Chinese nationals alone (534). The timber industry, especially 
the bigger companies., belonged to Europeans, but management in 
processing and retail trade of the finished products as well as 
export's remained in Chinese hands. Pork, fish and vegetable 
production and trade constituted Chinese dominated occupations,' 
as well as sugar milling and general retail trade.
Between 1910 and 1950, the ”Chinese provided between 60
and- 75 percent of all ■ skilled and unskilled, non agricultural ■
•labour" ( 535). .Since W.W.II. however, theltypical occupational
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distribution of the Chinese has been ffl^ udtogTT'partly because of 
Chinese socio-economic mobility in absence of new immigrants, 
who usually used to take up the lower paid jobs, and partly 
because of Thai economic indlgenism. Nevertheless, specific 
Chinese occupations still provide a belter distinguishing 
criterion between Thai and Chinese, than dress or physical 
features'(536). The Chinese occupations usually positively 
correlated with urban dwelling^ and^for cultural persistance 
reasons and/or defence considerations/the Chinese usually 
concentrated in their proper wards and streets. For example, 
out ‘Of a total 757,636 inhabitants there lived 214,743 alien 
Chinese in Bangkok, half of the latter living in two municipal 
wards out of the extant eight. In, one of those wards the alien 
Chinese constituted 40 percent of the population, and in the
other - 5 3  percent'. This concentration was voluntary (537).
The Chinese urban concentration was also well illustrated by 
their proportion in provincial.capitals: in the vicinity of 28 
of these lived more than 39.9 percent Chinese inhabitants, or 
more than four times their proportion in the country’s 
population, and around 16 others the Chinese proportion ranged 
■between 10 and 39.9 percent. In all/ there.were 58 provincial 
capitals, and mostly those of the ‘North and■Northeast had a ' :
l'esser Chinese proportion than their average, proportion-in the
country (538). This may have resulted from the late development
\urKljch o /
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immigration had stopped.
During the 20th century,- the Thais gradually imposed 
economic restrictions on the Chinese, not the least as the result 
of Thai resentment of Chinese remittances to China. In 
comparison with the government expenditure between 1892 and 1941, 
which totalled 380 million Bahts■, Chinese remittances in 1890-1941 
amounted to 1,250 million, Bandon estimated the'remittances- as 
not exceeding 2 percent of the Chinese created capital and not:- 
more than 10 percent of their net profits (539). Although most- 
of the money was remitted, as private transactions, communal 
enterprises such as the China Relief Bund of 1937, which united 
K.M.T. and leftist Chinese, aroused special Thai resentment.
After the advent of the communists in China, remittances were • 
drastically cut down, but rose again betY^een 1953 and 1957, only ■
to decrease sharply ever since (540).
Before discussing the economic restrictions proper imposed- .
• on the Chinese, a word should be said on the discriminating 
citizenship laws. Since 1913, birth in Thailand1 accorded
automatic citizenship, hut during 1953-1956, at least one parent- 
of the infant had to he Thai to ensure th^citizenship of the 
child. In 1956, the jus solis was reestablished,. Between 1911 
and 1952, a 5 year period of residence in Thailand sufficed as 
a naturalization requirement. During 1952-1956, the necessary 
period of residence was lengthened to 10 years and a knowledge 
of Thai language also became a prerequisite. After 1956, the
demand was again reduced to 5 years, hut naturalization
fees in. receiityears ranged between 2,000 and 5,000 Baht. The 
number of naturalized Chinese was 4,652, or less than half the 
applicants, during 1935-1958. I11. 1959-1960, 1,883 Chinese
applied and 1,650 were granted naturalization (541). A similar 
number.of Chinese became naturalized in 1965-1968 (542). The 
number of Chinese nationals in Thailand was 524,062 in 1937 (543) 
409,508 in I960 (544) and 335,763 in 1968 (545). ' This group 
must be rapidly disappearing,,not because of direct 
naturalization, but presumably because it is non-reproductive in 
the sense that they constitute a small proportion of the Chinese 
community,* and as they are culturally non differentiated from 
most of the other Chinese, they usually marry Chinese of Thai 
citizenship, the children being born into Thai citizenship.
. Thai law recognizes 3 categories of citizens,, namely: 
native born to Thai parents, native born to alien parents, and 
naturalized. The. two latter are discriminated against in voting 
rights and by the fac.t that their citizenship may be suspended 
(546)., Alien Chinese must carry identity cards and have been 
harassed by surprise checks; this has continued from the 1950s
until the present days (547).
Economic discrimination against the Chinese seems to have 
had 3 different aims: a) to-, decrease the economic power of the
a u
Chinese, b) to Thaify certain occupations where Thais could 
reasonably well perform, or where Chinese monopolies endangered 
the national economy, and c) to reward Thai officials by 
inducing the Chinese to accept them as partners. The laws 
against land alienation to, and the denial of 27 occupations from 
the Chinese during W.W.1I., may have represented the first 
category. The Thaification of the rice trade, the railway 
services, the army and the civil service may have represented 
the second category. The third type of discrimination 
concerned the distinction between the alien, naturalized and 
the citizens of non pure Thai parenthood. This type of 
discrimination became significant during the second Pibun regime 
and has been practised ever since. Thai officers and officials 
became partnersl^n Chinese businesses and companies as figureheads 
and "connection operators", as companies had to have a high share 
of "pure Thai" ownership and as proper connections with 
government agencies became necessary for economic survival.
Aware of this atmosphere, the Chinese themselves try to make the 
best of the situation. They are said to be keeping an eye on 
Thai officers who have promotion chances with a view of using 
them as figureheads (548).
A random sample of 7,725 inhabitants of Bangkok and 
Thonburi (549), comprising 57*1 percent Chinese (in fact, 
households where at least two people spoke Chinese at home), and 
53.5 percent Thais revealed that while 21.8 percent of the socio­
economic upper-class were Thais, only 2,4 percent were Chinese 
and 67.6 percent were Europeans. In the upper middle-class 64.8 
percent were Thais and 8.1 percent Chinese, and in the lower 
middle-class 63.7 percent were Thais and 33.3 percent were Chines^. 
In the two lower classes, Thai and Chinese proportions were 
almost equal. The sample does,not necessarily depict a
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deterioration of the Chinese socio-economic standing when 
compared with that of the 1950s (550), as wealthy Chinese must 
have referred to themselves as Thais. This was not only in 
view of diverting public opinioim from the wealth acquired by 
the Chinese, but also because of the increased number of Thai- 
Chinese partnerships and mutually beneficial arrangements, 
which has blurred the picture of true ownerships and income. The 
present Thai-Chinese economic arrangements seems to satisfy the 
Thai elite, as is implicit from a recent article (551) 
advocating the perpetuation of the present situation without 
demanding full Chinese assimilation.
-■ Although Amado (552) defined the Chinese problem in 
Thailand as economic in nature, this observation must have 
overlooked, many historical facts of the 20th century, when 
Chinese nationalism in Thailand motivated the community by 
pure idealism. The majority of the Chinese show a wide range 
of integrative trends towards Thai society. However, as long as 
they keep themselves as a distinct cultural group, a process 
of retro-assimilation may occur in the future similarly to
what happened in the Straits Settlements, The 20th century saw 
the rise and later a certain fall in Chinese nationalism in 
Thailand, The conflict between the Thai and the Chinese 
nationalist movements brought to the fore the question of 
national allegiance, as the ascent of China began affecting the 
minds of the Thais. A large proportion of the Thai people and 
the elite suspected the Chinese attitudes towards the country and 
the government (553). The K.M.T. ideology definitely demanded 
Chinese allegiance to China, while the communist one added class- 
struggle, and hence anti-government activities to its 
ideology. This meant that .
besides the • economic- lass /by.:. r,e.nii'i:tances, K.M.T.' nationalism 
■ endangered- the"Thai., dominant class only .in the eventuality of a: :- 
,-..China- - Thailand<war, while: Chinese communist nationalism was ■ ; 
permanently subversive. Although Chinese communism in Thailand 
was very-. limi ted in extent; and■ K-.M.T. nationalism, ,albeit more', 
popular, was ■relatively- less- extreme than in.Malaya,.-the long 
■established labelling -and stereotyping affected the Chinese 
community as ..-a, whole. , " • ...
' Chinese,/communist agitation in .Thailand began .in the
1920s .mainiy affeeting ’the ' labour unions. During W/ W.II. the - 
communists, -Chinese and'Thai, opposed the Japanese and 
consequently gained, if not ,gener.al -pub 1 ic Support, enough 
/ prostige - to "influence' the labour . unions before the,. Second Pibun 
regime,' Chinese communists operated in the Chinese schools, the- 
press and other Chinese associations.There were. 1,000 active 
Chinese communists and tens of thousands' of supporters in 1948 
( 554) .; In the mid: 1950s., 20,000 young Chinese went from Thailand 
to China, many infiltratinglhack after having received -training .. 
in subversion ('555) . , Since 1949, the K.M.T. ideology and party 
lost much of its.-previous . appeal,., and during 1953-1958 they also 
lost maiiy of their leadership positions within the community, as 
.’Chinese public- Opinion swung left (’556) . After the Sarit coup .. 
of 1958, the authority of the old. leadership was reestablished, 
following a strong anti-communist policy of the government. The'/' 
China's,‘e.y^ f-fi-cial--.ieader-ship, .by .nature of. its double role in the 
Chinese,, .society and towards the government cannot be 
nationalistic or even adopt1 an .-extreme Chinese cuhn-ral attitude.
:Since 1958.^ 'Chinese ■ bollti’cal convictions are not openly 
discussedp'and^though cultural persistence, problems personally' 
preoccupied Chinese people and institutionally also the
Ufai#' leaderslip,. integration-, and-' assimilation- into ''Thai society-;, ’ 
.has- increased. Arnyot is of opinion, that : Conditions for Chinese 
assimilation in In oil. and are the most f avoura’ble in Southeast 
Asia, and that assimilation is actually on the'increase in the 
country, the llliaish only^prejudice- against them being economic 
in nature .(557)'. He says:'."Generally speakingl the degree of 
assimilation is related to the.actual contact with Thai society 
; and culture". it is greatest in families of long' residence in 
Thailand,.and with individuals who, spent their formative years 
in Thailand', particularly' those who attended schools where.
Thai and'-not Chinese was the means of instruction. Some Chinese 
may define themselves ..as ..Thai or Chinese according to different 
circumstances, having both ■Thai.';and Chinese names (558). Also,
Coughlin, writing i n •the early 1950s, 'noticed the adoption of
-: ■ . ■ . : ■- 4u/t'
Thai ‘ names by the Chinese^ aftributed it to business purposes
(559). . dibblewriting in 1961, was of the opinion that relations'
between^Thais and Chinese were■improving (560). This may have
resulted from -the decline^in Chinese overt nationalism after the
Sarit coup and from the increasing number: of economic links
between/Thai officials and Chinese, businessmen, which decreased
: political - suspicion,- and economic pre judice -. Skinner asserted .
that-Chinese assimilation still went on in Thailand at the rates
experienced- in 1800 'and in 1900, which was "no less than in
any other Southeast Asian country".' He pointed out four factors
f a v o u r i n g ^  a s s i m i l a t i o n :  a): ,A'-decrease i n  China, b o r n  • p a r e n t s .
b) Dispersion of the Chinese communities. c) Stoppage of '.
journeys' to China,: d) Thaification of the education (561).
G-uskin, while, noting-that Chinese, assimilation ranges from full -
to n o n - a s s i m i l a t i o n ,  r e m a r k s  t h a t  i t  v a r i e s  i n d i v i d u a l l y  " a n d  o n  ■
a personal basis*'.’ While lie seems to accept the. last' three
factors-mentioned-by Skinner-, hefpoinis out- that Chinese social 
organisations,;: on a. pspee ch-group or 'locality level provide an 
' effectiye ■;-Bo.cializatibn '.system- for the Thailand:-born Chinese (562) -. 
. TobiaS;? writing |:on;:the:.Chinese community", of Ayutt.haya, report's 
r.a igiowing ’ Chinese' integration into - Thai s oci ety and’' a de cline 
in/proficiency -in . Chinese, language oflthe. younger- generation* , . 
There;- however, Chinese' social organisations still'maintain 
cultural influence on the. CoBim.uUity-, ,maiiy members belonging to 
clan, and other associations in Bangkok. ( 565). . .A research,’ .,- -
carried out by Boohsanohg, revealed that there was•differential 
assimilation .of,-the Chinese according,*to their level of 
education. -Though ••thev.Cftine s-e -usually-learned additional.
• Chinese -..dialects,-.as’ well -..as Thai-,the* data distinctly showed . 
that in the conspicuous facets of integration/assimilation the. 
educated" Chinese led.the less-educated, and were preceded by 
those-;who held offici-al. Thai postilions.; ; But-even the less , 
educated were integrating ('561)’;' • , . f
. .1 Some : of the Chinese who adopted Thai names have preserved .'
some ,.sound of their original name in. it. . Thai namesiand fluency 
in^the; language lead: to acceptance into Thai,society. -In' 
education,; !-a. Thai ;'nam'e'! is almost'a- prerequisite, ‘ and adoption 
of Thai e us toms . and way of .-life'- accompanied by wealth paves 
the way to .entry finta ;Thai elite- society (565).' Ichikawa 
stressed the similarities, in value systems and the lack of a 
're je c.ting: colonial elites as: re asonsJ ;for Chine s e . upward 
mobility.and■ assimilation into.Thai society. He noted that, the 
Chinese-, upper-class assimilated more.: readily, mainly because of, 
business ties (566). , - . f ; - /-y . .
.. It is - generally expected, that "in the probess; of 
assimilatibn behavioufial imodlfications - precede attitudinal
changes, at least when external’ conditions "bring about the 
assimilation. These, conditions exist in Thailand and 
consequently the . process has followed those lines'. .Where- 
external conditions are more demanding, such as with- those 
.seeking government posts,•better business possibilities or - 
.higher education, assimilation gathers greater pace. Those 
Chinese,whose activities, begin and;;, end within the Chinese society!, 
mainly in the Chinatown,- are likely to be more culturally- 
persistent. In-general, those Chinese who have a Chinese 
■name' and use it. in their., intimate■ milieu- still belong to the ■ ■ 
Chinese "cultural recruiting space" and may change their 
loyalties according to'future .circumstances. ;
Some Politico,-Geographical Aspects of the Chinese Identity in 
Southeast '-Asia. .Although "in the- last analysis, being a 
Chinese is, in Southeast-Asia essentially a matter of self 
definition11. 56.7) the Chinese group identity is clearly felt, 
not only by the'Chinese ‘themselves)■ but also by the indigenous 
societies. /: " - . . - - .
Chinese assimilation into indigenous societies in Southeast 
Asia has been-.a, continuous process, which has varied in exten^dM^ 
and in intensity. Assirni 1 ation was swinging iri extent from 
individual cases 'to- entire groups. 7 For example, the mestizos 
In the Philippines lost -the Chinese identity and the minh huong 
in Vietnam will probably' follow the same course. The babas and. 
.the per. anakans '-lost many .o.f their Chinese cultural traits but 
later, were reabsorbed-. Also, social .integration into Indigenous 
societies may indicate possible future assimilation,, but, as a 
general; ruley the 'Chinese 1 in Southeast Asia still\maintaln their--, 
identity as' a separate . ethnic- group with specific economic 
occu^nbionS',-d.nd skills. This; Identity and its. ensuing solidarity
have b6ns’iitut'ed.;\a;^grave -.concern-; of the Southeast Asian countries 
especialiy with/their;J!acute awareness of Peking’s growing 
'•power 1568;)/.- Formerly,- some colonialist, powers of the region ’ ' 
experien6;ed;.,a''si2iiilar\consciousness in relation to the K.M.T. 
republic„ -"Buteven .much, earlier, during the first two. centuries "■'
- of; the Spanish rule in'the Philippines, the .power-of Imperial 
China, ■ real'.:-or a else ,■ made the Spanish repress the Chinese 
" communities .-there . 'However; before- nationalismtaff ected ‘ . i-
Southeast Asia, anti-Chinese sentiments'"resulted from jealousy 
qf a prosperous .'"ethnic-.put-groupnjtyvuk &  pJlikxj*.. /
- , " 1 Chinese^nationalism introduced reintegration into/the ■ 
cultural identity of some culturally deviating gro'ups, and ■
; emphasized loyalties to China, as-a-state extending the former 
parochial- loyalties. ’In addition;, ;..the' modernization of Southeast 
Asia .by hew technologies and methods clearly favoured; the Chinese 
.minorities, whose ■hptltude. and . skills-proyided them with better 
^economic opportunities than those'..offered to the indigenous : 
masses (569) . It thus transpired;-that the bulk of publications, 
written,.during 1960-1970, on the;Chinese minorities, in Southeast 
Asih 'deai, with the distri-bhtioniof power and resources in the 
states!, and also -with the hypothesis that those .minorities ,,
. constitute :a'-"fifth column" for Chinese expansion (570).- In 
this context, the, independent states of the region produced . .
-. anti-Chlnese-legisiation in .order to we ale en their economic powers 
and with kr-view to Increase .their assimilation,, the states also 
debilitated the- Chine se.-. education system--. -.Most- of the. countries 
have lately; furthe-r ,toughened-.; this .line .against the Chinese (571) 
But,,, the economic restrictions brought ...about oh the one hand 
■more ppheSion ihto:, the 'Chinese., minority,, and on the other,- a 
corrupt cooperation .between the dominant:elite and the.Chinese t
■businessmen. This did not make- line Chinese apolitical'although 
they pretend to be so (572-)... '.Common; economic interests of the' 
Chinese businessmen and. .the' indigenous elite may prove to widen 
the social-cl ass breach in the Nan Yang Chinese communities, 
which'had, been developing • in the ’1920s and 1930s.
. , According: to Aimyot (9.73) there are four discernible 
processes in the assimilation of the Chinese: a) progressive 
adopting- -of. -indigenous, cultural traits substituting, the Chinese 
ones, which is typical to Th&Q.and’, b) a new culture . 
'superimposed nil/; then Chinese and the indigenous, sub,-cultures" in 
a, plural '.society, typical' toiMalaysia} • c) a creation of a 
specific Wan Yang Chinese culture, in total disconnection with 
the. host culture, and‘ with aspiration to the real Chinese 
culture-, as typified' by China^ d) a peranatan- or, bah a cultural 
creation which/ is-/neither Chinese nor indigenous'. .’The core'of 
. the'Chinese.-community -Is stereotyped, by .the third type mentioned- 
abot'e, and,though these-Chinese may have •'lost/the '.old fashioned 
Chinese/customs and may have’he en educated in non,Chinese 
schools, their identity 'is Chinese b y ■any definition (574) .
- The politidal problem' of - the' Chinese, minorities in 
Southeast Asia,' may seem to the dominant elites as- a race 
between the. states1 assimilatorv, measures and China’s efforts 
to -take control of Southeast Asia, either^ by direct military 
intervention^, or; more probably^ by- a Chinese inspired communist
revolution. Nevertheless, those elite's- are invariably 
satisfied with the economic .symbiosis they have created with 
Chinese businessmen, and'usuallyrleave room for further 
"personal arrangements" 'in bypassing anti-Chinese laws/ with the 
exception of those 'concerning Chinese education.
hierarchy'-of the:Chinese 'cultural centres in the 
Nan Yang (5.75) begins from be.'.low with, the home as a basic, unit. 
Although, the Chinese cultural 'identity may vary over a wide , 
.'.range from one home.to . another, the home is still the first 
"source; of Chinese socialization through' informal education, ./
customs and .especially ancestor worships. Of all the Chinese ;:
cultural objects provided by the;home the Chinese surname and ■ 
blood,ties may be the most'important from the cultural identity,, 
point of view. Next in• the hierarchy comes, the neighbourhoi^4/ ,. 
sometimes of a small isolated Chinese community,of agriculturalists 
like.those:found in some-parts of Malaysia and Indonesia, butt i 
more often 'of a number of Chinese = families ,in;.an indigenous 
village or small, town (576),“; Where many Chinese families are 
concentrated, a s , In more Important towns'.and cities, the 
neighbourhoods as social groups'-.tend to merge because of . urban' , 
social .conditions,-, but .still maintain some signfi.cance through 
the territorial distributary pattern of social' services,■ or by 
speech-group territorial concentrations.- . Neighbourhood :
institutions may provide a temple, .perhaps a club and a small 
sehooli, but. , more important, they■ provide a scope for Chinese', 
cultural"leadership, which on that'level and in those . ; 
circumstances can express its dedication to the • perijetuationjof 
the Chinese, culture'. The. .'town ■ or the.: small city include .
several neighbourhoods, in .many instances with speech-group' .
differentiation/ and sometimes- also! with some differentiation 
between old established families and newcomers. ..The "cultural- 
-division-.of. labour."'in a. town is -more elaborate and depends on;' ' 
the size of the Chinese population extant., lor example,' in - 
Ay u t lb. ay a, • wh e r e 1,.200 pure) Chinese families' lived, there were-
14 neighbourhood shrine S'. Ike entire community contributed 
to tke organisation of,religious festivals and even brought in a
Chinese opera troupe from Bangkok, and they also maintained . 
'V/Chinese school® (577). This community was not closed and 
had strong business, kinship and -marriage ties with the 
community in the capital (578). A bigger town or city provides 
a wider variety;of cultural.services non-existent' in smaller 
towns. Class -differentiation is more developed as relations tend 
to be more anonymous, labour unions and clandestine clubs may 
sometimes provide socialization institution for the lower™ 
class and for students.of leftist conviction. The middle-class 
certainly has its Chamber of Commerce usually affiliated to 
that of the capital. Religious festivals' are artistically richer 
and more-frequent, sometimes held by specific speech-groups.
There usually are several primary schools, and a secondary 
school, where permitted, as was the case in Semarang in the 
1950s (579). Also in some instances, pro-peking and pro-Taiwan 
clubs and journals may appear, leadership is usually'held by 
the wealthier Chinese, who in most cases try to subdue the 
Chinese political .overtones of those institutions and emphasize 
their cultural and welfare characteristics. The capital of a 
Southeast Asian country normally has the highest Chinese 
concentration,' usually centred in the Chinatown. The capital has 
not,,only social and kinship ties with dispersed Chinese 
communities in the country, but also provides cultural services 
in publishing newspapers and distributing Chinese periodicals, 
books and films from abrooad. But what is more important, it , 
is economically linked with extra-territorial-communities, and 
as economic activities are'dominant features of the'Chinese 
society, it ,,ensuea that an important part of the local Chinese
cultural socialization is strongly connected with .economic 
activities withrChinese communities abroad. With' all its 
variety of cultural services, thev capital, by strength of its 
Chinese, population, figures and lts: modern..urban n a t u r e i s  . 
characterised by. anonymous relations ■ and face-to-face 
socialisation is usually, achieved oh its neighbourhood level and 
mainly in the;'Chinatown (580). . •. ; • •
Amyptr.has characterized. the Chinatown' ’’Chineseness1 as ;
having a population- ofdistinct Chinese racial features (581) j ' 
Chinese costumes,, : names and etiquette.' It is distinctly Chinese, 
in . its reli'gipus- and ..-artistic ‘ lif e. If the indigenous : .: - ;
language is 'spoken, it' is done so with a heavy Chinese accent.', 
life is.; frugal,' and. economic occupations, rely. on> iamily tiesj 
the habitat is- typically, Chinese' and inhabitants are usually 
members of Chinese associations. When an inhabitant has relatives 
in. China, .he has close ties'with fhern by letter or remittance. 
Usually^ his. •attitude ,is . nationalist Chinese, -having pride of - 
race and cultureyand he tries to instil-t these values, in his 
descendants (582).. ' ■; . , : . ■ \
Erom the. geographical point of view, the ■conditions, in a 
Chinatown- provide an example of a compact cultural group having 
a"'low boundary to'surf ace- ratio, thus limiting the external 
contacts with other 'groups to a minimum. Dispersed habitation . 
•increases that/ratio, produces more cultural contacts and; ■ 
consequently, enhances integration andyassimilation, as ;ls the . 
case in rural' are as p ' • ■ . .
The hierarchical- cultural: contacts• of the Chinese 
;community withinya specific country are usually quite -obvious. ■
However,, the 'cultural.'links with other Chinese communities :
beyond the state f.s boundaries,, are less-conspicuous; - some of
these have an ideological nature, some -are purely cultural,
■some derive from kinship ties and some' are economic; the latter, 
as already mentioned, by no .means, of no cultural significance.'
All those Chine-se who still have pride in their race and 
culture must still have;.-some values attached .to China as a ■
• country. . This' is independent of-their political''conviction 
. and" is strongly discernible- in Taiwan,- whose dominant elite are ; 
' fervent, anti-Communists;. This attachment of the Overseas 
Chinese . to- China has very little to do with -a religious feeling 
of a ^ specific geographical nature. . unlike- Judaism or Islam, 
there Is-not an. outstanding sacred,.place which serves as a
• central theme of the religion^ preaching permanent residence in;_- 
or at least pilgrimage to it. for the'majority of the Han Tang 
Chinese, - the at tar lament to China-must be -directly related to the 
fact- that China - is; the-' source of the Chinese culture throughout 
history -Since- every '.event in • that, history oc.curred in China,, 
and- ,since; almost the, ,ehtire! cultural inherited achievements-
• remai'n in China, the. attachment is inevitable.. This, notwith- -■ 
standing communist denigration of ancestor worship, - the 
abolishment of-religious .festivals/, .and the Imposition of a 
social -.and economic: order ..unpalatable to the majority of the
lian Yang -Chinese. . ' ; ;. " -
■ Communist Chinese of the IIan Yang, and mainly young, workers 
, and students, very readily accepted' these changes in the Chinese 
•culture- of China, Some went, to China., for education and for 
•/ideological indoctrination, a '.few. remaining , others returning 
to. amplify; Chinese communist activities In their countries of . 
residence. Other ..Chinese, mainly -totoks from •Indonesia,, but also 
from other couhtries/ returned to China (583) as a result of 
economic difficulties and persecutions or for pure Chinese 
idealism.
m■; Attachment to China is by no means only culturally , 
derived. The growing power.of China, China1s. nuclear arsenal, 
its .command of communist subversion in Southeast Asia and its 
recent .world prestige., .have made it very unwise for even Chinese 
"big businessmen to pronounce themselves as anti-Communist. In 
the first place, theY look upon'their enterprises as continuous" 
family interests, which should survive any future political 
vicissitude;- iii the second, there 'is a prospect of a growing 
. trade with China, and existing bridges, should not be bimrt down.
China itself has been anxious to maintain good relations 
with the 'Chinese minorities of the Nan Yang^ ever^/ith their 
bourgeois stratum., usually without deteriorating their .relations 
with the host countries ’ (.584). The' Communist government 
realized the economic value of the remittances (585) and in the . 
1950s.made arrangements for the Nan Tang Chinese to invest in 
companies:administered by the government (586). 'They also . •
continued the K.M.T. policy of reserving; seats in the All' China 
People' s .Delegates Conference for Overseas.'Chinese (587)* The 
Nan Yang Chinese also, -are indispensable merchants, distributors 
and consumers of Chinese export goods, which, fact also provides 
a good, reason for maintaining; good relations with them (588), 
Also, although China has not expressed- any specified intentions 
of political dominance in Southeast .Asia, cultural relations 
with.the Chinese communities there may provide eventual 
supporters if conditions change. Thus, besides ideological ■ 
links .with" the communists .‘ampng the. Nan Yang Chinese, cultural :- 
relations with the major part of non-communists., is of certain . 
importance to China. '-But, its relative inability to separate 
ideology from its cultural relations, especially during-
besides being■ideological^ manifest-the
cultural drives periods,, and its relatively undeveloped 
.external trade render its cultural relations'' with the Nan Yang 
Chinese inconsistent and incomplete, hot to mention obstacles 
imposed by the- Southeast Asian governments.
As a possible Chinese■cultural centre, Taiwan has lost
much of its appeal for the'Nan Yang C h i n e s e . One reason may
be its recent .-political isolation, another may'be - the People's
Republic’ s Implicit threats against Taiwan's regimey^t 0 n  the'
whole, the Nan Yang Chinese; have no 'specific attachment to that
island,- they^^ Adnnta'vt originate<vfrom there,, nor lias Taiwan ever
constituted a'.,significant place in Chinese history. Loyalties:
to- Taiwan .still existing ' in South Vietnam and the.- Philippines,
conformity of the Chinese
to the 'foreign politics-.of their, host countries rather than a
cultural,attachment. Other manifestations of political links
with .Taiwan are-limited and represent a group of K.M.T.
supporters, .or . fervent anti-Communi sts, Considering thernselves
as the rightful leader's of Mainland China, the dominant elite
iii Taiwan developed Taipei into' a' distinguished centre' of Chinese
studiestransferring besides many -art collections also
numerous learned people in Chinese culture. It invited
Overseas Chinese to use. its educational, facilities. (589) and
also alledgedly to engage in para^military training. The Taiwan
government also organise national festivals on the Double Tenth •
and on the birthday of Chlang' Kai Shek/fwhich several thousand
Overseas Chinese- used to attend.. It has not neglected- to develop
its trade and other economic.'relations with, the Overseas Chinese,
To that effect a World Chinese Traders Convention has been 
.organized in Taipei, which holds bi-annual conferences in Chinese 
communities 'throughout the. world, and its 1972 book of mailing
adclr.esses.- -about 450 businesses in the Nan. Yang
countries (590)* Taiwan has also fostered- overseas Chinese 
' capital: investment in the island, and its export to Southeast 
Asia, .as may be inferred from the figures pertaining to its 
trade with .Singapore1, was. increasing between 1961 and 1971. (5'91) L, 
. Taiwan1s role as a Ghinese cultural centre may be 
maintained as-long as Communist-China will not fully develop 
the research of China’s traditional culture and invite.culturally 
dedicated Overseas Chinese to study there.But-, although this 
may directly involve only relatively few students, the$e may be
the' future teachers of the Chinese cultural traditions in the 
\U)W WOVaLcL
Nah Y a n g s a t i s f y  these persistent cultural demands. 
Chinese artistic creation in Taiwan, is still influencing the 
Ghinese communities in the Nan Yang through films,: theatrical 
troupes.-and newspapers as well as radio .broadcasts. However, 
in.. pure economic matters, the precarious political situation of 
Taiwan seems.’, to be reducing the inflow, of investment and Y/ill 
perhaps also affect.fother economic' links in the- future.
Ilohg Kong-’has .become^ another ‘centre of Chinese culture
outside .China itself. Publishing Houses, a Chinese film
industry, a- Chinese university and study centres,of Chinese
affairs made,it a focal.point, for the Chinese communities of the
Nan-Yang. But most of; all, it has become a cultural centre
through.its economic development and population growth.
Enjoying a neutral status vis a vls 1aiwan and Peking, Hong Kong • ‘
has-’ become a- necessary station for trade and cultural links with
either of . them, by those who wish to-; keep these links anonymous .
But,r as an economic focus,' Hong Kong suffers from congestion and
lack of sx>ace for further development.■ ..Wages are higher than 
those.'in Taiwan and'Its political future, is no less obscure than
u\
t li at of T ai w 0.11 J therefor.ey.it may "become .1 o s s ah di e s  s 
attractive for- further "investment. Moreover, like Taipei 
and Peking, it is situated outside Southeast Asia,, and so it 
lacks , the advantage of being a'-centrally located free port in 
.the region. Eong Kong, less though than Peking and'’ Taipei, 
must have-relatively reduced fami1ial 1inks. with the Ean Yang 
communities; be cause;of its Cantonese preponderance. It also 
may experience a reduction in entrepot trade with' Ohina, as 
the latter is beginning to trade-directly 'with the- Southeast 
Asian countries (‘592)_^ in'-.a new bid to improve its political 
relation's with' the Southeast Asian countries, or as a result 
of M M i l  developing its own trading agencies on a worldwide 
level... ■ ■ ’ ■-
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mPART THREE: SINGAPORE AS A CHINESE CULTURAL NODE. '
Singapore Under the British.
The politico-geographical conception of Raffles, which 
gave life to Singapore, proved well justified for its time, 
and showed foresight for later years. It did not, however, 
envisage the modern development of an independent city-state 
with only marginal British involvement. Though the Chinese
were encouraged to come in during the 19th century, it was
not until.the early 20th century that the British fully 
apprehended the real political issues concerning a Chinese 
Identity in Singapore. Thus, the conception of Singapore as an 
imperial base and a regional emporium, under effective British 
rule, was incomplete in that it failed to anticipate the 20th 
century issues of Chinese nationalism. Throughout the 19th 
century, and even after the naval base had been built in the 
1920s, military importance was secondary to that of trade. This
made Singapore, together with Penang and Hong Kong, a group
apart from the other predominantly naval bases linking Britain 
and China.
Raffles1 Conception of Singapore. Essentially an Empire 
Builder,. Raffles combined vision and practical sense in 
overcoming British inertia and Dutch opposition, to create 
an economically viable imperial pivot, which retained its 
significance for almost a century .and a'half. As a naval 
base and emporium, Singapore was conceived by Raffles with 
the intention of denying the Dutch control of the entrances 
of the Archipelago, and of securing for the British the
Maritime route to China (1), ' This conformed with the wishes 
of the policy makers in London,’ yet conflicted with their 
judgement of the profitable and the politically possible.
By 1819, Raffles could not boast great previous 
successes either in politics or in economic exploits* He 
had exhibited more vision than business acumen, when he 
failed to make Java self supporting; that perhaps decided 
the issue when London turned down his proposals for a 
British presence in the East Indies (2). Neither did his 
plans to expand spice plantations succeed, as.demand and 
prices felly and so he Remained governor of remote Bencoolen. 
However, nin view of his temperament and the capacities of 
the man, this was equivalent to penning.'up a lion in a dog 
kennel11 (3). This raises the interesting question whether 
Raffles1 visit to St. Helena (4) was made simply from sheer 
curiosity or from admiration to Napoleon. If the latter 
was the case, it would support the contention that he was 
more of a grand strategist - than a meticulous administrator .- 
It seems that when it came to bringing home his political 
ideas, Raffles demonstrated no mean ability, as Hastings 
finally undertook the responsibility, against the Central 
Government’s wishes, to establish a station 1fto secure, the 
free passage of the Straits of Malacca, the only channel 
left for us .... the establishment of a station beyond
Malacca, such-as may command the southern entrance of those 
Straits11. (5). This politico-strategic duty, placed on 
Raffles, involved the persuasion of the Sultan of Johore to 
agree to the creation.of the station, and later to induce 
him to relinquish his' rights over the entire island, again 
attesting to Raffles’ astuteness in politics.
3!o
Besides the politico-geographical. judgement, there was 
the economic Weltanschauung of the man: a liberal 
mercantilist conception of colonialism, demonstrated during 
his office in the East Indies under the British interregnum. 
While the Y.O.C. policy of short sighted profit maximization 
impoversihed Java, Raffles1 economic and social reforms (6) 
were intended to increase the indigenes’ purchasing power 
in order to buy imported manufactured goods. Realizing 
that conception in Singapore by declaring it a free port, 
he established the economic basis of the city,. However, in 
addition to thriving on China-India and China-Europe trade, 
it could also profit by smuggling to and from the East 
Indies, a fact of which Raffles must have been aware.
Contemporary political considerations dictated further 
instructions given to Raffles; the unwillingness to arouse 
Dutch enmity limited the possible., location of the station 
to the north of the equator and excluded Dutch held Riouw 
as one of the alternatives (7). In* addition, the mission 
t o ■command the southern entrance to the Straits geographically 
delineated a limited solution-set to the problem. As, by 
then, the Outer Provinces of the Dutch East Indies were 
held only by isolated stations, the east coast,of Sumatra 
or adjacent islands could probably,have provided some 
alternatives. However, the political concept of the Dutch
East Indies was already well established; Raffles and 
others must have been influenced by the image of 
territorial continuity regarding the location of the 
station (8).
Singapore was singularly well located to solve the
problem defined by Hastings' orders and their attached 
political limitations, and also to realize Raffles' 
implicit intention to penetrate the inter-island trade. 
Since Singapore was an island, its occupation did not 
indicate any intention of expanding into its Malayan 
hinterland. Land configuration and wind directions 
favoured if as a.port of call for sailing ships of the 
China trade. Calm waters, fresh water supply, a 
navigable river-raouth, fairly good'drainage, all combined 
to render the island's southern tip an exceptionally 
propitious place.
Singapore's phenomenal development indicated that a 
latent economic need had existed in the area for such a 
port-city, This immediately raises the question why 
Penang, Singapore's senior by a quarter of a century, did 
not fulfill that need as Wellington had forecast in 1797 
that it would. Established to defend the Bay of Bengal 
against a fleet enjoying a-favourable monsoon blowing 
landwards, Penang became a free port and developed export 
crop plantations, and yet its development lagged behind 
that of Singapore, The reasons seem mainly locational: 
Penang was too remote to participate in the Malay- 
Indonesian trade, although it was nearer than Singapore to 
the tin mining centres of South Siam and Malaya. However, 
Singapore’s locality was incontestable, as it was situated 
where the ocean route (9.) penetrated into and met the
prahus of the inter-island trade. The geographical
o _
projection of the Malayan Peninsula into Indonesian waters,
which physiographically combined them into a single entity, 
played a big part in unifying the basic culture of that
region, until political "boundaries superimposed "by the 
colonial powers produced a new differentiation. This 
peninsular penetration also favoured Singapore over Penang 
as a v/aiting station for seasonal wind direction change.
In a purely locational sense Malacca was "better 
situated, than Penang in its proximity to the centre of the 
.Archipelago, and as regards the monsoon directions, "but it 
lacked port facilities "befitting the size of the 19th 
century merchantmen and men of war. Its exposed coastline 
made anchorage hazardous especially when squalls came off 
the Sumatran coast, and its river was too narrow to 
accomodate the new larger ships. In any.event^it was held 
"by the hutch, who left it to stagnate after it had 
experienced a long period of trade hegemony from the.14th 
to the 17th centuries. Behind Malacca’s stagnation lay 
the Y.O.C. policy of elevating Batavia to supreme position 
in administration and commerce. This diminished the 
possibilities of each station in the Outer Provinces to 
develop according to its- geographical advantages. Moreover, 
the Y.0.0, was inimical to private enterprise competition 
and did not tolerate free ports'in its territory, (When 
between 1829 and 1855, the hutch opened 10 free ports.(10), 
realizing their mistake and trying to emulate Singapore’s 
success, they largely failed, as their.hederlandsche 
Handelsmaatschappij got a trade monopoly there (11)),
After the restoration of the East Indies to the hutch, 
they made 11 an energetic attempt to regain commercial and . 
political domination throughout the Archipelago and the 
Malayan Peninsula" (12), That attempt created friction
'between the British and the Dutch authorities at the local 
level,concerning the establishment of Singapore. However, 
at central government level,, relations were improving to 
the. extent of acquiescence to the new station (to which 
territory the Dutch claims were legally doubtful (13))» and 
to the point of exchanging Malacca for Bencoolen (14)* lh.e 
Malacca Straits thus became the dividing line of colonial 
influence between the Dutch and the British in the 
northwestern part of the Archipelago.
In rudimentary form Raffles1 anticipation of Singapore1s 
commercial role, as a free port, was outlined in his letter 
to the Supreme G-overnment (15). • It pointed out three 
1fconeentric circles” of activity, namely: the ‘'outer circle" 
involving European trade (mainly with the B.K.), an 
intermediate one linking China with India, and an "inner 
circle" of Southeast Asian trade. Ihe latter, by virtue 
of its dispersion and the small craft involved (prahu) was
A
'conducive to the development of entrepot trade. Port 
activities and other services also could increase the demand 
for labour, and so would promote agricultural .production, 
craftsmanship and local' trade.
Ihe prospects of a fast growing economically active 
population must have dictated Raffles1 preferential policy 
in land allocation and taxation. External trade being the 
prime income generator, merchants, artisans and 
agriculturalists received p r e f e r e n c e i n  that order. A 
central business district got the better part of the
ere given
generous allocation according to tactical assessments of
waterfront. Administrative and military areasijw
land features, and the Europeans were also largely
favoured. The Chinese and Indians business/residential
quarters and the Malay, Arab and Bugis wards were
ethnically and geographically well defined (16). This
racial division came as a necessary result of the variety
of languages and the occupational specialization, which
followed ethnic lines. The town planning scheme of 1828
(17), assumed to represent Raffles’ micro-geographical
conception of Singapore as of 1822-23 (18), reflects
contemporary socio-economic conditions. In principle, these
conditions did not greatly change until the 1950s, leaving
their mark on the fairly stable geographical location of
the ethnic groups. The inert nature of the ethnic-group
location in Singapore became enhanced by the fact that it
was not imposed against the will of the public (19). as,
r *
further unplanned, sub-ethnic divisions voluntarily followed. 
Later on, sheer population pressure and social mobility 
brought about some geographical changes in residential areas. 
The Chinese followed^ and densely settled the evacuated 
European quarter, which had been thinly inhabited.
The Muslims concentrated near the Sultans Gate, while the 
Europeans moved out towards the hilly ground of the Interior 
(20). All these changes only marginally affected the 
persistent multi-racial and segregated setting, as the 
immigrant nature of the population, and the shophouse 
building -type encouraged that segregation.
Raffles welcomed Chinese and Indian immigration as he
considered them better workers, traders and entrepreneurs
v
than the Malays. They braght in their urban cultural traits 
in architecture, high density living, high male migratory
rates and hence a socially dangerous sex ratio, to create 
•a sort of a "Wild West" society. Gregariousness, low 
hygiene and violence caused high mortality among a 
population whose age-group distribution would suggest 
strong vitality. The Chinese, more than others, introduced, 
industriousness, frugality and profit consciousness, which 
made Singapore highly competitive to existing or potential 
rivals. ■"The' adaptation of the Chinese to high activity - 
low consumption conditions, their overall more diversified 
occupations in comparison to other ethnic groups, , as well 
as "push11 factors operating from China gradually brought 
about their preponderance in Singapore’s population. The 
early dominance of the Chinese in trade and plantations,
.the two prime income generators of that early period, made 
them control also the related occupations generated by the 
multiplying factor. This was; primarily because the system 
of employment followed ethnic lines in Singapore’s 
segregated society, and also because of the Chinese 
occupational adaptation. This cultural adaptation, which 
would imply survival in demographic terms, occurred in a 
society whose negative natural growth was more than offset 
by immigration.
Thus, throughout the period of British rule, Singapore 
remained under Raffles’ spell in its macro-geographical 
role as an imperial pivot and commercial centre, and in its 
divided micro-geographical character as a multi-ethnic city. 
The Europeans played a decisive role in the macro- 
geographical sphere, in politics, economics and higher 
social life, while the Asians mainly fitted themselves into 
the micro-geographical setting, supplying labour, low and
- ■ Jit.
intermediate entrepreneurship and socio-politically leading 
their -own segregated life.
Singapore1 s Development until 1867.
(i) Economy. Trade constituted the motive power for 
Singapore1s development to such an extent that the history 
of the' city virtually became the history of its .trade. By 
1825., Singapore eclipsed both Malacca and Penang as trading 
centres taking some of their population as immigrants (21), 
and becoming the capital of the Straits Settlements in 
1832 (22). Trade.brought development by its increasing 
value, and also b^Jindependent increase in volume. With 
bulkier merchandise and more numerous vessels, demand for 
manpower was ever increasing (23). The introduction of the 
steamship and the establishment of Hong-Kong further 
contributed to the growing strategic importance of 
Singapore as a-coaling station (24)*
Although agricultural activities have always been 
marginal to Singapore’s economy, their importance cannot be 
neglected. Rice growing failed because of unfavourable soil 
conditions and a discouraging tax policy (25), and nutmeg, 
pepper and gambier also had their ups and downs as a result 
of soil exhaustion, plant diseases and price fluctuations 
(26). In 1849 for example, there were 26,834’ acres under 
gambier and pepper (27).
It was, however, external trade which decisively 
dominated Singapore*s economic scene. Already in 1822-24 
it amounted to 18.6 million Spanish dollars, and in 1821,. 
at least 12,311 tons of shipping called,at Singapore on
their way to Canton, while 11,204 tons went South towards 
the islands (28)., During 1822-24, 208 European ships and 
2,500 prahus traded with Singapore, the latter doing a 
5 million dollar trade in two and a half years (29). In 
1836, Singapore*s external trade totalled 9.2 million 
(Spanish) dollars, of which food, drink and tobacco amounted 
to one quarter of the value, opium - to one fifth (with a 
net import of 0.6 million dollars worth), piece goods 
constituting another fourth of the value, and unwoven 
textiles, metal ore and concentrates amounting to just over 
one fifth (30).
The following figure (C-1) illustrates the growth of 
trade (in millions of dollars (31)) and the population growth 
(in thousands (32)) for the period 1823-1874. A computed 
graph of per capita trade figures is in the inset.
The dip in per capita trade figures may be attributed 
to the large influx of immigrants during the sailing-ships 
period, when spice plantations were still profitable. The 
increase in figures experienced since 1853, is due perhaps 
to the appearance of the steamship. The trade percentage 
breakdown according to world regions for the 1823-24 -
(fh-C'jU
1868-69 period 6(33) proves that trade with the U.K. and the 
Continent, the "outer circle", kept a more or less steady 
proportion of over 22 percent for the entire period.
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The "intermediate circle" represented by the China and the 
India' trade indicates a -fairly steady 14.5 percent 
proportion with China and a fluctuating trend in the trade 
.with India. The latter was increasing towards 1841-42, and 
on the whole decreased towards the end of the period. The 
total average trade.with India was more than 16 percent, 
and altogether the "intermediate circle" provided almost 31 
percent of Singapore's external trade. The "inner circle" 
trade proportion averaged more than 40 percent for that 
period with a marked trend of increase since the early 
1830s* It w a s .estimated that 90 percent of the manufactures 
imported from Europe found their way further east from 
Singapore, while less than 5 percent of the produce exported 
to. India and the West came from local production”(34)• The 
appearance of the steamship shortened the sailing time from 
Singapore via the.Cape to the United Kingdom from 3 months 
to 5 .weeks (35) with marked positive effects oh Singapore's 
trade. This change in transport technique brought about the 
eventual shift of the port from the river-mouth to Keppel 
Harbour with its deeper and larger docking facilities and 
storage space. It was only by chance that a geological
ocal.solution to a problem 
which plagued many other ports.
(ii) Society. Throughout the period.of E.I.O. rule in
Singapore,, social conditions reflected a "society devoted to
making money fwherej all appreciated the absence of official
restraints, the unrestricted immigration of labour, and the
freedom of all taxation upon commerce, even upon luxuries 
of life. Only man's vices were taxed; the government
fault provided an excellentll
remained, largely inactive, its administrators being too ■ 
few to do much at all" (36) . In that,atmosphere whatever . 
refinement could be' found came from the British community, 
which though In large measure* responsible for those 
conditions,, still derived from a middle-class disposing of 
a sophisticated culture,.' The Asian immigrants and Indigenes 
mainly belonged to the lower classes ^ In their countries Of 
origin and were,mostly illiterate. Their cultural ties with 
their homelands, strong as they might have been, emanated 
from .family and. kinship ties, more than from a general 
attachment to a.state, nation or culture. Even within 
Singapore, blood-ties played a decisive role in group 
consciousness, while solidarity based on language and customs 
and hence on-district of provenance, prevailed over other 
cultural ties in group consciousness. Each of the main 
ethnic groups'introduced.its own customs, apparel, 
architecture and recreation patterns, and together with the 
different religions, .not to mention the language and the - 
local geographical segregation,- Singapore's society reflected 
its geographical” division into handsmannschaften. The most 
one can say of sentimental attachment to Singapore during 
that period is perhaps that it was commensurate with material 
success. It is -no wonder then, that the British were most' 
concerned with the proper functioning of the city for 
business and quality-of-life reasons, and exerted political ■ 
pressure on the E.I.O. to improve the administration with a 
view to becoming independent' of the Company (37)»
The following table depicts some demographic changes 
which, occurred during the first fifty years of Singapore (38)
Table 0-3• Some Demographic Data*
Year- Total Chinese
pop. 
X1000 ,
P/M ' 
ratio
Number
n o  oo
1°
in tot.
P/M
ratio
1824- * 11 0.504 3.4 31.0 0.122
1830 17 0.362 6.8 .39.4 0.089
1836 0.317 45.9 0.068
184-9 53 0.255 28.0 . 52.9 0.087
1860 82 0.166 50.0 0.069
1871 96. 0.304 54.7 56.8 0.162
(Table;;,0-3 cont'd.)
Year Malays__________________  Indians____________ Others
Number P/M. Number % P/M %
X1000 in tot. ratio X1000 in tot.ratio in total
1824 . 6.6 60 .2 0.945 0.8 7.1 0.170 1.7
1830 45.9 0.875 . 1,9 11.5 0.096 ,3-2
1836 41.9 0.855 9.9 0.104 2.6
1849 17.0 32.2 0.703 6.4 11.9 0.159 3.0
1860 0.600 0.118
1871 26.0 ,27.1 0.790 11.5 11.9 0.242 4.0
Prom this, two striking facts stand out, namely:the 
•proportional increase of the Ohinese in the total population, 
and the abnormal sex ratio of theirs and the Indian 
communities. The proportional increase of the Chinese 
population has been explained by their better adaptivity and 
by their popular.cultural esteem for achievement values, in 
contradistinction to the Malays. In addition, labour 
recruitment usually gave the advantage to kinsmen and
secondly to people with whom the employer could communicate 
The Chinese entrepreneurs had then every reason to recruit 
Chinese labour especially as--the Chinese were considered 
the better workers*
The analysis of the sex ratio of the ethnic groups in 
Singapore by applying the function described in Appendix A 
produces the data of table C-?!}.
...Table C-^. Population Stability within Ethnic Croups.
■___________ (Discrepancies because of rounded figures)
1824
1830
1836.
1849
1860
1871
$> Integrated tr lumber ][ntegrated 1 Ion Integrated
T. 1° M |I T 'C M ['I T C M I
67 24 96 29 . 7.4 0.9 6.4 0.2 3.6 2.5 0.2 0. 6
53 16 94 18 9.0 1.1 7.3 0.3 8.0 5.7 0.5 1. 6
48 13 92 19
41 16 83 27 21.7 4.5 14.0 1.7 31.3 23.5 3.0 4. 7
29 13 75 21 24.3 6.5 57.7
48 28 89 38 46.1 36.0 23.1 4.4 I 49.9 41.4 2.9 7. 1
numbers X1000. T = total, C = -Chinese 
M - Malays, I Indians.
The study of -table 0-^ in connection with table C-3 
conveys useful information regarding socio-cultural changes 
in Singapore.as derived from demographieal data. The 
cultural geography aspect of these changes concerns the 
attachment values of Singapore's population during the period 
under consideration. Between 1824 and the 1860s, there 
occurred a steady decrease in the stable element of the
whole population. The fairly high stability of 1824, due 
perhaps to the immigration of families of Chinese traders 
from Penang and Malacca Babas, but mainly to the high 
proportion of the stable Malays in the population, gradually 
gave way to Chinese immigration, mainly of single males.
These came in fairly large numbers and decreased the stability 
of the Chinese community by half, from 24 percent to 13 (39). 
The Malays themselves must also have immigrated as their 
stability proportion'declined from 96 percent in 1824 to 
75 in I860. In absolute figures,the example of 1849 is 
illustrative: The 21,700 persons integrated into families, 
must have constituted some 5,000 families; at the same
time there existed 31,300 non«integrated bachelors in 
Singapore. The So'cial anomaly is well illustrated by 
histories of that period giving details of crimes, 
lawlessness and miserable living conditions (40).
Until the 1860s, the Chinese immigrants, who gradually 
began dominating the demographic and the ethnic scenes of 
Singapore, usually, used sailing ships as means of transport 
from China. Costs, risks and travel-time added to 
difficulties in bringing women to the city. The changing 
trend of stability in 1871, may be due besides to 
individual economic progress, tojthe steamship regular service 
between China and Singapore.
In comparing ethnic stability proportions, it is 
worthwhile to note that the Malays, although reduced to 27.1 
percent of the population in 1871, still comprised 50 percent
of the stable population. But, the Chinese with almost 55 
percent of the population, had only 16,000 stable people
out of a total of 46,100 i . e.^  just about 35 percent. This 
cannot be wholly explained by the Malays cultural evaluation 
of Gemiitlichkeit* jtor by the availability of women at short 
distance, and the relatively easier transport for whole 
families. The Malays emigrating to Singapore came to a 
British held Malay country with a Malay sultan. They came 
to stay whether they made money or not. The Chinese on the 
other hand, being driven by a will to make money, usually 
returned,home when their hopes failed to materialize.
Another illustration of the Chinese instability is 
useful* Between 1840 and 1871 the Chinese population rose 
from 17,704 to 50,043 (54,700 according to Saw Swee-hock). 
Thi€ increase was brought about by immigration to a society 
with a negative natural increase (41), A. low estimate
of.the immigration figures averaged 8,000 annually;for that 
period (42)^ This means an immigration of 250,000 in 31 
years. Assuming that 50 percent of the immigrants used 
Singapore as a transit port for other destinations, it 
.ensues that at least 90,000 Chinese (the difference between > 
.125,000 and the population growth) stayed in Singapore for 
fairly short periods. This amplifies the statement that 
the Chinese immigrants in Singapore showed a low attachment 
to the city.
Some additional indices to measure the quality of
residential stability and the development of sentimental
I
attachment to the place of .settlement, may -be -derived from 
the material quality and number of sacred places, from
investment in buildings of aesthetic value and acts
concerning the improvement of the environment. In addition,
the fixation of capital in immovable property rather than 
keeping it liquid, may sometimes serve for that purpose. 
Besides Christian Baba churches, Chinese places of worship 
(Confueian, Taoist and Mahayana Buddhist) of solid 
construction numbered only 2 in the 1820s,and 10 in the 
1860s (43), yetjthere were also attap covered Joss Houses. 
The figures seem low in view of the diversity of Chinese 
sub-groups. This must account for a low level of 
sentimental attachment as well as for the down to earth 
character of the ”Chinese low culture".
During the first fifty years of Singapore, socio­
economic standing must have had special significance as an 
indicator for sentimental attachment to the place. By this 
criterion the Babas aid Straits Born stood first among the 
Chinese groups. They enjoyed better trade relationship the 
Strait Settlementsj and closer links with the British, to 
whom they had more cultural affinities than to the Chinese 
(44). Still bearing Chinese names, they had lost their 
familial and parochial links with China as well as the 
ability to speak Chinese, and socially kept aloof from the 
Chinese newcomers. -
The China born towkay and the shop-house owner' must 
have had ambivalent feelings towards Singapore, as regards 
their sentimental attachment to the place. On the one hand 
they were permanent residents and materially did well, and 
at least part of their capital was invested in immovables.
In addition, they had real interest in the efficient running
of the city, as their businesses were sensitive to social 
disorder. They belonged to Chinese social institutions and
organizations; secret societies, speech-group associations,
guilds and religious associations and did not move towards
the British in a cultural sense. In business and
administration the towkays had limited relations with
Europeans, their main activities, social, political and
xtTluo
economic being within the Chinese society, NStSfc offered their 
commercial and entrepreneurial abilities a vast field of 
activity, in labour exploitation, supply of opium and 
satisfying gambling needs (45), besides their usual trading 
activities. Still closely linked to their provinces of 
provenance (46)., they sent remittances, children to be 
educated, and sometimes the dead to be buried in the family 
graveyard. The merchants,oftentimes according to speeeh- 
group; had commercial relations with other Chinese communities 
in Southeast Asia. Especially known are those among Teoehiu 
rice merchants in Singapore and those of Bangkok and West 
Borneo (47), and between Hokkiens of Singapore and Burma (48) 
The-nature of these relations must have emphasized the 
central position of Singapore in tradeJrelations and does 
not seem to have contrasted the towkaysT attachment to 
Singapore.
The coolies, shop assistants and labourers, who
constituted the majority, of the population, and who, as a
rule, were not integrated into families, must have had no
real attachment to Singapore. Their familial links turned
to China, and though they got social support from their
secret societies and guilds in Singapore, their miserable 
conditions led them to rioting and civil disorders/which
may be considered a protest against those inhuman conditions. 
Although most of them came with the hope of making money,
the majority had to return frustrated, to China.
During Singapore’s first fifty years, -Chinese society 
resembled that of Imperial China in manners, customs (49) 
and in itS:. internal leadership (50). There were two 
hierarchical leadership systems in Singapore,. as in most 
other Southeast Asian countries, and this double system -has 
remained, in some sense, to this day. One .4$ dfoJAffe# was wholly 
Chinese, where the head or heads of the system did not come 
under British authority^ and,in fact^usually were not known f 
to them as such. The other operated through different 
institutions and its head was appointed by and responsible 
to the British authorities. The latter system headed by the 
Kapitan China took the responsibility for law and order,and 
revenue collection from the community, as "the government 
desired not only.maximum revenue but also minimum bother” (51) 
Ilie Kapitan’s duties presented him with mrious opportunities 
to enhance his wealth and thus establish a high status among 
the. Chinese as well as the British. As - a local leader he 
had a double roleSof a key leader towards;his subordinates, 
and as an- agent of the authorities. This denied him the 
possibility of playing the extremist within the Chinese 
community (52) and thus tended to decrease his authority 
among the Chinese socially unstable element.
The wholly Chinese system of leadership,, the secret 
societies, held sway over the Chinese community in 
Singapore. Their influence was relatively higher than in 
other Southeast Asian countries (Java, Philippines, Cambodia)/
where the Kapitan system was firmly established, ' The 
societies.indulged in "robbery, piracy and murder" (53); yet; :
they fulfilled a social function which had not been 
undertaken by the British *or by the ICapitah. They provided 
welfare services, an intimate social milieu, and labour 
exchange services to newcomers. Receiving only minimal 
fees from the newcomers, although exploiting their labour, 
they.largely relied on protection money, secondary 
monopolies and robberies for their income. The secret 
societies operated within speech-group limits, but also 
along occupational lines and locality; as all these never 
perfectly conformed, some cross cutting occurred (54). 
Moreover, the compactness of Singapore activated the "contact 
zone" of these societies^ and/therefore/ the friction among 
them. In overall organization of the secret societies 
usually performed.dispute reconciliation functions in 
disregard of British law courts, as the secret societies’ 
penal code forbade members to give evidence against other 
members.
In 1848, gang robberies brought about armed
confrontations between the societies, the police and the
other Asian communities. In 1851, the societies rioted
against the Christian Ghinese and caused 500 dead (55).
Again in 1853-54, rebels from China arrived in Singapore
with loads of arms, and perhaps caused the Hokkien-Teochiu
riots which ended with 400 dead (56). It was, however, in
the interest of the secret societies to exist symbiotically
with the developing economy, but their high intransigency 
resulted from the nature of their leadership which did not
come under British supervision, and from the geographical 
"strait-jacket" of the compact Singapore environment.
When in 1857, the government proposed a registration act 
for secret societies, spirits were aroused (also as a 
result of the second Opium■War), and confrontation with 
the police "became imminent, hut later things quietened down.
During that period Chinese formal education virtually 
did not exist in Singapore. Bahas sent their children to 
English and missionary schools and to the Raffles Institute. 
There is a report of a Chinese school operating in 1829, and 
of a Chinese school attached to the Raffles Institute between 
1833 and 1845, hut since the institute
retained only the English section (57). Some children of 
the wealthier Chinese went to China for higher education.
This did not seem to have improved the "low Chinese Culture" 
(58) of the community. The "low culture" of speech, customs 
and religion seemed to perpetuate itself very easily as 
immigration and other cultural links with China went on 
uninterrupted.
Singapore, from 1867 to W.W.I. The second half century of
Singapore elapsed within an atmosphere of economic expansion
throughout Southeast Asia. The steamship, telegraph
communications and the opening of the Suez Canal, contracted
the world, as it were, and combined to render extractive
activities highly profitable. Erench, G-erman and later
Japanese economic and political pressures began being felt
in the area, to which the British and Dutch reacted by 
extending their effective control over Malaya and the entire
Archipelago, respectively. While the Europeans in Southeast
Asia supplied capital, planning and high level management^
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for^xpanding economy, the indigenes, the Indians, hut 
mainly the Chinese supplied labour and low level
entrepreneurship. As food demand increased with the
<L
growing population, and with increased neat in Europe, the
traditional rice production areas were extended, and the
Irrawady and the Mekong deltas were virtually opened for
the plough, The Chinese immigrants throughout Southeast
Asia in ever increasing numbers indulged in mining,
construction, trade and services, and occupied an
intermediary niche in trade between the Europeans and the
indigenous primary producers;
Singapore’s trade flourished-during the economic
expansion years, and the Chinese increasingly came to
dominate the life of the city, The Malays more and m ore
contracted and segregated themselves in Kampong Clam and
the Malay Muslim areas of thejcity, not the least for the
sake of cultural persistence (59). With their.ascriptive
status values and the lack of incentive to lead a life of
ad to leave the
arena for the economically aggressive Chinese.
Towards the end of the 19th century, Asian nationalism
which had been still in the bud during the second half of
that century, began to make its imprint on the political
scene of Southeast Asia and Singapore, It emulated
related developments in India, China and Japan and in some 
countries, affected the Chinese minorities^ before it .
impressed the indigenes. In Malaya and Singapore it mainly
affected the Chinese population during, the period under
consideration.
intense hard work and competition, the Malayslh
(i) Economic Development. Singapore* s export~crop 
agriculture was declining during that period. Though some 
increase.of gamhier and pepper acreage is reported in the 
1870s, the peak'of 1849 with 26,834 acres, dwindled to
11,000 in the 1890s and cultivation completely stopped in 
1913 (60). At the beginning of the 20th century, rubber 
production increased., and by 1918, occupied 46,000 acres. 
Coconut and pineapple for canning occupied a fairly large 
acreage, and market gardening showed a constant increase 
commensurate with the population growth (61).
during tisW agriculture constituted a less, significant
factor, in the economy in proportion to trade and services, 
than in the first fifty years of Singapore.
Trade characterized Chinese occupations in Singapore, • 
yet, in numbers employed, manual labour prevailed over other 
activities. This must be again asserted! if labour was 
exploited by the Chinese, it was mainly Chinese labour and 
Hentrepreneurial talents'* (62). It came as a result of 
labour-market saturation (63) and the system of labour 
recruitment. The incoming workers fell into three categories, 
namely: "indentured" - they usually went to the IT.M'.'S-.;
"free" - who could apply for the best paid vacancy, or engage 
in petit trade, and "credit ticket holders", who had to 
repay their transport fare and usually took whatever job was 
assigned to them. "Indentured" and "credit ticket holder" 
labourers became objects of exploitation by towkays and 
secret societies, the system operating until the British 
liberalized it (64). .Craftsmen, traders and their 
apprentices continued to belong to the Chinese classless
guilds, usually on a speech-group basis. Not until the 
1920s, did class differentiation In skilled labour 
institutionalize itself (65). The guilds exploited 
apprentices and workers, though the human relations inherent 
in them, made exploitation less conspicuous than in the 
unskilled labour market. However, labour conditions in 
Singapore were better than those in the 3?.M .S ...
British intervention brought economic development to 
Malaya, and it gradually increased its share in Singapore’s 
trade, mainly in tin and rubber (66). Tin exports, mostly 
effected through Singapore, reached 26,029 tons in 1889 and . 
51,733 in 1904. In 1887/ a smelter was built in the island 
(67), which diversified related secondary .activities. Also, 
rubber trade provided secondary sources of income by grading, 
processing and packing. Quantities reached a mere 533 tons 
in 1912, but rose to 31,668 In 1918 (68). The rubber, 
industry began as a par excellence European intiative. Even 
plantation labour was ton the whole^ot Chinese, yet, the 
Chinese penetrated the industry and found a whole range of 
gainful activities between the producers and the grand 
wholesalers. This compensated the Chinese for their loss 
incurred by European penetration into the tin Industry. 
Chinese commission agents and merchants in the rubber 
industry made great profits and progressed in economic 
importance, by acquiring European knowhow in Western World 
commerce and finance.. These, and other Chinese big 
businesses, made possible the development of Chinese banks 
between the Wars (69).
Tin mining in the Southeast Asian "tin belt" in general,
and in Makya in particular, had been introduced by the 
Chinese before the Europeans showed interest in its 
production. When it became highly in demand, European 
capital and technology began competing with the Chinese 
traditional methods of extraction. In 1913, however, the 
European share in production reached only 25 percent. It 
thus occurred that both tin and rubber, open to competitive 
economic efficiency, became a cultural. ,feontact zone” 
between Europeans and Chinese,-, as was general trade.
In addition to tin and rubber, which emphasized a 
growing interdependence between Singapore and Malaya, the 
Europeans initiated new enterprises into Singapore, increasing 
the number and proportion of skilled workers among the Chinese. 
Ihe development of the new deep water port, the entrepot 
trade in fuel oil, and a modern finance a nd‘banking sj^bem (70), 
constituted the major activities, which must have generated 
subsidiary skilled activities. The case of banking is 
interesting, as it did not attract Chinese attention for over 
60 years. The first bank, established by the British in 
1840 was followed by other European ones, but the Chinese who 
had had no banking experience in their homeland could generally 
ignore the system due to kinship ties among their compatriots 
overseas, which facilitated money transfers. Also, the 
small scale of the transactions during that period, and the 
specific Chinese financing system, the tontine, proved 
adequate. When however, business expanded and capital had to 
be concentrated, they easily emulated the Europeans.opening 
their first bank in 1903 and a second in 1907 (71).
The growth in the number of skilled workers in trade, 
finance, industry and services introduced a new social layer 
of fairly well paid wage'earners, who had fixed jobs and a ; 
higher .status than the coolies. They could support families 
and thus increase theforoportion of stabilized ..people in 
Singapore, This in rurn must have changed their sentimental 
and material attachment to Singapore, bringing their 
attitude closer to that of the traders and towkays without, 
■however, conforming with the latter1 s social class views.
Trade figures for the second half century of Singapore 
continuously rose. In 1891, they totalled 243.3 million 
British dollars (72), in 1901- 549.6 millions (73) and 
reached a peak during W.W.I. Though figures represent 
current pri-ces, the 2,000 dollar per capita external trade 
of 1901 is an impressive figure, which provej? that a trading 
centre at the southern tip of Malaya was essential to the 
economy of the region.
(ii) Political and Social Developments. British 
intervention in Malaya seemed a process in which the inert 
authorities in London followed the initiative o^ftheir Straits 
Settlements staff. As disturbances among Malay .chiefs and. 
Chinese mining kongsis jeopardized the smooth inflow of tin 
into Singapore, English and Chinese merchants put pressure on 
the local authorities to introduce order into the tin mining 
areas by immediate intervention. .The London authorities gave 
their consent, perhaps because they ttosw were-aware of. 
possible European encroachments into the area. By that time, 
Singapore had become an important coaling station and a rear 
base for the fleet operating in and off Chinese waters, and
a long established commercial outpost for .British trade*
As a result of Singapore* s increasing importance in
strategy and economy the* “public opinion” of Singapore’s
European, community became, increasingly weighty/ and
.accordingly, the Straits Settlements got the status of
a Grown Colony, in 1867. Local organizations: the
municipality and the Legislative -Council, were accorded
more freedom in the issuance of by-laws concerning health, .
internal trade, land-use and the administration of English
and Malay education* Permanent residents received the legal
status of British Subjects, bringing them under British law,
rather than their own ethnic group jurisdiction. The Straits
Chinese took much pride in thfct status which brought them v
\ t W  ofwUvj
closer to the British, customs/they sometimes tried to
emulate.-; It simultaneously Increased the social distance
between them and the non-resident Chinese, gua;rding the
former from nationalist Chinese influences (74). The status
of British Protected Subject accorded to the P.M.S.?permanent
residents gave less prestige to its holders,;still both
statuses ensured Chinese law breakers and poll lie ally active
person's from expulsion. Banishment constituted a severe
punishment for those Chinese already economically established
in both Singapore and the P.M.S.
■ Before Chinese nationalism in its early 20th- century 
form reached Singapore, a proto-nationalist sentiment had 
been diffused in Singapore by Chinese newcomers. It took 
the form of hostility to the British, and to things West., 
discernible since the 1850s and following the second Opium 
War. It spread among the Chinese coolies and'hawkers who,
due to British indirect rule, remained under the full 
authority of the secret societies (75), and who constituted 
the geographically and socially unstable part of the Chinese 
population.
At the other extreme, still representing a Chinese 
attitude towards the British, 'were the Straits Chinese, not 
all of whom at that time were Babas. They manifested their 
pride in their Anglophile attitudes by creating the Strait 
Chinese - British association (76), by educating their 
offspring in the English schools, and by emulating British 
customs. Their ties with the British, besides being- 
sentimental and social, had clear economic origins, yet it 
is said that these relations developed on a ‘‘love-hate1 
syndrome basis (77).
Most of the Chinese traders and merchants did not adopt- 
these extreme attitudes at least,as far as their behaviour 
was. concerned. Their intermediate situation between British 
business and administration and the Twer-class Chinese, which 
enabled them to communicate with and profit from both sides-, 
made them generally unresponding to political agitation (7.8), 
Only grave social irgistice or an economic crisis could shake 
their political non commitment. All this resembled historical 
conditions in Bukien and Kwangtung, where disputes were 
solved within the lineage, and as long as the government got 
its taxes and there appeared no sign of sedition, it did not 
meddle in the affairs'of the people (79) * •
Towards the end of the 19-th century, Chinese secret 
societies were losing much of their power and significance as 
a result of improving internal security conditions brought
about by the Crown Colony administration. The Protectorate 
of Chinese assumed part of the social role of the secret 
societies by regulating labour conditions and by dispute 
reconciliation. It also arrived at spreading some sort of 
information network into the previously tightly closed 
Chinese lower-class circles. This enabled the Protector 
to enforce the 1889 ordinance of registration of societies, 
banning those which failed to produce their regulations and 
the list of their members (80), The extent and intensity 
of the societies1 activities may be illustrated by the fact 
that in 1885, the press compiled the names of 20 societies 
in Singapore, 9 in Penang and 7 in Malacca (81). Since 
then, the secret societies have generally deteriorated into 
outlaw- gangs with little political agnificance, but their 
existence is still felt in the; present day Singapore 
underworld.
The .suppression of the secret societies and the 
liberalization of labour regulations marked a substantial 
change from British indii^ect rule to efficient government. 
Yet, if the British had in mind anything like changing the 
attitude of the Chinese majority-in their favour, their 
measures came too late and were incomplete. The British 
did not offer a proper substitute to the intimacy of social 
relationsjwhich the young bachelors got in their secret 
society milieu, neither did thejr meaningfully improve income, 
nor lodging conditions nor provided vocational education.
In sum, they could not fu.llfil the hopes of the newcomers in. 
any material sense. But, except for humanitarian purposes 
and the efficient running of the city, there were no
contemporary real political reasons, why the British should 
invest in winning the hearts oj^the Chinese coolies. The 
Empire, stood safe and sound, China was politically on her 
knees, the economically significant part of the Chinese
MX,
community exhibited a friendly or. at least' neutral attitude 
towards the British, and there always existed the Indian^and 
Malays who could eventually counteract Chinese unrest with 
government help.
The decline of the secret societies left. the; internal 
leadership of the Chinese community in the hands of legal 
associations, who increasingly undertook welfare and
i . 1
reBgious tasks within speech-group limits. In 1905, all tk 
'speech-groups participated in the establishment, of the 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce ( 8 2 ) as a unified head 
organization for the Chinese traders, and businessmen, TflllWfc 
iate^ it gradually undertook leadership functions in social 
and cultural .matters as well. This organization represented 
the Chinese community and became officially accepted as the 
leading Chinese organ. ■ However, it had no direct authority 
over the Chinese unskilled labourers, since its 
institutionalization into the British system, its Inherent 
class interests, and its inability to adopt extreme 
nationalistic policies, ruled it out as a means to 
revolutionize the socio-eeonomical misery of those 
labourers. These,still had to await modern nationalist 
and social ideas to find their natural leadership and 
organization.
The following table represents some demographic changes 
during the 1871-1911 period.
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Table g-5. Demographic Changes in Singapore.' (83)
Year 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911
Total pop. X1000 96,1 137. 7 181.6 226.8 303.3
Chinese °fo 56.8 63.0 67.1 72.1 72.4
Malay fo 27.1 23. 9 19*7 15.8 13.8
Ind-ian 11.9 8. 8 8.8 7.8 9.2
Others % 4.0 4. 3 4.3 4.3 4.7
(F/M) sex ratio.
Total pop. 0.31 0. 3:2 0.31 0.34 0.41
Chinese' 0.16 0. 20 0.21 O'. 26 0.36
Malay 0.79 0. 77 0.72 0.78 0,85
Indian 0.23 0. 25 0.24 0.24 0.23
Operating the sb t ability function <3n the sex ratio
pMAloU^/
iM$&/table and on the population figures, we get the following 
tabulated data.
Table Q-C. Population Stability within Ethnic G-roirps. .
Numbers in 1,000.
Year Integrated Integrated • Non~Integrated
. IJY” 0 M 1
--- pjj— —
■■■"O' ir 1 ""'T . ‘ CT ,1 I
1871 48 28 89 38 46.1 16.0 23.1 4 .4 49.9 . 41.4 2.9 7.:
1881 49 33 88 40 67.5 28.7 70.2 58.1
1891 46 35 84 34 83.6 42.7 .98.0 79.2
1901 50 41 88; 39 113.4 67.2 113.4 96.8
1911 58 52 92 39 175.7 114.2 127 . 6 105.4
Numbers.X 1000. 1 = Total, 0 = Chinese, M « Malays
I - Indians.
Tables C~§ and C-C may lead us to realize the scale of 
the.problem represented by the non-integrated Chinese unskilled 
labour and compare it with.other ethnic groups. Although the 
proportion of non-integrated Chinese declined after the.-
186o*s, absolute numbers rose to about 100,000 in the
Ctjdj
first decade of the 20th century. Not before 1901,fthe 
integrated part of the population o u t n u m b e r t h e  unstable 
section. It will later be seen that during thejeeond fifty 
years of Singapore, the Straits Born increased their numbers, 
and although births naturally have a 1:1 sex ratio, births 
alone could not wWfcbal'ance tlie ■ <on\ U&M0
sex-ratio of the group. It is assumed that Increasing 
numbers of skilled workers with fixed jobs reaching a stage 
where they could support a family, brought females from
S. irU'Uj /
China flW mte &£ the sex-ratio and
residence stability. The existence of over 100,000 non­
integrated male Chinese in extremely difficult working and 
living conditions had significant modern political meaning, 
though by then still greatly latent. As a group' they were 
divided, like the entire Chinese community, into speech- 
gro.ups', but common conditions and a strong unifying ideal 
could easily unite them in a common cause.
The increasing proportion of the Chinese who were 
integrated into stable units, did not uniformly proceed in • 
every'speech-group. By 1881, there were six major groups, 
namely: Cantonese, Hainanese, Hokkienese, Hakka, Straits 
Born and Teochiu. Table C-^ gives a speech-group breakdown 
in absolute figures for both sexes (84).
Table C-1jh Chinese Speech-Group Population 
_____________ According to S e x e s * ______
1881 1891
M P T M ■ B T
Cantonese 9,699 5,154 14,853 15,750 7,647 23,397
H ai 1 am 8,266 53 8,319 8,596 115 8,717
Holdcien 23,327 1,654 24,981 41,776 4,080 45,856
Hakka 5,561 609 6,170 6,558 844 ■ 7,402
Straits Born 4,531 5,014 9,527 6,084 6,721 12,805
Teochiu 20,946 1,698 22,644 21,682 2,055 23,737
Others 259 13 272 -
Total 72,571 34,195 86,766 100,446 21,462 121,908
1901 1911
M p T 1 ,T
Cantonese 19,963 10,766 30,769 28,934 18,566 47., 500
Hail am 9,237 214 9,451 10,206 298 10,504
Hokki en 49,061 1Q056 59,117 68,370 22,378 90,748
Hakka 7,2.52 1,262 8,514 9,516 2,431 11,947
Straits Born 7,719 7,779 15,49.8 20,369 23,193 43,592
Teochiu 24,186 3,378 27,564 29,705 7,708 37,413
Others 238 42 280 5,463 129 5, 565
Total 130,367 35,674 164,041 161.648 57,929 219,577
It immediately stands out that there were differences 
among the speech-groups in respect to their attitude towards 
Singapore as a place of permanent residence. The Hainanese 
not only suffered initially from the most unbalanced sex- 
ratio, hut also failed to improve it in any substantial 
measure. On the other extreme, the Straits Born of Y/hom 
increasingly greater numbers virtually belonged to "original 
speech-groups as regards social solidarity, had some female
numerical preponderance within their ranlcs. The Cantonese 
had throughout 1881-1911 the second best sex ratio, and it
is very likely that among the Straits Born a significant 
number actually were Cantonese. In 1881 and in 1891, there : 
were more Cantonese women than in all other Speech Groups 
combined, (bixcept the Straits born). This must have had a 
strong stabilizing effect on the Cantonese, and in fact, 
they have been known to be one of the least inclined speech- 
groups to create social disorders. The Hainanese at the 
other extreme, had a reputation for being irascible and 
socially intransigent.
The Hokkien and Teochiu constituted the largest groups 
in 1881, but while the former proportionately increased their 
numerical standing from about 32 percent in that same year to 
about 41 percent in 1911, the Teochiu decreased from 29 
percent to 17 percent in the same period. However, in ' 
absolute numbers this means an increase from 22.6 thousand to 
37.4 thousand. In terms of sex-ratio the Hokkien, as well as 
the Teochiu, had about ten males per female in 1891, and an 
even worse ratio in 1881. This improved to about 3:1 for the 
Hokkien and something less than 4:1 for the Teochiu in 1911. 
The Hakka constituted the smallest of the six groups, but 
overtook the Hainanese (the smallest but one ) in 1911.
While the former improved their sex-ratio during that period 
in a similar way to the Teochiu and Hokkien, the Hainanese 
remained exceptionally highly imbalanced in that respect, as
until 1918 Hainanese women were prohibited to emigrate and
men forbidden to marry outside the speech-group (83).. When 
l&SJj
the/sex ratio of the speech-groups is interpreted m  relation
to the integration into families function (Appendix A), it 
seems that the Cantonese had 69 percent of their members 
thus integrated, the Hakka had 20 percent, the Teochiu had 
15 percent,, the Hokkien - 13 percent and the Hainanese only 
one percent. In 1911, the proportions improved to 78 percent 
for the Cantonese, about 50 percent for the Hokkiens, 41 
percent - Teochiu, 40 - Hakka, and 5 percent Hainanese.
Between .1881 and-1911, a balanced sex-ratio had little 
effect upon the order.of numerical importance of the speech 
groups. Immigration was the decisive factor in population 
growth of the various speech-groups, and the employment 
potentials of each of them was a major factor in the number 
of immigrants. Bor example, the Hokkiens.increased theif 
proportional strength against the Cantonese from about 25:15 
to 91:48, although they had a less balanced sex ratio. The 
overall Chinese sex-ratio improvement from (B/M) 0.198’to 
(B/M) 0.358 during 1871-1911 representing an absolute increase 
from 14,200 females to 57,900, shows, a growth of proportional 
integration into families from 35-to 53 percent and, must 
have resulted from economic standing improvement, -which allowed 
more and more Chinese to support a family in Singapore. But 
besides economic consideration, cultural attitudes of each 
speech-group also influenced the proportion of women among 
the group members. The case of the Hainanese has already 
been noted and as for the Hokkien, their inclination to; 
maintain ’'-small women" In Singapore, perhaps Malay or other 
concubines, may explain their low (B/M) sex ratio insplte of 
their economic standing. Also, China*s official recognition 
of the right of their people to emigrate (86) must have had
some effect on female emigration, "but certainly less than on 
male emigration.
As already noted, the Hokkien maintenance of the 
numerical supremacy of the speech-groups may be explained by 
their good starting point in numbers and economic position, 
at the beginning of the period under consideration, i.e.
1867* It seems that by then, though similar in number to the 
Teochiu, and practising virtually similar occupations, they 
began to profit from the decline of the Teochiu trade with 
their lingual brothers in Thailand and West Borneo, which 
increasingly came under severe competition from the steamship. 
The Teochiu of Singapore operated a junk trade with those 
communities, and as Hodder remarked, their business-residence 
location up the Singapore river mouth indicated the size of 
the craft in use. In addition, the increase in immigration 
to Thailand, where the Teochiu have^Llways been the . 
predominant speech group, might have affected the numbers 
immigrating to Singapore. These two reasons seem very
I) aplausible in view of the Ohinese system tauvuh-
.recruitment, which gave preference to kinsmen, and in any 
event to the same speech-group members. The more a speech- 
group had been economically established in occupations 
offering employment, the better chance it had to increase its : 
numbers.
The original Babas and Straits born, though undoubtedly,., 
in dominant economic position until the beginning of the 
20th century, had only little human reserves to rely upon 
in increasing their numbers in Singapore (87). The Hokkien 
seem to have adapted themselves to the economic expansion
of tile period. The Cantonese growth may be explained by 
their domination in the diversifying skilled—occupations, 
which flourished as subsidiaries to the development of 
trade, The Hakka trailed behind, being disfavoured by a 
worse starting point than the four other maoor groups. The 
Hainanese lagged behind, as they usually were occupied as 
unskilled labourers and owned only very few businesses of 
their own. Thus, the sex ratio differences between the 
speech"groups, largely brought about by economic conditions 
and cultural attitudes, also indicated differential 
attitudes towards permanent residence and geographical 
.attachment to Singapore.
At least before W.W.I;, the interrelations among the 
Chinese speech-groups were oftentimes aggressive, and their 
mutual attitude was "analogous to racial stereotypes in 
other parts of the world" (88). However, within the city, 
face-to-face relations between different speech-groups must 
have been ubiquitous and daily, and many of them must have 
spoken' more than one dialect. The fair degree of mutual 
intelligibility between Hokkien and Teochiu and to a lesser 
degree between Hakka and Cantonese must have facilitated these 
lingual links. In this sense, it created conditions to 
confusion of the clear cut social boundaries between the 
speech-groups, even before the appearance of Chinese
9
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nationalism. Behind all that lay ample geographical 
congestion, which increased the "boundary to area" ratio of 
the groups, and the social mobility which tended to blur 
geographical segregation. Generally speaking"however, 
distinct speech-group residence patterns still existed (89),
as speecli group~specialization in certain occupations and 
the custom of having servants and apprentices living on the 
premises of the shophouse rendered change difficult.
(iii) Changes in the Geographical Conception of Singapore. 
Between 1867 and Y/.W.I,, the British community of Singapore 
and the Straits Born clearly constituted the higher classes 
in Singapore. While only few of the British made Singapore 
their permanent place of residence, they were/as a whole, 
more interested than the other ethnic groups in the quality 
of, life in their residential areas as well as in Singapore 
as a-whole* Their move inland into the hilly ground in the 
north west represent^their cultural attitude in that,respect, 
rather than a shift of sentimental attachment from Britain 
to Singapore. London was still their capital in political 
decision-making and economic links, and Britain was still the 
country of familial ties, personal property and socio^- 
cultural norms. The Bahas had evidently no such links with 
Britain, and their family relations did not transcend the 
Strait Settlements or perhaps the Bast Indies. Their 
attitude towards Singapore must have Been determined By the 
fact that they usually had Been Born and spent their childhood 
there, and thus saw it as their homeland. They, certainly took 
pride in Being British Subjects and they did not raise any 
question concerning the political future of Singapore.
Concerning their sentimental and material attachment
to Singapore, the Chinese community divided along., a distinct
line of permanent and temporary residents. But Before the
advent of Chinese nationalism to Singapore, the Emperor did 
not symbolize for the immigrants the unity of China, to which
unity no# loyalties were sanctioned by the Five Confucian 
Relationships. As a rule, all those established in,
Singapore with their families, owning property a.__. X
jobs there, must have developed a sentimental attachment to 
the place in addition to their attachment to families, clans,
temporary residents must have lacked that attachment to 
Singapore, as their needs for community services was much 
less and as family responsibilities did not cast upon them 
the kind of sedentary outlook on that place. In:..a sense, 
their outlook was "nomad" .as regards their attitude towards 
"conservation" of the social and. physical environment. They, 
more than the "sedentary" Chinese, lived in' overcongested 
conditions and in extreme frugality,- although- the entire 
Chinese community shared these characteristics (90). in 
addition, the temporary residents'did not become British 
Subjects and were liable to banishment for breaking the law.
In 1901, the Chinese in Singapore numbered 164,000 and in 
1911 - almost 220,000. If the index of integration into 
families correlates well with a sedentary attachment to place,, 
as is actually assumed (table C-6>), then about §^,000 Chinese 
did not consider Singapore as their home, while some €k ,000 
did so in 1901. In 1911, the respective figures were
105,000 aid 11^,000.
During the second fifty years of Singapore and 
especially in the 20th century and increasingly until W.W.Il, 
the. British and the Chinese in. Singapore modified their 
macro-geographical conception of the city. This concerned "Oia, 
notion-of the dependence of Singapore on Malaya for its
villages and ancestral graveyards-in China. The. bachelor
economic viability, definitely a non~Rafflesian conception, 
but in effect, it eventually conformed with later British 
political policies. The tin and rubber trade and the 
financial and commercial services Singapore provided for- . 
Malaya justified the modified conception, and the "centrality** 
of, Singapore in linking West and Bast Malaya (91) added' a 
temporary weight to this new role. This economic dependence 
of Singapore on Malaya was real but not necessary. Among 
many other factors, it resulted from a traditional 
charactei’istic of Chinese economic enterprise, namely;' 
following the Europeans in grand economic decisions. This was 
true in Singapore .as if was in Southeast Asia in general, and 
did not chang^until the 1960s, when independent Singapore 
initiated big scale industrialization into the .city.
Prom.W.W.I. to the Japanese Occupation.
(i) Chinese Rationalism in Singapore. Prior to 1911,
Kang Yu Wei, Sun Yat Sen and other .Reformers and Radicals 
came to Singapore and Malaya to establish cultural and 
political associations and to raise funds. These activities 
of the pre-Republic era were characterized by two distinct 
Chinese approaches to the solution of China! s .problems. The 
Reformers with Kang Yu Wei tried to raise Chinese support in 
Malaya and Singapore- for the dethroned emperor in his strife, 
with the empress dowagerf without destroying the imperial 
•rule. They raised 100,000 dollars and obtained 1,000 
signatures from middle”class and wealthy Chinese, many of 
whom were Straits born (92). Kang introduced modernized 
Chinese education into Malaya and Singapore^ by establishing
6 schools in 1906.
In contrailstinction to the mild and gentlemanly'nature
of the Reformers1 activities, the Radicals adopted down-to^-■
earth straightforward methods. Popular appeals;;aad mass
rallying brought the message of the Radicals to'the entire
Chinese community, while reading clubs and newspapers
intensified the political acculturation of the, more
dedicated (93). Sun Yat Sen became personally known to
thousands of Chinese -in' Malays and Singapore, and, when later
his prestige'in China rose, his supporters could not.but
regard it as their personal victory (94). This may have
been one of the reasons why the Chinese in Singapore showed
less parochial solidarity-with South East'China than those
of the Philippines during the Fukien army revolt against
Chiang Kai Shek (95),.although Hokkiens constituted the
majority in both, communities. - v
Until 1912 the Radicals1 major theme of political
activity in'Malaya and1 Singapore was anti-Manchu and pro-
Republi can, , with the; I) ung Meng Hul' (96) as the . 1 eading
Chinese political organization. From 1912, the political
Cwiti -
themes changed frommti-Manchu to anti-colonialist, 'that 
is against all those who had... been responsible for China's.
VUil^ o
plight^and imwsh) were still economically exploiting and 
politically degrading■it. Since by 1912,. the Radicals 
absorbed the Reformers* it ensued that the entire Chinese- ~ 
nationalist movement in Malaya and,Singapore became hostile 
to the .British, .the suppressors of China. The unified Chines 
nationalist movement.in Malaya and Singapore‘organized KiM.T* 
branches (97)> which spread pro-Chinese and anti-British
propaganda af fecling the; feelings: of. increasing numbers. of 7;.
, Chinese from every sp ee ch-group. Many of the Straits Born' ■ ■
. - also;; "became actively involved in politics,.. For:example, K ,yy
: out'pW k -.M.$. officials in Singapore "belonged; to that v. ■; -
- grbup7';in";i9.13 :$98.). It seems also*. that the:;.Chinese schools >.
. • and night classes enabled i at least, some . Babas to learn - y
LI Chinese and .xveintegrate: into the community (99) •.
:• . . : The British.lad to .react against the-K.H.T... agitation, IVy;
.-. and as . a result the. .party practically went underground during. .
. 1914-1922. During that periodyhowever, .agitation^realized:.= :/
by demon strati, on s, ail. anti-Japanese boycott, in 13-19 and : \ ./ ,;;i
y  y ' general political activity through reading clubs and schools/,
almost, uninterruptedly continued. , In .the 1920s, following y y - i ' : 
the appean.an.ee of a left wing, group within the K.M.T. of. '
China, leftist nationalist groups appeared in the Nan Yang; y . ;
V; . Chinese communities,.' - .In. Singapore-this coincide..d with the - • .
appear.ance- ofLclass stratification' in - the Chinese society. y. y-;
; Coolie.s, -labourers and wage"* earners naturally favoured the , .
.. . leftists' who added » class-struggle to their nationalist ? ' " , : '
•■'•y ■. ;'lyi^ ep;l.ogy> No wonder that Haihanese and . Hakk'as, the mo st ' y -
: ■ .economically underprivileged Chinese groups',: were, among the -. '
■ 1. . mo.st active .in the leftist group; (100) . .The m i d d 1 e ~ c 1 a s s.
, .-support.ers) of the II;M .I . could, not identify themselves with 
' a group .who preached • class-struggle, ..especially when Sun Yat \
. Sen considered .it irrelevant to -the Chinese national .
. revolution.. - i" V L  . • .
-The: split of 1927, between the II.M; T . ; and the leftists . 
reintroduced the.pre-1912 political division within the ,
. Chinese , community,' the. II.M. T. reversing their, role . from ■ y .:V ,.
.Radicals to moderates, in.'relation toy the 'communists. " This 
role r.ey or sal/ipg^ from socio-economic' y.y- ' L
; y condi tionsvv .'Not .unlikelt hep secret s o cl e t i e s1 • 1 e ade r ship in 
v- .its time, the- leftist-leadership of the‘1920s’ dici y;
.-/ .no t ypar ti'eip ate /in . the ’ hi erar c.hy of;•- Chine se 7 formal institutions, 
and had little to do with the British." They directly- : ’ ; yy-i
y i responded to • the ' communists in/China ahd^'iat.ery to. the /  . t, ;r 
VQommintern, 'Being thus - to taily- independent of the British,, 
h .ythe;;leftisiileadeiship -could' easily; adopt, extreme yppiiticaiy ' .
/Tvlews.y These views,- among^which-class-struggle and .antiyty' 
v . yimperiali sm; were;' prominent , : appeal e d .not • only to the working 
/class • but. also to the youth, wholly:nature Of. their : age, were 
inclined towards-’ extremist' idealogles.; ’ '%-7, y l y / / -
•'it ;yV ••'•5?he k.,MyT’.:,.officials in Singapore, , with ?all their ;fy :f 
• n at-ionalis t r adi c al i sm, s t illde p end e d On the : t r adi t i oh al-' • 
/leadership of; the.:, Chines#. community. .. While the II, m. I. ' !.
':'l governmentyof China, ' endeavoured tpymaximize. theyfinancial 
'Cphtrii)utions of the Chinese abroadyyii gaveitsLblessings :'y\ 
;/:to../theVlinks.' between fthe Chinese, leadership in the- ®an Yang ; - ; 
and the..Britishvy Thus/.--they prb-K.M, 1 . 7 leaders constituted, 'a ,7 , 
. -' system ihtbrfixed' between Ghinesemasses ah?d British authority 
7 - playing; a- doubie role o:f leaders' to,; the Chinese and, to a / . -
,v pentaintdegree ,y as.-respondent to ; the. Brl tish. This latter . 
role also stemmedyfromLthe dipiomatichrelatiohs-between ty'Tr 7 
Britain and . China, -which both ; sides, werei/anxious not;-’ to. 
seyer ;7 yMoreover,- being--related totthe middle-class, ! the • y y.
■;:7 -II.M . Tv/officials - caiiie under; the; influence oftaygroup^ Miose ■, -_y 
natural interests/yrere.../inimical to . social revbiutidn. In -,..y 
7 ■. practice however,:' "propaganda was very .much anti-British^y
: 7 "OrkVv V- 'T *' . • " V  m l  ' ■" y  ViU; . ■ ' ; , 353 y
•y and even after 1927, ' the British' suspected .that the . 7
' Chine se; government considered. Malaya . as. n t err a irredenta” (101) y -
v . I : 7’-y During the 1920s and the 1930s/the leftists extended ,
their, influence, among ’.the Chinese community.' This resulted .7 V  
from; the leftist.control of many of the trade unions, and 
7 also from the increase in • absolute... numbers and, proportion of. 7/ , 
Chinese high-school students. The leftists, whose official.-.
7 organizations were banned by the British, resorted to ,
y finfiItrat!on into neutral and II .M.T.- organ!zations, in .order.- ■ ' .V
to; increase their political influence. For example, the '
•:vy. Overseas..-Chinese Union established for anti-Japanese action, . .y 
■ following-.the- 1931 .aggression, ., was-especially, affected in- " ' . ■
that respect (102). 7. 7' -,'/ . ■ . ; "L
;. - In the late 1920s, theyleftists: cara.e under the control7 y. 
y of the Commintern, which naturally emphasized the class~ yy ',
struggle role and the anti-imperialist mission of the 
communists in Malaya and Singapore, at the expense of Chinese /■ :.
. 'nationalism. Under Commintern instructions’, the Chinese -,:y' 77. 
eomm'unists in, Malaya- add Singapbre. tried: to spread ,,7.7.
' communism; aiTiong^  and 'collaborate wfth^ indigenous Malays to. . .  
■create a common: organization, yThe Malay, response was y . y' ‘:. 
practically negative^, and^.accordingly it’was agreed that the,
. . Chinese would create a separate..Nan Tah'g Communist party (103)... . ;
:■ ■ This . party,. renamed, the Malayan/CommunistyBar.ty ;('M. C.P.:) in y y y -/
1930, had anyoverwhelming.Chinese membership, who engaged 
v . no;t only in subversive.’class"-struggle^,but. also, in7actions'hy/yy 
v . supporting China' s'cause. They clahs~struggle activity.could.1 y;-'..
. not. appeal to the Malays for socio-religious reasons, . and 
:'the' nationalist Chinese . activity .made the Malays.-;suspicious ; ■
■ ■ ■ ’. ; ' ' 3^i
•towards the real intentions of Chinese .nationalism*
■, y' -On; the outside Chinese nationalism exhibite'dl a-pstrdng-.-- 
.group solidarityand its manifestations, for"’instance, in..,
‘ ahti-*;japanese .agitation. (especially after 1957), endangered 
. the Malays, according to Malay interpretations,CIO4} *• - The 
fragmented Malay ethnic solidarity: and the’relative political 
indifference of the Indians, made the entire. Chinese ' ;:
community. seem politically more dangerous-looking than they i 
/really w e r e . I n  terms of territorial attachment, the. 
situation in Malaya gave the impression that: -^most Malays 
. gave their allegiance to the sultan, the majority of Chinese 
;to China,. and most of the. Indians, .so, far as they were aware / 
of loyalties, to India” (105). In that political atmosphere, • 
the growing . proportion- of ■' the: Chinese in the entire population 
of ..Ifal ay a and' Singapore could not hut raise anxiety among the 
•politic, ally '-aware. Malays and/among the British •authorities..
The latter, for •their own political, reasons, maintained ... 
restrictions on Chinese ..immigration,, although after-the; 
depression years the .economic justification thereof became 
doubtful. . . . ■ : ■' s. I.-/"-’
As. regards the sentiment.al- attachment ,to. territory of, . 
the K.MiT. supporters in. Singapore; nationalism brought China 
and its current affairs into their.'minds, yet) it::'generally■ 
did not occur to them tliat; allegiance to China entailed 
■reemigration. If there was talk of regarding Singapore and • 
Malaya, as .tributary parts of. China, it was mooted and 'obscure*
In; g eneral, their. attachment to/ Singapor e.^1 argely ■ stemmed ■ 
from their. evaluation of the city, as a place where, at le ast a
decent .living, could be gained, as opposed to. their attachment . 
to China, which was^fijlS^ ideologically . inspired.
. supporters, by nat.ur'e 'o£:-bheir 'political' •
Conviction, must; have: .acquired a sentimental attachment to
. Malay a- and Singapore. Thi s s t emm e d, from the M.C.P. politico-.
-geographical.- conception that Malaya and Singapore, as an -fy/v 
■ '-/ ■ / ■ ’ - , v  ■ .■ / / / .  \ C l v h \ j g A t /
' integral..'part -of it;, constituted a land where bothNfthik&a and:
Malays would live happily under a/ socially: just. and -
independent government. As a result, the-political
conviction became & substitute to. property, ownership in what
regards the|territorial attachment. of the' Chinese .proletariat.
., As,- for Chinese ■ attachment to China, • nationalism transformed .
the’ former‘parochial attachment to districts/of-provenance
'.into a unified allegiance to China in its entirety (106)/.
,f(fi:)i Ecohqmio'^Develbpineiit/ and British Politics. ' Except
• for the 'depression years;, which affected world-trade —  X3L ■ 
sensitive barometer of SingaporeVs economy — :the general, 
trend of t h e .economy, between•1914 and 1941, marked growth
. and expansion. In .the slump years of 1931-1933, trade
• figures/went down.to half the 1918-1920 average/ but the 
economy, recovered during 1934-1938, when the average annual 
trade exceeded: by .20 percent. that of the immediate post .
W.W.I. years (107) .• .In 1926, for example, 16,000 ships , ,
tilling . 12. 5- million tons called at Singapore. harbour ,. while 
in 19-35, the tonnage rose to 16 million.(108) . . /
. During the slump year-s, ; it' was mainly the economically 
weak/ layer; of the' Chinese .population .who were . the hardest - hit, 
Met migration 'to- Singapore became "deficit. for/ the first /time 
in .its history. . for • instance, the ./number, of Chinese immigrant 
, to the, Straits Settlements in; 1929;. was about 80, 0.00 less than
In 1927, and those of 1930, 9.1)0111 10,000 down over the 
1929 figure. The number of outgoing Chinese in 1929 was
60,000 less than in 1927, hut that of 1930 was 72,000 more, 
than the 1929 figure (109). It seems that property and 
business ownership in Singapore besides pnviding reserves 
for lean years, must have had some stabilizing effect (in 
the physical sense of the word besides its emotional 
connotation).
At the end of the 19th century, the British decided to 
fortify Singapore and build there a naval base. In view 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 the plan was postponed 
and priorities given to the Home fleet. After W.W.I., work 
began on the base and dockyard (110),. and when it terminated 
in the 1930s, it had.already been presumed that a future 
war would’ be fought against the combined forces of Japan and 
Germany. Singapore became thus the "keystone on which the 
survival of the British Commonwealth of Nations would c%>end" 
(ill). The construction and the maintenance of the base 
directly affected labour specialization in Singapore and 
created new permanent jobs, but it also expanded production 
and services, which became more technical in indirectly 
related sectors such as processing of foodstuffs and non­
durable commodities. These permanent jobs demanded certain 
skills and individual sophistication and consequently were
well paid. All this was conducive to the development of 
i
trade unionism and to the increase of the sedentary part of 
the population. While the base.depended in many respects 
on Chinese and Indian, labour, the nationalism of the former 
and especially their anti-colonialism presented some danger 
to its smooth operation. The M.C.P*'members and supporters,
hostile to the British in every respet, could subvert work, 
while the K.MI., though hostile to the British only in 
matters concerning China, provided a "recruiting space" (112) 
and a.cloak for the communists. Effective internal security 
measures had to he taken, uud their existence until the 
..present time indicates that political subversion has remained 
a constant factor throughout Singapore1s 20th century history.
Although during the 20th century, Singapore and Malaya
were increasing their mutual economic activities, the
growing strategic importance of Singapore led the British to
adopt a policy o'f alienation between the two. It. seems that
the British thought they could strategically maintain their
maritime routes by holding fortified naval bases at critical
V tlv u /v
pointSjin the event of .a future independence of\&tbi«major 
colonies. These bases could best be held when backed by 
. friendly.; or at least neutral territories. Since the British 
.must have anticipated that Malaya wdould eventually receive ; 
its eelf-rule, they preferred a Malay-dominated-Malaya to a 
Chinese, predominance there. The socio-political reasons 
were obvious, as by holding Singapore the British would have 
reduced the Chinese proportion in Malaya's population and 
that,- in addition to the protective laws, favouring the Malays, 
would have ensured Malay' political domination in a self-rule 
eventuality. The British deemed they could-take the risk of 
Chinese subversion in Singapore as their experience in Hong 
Kong did not prove the contrary. .
(iii) Social Changes.. Some demographical data are 
pertinent;
Table C-g. Pemographical Data (113). 
(Pop. numbers X 1000)
Year 1911 1921 1931 , . 1947
Total Population • ■ 303 418 558 ■ 941
P/M Sex Ratio ■0.408 ; 0.490 0.584 0.822
io Integrated 58 • 66 73 90
Chine s e„' P opul at 1 on 220 317 422 730
P/M Sex Ratio 0,. 358 0.470 0.603: 0.882
io Integrated 52 64 75 94
ti/o of Chinese born 20 , 25 . 36 60
in Malaya.
Between 1911 and .19 21, the Chinese increased their
proportion in the population from two thirds to over three
quarters and generally kept that until 1947* Also
between 1911 and. 1921, Singapore’s population growth reached
115,000, despite a natural ngrowth.” deficit of 38,000. Only
in the following decade the natural growth became positive,
but with only 9,600 births in excess of deaths. The trend
Ou
improved during 1931-1947, when out of a toiaL increase of 
310,800, the share of th^natural increase was 117,500 (114). 
■The growth in the proportion of' the integrated part of the 
Chinese community represents the improvement of the economic 
■conditions, and indicates that the Chinese increasingly 
became attached to Singapore as their place of residence.
Pigures concerning migration to and from the Straits 
Settlements are the following (115):
\9 , .
Table Q-JP. Chinese Migration - Straits Settlements.
(in
East-
Indies
thousands)
from
to
1923
.48
52
19.25 - 
52 
75
1927
60
. 86
1929 
' 74 
85 '
1930
92
93
China from 158 191 •347 - 267 232
to . 95 SO . 184 146 203
India and from 1 1 2 - 2
Burma , to
' 4 1 6 2 4
Other from -10 .12 27 .13 18
Ports. to ■ 9 13 ' :27 10 15
Total : in 217 255 436 354 344
out. 160 • 169 .'" 303 .243 315
Total- net 
increment 56 91 132 111 29
Men 33 50,- 66 5.9 - 11
Women n 10 15 29 25 4 17
Children T l 14 ■ 27 37 37 23
In 1930, the "government enforced.‘immigration restrictions 
in the Straits Settlements; catting the quota down to 6,000 a 
month, and in 1932., to- 1,000. a month. Until 1938,. no ■ 
restrictions': were . imposed on female and child immigration,■ 
but in 1938 the overall quota went down to 500 a month.
These restrictions, economically, justified as they might have 
been, seemed to have stemmed from the British policy of Malay 
protection. This must have had a. decisive influence on the 
proportional growth of the.,Chinese in Malaya and in Singapore, 
which emphasized■ the strategic aspect of that same policy-*
bht, also increased the stability of the Chinese population.
In terms of sex ratio and population stabilization, the
. Chinese have done we'll between the two World Wars: from 
(F/M) sex-ratio of 0.358 in 1911, they improved to 0.88,2 
in 1947-, and this meant an increase in percentage of *UuL 
stabilized population from 52 in 1911 to 94 in 194^. At 
least since 1931, the ..Chinese bettered the average sex-ratio 
of the entire population of Singapore.
The above mentioned developments introduced a new 
stabilizing factor into the Chinese society. The increasing ■ 
number of locally born Chinese naturally had a 1:1 sex ratio,
\CVwoi '
iWvk in addition, the fact>.of having spent, one's childhood 
in a place where one's culture was dominant, must have 
increased sentimental attachment to the birth-place, This 
qualification must be.kept in mind, when the'following' 
figures concerning Malaya (and Singapore), born 'Chinese' are 
considered: 1911 -.20 percent, 1931 - 36 percent, 1947 - 
60 percent. The- proportional growth of Malaya born Chinese - 
must have indicated/an increase-’ in the number of children, 
and with the ensuing improvement of the sex'ratio-, also in 
•‘the number of families. This development naturally increased' 
stabilization through integration into families, yet it must 
have , introduced also'; an important- socio-cultural' phenomenon, 
namely, the growth of ' the teen-ager group (116). These, 
inasmuch as they , got Chinese education^largely came under 
leftist political influences.. It is safe to assume, that the, 
age-gap and . the leftist influences brought about political 
splits within the traditionally closely knit families.
In general, the increase in the numbers of teenagers and 
In the . proportion of oi’ganized labour in the
population tended to augment the absolute number.of.
potential M.G.P. supporters. An estimate for 1941 quotes
5,000 active M.G.P. members in Malaya and 100,000
symp at bikers (117). ‘The party being radical, compared with.
the K.M. T.,,the members' and sympathizers'must have, been
more efficiently ideologized and politically responsive,
.improving the quality and enhancing the overall.political
..weight'of the M.C.P.. To this one may add the quality and
dedication of the leadership. Their independence of the
British authorities has already been.discussed, in.addition, ,
however, they;: were of the working class, and usually had no
substantial property. . Unlike the traditional leadership
they did hot exploit their leadership functions to promote
personal ends, which fact must have enhanced their
ideological appeal. ,.
u
The socio-cultural chang esybraght about by the- Chinese . 
nationalism in Singapore, differentially affected 
individuals according to their personalities. As in 
similar political acculturation processes, the population 
affected must have been distributed over the whole range of; 
active idealists, sympathizers, fence-sitters and the 
apathetic.. It seems safe to assume that the M.G.P. got the. 
more politically active part ofthe^Jpublic, as their 
followers were younger and economically underprivileged.
They had less to lose than the. K.M.T. supporters in case they 
failed, and more;to gain in the event they succeeded.
(iv) Chinese Education., Since the time Chinese 
education was introduced in Singapore, the dilemma of choice 
presented itself tc^he Chinese with three possible solutions:" -
a) Chinese education alone; b) English education alone;
^ z
c) Double attendance of Chinese and English schools. The 
Chinese resorted to all three possible -solutions.
English education was indispensable•for "bread and 
butter"- purposes and it gave, a "passport to. a sedentary 
occupation1^  (118). Chinese education could not prepare its 
students for modern’ occupations in professions, administration, 
commerce or any job which had to do with close relations with 
Europeans. Those attending both systems.- profited from the 
cultural and nationalistic schooling offered by the Chinese 
system and from the knowledge acquired, thragh the English 
system, which opened .their way .for advanced Western education. / 
It may,be assumed thal!|those attending the English schools 
alone, belonged to the higher middle-class, who still- 
remained loyal to. the British and at most, felt some national 
pride in the. revival of China without actively talcing part in 
K.M.T. politics. Those who attended Chinese schools alone, 
mainly came' from families of the middle-el ass, the majority f 
of whom were K.M.T. sympathisers, and also from the skilled ’ 
working class. In both cases these families must have been 
quite strongly dedicated to .the nationalist cause as they 
knew they limited the -child1 s opportunities. Those attending... 
both systems,, spending their mornings in English schools and 
their ..afternoons in the, Chinese, must have belonged to the 
less idealistic, 'and more materially minded group, which still
under the pressure of the new nationalist norms, or-for . 
purely cultural motives tried to have the best of two worlds.
■The commencement Of Chinese education originated from a 
daily Chinese newspaper, and from'the Singapore Educational ■ 
Institute,, which'promoted studies of English and Chinese in
night classes (119). Besides'-these* night classes,- there 
also developed 'a fairly; broad primary school system.,' which 
since .1917' taught Kuo Yu,.geography and history of China, and 
ex curriculum also interpreted; current politics of China*'
From 1917 until 1926, a single Chinese secondary school 
represented that level of Chinese education (i20). Those '/ 
who finished' Chinese secondary schools could either go to 
China for further studies, or" relinquish further educational 
aspirations, unless they had an English Matriculation.
Chinese'education Statistics'render the following ; 
figures: ;
Table. C-1Q. Chinese Education , in Singapore. (121)
Year Schools • Pupils Pupils in Govt, aided
schools- and in English 
  ; ■______schools. _____________
■39 1,950 6,288
205 14,321 8,194 ,
329 28,411 10,591 ■
Speech-group or district associations voluntarily 
sponsored the Chinese schools. Bees were low, yet through 
the student figures one realizes that only part, of the 
relevant, age-grottp had ac'cess to education (122). As the 
schools promoted anti-British sentiments, the government in 
accordance with its Malay protection policy only marginally ' 
accorded grants to these scho.ols. Since the 1920s, the 
schools came under British official supervision,' but only in 
1932, there, appeared the new Chinese text-boolcs free of anti- 
British propaganda, especially prepared for use in Malaya.
.The Registration Ordinance of the schools became ”a carrot
1918.
1928 ' 
1938
and stick" means to control them, as it offered grants in 
aid to registered schools. In 19-28, the British .closed down 
13 schools for political agitation (123), and only during 
the depression years the financial situation of the schools 
made them comply ..with the ordinance. However, in 1937, besides 
health control and book censorship, the British provided 
only 4.1'percent of their, expenditure oh education for 
Chinese schools, while 71-.4 percent went" for English 
'education, and 20 percent to the Malay, the total expenditure 
being for:that year 3*9 million dollars (124)* The Chinese 
government supplied, the schools with books and/teachers, 
retaining control of the curriculum. They do not 'seem to 
have sent any direct financial support (.125). .
On the whole,- Chinese education helped to'perpetuate 
the Chinese culture in Singapore^ introducing/if not the !fhigh 
Chinese culture", at least an important element of it. Besides 
ICuo Yu, which in some sense helped to decrease the differences 
among the speech groups, Chinesefeducation introduced a 
common ideal, that of the Chinese politico-cultural revival. 
With all the shortcomings of this education in meeting the 
demands of a modern economy under a British government,
.the majority of Chinese school children still utilized it.
The idealist reason behind the decision to send a child to a 
Chinese school is evident; but from the material poin^of view,
it seems that between the two World Wars, the Chinese 
community improved -its> ego n^.omic position and created numerous 
jobs- where English education was-hot necessary.: /“
From' the Japanese Occupation to the City-State.
Between 19.42 and 1965, Singapore experienced the most 
profound political changes in its history. The period.may 
he divided into 3 distinct phases: a) the Japanese Occupation,
b) the British Comeback and Self..Rule and, c) Merger and 
Secession. These three political.phases were also socio­
economically distinct.- The first one was traumatic and 
involved the breakdown of the British and Chinese institutions 
reducing the population to almost 'sub-human living conditions. • 
The second saw the reestablishment of' the crumbled institutions 
an increase in political power of leftist groups, and an 
eventual victory of the moderates. The third phase was 
characterized -by a bid to federate Singapore within Malaysia 
followed by ■disillusion. All three phases were- governed 
by distinct macro-geographical conceptions of Singapore. The 
Japanese considered Singapore as a strategic point during the 
war, and accordingly established there a regional military 
command." Since they-did not envisage an immediate independence 
of Malaya, it- seems, probable that they would have maintained 
Singapore as a colony within their Co Prosperity Sphere. After 
the British comeback, the conception of Singapore1 s dependence 
for its-economic viability on the British Empire, on the 
reestablished base,, and on Malaya was reintroduced and seemed 
so natural that (ncrpolitical party in Singapore contested the 
idea. And1 yet, the British politically separated Singapore 
from Malaya to fit into their postwar strategy. , But, the . 
belief in' the inseparability of Singapore from Malaya led to 
Merger, which was dissolved^however, when suspicion between
%: ■ \ ■ ■ "■ . % i
the.two; major ethnic groups overrode mutual■economic interests. 
Singapore’s independence - followed, tut not "before; some 
'foundations of industrialisation had been-laid . even'"before 
Merger," perhaps with an unadmitted anticipation of that 
eventuality. ' ■
The political background, in Southeast Asia was marked 
by ,the; Japanese Occupation during 1942-1945 amid by the neo- 
colonialist bid to regain control of its colonies in 1945-1954. 
The latter phase varied in mode from the honorable retreat of 
■the Americans • and British from the Philippines., and Burma 
respectively, to the,violent comebacks-pf the Dutch and the 
"French. This breach of the Atlantic ; Charter contributed to 
the growth of suspicion of the European powers .among the newly 
created .states1 of Southeast Asia.
The Japanese Occupation. Forced contributions to the Japanese 
war effort, -forced labour (.126) and mass killings were the lot 
of the Chinese community in Singapore under the Japanese 
occupation. Twenty years after the-war had ended, those 
ferocious,injustices still burnt in the memory of the Chinese 
,,(127).' The Japanese meted out different treatment^ to the 
various ethnic groups,., sub-groups'' and individuals within each 
community in Singapore. For example, M.C.P. and If.I.T.
■activists wheh •spotted.were usually, executed, while those '
individuals who: spied for the ’Kempeitai ” (128) creating 
•mistrust-within and among, ethnic groups improved their standing.. 
This issue sharpened the hostility between the groups bringing 
it to a high pitch (129).
The Indian and Malay‘nationalists who identified 
themselves with a political future-in relation to the Japanese
Co-Prosperity Sphere, were politically privileged in ' ■'
comparison to the Chinese. Butt the Japanese did not fail to 
notice the fact, that their demands of the Chinese community 
to identify themselves with the puppet regime of Wang,Ching-wei 
in China received only a forced insincere response. ifhe
Japanese received more positive economic collaboration and 
political support from the Malay Sultans. These responded 
favourably having every reason to believe that in the event of 
permanent Japanese presence.in Southeast Asia/the Chinese 
community5would lose its political power, while an eventual 
British, return '.seemed more harmful .to them in that respect. 
However, as time'elapsed,the Japanese failed to promulgate a 
plan concerning the future independence of Malaya, while the 
Allies were getting the upperhand, consequently, the sultans* 
quiet approval changed to reticent censure. Also,, some Indian 
nationalists showed intensive activity within the Japanese 
political manipulation of the Asian peoples in their empire.
In fact, the Provisional, G-overnment of Free India and’ the. 
Hational Indian army made, their debuts in Singapore^/l943£ (130)
As the wai continued, economic conditions were.
deteriorating/ Food was short and daily commodities had to be
substituted by locally manufactured low quality-goods. The
island became a. grower of tapioca, and some people migrated to
Malaya to■ open new.lands for rice cultivation. • Whatever trade
in tin and rubber still existed was taken by Japanese firms, 
tyke
also monopolized the transport means. Unemployment,., 
inflation and-military control of the economy degraded the 
once prosperous city into a shadow of itself.
Of the two Chinese political streams, the situation of
the wealthy and middle-class,., the. backbone of the British and 
of theK.M.T, supporters of pre-war times, was in a sense the 
more tragic. They lost more wealth than-the leftist sans avoir, 
but still retaining-their immovable property, . were, reduced to 
inactivity as far as subversion was: concerned (131) hoping to 
save, whatever property was still left. The M.G.P. adherents 
showed;, active resistance to the Japanese. Their few thousand- 
fighters in the Malayan jungle were supported by tens of 
thousands of Chinese workers, peasants and traders. The, 
popular esteem that the EC.P. acquired, resulted more from its 
uniqueness in offering armed resistance, than from the strategic 
value of its operations. (This perhaps led the M.C.P. to 
overestimate its military capabilities in 1948). However,' 
within Singapore itself subversion was minimal, as the island 
was geographically unsuitable for guerrilla warfare although 
the majority,of its Chinese population'were hostile to the 
J apahe se.
The British Comeback. Aftei* their return, the British modified 
their politico-geographical conception of Malaya and Singapore., 
..If before the war both were considered economically 
inseparable, the Avar years convinced the British that .Malaya 
would sooner or- later get its independence. There was no more 
question of a British Empire, but of holding of a chain of 
small bases between -Britain-and Australia. Malaya’s eminence 
as a tin and rubber-producer demanded, from the British point 
of• view, that it would repiain friendly to Britain. This implied, 
a Malay dominated Malaya, and to that effect the.British 
created in 1946 a Malayan Union including Penang, Malacca, 
and the federated and non^federated states, excluding • Singapore..
The exclusion of Singapore decreased the Chinese proportion*in 
the population of Malaya and. IS ft the island .in a Crown Colony 
status. The naval base was supposed to provide employment 
besides the usual trade activities. Naturally, presumed the
British, the local population would, not-disturb the function of
•the base, which would have provided them with jobs. The
official reason for the creation of the Malayan Union was
economic (132), although the economic dependence.of Singapore
on Malaya was generally accepted at that time (133). However, 
.o. ! -V ; ' -■
the pdLitical considerations were easily discernible because
they.were unjustified by what befitted the Malay sultans for'
their misdeeds during W.W.II,-.and by moral obligations due to
the Chinese;, _
(i) Political Developments 1943-1939. The Occupation, 
having shattered the Chinese social and economic organizations, 
broke the traditional leadership of the wealthy. traders and . 
businessmen who were either.supporters of the K.M.T. or loyal 
to the British. After the war had ended,, they tried as best . 
they could to regain their economic position, leaving the
leadership of the■community to whoever was in a position to.
undertake the responsibility (134). In 1947, when the ;
communists in China began- their victorious campaigns against 
Chiang Kai Shek1 s forces,- the traditional leadership found 
themselves supporting a losing side, a regime labelled 
reactionary and supported by colonialist powers. This further 
reduced their self confidence and intensified their 
involution towards their families, kinfolk and their private, 
business. Whatever'posts of leadership they still held, lost 
much- of their significance in a. political atmosphere of a
general; shift to the left of the Chinese., public opinion (135).
■ The leftist leadership extreme and moderate, though 
suffering from Japanese persecutions^during the war.years, 
emerged afterwards hardened by adverse conditions, more 
sophisticated through its experiences and morally uncorrupted 
in the public eye. They came to dominate the politically 
active-, part of the Chinese community, who had increased' their 
social and class.-struggle consciousness in the immediate 
postwar years. The socio-economic atmosphere of general 
poverty and unemployment favoured the popular acceptance of 
leftist leadership (136), and the shift towards political 
radicalism was enhanced by. the tolerant British attitude 
towards the M.G.P, between 1945 and-1948. fh&S party exploited 
the ’circumstances in propagating its ideas through’ newspapers, 
mass meetings, street propaganda.,, strikes (137), and small- 
group indoctrination. .The official non-ethnic.character of 
the M..C.P. based on its politico-geographical conception of 
the unity of .Malaya'and Singapore .appealed somewhat to non- 
Chinese workers, mainly Indians, .-who. fared as badly as the 
Chinese-masses. Some young liberal non-communist leaders 
also appeared during that period. ■ They wereraainly English
U>UU) -. /
educated and Hnotivated by-the. economic plight. and the post-war 
years1 idealisticdrive of political emancipation and social 
justice. The former leaders who. had collaborated with the 
Japanese., did the best they could to either destroy .evidence 
of their m.alf aisance or vanish (138)-.
The constitution of the Malayan Union, of 1946, which 
handicapped the Chinese democratic rights not only by excluding 
Singapore but also by discriminating citizenship laws in Malaya,
did not bring about a Chinese violent reaction (139). Only in 
1948, when the Federation was established,- did the M.C.F. take 
up arms in rebellion. fhey seem to have needed reassurance■
, of .the Indonesian nationalists1 success against the Dutch .and tW. 
victories of Mao against. Chiang. Again, just as during the 
Japanese occupation, they deemed Singapore' unfit for guerrilla 
warfare although they had many supporters there. Ihis was in. 
accordance with communist Chinese strategy: to begin in remote' . 
rural areas, and gradually advance on the urban, 0?he rebellion 
strengthened British' suspicions that the Chinese- communists in 
■" Malaya and Singappre looked upon China- as their homeland/and ■ 
constituted" a vanguard of subvex^sion. for an ultimate danger 
of Chinese military'invasion (140).
In the early days of the rebellion/Chinese workers.and
Coin/Hi ic ttH ta  /
peasants in Malaya generally supported, the Chinese-
middle-class traders.and entrepreneurs, anxious about their 
• future, in the” event of a communist victory and envisaging 
self rule,. for, Malaya, created the Malayan Chinese Association 
(M. C. A.) : and coalesced with the U.M.N.O. in 1953 to create' the 
Alliance■party, which latter won 51 out of 52 seats /with/ 
almost 80 percent of the Malayan vote in the elections, of 
1955 (141).. Ihe union of the two ethnic parties became 
feasible after the Malays conceded a i*elaxation of the 
citizenship-laws for Chinese, the Chinese conceding other 
political rights to retain their economic standing (142).
ihe .majority of Singapore's population was Chinese by 
1 1 ethnicity and workers by class, .therefore their, loyalties could 
be won either by a Chinese or by a leftist ideology; preferably 
by both (143). Thus, the M.C.P. made good ground in Singapore
during 1945-1948) when it was. outlawed in 1948, some of
its supporters clandestinely dispersed among other parties 
and; organizations trying to gain control* During- the early 
1950s when self rule was in the•offing, several political 
parties made their appearance. Some .experienced only 
ephemeral existence, and most were characterized by their 
dependence on personal connections rather than on distinct 
ideologies (144).
The ban on the M.C.P-. was followed, by strict security 
measures, which constricted the development-of major communist 
disturbances but did not totally suppress agitation. Threats 
of deportation and administrative detention prevented, the 
smooth operation of the communist organizations exposing the 
rank and file to the moderating influence of other leaders, or 
reducing them to political apathy.. In 1948 and in 1951, the 
respective votes in the Singapore elections.were 15,000 and
24,000 out of an electorate of 250,000. However, the Chinese 
in Singapore, especially high-school students both.leftist and 
nationalist^revived their cultural links with China (145).
They agitated, against the M.C.A. ~*'U.M.F.0« alliance, and for 
the revival of Chinese education as well as against the 
introduction of English as a second language in Chinese schools 
(146). The -next, elections, those of 1955, preceded the 
accordance of a limited self rule to Singapore. By then, 
economic conditions had greatly improved, th^M.C.P.•had been 
banned and the Banishment Law effectively restrained leftist 
leaders. Again^the voter-s constituted only a small proportion 
of - the electorate (147); consequently^, a loose amalgamation of 
small, mainly workers' parties carried , the majority-of the
seats. -Some leftists participated under an innocent cloak and 
thus achieved some representation, but■the Alliance nnd a 
Chinese Chamber of Commerce sponsored party totally failed.
The mo.derate labour government headed by Marshall, and 
later by him Yew .Hock, firmly reacted against the leftist 
agitation (148) frying to erase the contemporary image. of 
Singapore as a potential "outpost of Communist China,, in fact 
a colony of Peking" (149). The ban on the l.C.P. only directed 
communist activity to cperate through front organisations, and 
thus they infiltrated the P.A.P., making it a militant leftist 
party. By then, the P.A.P". realised that its failure to 
participate in the 1955 elections.was a mistake, as the 
Singapore government had substantial authority notwithstanding 
British, presence. By 1959, the Emergency nearing a successful 
end, .Singapore-., got ■ its independence except, for defence and 
external affairs.
(ii) Social and Economic Changes. In 1947, living
conditions in the city of Singapore'were abominable: 327,500
p.eople, just under half the population of the municipality,
■lived, on 2,285 acres, a density of 143 per acre in. the inner
city, but the-density in the outer city was 19 per acre. (150).
u
About 15 percent of the hoseholds lived .in what was termed 
as ’!space". This included "bunks in passageways, the tiered 
bed-lofts so common in Singapore,: .sleeping shelves under or 
over staircases" etc. , Another 32 percent lived in what .was 
termed- as "cubicles"' ( 1 5 1 ) The socio-economic status 
distribution of wage-ear-ners; according to ethnic groups and to 
the head of the household birth-pLace was represented by the 
following sample.
:-ToJbLe t-\\
t W  Percentage Distribution of Wage Earners, according to
Occupation. (152).
Chinese Indian ' Malay •Others Total
IM IH IM ■ IH *IM IH, Euro p. Eur [ o 
cElanX
ther
\
1.Highest prof 
& Big'Busin. 1.1 ; 2.5 1.7 0.9' 1 v 1 81.5 10.8 8.3 2.1
2.Medium
Business . . ’ 2.4 .1.7 1.9 .1.2 ■m - — — 1.9;
3. Minor
Profession 3.7 '5.8 4.2 1,2 0. 6 •3.2 6.9 18.5 22.9 4.3
4.Clerks 4.1 ;16.3 6.8 34.6 1 -1 10. 5 2.3 50.8 43.7 8.5-
5. Shopkeepers. J 
& Assistants 18.6 13.1 15.7 6.2 1.7 1.7 =— 3.1 4.2 -14.9
6.Overseers, 
Boremen 0.7 1.4 . 0.6 4.9 0.9 *:,5-J1 9.3 3.1 2.1 1.2
7.Skilled 
• Workers 9-5 16.1 4.9 11.1 4.7 12.2 7-7 — 10.5'
8.Semi Skilled 
Workers 39.6 27.2 30.0 33.3 68.2
DO,00 _ 1.5 10.4 ■ 36.8
9 .'Unskilled . 
-Workers 18,5: 13.4 32.5 4.9 18 ..3 15.1 _ — 6.3 17.7
D.,No Occup, 1.9’ 2.4 1.7 2.5 . 2.0 2.3 - 4.6 i 2.1' : 2.1
Humber
Classified' 3772 1661 527 81 343 344 43 : 6 5' 48 6887 ,
Humber
Unclassified 69 29 7 1 . 9 14 3 2 2 133
(IM = Head of household horn outside Malaya, IN - in'Malaya)
The table demonstrates that, ■ on the whole, the Malaya
horn families were better off no matter to which ethnic group ,
they .belonged. Another striking feature, which reflects the
inertia of .a long tradition, may he observed by the high
percentage of Indians and Eurasions. occupied in clerical work.
It dates perhaps back, to the 19th century when the Indians and 
Eurasions were the o.nly ones who could easily communicate with
the British. ,.The Chinese, as a whole, constituting three 
quarters of the population, strongly influenced the total • 
average in each occupation. The inferior position of the 
Malays and the highly superior of the Europeans is eminently 
demonstrated. It seems plausible to define the first three 
occupations of the table as' providing opportunities for greater 
wealth accumulation, the next four as providing economic 
security, and the last three as-- precarious. It seems' that 
over half the population sample lived precariously, that is, 
in addition to the low incomes involved, the workers had no 
assurance of permenent employment. In fact, a survey carried 
out in 1953-54, revealed that the standard of living of 25 
percent of the population- did not reach the absolute minimum 
of 18 dollars- per month for expenditure on food, and that
40,000 new-.babies were annually born into a society which 
suffered from unemployment (153).
It is no wonder that, in the existing conditions not only 
communist activists and adherents but also many of the 
liberally educated became conscious of the social evils, and 
were-prepared to bring about social change through political 
activity.
In 1947, within the framework of its social survey, the 
government researched into the matter of the links between the 
Singapore population and their countries of origin, Eor a 
sample of 3,841 non-Malaya born Chinese, two parameters were 
chosen as indicatorss the number of returns to the homeland and 
the annual number of remittances.
Table C-lgL Frequency of Remittance and Number of Returns
per 1,000 Chinese (154)
Number of Returns to Homeland •
frequency of Remittance- Nil 1 . 2 . *3 4 5+'Unknown Total
12 times a year , 78 27 13 8 4 3 1 133
6-11 times a year 21 11 5 . 3 - 1 1 42
3-5 47 20 9 7 1 2 - 86
2 •. 52 11 6 2 1 " 1 1 53
1 * ' • . 11 4 . 1 1 - 1 - 18
’'Occasionally11 31 13 7 2 2 , 1 ''1 ■ 54
Nil 499 ' 52 25; ■ 8 .3 ’ 12 ' 60.4
Unknown . ; • 5 1 — 10 — — 7
Total 724 139 66 .31 13 ,11, 16 1000
Among those who did not remit and did not return^half 
the sample^ there must have been a prportion who just- could not 
afford it. These must have..-at least corresponded-with their 
families- in: China, and perhaps some of them had stronger 
feelings towards their relatives than those who remitted or 
returned to China. It would, however, seem advisable to stick;; 
to. the statistics, as both parameters characterize an immigrant 
society,-', and the 50 percent proportion of those who either - 
remitted' or,returned to China, manifest the strong familial 
links', of"the Chinese society in Singapore. The percentage of 
immigrant Chinese heads of households in the survey was
about 60$,. the rest being Malaya born (155)'.- The immigrant 
heads of households* also distinguished themselves as 
constituting' 87$ of the single person households*, while the 
percentage of that category among the non-immigrant Chinese did 
not much exceed the corresponding figures in the U.K. (156).
Rehabilitation 'began in Singapore almost: as'soon as 
the British'arrived. In addition to trade in rubber and. tin, 
by then in heavy demand, the British' reestablished their 
• military base. and. further’developed It .in the 1950s and 1960s 
to serve .as a future base for counter guerrilla and nuclear 
warfare. The 'base occupied some 10 percent of the islandTs 
area and, as it developed, it generated an important proportion 
of Singapore1 s G.D.-IV (157). In addition* the restoration of 
Malayans economy provided Singapore with increasing service and 
trade activities. ■ Also., .the Korea .and Vietnam wars, contributed 
to the .prosperity by increased prices of raw materials and 
intensified shipping activities in the area adjacent to the 
theatres of war. In view of the political .atmosphere in 
Singapore,;-the economic. activities related, to the Korea and 
Vietnam wars incurred surprisingly-;subdued., leftist opposition. ; 
Strikes and riots orcurred, but of inexplicably small importance 
This was perhaps--due to. the efficient security net^which. the 
British had imposed on Malaya and Singapore especially since 
.194-8, but It also seems, that sympathy for the M.C.P. could 
not outbalance the effects-o f  relative prosperity on popular 
satisfaction., Thus, the British repression of the leftist 
.agitators spared Singapore■socio-political disturbances at the . 
time when world economic activities presented good opportunities 
for a rapid economic recovery of the Island. .However, this, 
repression .was not the sole, reason : for Singapore ’ s economi c 
restoration. Chinese industriousness, frugality and perhaps an 
inherent optimistic'.view that hard work would Improve their 
economic situation,, also, lay behind that revival. ..In relative 
terms, Singapore’s economic- expansion surpassed all of the
other Southeast Asian countries during that period.
- After W.W.II., the Chinese' community with some help from
the British administration undertook to restore the Chinese
education system in order-to satisfy the n.eeds which had "been
heavily suppressed-under the Japanese Occupation. Thusf Chinese
vernacular schools opened immediately after the British'return,-'
numbering 124 in 1946 and increasing,to 154 with 53,478 pupils
in 1947,, and to 184 with a 58,096 enrolment in 1948. This-
pertained- to primary schools, 'but-Wi W ®
CAoui^ c OtteMtUA S'US/.ioxJ, /
M m m  M  W p m  XMK& t m m m m r  (158). Further
developments in .-1949-1963 are illustrated in the following 
4 gr aph ( se e, f i gur e ■ C -13).
While the Malay and Temil streams of-education 
practically maintained the same enrolment throughout that 
: period i. e., about 8,000 and 1,300•respectively (.159) , the Chinese 
and English; streams greatly increased theirs, the English stream’ 
enrolment; maintaining a higher rate of increase. English 
Education student numbers surpassed those of the Chinese'
Educated in 1954,^wJw5ha^ a 209,070 to. 156,302 preponderance - 
in 1963. ,,At that latter year^ 31, 207 pupils attended integrated 
bilingual schools (160). Ihe development of the English' stream * 
of education signifies that a high proportion of the Chinese 
still considered "bread and butter" ends as primordial, and 
sent-their children to English schools in spite of nationalistic :
agitation against English schooling. .As late as 1956, only '
75- out of 230 Chinese schools were accepting government aid (161),=
which .fact did not contribute to their educational quality. • It
should be noted, however, that.as Singapore progressed on her
way to_ self rule and independence, and as the Emergency was ,
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reaching-its end, hostility towards the British wa^/subsiding.
Singapore,., in some sense or other became more Chinese in the. .
Chinese■community political conception, consequently, the
dilemma of choosing between the two-educational streams lost
- ‘ .-a, ■
much of dts political actuality, and retained its acuteness 
only among those who still held extreme views.
Che post W.W.XJ. expansion of the English' and Chinese 
.education streams reintroduced, the problem of educational 
background dichotomy of the Chinese society.- Even the 
introduction of bi-lingual' integrated schools in the early 
1960s', hid not change the fact that the English Educated were 
increasing in number. These latter usually formulated their 
knowledge of-the world through studies of Western textbooks 
.and, through their occupations, usually came to have contacts 
with the British, with European firms and generally with things 
West. They must have ' also adopted in, part the British macro- ' 
geographical conception that Singapore was necessarily linked' 
with Malaya for pragmatic interests and,.in any event, with 
the British Commonwealth 'for economic and strategical reasons.: 
However, this is not to s.ay that they,were losing their Chinese 
awareness; indeed, they kept their Chinese, names,, generally 
spoke at least one Chinese dialect, and still had some, perhaps 
undefined, attachment to China. Since most 'of them must have . 
belonged to the higher socio-economic strata, they generally, 
could not identify themselves with the communist government 
of China* In fact, this group did not exhibit total 
ideological homogeneity. There were the more extremely 
Westernized, perhaps- with an educational background .of British 
universities, and a. familial background of 19th century Straits 
Born,^  whose attachment to China was non-existent or minimal,-.
and who could not even speak Chinese^ though they had Chinese 
names.. - On the other extreme, were those who got their English 
education tor pragmatic purposes, and therefore showed only ’ 
external signs of Westernization, still feeling greatly 
attached to China, and experiencing- great pride in its military, 
political and socio-economic .achievements. These also could not 
conceive of Singapore, as a totally independent state 
disconnected from Malaya or the Commonwealth.' - On the one hand,, 
their educational background, their, economic links with the 
British and the contemporary political situation in the world, 
...did not suggest any chance of viability to independent Singapore. 
On: the other hand, being "more ■ Chinese1* than the o t h e r . 
part of their group, they must have felt that the Chinese 
majority in a unified Singapore-Malaya state,1 would enhance 
the..chances of the Chinese to govern Malaya and mutatis .mutandis 
'a 'separation from Malaya would harm the Chinese community there.
The Chinese Educated must have formulated their 
politico-geographical conception of Singapore along Chinese 
cultural patterns, not necessarily of the traditional ones, 
but perhaps through the modern Chinese concepts,-.whi ch‘permeated , 
their system of education. Bor.,them, China was the homeland, 
though they themselves were'-immigrants, and its culture deserved - 
their full allegiance, at least in theory.. Both K.M.T. and 
Communist.China supporters envisaged a unified Malaya with a 
Chinese, majority enjoying its right to lea.d the country, without 
political' links with, the Commonwealth. Their ideology being 
more, idealistic and less pragmatic than that of the British 
Educated, they preferred economic difficulties rather than 
political dependence on the British in a Commonwealth setting,
especially as they knew the British opposition to Chinese 
political dominance in.Mai,ay a. In.any event, a semi-independent 
.Singapore und.er British military, supervision must have been 
considered-by them as politically inferior to full rights in 
a unified Malaya. ...
■The Chinese Educated did not' constitute a monolithic 
group. As already, mentioned,. they were politically divided, 
and naturally the ’'normal distribution", of the fanatics, the'- 
dedicated, the supporters, the fence-sitters and the "semi- 
apathetic" must have existed within their ranks. Moreover, 
they still failed to overcome all speech-group differences-as 
is proven by the existence of Chinese welfare, religious and 
business. associations operating ;on those traditional lines, ' 
though with an overall declining significance. .i-The group, in 
part, retained traditional .Chinese customs which had been 
abandoned and even denigrated ..in Communist•China. This 
disenchanted those attached to) traditibna.1 Chinese culture, 
who could be potential supporters of the Communists in;China. 
Filial .piety- and family relations values, ancestral grave yards 
and religious procession still constituted a profound concern 
for that part of the Chinese. Educated.
The failure of.Kuo Yu t^ecome the sole or, . at least, the
major spoken dialect must have been related to the fairly
strong and positive kinship relations among the Chinese in
Singapore. -.Besides an "objective-." difficulty inherent in the
.identical .characters used for "all dialects, which rendered
\th*iougK -
impossible the promulgation, of Kuo Yu t&awgSa written media, it
h4d only fairly limited time on. the radio among programmes in
H.okkien and ' Cantonese, ■ not to speak of English, Malay and Tamili
1 . ' ,1 y
Chinese classes alone could not . elevate Kuo Yu to /dominant
position, and. as a result, it remained a largely unspoken .. 
dialect though to .a great measure understood. But, as the . 
contracted living quarters of Singapore made inter speecli-group 
•confrontations ubiquitous, and as residential areas became 
more heterogenous’ during the post W.W.II. days, it seemed that 
Kuo Yu was in a position, to spread over the entire Chinese 
population. This did not occur, although the expansion of 
that national vernacular became, an official policy in China. 
Many of the Chinese in'Singapore had a speaking proficiency in 
more' than one. dialect,'especially the non Hokkiens. It is 
worth adding that even in China, where a constant propaganda . . 
campaign to spread Kuo Yu-has existed and where the education 
sybem was: harnessed for the task,- the .South East is still 
largely dialectal.
Merger' and. Secession.,
( 1 )  The P .  A. P . .  U n t i l  M e r g e r . . C r e a t e d  i n  1954- a s  :a
—  VwVVU) J . , '
moderate leftr^arty, the P. A.P. was .later infiltrated by 
radicaly&W# . and officially symbolized extreme anti-
imperialism, Its ranks' increased by massive propaganda, which 
differentiated it from personality orientated .parties of the 
post W.W.II. period. ; Between 1955 '  and 1 9 5 7 ,  the leadership. of 
the party divided between those., with strong communist 
affiliations and the moderates, mainly of English Educated 
liberal leftists. Thejparty avoided, a direct bid for power in 
the .1955 elections as government under the contemporary 
constitution, seemed unfavourable for a radically oriented party.
him Yew-hock's strict security measures hit the leftist 
leadership of the party by administrative detention, and this:
brolight Lee Kwan Yew . and Toh'Chin-'Chye,./ the moderates, to .- ' 
the, fore (.162). The moderate’leadership was acceptable to - 
the, chief minister and the. British, 'but had difficulties in' 
controlling the extreme, leftist low-level party activists and.. ! 
■ hence the rank and file (163). With 141,000 union members in 
. 1 9 - 5 7 >u-the "basic, factor in Singapore’s political 
development:'.had been the proletarian: nature of Singapore's 
society, a condition Conducive to the growth of extreme left 
w'i?ag, and in this case:; communist dominated; labour activity" (165) 
This greatly^hampered Lee 'Kwan Yew and rbhe moderates, in taking 
effective control of.the party machinery, nevertheless, after 
some internal friction, personnel changes and secession of 
•some 'extremists, .'Lee,; remained in ©ntrol'of the party, though 
still not in full authoritarian command of it (166).
I n '1959,' the‘ party wholeheartedly harnessed itself for
the election; canipaign, and emerged' victorious with 54 percent
• of 'the;'votes and 43 seats out ;of 51 in parliament. The
impressive victory. came as a .result of the reorganization of
the party after.-the 1957 crisis, at the eiid of which no. other
party., showed any similar degree of organization and grass- root
' penetration. The party practically dominated the. political
scene duringlthe .election campaign*- The disorganization of
•the. .parties on the P.fA.P.’s right (167) and the dislocation
of the groups to the .left before the elections, provided the
party with, the' Conditions, ;,and;. after the election also with 
•: governmental, machinery^ to reestablish its political dominance
from the succeeding elections" to- the present time.
, The ,PrA,P. government introduced a democratic political 
setting which is almost unique in Southeast Asia, although
relations between party.and government in Singapore lie 
somewhere between those existing in'Western Democracies and . •
those in the communist countries. When it came to power In
1959,, still under a constitution which denied it.total 
independence, it could choose between a, policy of. demanding 
full separate independence' or. that of merger with Malaya. As 
already mentioned, the vast majority of ' the population did not 
favour separate, independence. There’were the economic links 
with Malaya,^ the fear, of isolation in the midst of a Malay, 
world surrounding a Chinese dominated.Singapore, and a prospect 
of concerted Chinese political action within a united Malaya.
Since the mid 1950s, the Alliance coalition'.in Malaya,, 
dominated by TJ.M.11.0. did not-regard merger as favourable for 
itself. ' Merger would have geopardized■the precarious Malay 
majority,. and would have added an organized leftist, presumably 
.communist led, entity into a country, which had gust.undergone 
the'disturbances of the .Communlstirebellion.. Therefore, the 
rejection® as formulated:.by the TUnku (168). was trenchant, 
though termed in fairly vague terms emphasizing the inability 
of Singapore to. accpet-the Malayan.-constitution a BesA in order' 
to change the- image of Singapore and- make it more palatable to, 
the British and to Malaya, the ‘P.A.P., government decided to 
cooperate with both in- internal security.matters, an arrangement 
which was also' beneficial to the P.A,P. government itself. As 
the P . A.P. was-open to all athnih groups from its inception, it 
decided, after its political victory, to adopt a "Malayan 
.Culture"; policy.'in. order to increase its credibility in Kuala 
Lumpur." Talks concerning the conditions of merger between
Singapore, and-Malayacontinued between 1959 and 1961, when 
. the Malays accepted Singapore as a possible partner in a 
suggested 1 alays1air Bederation to.al so Include 11 orth Borneo.
In 1961, -it became clear that Singapore’s ultimate conditions 
for merger amounted, to the right for independent labour 
legislation and an educational system, The latter condition did 
not seem compatible with the ’’Malayan Culture” policy, and the 
former was essential in view of the*developed trade unionism 
in the city.
In 19.61, leftist members of the P. A.P. , including some
l.'P. s,'-'defected toicreate the Baris an Sosialis party (3. S.)
■ They opposed 'Merger, not in principle but on. the conditions of 
.acceptance, and specifically:, the unfair■ representation of 
Singapore in the ..proposed Federal G-overnment and . the • -
discriminating' citizenship laws against the Chinese (169)*' They' 
based their argument on, the precedence of the acceptance of 
Penangvland Malacca to the Federation, in,...194,8 (170). The., 
acceptance on those terms was. impractical,;and the B.S. proposal 
must be interpreted as to undexmiine, a political
develo'pm'ent j (which almost followed>their declared ideals, in 
order to embarrass-the P.M P,. lee publicly committed himself 
to Merger declaring full independence to be ’’ludicrous” in the 
• existing circumstances"(171) * : .
It was estimated that 80 percent of the P..A.P. members 
defected when the B.S.- was created in 1961 (17.2) , while 
another estimate- put the proportion at two thirds (173). 
Nevertheless, by new nominations of cadres the party rebuilt 
itself in a very/short.time, asyin. retrospect, the, successes • 
in the- 1962 referendum and the 1963 elections may prove.
Citizens Consultative'Committees were created by theP.A.P. 
and became widespread to bring the. party activity nearer to . 
the public, and:a reshuffle in trade unions’, cadres 
introduced moderation into the activity of those organizations 
with a resulting decrease in industrial stoppages in 1962 (175). 
Success in the referendum reassured the.P.A.P. leadership 
that the public was under control and that 'their policy of 
"independence through merger" would .meet only weak'opposition. 
The .1963'- elections gave the P.A.P. 37 seats in parliament 
with 47 percent of the' vote, the B.S. got 13 with 33 percent . 
of the vote .and one seat, went to a small party; the Alliance
' t
totally failed.
By 19.61, merger became the official common policy of 
Singapore and Kuala Lumpar. It remained during ..the two 
following years to decide its detailed conditions,, which 
finally could be generalized as;.according Singapore economic 
advantages, at’ the. expense of its democratic political , . 
representation and.citizenship rights (176). For example, 
the representation quotas to the Federal parliament envisaged 
a. one per .30,000 representation for North Borneo, one per
60,000 for Malaya and ;only one per 113,000 to Singapore (177). 
Nevertheless, during the. negotiations for Merger, pragmatism 
prevailed over principles and ideologies, yet concealed, 
intentions later began to’ float over the seemingly clear water 
of mutual accord.
(ii) Further Political Developments. The first cracks 
in the Merger foundation appeared during, the negotiation 
period, as both the M.C.A. and the P.A.P. • announced their
intentions of future political action in Singapore and Malaya 
respectively. The P.A.P. envisaged a political cooperation 
with leftist non-communist parties in Malaya, which parties 
^however^ rejected that hid. This intention presented a real
danger to the M.C.A. supremacy in the Chinese community of 
Malaya. That community provided a potential "recruiting space 
for.a possible P.A.P. expansion' into Malaya, which could, 
displace the M.C^A. from its position in■the Alliance. A  
journalist well posted near P.A.P. sources, put it bluntly:
. "He who speaks of the Chinese in Singapore speaks as well for 
all the Chinese in Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Sibu ..." (178). .This 
P.A.P.- M.C.A. confrontation seemed as if restricted to inter 
Chinese ..relations, yet, the Tunku well understood the 
difficulties which would have followed, had the politically 
aggressive P.A.P. outplayed the docile M.C.A. The racial bloc 
constitution of the proposed Malaysian Pederatioon showed that 
the Chinese had 42.3 percent of the population, the Muslim bio 
41.6. X)ereent, the Indian - 9*9, and the North Borneo tribes - 
5 percent. The. distribution in case of Singapore’s exclusion 
would consist of only 35,7 percent Chinese, 47.0 - muslim,
10.1 percent Indian and 5*9 percent North Bornean tribes (179) 
Tile percentage difference could seem marginal, yet.,excluding 
Singapore would hav^Leant getting rid of a Chinese, aggressive 
element, which eventually could destroy the Malay political 
dominance in the Malaysian Federation.
The M.C. A.-P. A.P. dispute, not unlike the’ pro-K.M.T. - 
Communist confrontation, divided the Chinese middle~class in 
Malaya and Singapore, and demonstrated that, at least at the 
leadership level, politico-economic considerations, and perhaps
also personal ambitions, outweighed ethnic and even blood 
ties solidarities (180). Another-..political initiative,' 
undertaken by the P.A.P* in 1963, exhibited disregard,. if not 
a direct insult, towards .Malaya and the Turku's authority..
This was the proclamation of Singapore' s independenee • and, 
following lee1s persuasion, also that of Sarawak and Sabah 
before Merger. This could be interpreted as a combined bid of 
the subaltern partners to contest the primacy of Malaya in 
the new Federation. Discipline and practical acceptance of 
the constitution'as well as- courtesy towards the senior partner 
constituted a field in which the P.A.P. continued to commit 
several faux pas before and during merger, lee's visits to 
Africa, -Australia .and : Southeast Asian countries were intended 
perhaps.to promote-Singapore's external trade (181), yet,they 
embarrassed the Tunku as the constitution excluded foreign 
affairs from the responsibility of all federated states,. But, 
the crucial act occurred in 1964,- when the P.A.P. took part 
in the elections in Malaya. This was said to have caught the 
Alliance by surprise, perhaps as regards timing.rather than 
intention. Though the P. A.P.~ sponsored party got only 13 seats 
and^in,general;the first appearance in public of the P.A.P. 
could be interpreted as a.failure, it nevertheless caused a 
"Malayan Malay" resurgence in TJ.M.N.O., the "M.C.A. acquiescing 
approvingly at the.elimination of this political threat to 
themselves as well" (182). As .a result of a growing political 
tension between the P.A.P. and the U.M.H.O., ethnic riots 
broke out in Singapore in 1964, and similan riots, were imminent 
•in Malaya. This led to final secession, or in ideality to the 
expulsion of Singapore from Malaysia.
;When thxi secession occurred, one of, the significant 
reasons, for the creation of merger, had already, ceased to 
exist i.e. the communist take-over, th'reai. Internal security 
administration in its centralized form became superfluous when 
the B.-S- in Singapore lost= much' of. its ’’teeth”, and the M.C.P. ;
■ :continued to "hibernate" after ■its defeat in Malaya. This 
tended to accentuate disputes father than mutual links with 
Malaya,1 (.1.83;).. ' - .
■ -An Independent. City-State. .
' \The politico-geographical'implications of Singapore’s 
secession.in 1965 were twofold. On-the one hand,. total 
sovereignty affected the relations rf. its government with 
other states, as ;well as with its. own people through its newly 
acquired direct links: of voter with the supreme government. On 
the other land, the various ethnic groups’ relations with their, 
counterparts" in the extra-territorial cultural centres .and in 
'other countries also changed. Neither of'the ethnic groups 
showedymuch delight over the new political status, and the 
government clearly demonstrated its worries over the uncertainty 
of the outcome of secession., The P.A.P.
■government still considered the perpetuation of Singapore’s 
.primacy-in Southeast Asia in income per capita as a major, 
goal for achievement. In the,'new circumstances,, it became a 
..special- challenge- and,, therefore, thef former liberal and 
capitalistic . econornic policy wa,s reaffirmed. The related 
policy.of ethnic tolerance was ,also maintained to the. point of 
virtually declaring Singapore-a non-Chinese city, as in the 
contemporary atmosphere of Southeast Asian'economic, indigent sm 
-a Chinese city-state would have.had small chances of cooperation
and sympathy:- Thus., inprder to -obviate-a~potential image of a
"Third .China", .Singapore became unique in Southeast Asia in -1- 
proclaiming a policy of "multi-racialism" or ’’plural
.cultural!smu, .although, at least theoretically^ considering 
its democratic -regimethis, could, produce difficulties in 
imposing a cohesive .state-idea.
The. idea of Singapore * s ^ economic dependence, on Malaya had 
■been established ever since tin, and more, especially rubber, 
became important trading and processing-commodities in 
Singapore’s external trade,, it was further augmented when 
subsequent trading relations■followed, yet,.this originally 
British idea also implicitly induced the notion, (amply proven 
through the non-existence of a.contradictory example) that the 
Asians had-to have European economic leadership in high business 
and governmental,levels, hot only the British educated Chinese 
leaders-of all .parties,: but.also, the leftist leadership 
accepted the idea of ;SingapGre-Malaya. inseparability, when 
independence., was in the offing after - W,W.II. (184)-.
The B.A.P. leadership.was,the,first to undertake to prove, 
■the fallacy of that idea b^adapting Singapore to the new. 
conditions'.existing in the mid 1960s in Southeast Asia.- Without 
underestimating the inrpdrtanCe of. Malayan trade, they'had 
already realized that they could make use of the skilled labour 
force in increasing the industrial manufacturing share in income
generation. . Hong; ICong-had provided. a good example in that 
respect, and • Singapore had also indulged itself in that direction 
As for their capacities to lead the economy' on the governmental 
level, their past experience in power .showed neither, less
efficiency than'the British had demonstrated, nor worry about 
the big Chinese merchants1 abilities. Moreover, Confrontation .
mwith Indonesia, which greatly affected trade "between it and 
Singapore, did not produce an economic crisis, though in terms 
of value^ iyCmust have been close'to that of Malaysia. It 
ensued that with good political judgement and effective control 
of the population, Singapore had substantial chances of success 
in its new independent way.
The Political and Economic, Background. When Singapore ''became / 
independent in 1965, neither the ¥/orld Powers nor Japan and 
Britain changed their policies and committments in Southeast 
Asia. Especially the British base in Singapore'provided for 
the new independent state^, a deterrent against Indonesian 
aggression (185)v -Thus, in the immediate neighbourhood 
Indonesia was reduced to verbal attacks, while the more remote 
Philippines were attenuating their political attitude towards 
Malaysia in general and Singapore An particular.
The eviction of Singapore from' the Federation did not,
create any immediate hostility between it and Malaysia,
not the least because of the Tunku* s affability and the net
territorial gain Malaya got through its remaining partners in
Malaysia. Though some ,rpublic declarations'1 were exchanged
between Lee and the Tunku, they did not sever their relations.
Also, the Chinese in Malaya did not agitate, when secession
decreased theix1 proportion in the population of Malaysia, mainly
because of the M.C.A. political enmity with the P.A.P. and also
as a result of the M.C.P. political and military impotency. in
addition, the weakness of P.A.P. supporters in Malaya and the
official policy of Singapore,of minimizing the ill effects of 
d&oviPA&cLsecession^ the danger to political stability from that
quarter. Peace was especially essential for Singapore in its
IV>
first years of independence, but.,- apparently, ' Confrontation and 
the- reality of a Chinese island in the midst of a Malay ocean 
of 120 million people did not portend pblitical
stability. However, maintaining Malay as a national language 
and proclaiming a non-Chinese identity, Singapore expected to 
reduce Malay resentment of its creation, and Confrontation could 
produce for Singapore opportunities of survival through the 
playing off of Malaysia and Indonesia. As a last resort there 
were the British, whose armed forces could defend Singapore 
against an Indonesian invasion and whose conciliatory influence 
could reduce Malayan hostility. Moreover, Singapore still held 
two trump cards against Malaya: the possibility of Singapore, 
if not becoming communist at least to align itself to a 
communist bloc hostile to Malaysia (186), and the importance of 
Singapore to the economy of Malaya, from purely economic 
considerations as well as internal politico-economic ones. This 
was perhaps in Lee's mind when he said before secession that 
Singapore was no less vital to Malaya, than Malaya to Singapore 
(187)* The interpretation of that statementjwcy have taken into 
account the pure economic fact that port services, trade and 
financial facilities for Malaysia1s economy were still more 
economical to operate :from Singapore. In the event that 
Malaysia would fast develop these services on its own territory 
in order to strangle Singapore, the Malayan Chinese- would 
inevitably benefit economically from that development, prom a 
bumiputra point of view, it seemed preferable that the Singapore 
Chinese and not those of Kuala Lumpur increase their economic 
strength. In addition, there always -remained the possibility of 
smuggLing, for which geographical proximity, shallow tree covered 
shores, swampland and calm waters provided optimal conditions, and
indeed, which had never stopped. The recent smuggling between 
Indonesia and Singapore (108) must have been known to the 
Malaysian government. In the last resort, had Malaysia broken 
its trade relations with Singapore, the latter could still expect 
an improvement of its trade with Indonesia, as .lee himself 
declared (189). With all these political and economic 
considerations, Singapore's leadership officially declared its 
regrets for secession and its hopes for a future merger.
Singapore more than Malaya bore the economiC;brunt during 
Confrontation. Its external trade in 1964 and 1965 went down . 
1,500 and 1,500-million Singapore dollars respectively over the 
1965 total figure of 7,754 million (190), which must have been 
the result of its loss of the Indonesian trade.. This is 
verified by the 1955-1959 figures, which for a slightly smaller 
annual average total external trade,- Indonesia's share exceeded. 
1,200 million S. $ (191). Nevertheless, former planning 
resulted in increasing added value by industrial production, 
which in 1964 and 1965 improved both its "per worker" figure and
the number of workers involved (192).
The industrial development realised among other smaller
places in the Jurong Industrial Estate project, justified the 
government economic planning of pre-Merger days which envisaged 
a total investment of 871 million S. $ for the 1961-64 period;
58 percent were allocated for economic investment and 40 percent 
to social development. By 1963 about 75 percent of the 
objectives planned had been achieved (193). The plan and its 
successful achievement must have increased the P.A.P. leadership' 
self assurance in their governmental abilities.
The expansion of the economy through investment in industry 
increased the G-ros.s Domestic Expenditure (estimated figures) in
1964 and in 1965 over that of 1963, and though the per capita 
index slightly decreased in 1964 over 1963, it considerably 
increased in 1965 to reach 1,550 S.$. Also, the G-ross 
Domestic fixed- Capital Formation increased in 1964-1965 (194).. 
Thus, the setback suffered by the decline in entrepot tra.de, which 
had been foreseen by the government, was more than offset by 
other sources (195). But despite merger and confrontation the 
Singapore - Malaysia trade did not show a spectacular "jump" 
in the sense that.it did not compensate for-the loss of trade 
with Indonesia. Nevertheless, it was increasing with a 
positive balance of payments for Singapore and, especially 
with the decrease in Indonesian trade, the Malayan share in the 
total external trade proportionally increased (196).
The relatively favourable economic prospects in combination 
with the West's un¥/illingness to see Singapore- .setting out in 
guest of a Communist bloc support, enabled the P.A.P. to continue 
their close economic and political relations with the West. Had 
secession occurred during a "rapprochment" period between 4
Indonesia and Malaysia,, it could have 
happened that the West would have sacrifised Singapore in favour 
of a united Western-Malay alignment in the event that the 
latter would have been hostile to Singapore. Also, as things 
stood In 1965, the P.A.P. held full sway in Singapore (197): 
the leftists were disorganized (198) and the potential 
resistance from the Chinese Educated to itsjmulti-racial policy 
im did not materialize, as they were organized in
multifarious small associations, lacking central control.
Inner"Political and Social Developments. The liberal economic 
system of Singapore has favoured owners, investors and
; ; :: ■ • ' ;; : i ■ ■ . \ ■ 3 U  ; ,
entrepreneurs in order to maintain a .high .rate of development - •'
(199)* However, -s :for positive popular response ’through social 
justice, it lias been, following a policy of; government :: .
expenditure favouring- the lower-income strata of the.population .
(200) decreasing' Unemployment and maintaining.-relatively , ,
. reasonable wages. This socialist touch of the democratic . . , -
government has been supported by government ownership of ,
considerable economic assets. Government investment, has been ■ 
increasing and, since 1967, .has outweighed the private .sector1'^ ' 
'share,. " . , \ ■ ■ • ;- .
: : Speaking on behalf of the- Singaporeans,. and; "echoing’1
- Lee Kwan Yew, Jo.sey said that that they--wanted: ’imore than 
parliamentary democracy on Western lines, [aj good government by 
■good men"; - and to be in-a position if they so wished, to reject, 
an.oppressive or incompetent government by secret ballot (201). , .
The theme of a good government and of a tough and responsible :v; .1
leadership-was oftentimes "expressed by-lee, stressing that it • 
was the only possible democratic system of ■ government'. "A . - i:
soft people, faced with tough problems electing a soft", 
government, soon find themselves in .chaos "and confusion, which .■ 
in turn inevitably, lead to the imposition o.f a military rule" ( 202) 
In the case of Singapore the alternative was a,communist rule . 
by the jB.S./KLO.P. (203).,, Considering the socio-political 
circumstances of 1962, with the B. S. mass rallying people into'r 
the streets, and Chinese high scho.ofs serving as hotbeds for , 
leftist-agitation, the theme of "tough leadership becomes 
understandable as regards the perpetuation of the democratic 
, system. * • '
The referendum of 1962 and the electionsjof 1963 ■■2 1
demonstrated that the P.A.P. could match the B.S. in activating '
.
y\\
the political field. Emulating leftist methods of political 
work at grass root level, increasing their number of non-corrupt 
cadres and organizing them into a closely knit party organization 
(204), they reaped their political reward from the ballot box. 
Moreover, internal security and administrative detention, indeed 
a British legacy, enabled the P.A.P. to waylay the leftists; in 
early 1965, 200 of them were under detention (205)* Ihe P.A.P. 
political activities and the security measures constituted, 
however, only -one aspect of the measures leading to its success; 
provision of better social services to ease off social pressure 
was i m o r e  significant, and it directly depended on the 
economic success of Singapore.
Under P.A.P. rule education facilities improved, not so
much on the primary level, which had been quite widespread even
before 1959 (206), as on the secondary and university levels.
Secondary school attendance almost doubled during 1961-1966,
rising from 67,857 to 132,088 (207), and university-level
enrolment rose from 8,966 to 13,807 during 1961-1965 (208). In
later years, 'the increase was not at as fast a rate, seemingly
as a result of satisfying most of the demand. But education in
itself could not ease social pressure, in certain conditions it 
v<t<> be
has been known* the actual cause of that same pressure, especially 
when economic conditions did not lead to socio-economic 
integration of the graduates according to\jblieir expectations. 
Smooth integration^nevertheless followed in Singapore as, among 
other things, the economy was expanding and a conscription army 
was established.
Besides promulgating its socio-economic policy through 
education and propaganda, the P.A.P..took effective control of 
the trade unions. Relieving them from leftist leadership,
the government drastically reduced labour stoppages, but it 
also maintained wages commensurate with the rise in the retail 
price index. The figures concerning labour stoppages illustrate 
the net economic gain, but the social benefit must have been 
even greater.
Table 0-14 Industrial Stoppages (209).
ear_____  Workers Involved Man-day host.
1961 43,584 410,889
1962 6,647 165,124
1963 33,004 388,219
1964 2,535 . 35,908
1965 3,347 ' 45,800
1966 1,288 .44,762
1967 4,491 41,322
1968 172 11,477
1969 - 8,512
1970 1,749 2,514
1971 1,380 5,499
Population figures according to ethnic groups are shown 
in the next table.
Table 0-15 Demographic Data. (210).
Year Total Chinese Malay Indian Other (]j?og^i
Census 1947 938 730 114 69 26
H 1957 1,446 1,091 197 124 34
Estimate I960 1,646 1,252 232 128 35
1965 1,887 1,440 277 135' 35
Census 1970 2,075 1,580 311 145 ■ 38
The table shows that within an increasing population the 
ethnic groups generally kept their former proportions with only 
minor changes.
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Table 0-16 Demographic Data ( 211) .
Year 1961 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71
Pop. growth.
per 1,000 29.3 27.9 27.5 25.9 24.1 22.9 20.2 18.0 16.8 17.0 16.9
Inter group 
Marriages
absolute numbers 361 451 425 508" 505 538 527 659 675 788
The decline in natural growth (table 0-16) came as a 
result of a decrease in the birth rate, as the .death rate for 
that period remained between 5.0 and 5.9 per thousand (212).
This index of modernisation of the Singapore society directly 
attests to changes in cultural values .concerning quality-of-life 
questions. Yet, another aspect of social modernization, that of 
cultural integration and amalgamation, remained essentially 
unchanged as proved by ethnic group intermarriages figures 
(Table 0-16). The official cultural policy of letting each 
ethnic group maintain and develop its specific way of life, 
certainly was not conducive to higher intermarriage figures. 
Without actually forcing the issue, the government 
hoped that, as|time went by, the jbate-idea of Singapore would 
catch hold and bring about socio-cultural amalgamation. The 
separate cultural persistence proves that not all developments 
correspond with the government1s hopes, and may even run 
counter to official policies of greater significance.
The annual contingent, which presented itself to the 
labour market increased from approximately 27,000 to about
51,000, during 1957-1971 (213).. However,, actual figures'must 
have been considerably lower as, at least not all the females 
actually demanded work. Nevertheless, this contingent
constituted a heavy burden on the labour market by any standard.
As by 1971, the numbers of all those gainfully occupied
tf'OO
totalled 4-87,464, “the extent of the problem is remarkable, 
yet, "live" registrations at employment exchanges decreased 
during 1961-1963 from 54,058  to 42,777* It later increased 
from 50,667 in 1964 to 72 ,350  in 1967,  from which latter date 
It gradually decreased to reach 35,953 in 1971 (214)* In that 
same year, unemployment must have been about 8 percent, if 
numbers actually represented all those unemployed.
As already mentioned, the creation of a conscription army 
offered a respite for industrial expansion improving the labour ■ 
intake capacity of the market. This may have brought about the 
decrease in absolute numbers of employment seekers In the 
1967-1971 period.
Former poor living conditions (215)  and the annual increase 
in population put great pressure on the government in housing 
projects. The Housing and Development Board (H.D.B.) projects 
eased living conditions while substantially helping to sustain 
the economic expansion. In 1959 and I960 ,  it built 
1 ,650  flats and shops, the numbers increasing to 7 ,320  in 1961,  
to 12 ,230  in 1962 and to ..10,085 in 1963 ( 2 1 6 ) .  In 1965,  69,660  
units were under H.D.B. management, increasing to 126,710  in 
1971 ( 2 1 7 ) .
Between I960 and 1971,  the consumer price index in 
Singapore rose only 13*6 percent, about a one percent compound 
annual increase. Food, constituting almost 51 percent of the 
price index rose 14.3 percent in price,' and housing constituting- 
about 15 percent of the index increased by 16 percent ( 2 1 8 ) .  
During I960 and 1965,  private consumption at fixed I960 prices 
rose 34 percent from 1 ,742  million S .$  to 2,330 million ( 2 1 9 ) ,  
while the population increased 14.. 5$. Adding the 5 percent
increase in consumer prices to■the increasein population' during 
.that period, it transpires ‘that abo.ut 14. 5.percent constituted 
the increase in private consumption in real terms...
As already mentioned, the Singapore Armed Porces . ( S. A. P..) 
have fulfilled a socio-economic function as a pressure outlet 
for the labour market, and it-may. continue so. to serve .at least- 
until a smaller age"group is'annually released to the labour 
market,- or until the economy is^ ccble to absorb'greater numbers. 
llhe mean reason for the creation of the S. A. P., . was. indeed '■ 
politico-strategic: to maintain independence and;sovereignty. 
Planning envisaged British-presence until, 1975, ..and two army 
brigades, to be set up in five years, were'’deemed, sufficient, 
but in view ofjthe early British withdrawal- the phases had to . be 
accelerated in 1968 .(220), , ■ '. ;
The defence policy of’. Singapore has been based, on several 
long term strategic and political ■ considerationswhich still - ., 
seem, valid in 1973. " The basic assumption was.the . strategic 
importance of Singapore in global terms, to the .world blocs,
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with Singapore#would have .to associateitself.
Although a reduction of- tension-.between the-World powers would 
entail a decline in. the Third World’s.. political importance, . 
Singapore’s strategic location would, still render, her a 
bargaining power in her. choice of a grand ally (221)., Independent 
armed .forces were deemed an.imperative necessity for participation 
in a regional collective defence, agreement, as ..otherwise 
Singapore1 s neighbours could have ignored it-. -Singapore naval, 
and air units-were assigned with,. the. defence of "the- immediate ..... . 
approaches to the island, while security of free passage in the 
Straits .of Malaeca-was deemed outside of its military,abilities. - :
Regional military cooperation with, a friendly Malaysia 
under the Alliance government, involving joint defence projects,, 
undertaleen when the British would have left, seemed a natural 
expectation after secession. hater, when Sukarno tumbled, it 
was assumed that the-. Suharto regime.would not exhibit an 
offensive attitude towards Singapore. Nevertheless, a 
possibility of either neighbour turning hostile at short notice 
seemed a reasonable longer view of the situation, whichw&S 
summed up: "we can find no ground for complacency" (223)*
Reaction to the creation of the S.A.P inside Singapore 
varied from total hostility demonstrated by the 33, S., to 
public scepticism, and to a probable support from the P.. A.P. !
members. rfhe B.S. finding fault with everytiaihg initiated by 
the P.A.P., and for whom Malaysia' was a "U. S. -British base" and . 
Singapore - "a bogus republic" (224)', tried to arouse public 
opinion against the creation of the S. A. P. The public,, who 
traditionally considered security, and mainly defence, as a 
British responsibility, generally believed, that this was a 
wastage o^money. The public, still not acculturated to the 
independent Singapore state idea, considered business and' the 
professions as providing higher status than military service. 
Nevertheless, the P.A.P. decidedly undertook to create the S.A.P. 
and based it on a two to three year period of national service.
The decision against the establishment of a regular army 
stemmed from negative and positive reasons. The negative one 
postulated that "no regular army in Asia has ever been built up 
and been demobilised; This has a momentum' of,its own: as it 
groY/s bigger, its apetite grows with it, and it begins to sv/allow 
the whole" (225). In the existing economic conditions of 
Singapore, the postulate seemed out of context; though the model
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of such a political change had "been perceived by political 
scientists, it pertained to economically frustrated under­
developed countries (226). The positive reason for the creation 
of a conscription army .could he resumed to he as follows: a 
multi-ethnic army under good leadership could acculturate 
itself and the public with the state idea, bringing about a 
situation where eve^body would identify- Singapore’s survival 
with his own. When Xee spoke to .school principals, he referred 
to the Swiss, Israeli and Finnish armed forces as political 
acculturation agents for the state~idea of small countries (227)
By 1968, the P. A.P. beat all opposition in the elections,
e
and eirerging as a totally dominant party, left no .room for 
opposition in parliament.
Prelude to and Formulation of the .Ideology. Most1 of the 
characteristics modifying a state-idea exist in various degrees 
of intensity in the Singaporean one, whether it be the 
territorial sovereignty, the demand for sacrifice -from the 
population, the propaganda system or the hostility to minorities 
resisting values of political integration. Furthermore, 
Singapore, like most states, possesses both overt and covert 
policies in that respect, and sometimes makes temporary 
concessions to internal and external opposition for tactical 
reasons.
Total and indivisible sovereignty as a value inherent in 
the state-idea was introduced by the government. in 1965? IfUtjthe 
idea of Singapore’s uniqueness within the former political 
entities of Malaya had been.historically established. , Although 
this uniqueness was socio-economically derived, it always 
manifested itself in a political construction of one sort or 
another. This must have created pride within Singapore’ g
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sedentary population , and certainly reduced the •
resentment of those groups whtich did not directly benefit from 
Singapore's independence. The leftists who adopted the. 
communist politico-geographical conception of the unity of 
Malaya and Singapore opposed Singapore's independence. Their 
communist conception of the economy made them denigrate tire role 
of trade, and their political conception of strife between the 
World Powers and between the communist and non-communist countries, 
would suggest that they were ready to relinquish a priori the 
commeEdal position of Singapore for political unity with Malaya.
The implementation of this state-idea would have involved 
excessive economic sacrifices from Singapore’s population of all 
political shades. It would be interesting to speculate on a 
possibility in which Malaya turned communist and the /British clung . 
to Singapore, In that situation, relations
between Malaya and Singapore might have developed, not unlike
those of the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong, still
s '
enhancing Singapore’s uniqueness vis a vis Malaya, but. also 
emphasizing its complementary role to the Malayan economy.
Historical events, however, broughtjabout a leadership 
whose image of Singapore, in its macro-geographical conception, 
greatly resembled that of Raffles. They could not separate the 
city from its international and regional commercial ties. . That 
leadership, dependent on.popular suffrage, like Raffles,- 
understood the importance of trade in the city’s economy. Trade 
generated employment for the mass of workers, whose interests 
the leaders were guarding. Marshall, Lim Yew Hock and later 
lee Kwan Yew represented that leadership, the former in its. 
fairly unorganized form,the latter in. its efficient regimented 
expression. While since the 1960s industrial production began
encroaching on the entrepot trade's share in the national 
income, its dependence on trade for raw materials as well as for 
marketing did not change the basic conception of the.city’s role. 
However, the post-W.W.II. Singaporean leaders, either by virtue 
of their British education, or - in the case of leftist leaders - 
by their adoption of the M.G.P. politico-geographical conception, 
accepted the inseparability of Singapore and Malaya, a British 
modification to Raffle’s original conception. It is with that 
image in mind that Singapore’s official leadership endeavoured 
to bring Singapore into federation with Malaya after the 1950s. 
They were ready to sacrifice sovereignty in foreign affairs and 
defence for economic cooperation. It is most unlikely that they 
would have integrated with a centralized state or that, in 1963, 
the P. A.P. would have merged without retaining its rights over 
education and labour legislation. These indicated the advanced 
position of Singapore in Southeast Asia in social modernization. 
The slogan adopted in the early 1960s was ’’independence 
through merger" which could be interpreted either literally, 
or that merger provided a means by which independence would be 
achieved through the P.A.P. penetrating into Malaysia (228). In 
any event, in 1963 the P.A.P. could not think of separate 
independence as practical, as on the one hand, the B.S. was still 
strongly agitating^and the Chinese Educated would not waste a 
chance of combining with the Chinese in Malaysia in a possible 
bid to dominate EeS;say\aa^ . On the other hand, in 1963, Singapore,
having no armed forces of its own, thought it wiser to ally Itself
with a Malay entity, thuss>%¥i$k$’5 ^  World in the
midst of which it constituted an island of aliens. In short,
Singapore1 s "dependent state-idea" “before and during merger
was governed by pragmatic policies of maintaining its economic
primacy in the region and of commensurately remunerating its
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(i) Singapore1s Independent State-idea* Had Singapore 
remained within Malaysia, and the P.A.P. democratically presented 
itself before the entire electorate of Malaysia, the party would 
have undoubtedly enhanced its Chinese character and perhaps also 
its social radicalism. This would have been due to the nature 
of the potential supporters of the P.A.P., which resembled those 
of the 1950® in Singapore, i.e. Chinese iMMl/M wage earners 
and shopkeepers. It so turned out, however, that secession 
brought about a more moderating influence on the implementation 
of Singapore^ independent state-idea. As already mentioned, the 
basic tenets of their moderate policy were to destroy the image 
of a Third China, which would have impaired Singapore1s external 
trade relations, and also, being democratic, to remunerate its 
people in order to get their vote at the expense of maximizing 
the state’s wealth.
The character of the Singaporean identity, besides being 
defined by its citizenship laws and geographical boundaries, lay 
in the creation of a "multi-racial" society, or a "cultural 
pluralistic" community. fee Kwan Yew said of the uniqueness 
of Singapore, that with 80 percent Chinese, it was a distinct 
community, neither Chinese, Malay nor Tamil. In this sense, 
the policy of 1965 in its explicit formulation remained 
unchanged: "I do not think, and I never did think that race or 
ethnic affinity was the fundamental basis of any national unity" 
(229). Also the M.C.P., as its name implies, had embarked on
* lo >  '
a similar policy, albeit with an almost totally Chinese
membership. This line, besides being ethnically just was perhaps
adopted out of grave concern for the fate of the Chinese
minorities in Southeast Asia, who might be subject to
persecutions and deportation to the new Chinese political entity.
A single culture state-idea in Singapore would have been
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difficult to impose upon the multi-racial society} ^
would ensure at least the immediate support of 75 percent of 
the population. But, as this culture would have entailed the 
image of a third China, the method chosen by the P.A.P., 
totally contrasting that of the other Southeast Asian countries, 
was to maintain the cultural pluralism while awaiting the slow 
integration of the elites of the various ethnic groups (230). 
However, the low proportion of Malays among the socio-economic 
elite of Singapore constituted an obstacle for Malay integration, 
as no priorities were anticipated for this weaker ethnic group.
To the P.A.P. leadership, whose only organized opposition 
in Singapore was the B.S., the adoption of a Singaporean identity 
has been associated with their own party (231), and support for 
the P. A. P. actually meant support for a Singaporean identity.
Thus, the party political division became the divide between two 
opposing state-ideas. The Malays and Indians could gain very 
little from supporting separate ethnic political parties. These 
could not coalesce with an ethnic Chinese opposition party 
against the P.A.P., who dominated the parliament.
There remained the possibility that the B.S., rebounding 
from its relative inactivity and allying itself with those Chinese
Educated'dissatisfied with the' education policy, would create 
a centre, of opposition in a hid. for- political power in Singapore. 
Indeed, the cultural policy.of the government provided some 
reasons for Chinese dissatisfaction with some aspects of its . 
application. The.lack of government support for the Nan Yang -' 
university, for Chinese associations, and the lingual problem ' 
were,.outstanding. The language issue -seemed especially 
incompatible with the government policy of ethnic «^uallty. 'With 
almost.80 percent Chinese in Singapore, Chinese and Tamil had 
the -same official standing, .while Malay remained,. ' at least . - ;
pro forma, the national language, and < English'the official. one. 
The latter was supposed to facilitate the learning of Western . 
techniques, yet China had proved that even the most modern -
science and technology could be taught in, Chinese. However, 
English provided a better means for inter-ethnic communication 
and helped to efface- a potential image of a Third China Singapore.
■Also, in connection with the state-idea, • the P. A.P. 
leadership, following Lee’s formulation, promulgated, the theme 
■ of a "strong government". . This must have been 'the democratic -■ ; 
manifestation of a firm governmental hold on the political^social 
and economic activities of the^population. With practically no 
political party supporting Singapore’s, independence, :
a change in government would mean another state-idea, :
communistic or raeially Intolerant, or. perhaps military backed 
by plutocrats.
"Strong" or "tough" government did not mean an irrational, 
government. The high population^resource ratio of the island • 
did not permit any. eccentricities' in external relations,... such as '• 
exhibited by Sukarno's -Indonesia or he Win's Burma. Both could 
let the economy deteriorate to subsistence-level by'embarking
on unusual political policies. In tills sense, some governments 
may be tough in disregard of people's needs and rights. The term 
"tough" itself may have derived from Lee's educational background 
in the British school system, which had a long reputation of 
character formation, yet cherished the democratic way of life.
Toughness meant an efficient government inflexible in
l
pursuing its aims of remunerating its working people and
<• " . 
controlling essential socih-economic sectors, where private
enterprise was likely to fail. There was no question of
corruption being tolera/ted or inefficiency accepted, people
and leaders had to-w.or-k hard and abide by (Chinese and Indian)
achievement values, rather than by (Malay) ascriptive values.
Government intervention in labour relations was deemed crucial
and thus the labour unions came under unofficial control. Public
services and the media came under government control and
ownership ( 232). The government itttifyftw. invested in developing
the infrastructure and also became owners of industrial
enterprises. Toughness meant also providing all ethnic groups -
with equal opportunities in education, jobs and the use of
public services. This actually resulted in less- opportunities
for the underprivileged Malays. Moreover, the. P.A.P.
dominating the political scene, of Singapore, whose Chinese and
Indian population have had a long tradition of hard work almost
without social.security, did not consider social welfare
(excepting housing and health) as demanding a high priority. This
again handicapped the Malays. In addition, the government 
banned "hippies"- and Western long hair style as representing 
decadence and lack of achievement values.
The small size of-the island and the excellent communication 
network facilitated efficient-government control,- while larger
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neighbouring countries lacking in conimunications had to resort 
to provincial and local governments and sometimes to ethnic 
traditional institutions to control the people, Singapore 
could dispense with all these agencies with their centrifugal 
tendencies and literally maintain:!^ direct government control 
(233). This control has provided besides direct information 
on people's grievances and attitudes, aiiieahs to prevent 
corruption of the civil service, and to facilitate the talcing 
of a palliative or other desired measure witho.ut delay. To this 
one may add the developed and reliable■statist!cal service 
which constantly feels Singapore's demographic and economic 
heartbeat (234).
Information on the state of the people's affairs and the 
promulgation of the ideology wouldjhave been useless unless the 
government disposed of its. own economic resources. The 
capitalistic nature of Singapore's economy did not exclude 
government participation in economic exploits, thoiigJaH usually 
the government tended not to interfere with private enterprise. 
Besides owning the statutory boards, the government's share in 
the total investment in commerce.and industry was about one 
seventh in 1970 (235). It also augmented its reserves, holding 
1^085 million S.$ in Singapore and 2,200 million in foreign 
assets in 1969,. while in 1959, when it came to power it inherited 
only 362 million S.$. in foreign assets (236).
The expansion of industrial production largely resulted 
from government investments in the infrastructure, mainly in . 
Jurong (237). Consequently, it was natural that the government
gained through the increase in value of its.land and water 
reserves. The development of the infrastructure was rapidly 
achieved as a result of the tough government legislation of land
Mil
acquisition for;economic development. Brushing aside individual 
owners1 rights was only one part of the toughness, remunerating 
according to market prices was the other part. The 
government's resourcefulness was also demonstrated when money 
was poured into the economy to minimize the ill effects of the 
British withdrawal, through economic investment, Building projects ' 
and the creation of the S.A.F.. Few Southeast Asian countries 
showed that degree of shrewd judgement in choosing methods and 
in timing. ■
The theme of toughness concerned the entire' population as : 
well as the government. Though within a normal society only 
about- 2 percent constitute the leadership prone (238), their 
importance is crucial in maximizing the performance of the entire 
society. Singapore had to develop so as to provide for that 
elite a field sufficient for their capacities, otherwise they 
would flee the country through "brain-drainage" (233). To that 
effect the tough society had to provide a fast rate of 
development through increasing competitive abilities. These had 
to be maintained by -restricted consumption, a high investment 
rate, and technical skills. The latter depend on education, 
mainly on the English stream. However, not to arouse unnecessary 
opposition, a bi-lingual integrated school system, lias been
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established to those who prefer a Chinese education^ also
to advance economically. . Restricted consumption in itself wrould
increase discontent and might shrink the local market.
Furthermore, the government with all its ^ .toughness", still 
adhered to democratic principles and their ensuing social 
implications. They committed themselves to improving material 
remuneration to the public, and this largely materialized in 
education, housing and some direct wage.increases. All these
measures tended to attenuate the ill effects of the essentially 
capitalistic economy. By controlled government expenditure and 
.by attraction of industrial investement, the employment 
situation considerably imjsa&ved. Also, the housing projects have 
alleviated the miserable living conditions of a large 
proportion of the population, and contributed to diversifying 
the former speech-group and .-sub-ethnic geographical concentrations, 
thus decreasing spee.ch-group solidarities and creating better 
condition to gain thereby more allegiance to the state.
Direct remuneration in wages, has always had much more 
tangible popular response than indirect expenditure ;on social 
services, However, government policy had to keep control on 
excessive wage demands, and proportionally match them with 
actual production. In his 1971 new yearks message to the people, 
Dee Kwan Yew said: "The government believes in.-a more liberal 
sharing of profits, where they have been exceptional". This 
statement.has been realised through a joint meeting of the
government and the trade-unions which suggested a level of wage
increases commensurate with the growth in 'efficiency of the 
previous year. In 1972, the "problem of the year" was not to
create jobs as in 1965 and 1968, but to upgrade skills and
increase productivity "to create a gracious Singapore worthy of a 
people who have striven hard ... and deserve to go up the ladder 
of success" (240). With the approval of the chairman of the 
Chamber of Commerce, wage increases- substantiated the prime 
Minister’s declaration (241). This trend in improving the 
average share employees in profits■can be traced back to 1969, 
but, th
this was perhaps the reason for the more rapid increase in 
profits.
^government also fostered new industrial investment and
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lable C-17 Industrial Production and. Employees* Remuneration.
In- S. $ Millions,j----------------------------------------------- .---------- .-------------- \
Year Establis?a- Workers Input "Output Value Employees Capital
went ' Added Remuner-.. Expenditure
at I on
1961 595 33,885 1,207 1,415 204 86 11
1962 .642 35,533 1,495 1,741 241 93 36
1963 897 43,184 1,295 1,592 292 112 19
1964 . 965 46,284 1,227 1,545.. 310 122 54
1965 1,036 51,999 1,311 1,686 36.8 142 60
1966 1,159 57,521 1,531 .1,980 438 162 76
1967 1,236 63,195 1,733 2,254 510 183 86
1968 1,626 80,533 2,138 2,806 . 649 226 9 6
1969 1,758 107,235 3,349 4,291 . 915 338 219
1970 ,1,-790 126,361 3,437 4,627 1,141 415 425
With regard to the policy of workers remuneration, table 
C-17 May he analyzed hy the following table.
Table C-18 Analysis of Employee Remuneration.
Year A- B C ■’D
1961 2,540 12,530 ,6,000
1962 2, 620 2,540 6,750 ■ 21,800
1963 2,590 2,510 . 6,750 / - 2,480
1964 -2, 620 2,500 6,700 17,500
1965 2,710 2,570- 7,050 10,500
1966 2,810 2, 620 7,600 13,700
1967 2,880 2,610 8,050 14,300
1968 2,800 2,540 8,000 5,500
1969 . 3,140 2,830 8, 500 8,250
1970 3,280 2,860 9,050 22,200
1971 9,950
Eor explanation see footnote (243)•
This table shows that workers remuneration in the 
industrial establishments employing more than nine workers was 
practically stagnant in 1961-1968, but considerably increased in
M m
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in 1969. In 1970 it remained at that CTevel, and according to . 
official statements seems to have grown since then, flow ever, 
per capita value added was rising at a more rapid rate than wages 
during 1961-1971•
The toughness of the government in its socio-economic 
activities may justify a definition of Singapore as a 
capitalistic entity governed by a democratically conscious 
government, which has empowered itself to exercise a certain 
control of the economy and provide essential social services to 
the working class (244). In internal politics., however, the 
democratic nature of Singapore must he judged with regard to the 
nature of the opposition to the government. The communist 
inspired opposition has been known to resort to illegal and 
subversive activities in Southeast Asia. As a result, the 
government maintains theold regulations of administrative 
detention, which It uses to guard against groups who made no 
pledge to abide by democratic laws (245)* However, the nature of 
administrative detention, makes it sometimes impossible to verify 
whether it is used against subversive or democratic oppositions.
(ii) The State*s Viability: Opposition, Scepticism, Doubts 
and Hopes. Since its full independence, Singapore received 
official recognition from the lest, from the Third World 
countries and from the- East European communist bloc. China,
North Korea and North Vietnam diplomatically ignored it, though 
they continued mutual trade relations, as they had done before 
and during merger. Eor example, the trade with China amounted to 
about 140 million S.0 in 1961, rose to 247 million in 1965, and 
reached 454 million in 1971 (246)., with an increasing trend in 
1972 (247).
The failure of Ohina.to recognize Singapore, may.he 
interpreted as political support for the M.C.P. and the B.S. 
and their state-idea. Although. China expressed its disinterest 
in intervening with internal politics of other countries, and 
after the Bandung Conference went further and tried to help 
Indonesia, .solve the Chinese minorities problems, its policy 
towards Malaya and' Singapore was totally different. The strength 
of communist supporters, and especially the proportion of the 
Chinese in the population, made it worthwhile delaying 
recognition of those countries (248). In 1972, following the 
detente in world politics, the prime minister of Malaysia visited 
Peking and mutual recognition was seriously- -considered. It must 
have had some reassuring effects on Singapore, and indeed Lee 
envisaged a thaw in diplomatic relations with China,- IfcHflffc Tdiis 
does not mean that China does .not or will not support subversive 
movements in the area.
The clean sweep of the 1972 elections, with a 70 percent
majority•and a win of.all the seats in Parliament (249), proved
a great victory for the P. A.P.. The main reasons may have been
the socio-economic success of the government in.realizing, its
plans, the economic-expansion of Singapore, and also the
disorganization of the opposition with only one faction of the
B.S. participating in the elections. As previously, the P. A.P.
limited political activities between election, and shortened the
election campaign period, while legal restrictions made life
particularly uneasy for the opposition. The 30 percent of the
votes opposing the. P.A.P. must have split among ethnic oriented
groups, the B.S. and intellectual circles. resenting a. one party
dominance in Parliament. The amount of opposition musijhave 
surprised the P.A.B. leadership, as this is the. only way to
explain-lee*s unexpected announcement, that he would consider 
the participation in Parliament of a non-elected opposition 
consisting of university teachers and intellectuals.
Following secession, some academic circles in Singapore 
expressed scepticism as regards the econoraico-political viability 
of the state. The scepticism, in contradistinction to 
ideological opposition, did not result from a belief in a 
utopian future, but from what seemed a ^rational evaluation of 
the situation. But, relying on general principlesj(rather than 
on political reality, the sceptics underestimated Singapore1s 
viability, -Perhaps more than evaluation of the situation,
declarations and formulae expressed by ministers may have created
ome doubts 
the press,
an atmosphere of crisis just after . -.Also s
concerning Singapore’s future, expressed by leaders to 
might have been interpreted as disenchantment or decrease in 
optimism, though it seems that they were originally Intended to 
arouse public response through creating an atmosphere of crisis; 
a gimmick well known in mass leadership. It seems that the 
mood of crisis affected the academics and crept into titles of 
their works (250), and perhaps with the aim of consolidating the 
people.1 s spirit also into Josey’s book (251)* However, the 
contents of the book with its demands, hopes and judgements of 
P. A.P. ministers, makej its title mean, reassurance through hard 
work, rather than loss of hope and indecision ( 252). It could 
be that owing to difference In personality and .to the choice of 
words sdme speeches and declarations seem less assured than 
others.
Public response to the promulgation of Singapore's 
Independent state-idea is difficult to assess,•although some
partial researches have been made to that effect. The Malays,
more than any other ethnic group, may delay their positive 
response as their allegiance has traditionally gone north of 
the causeway. The recent secession and .their lower economic 
standing are not conducive to rapid political integration. The 
Indians, marginally better off than the Chinese (253)> had not 
by 1971 entirely stabilized themselves. Their 0.667 (F/M) sex 
ratio of that year (-254) indicated about 80 percent integration 
into families. " Another indication of their instability may be 
derived from the figures of departures and-arrivals by sea and 
air f?om and to Singapore during 1967-1971. The 369,000 Indians 
thus registered amounted to two (tlmesjand a hal^their 1971 
number of Singapore residents, while the Chinese thus registered 
numbered 938,000, or only 60 percent of their 1971 population 
(255). These indices may prove close familial connections with 
India constituting some sort of hindrance to full integration.
The Chinese, who traditionally have lent their hand to 
efficient governments, may prove to be the more politically 
acculturated to the state idea. Though Singapore is not a 
Chinese state by-law and practice, providing no special privileges 
to Chinese of other countries, and though the Chinese language
reality tends to r relations with China and with
Taiwan.- Sober thinking may have proved to them, that an Image of
a Third China Is presently harmful to the Chinese minorities in
Southeast Asia, and as.identification with the state-idea of
Singapore does not prevent them from having territorial value-s
attached to China, their culture not being suppressed by the
government, they seem likely to adopt' the state-idea to a higher
degree than the other ethnic groups. As for 3?. A.P. members of 
all ethnic groups,'these- seem to have their territorial values
has officially a tanding than the Malay, political
41%
attached to Singapore.
The policy of multi-racialism, perhaps with the tacit 
consent of the ethnic groups, did not provide any posibility 
of becoming ethnically a Singaporean. The ethnic groups being 
strictly defined, create a situation where offspring of ethnic 
intermarriages, few as they may be, must be identified by law 
as members of one of the existing ethnic groups. The perpetuation' 
of these groups thus hinders assimilation and integration; bi­
lingual- education may also be thus.' categorised. Thus, it may 
well be that in the future Malays will demand a Malay 
university, following the example of the Nay Yang university. 
However, education in English is- spreading .and increasing in 
importance and recognition. English language, national service, 
and "meritocracy” have been considered to structure the emergent 
Singaporean national identity, which in thoblong run may tend to 
homogenize the separate groups (256). Conscious of the long 
period needed-to instil the state-idea in such ennditions, the 
government makes great efforts to render Singapore free of what 
it deems external demoralizing effects (257), and launches 
1Tcultural drives” to initiate community activities to. improve 
the quality of life in Singapore.(258)
I n ■the meantime, partial indices show that people in 
Singapore are generally socially and economically content and 
that at least some progress has been made in the diffusion of 
the state-idea. The indices are: a subjective perception by 
IJeople of socio-economic facts which definitely indicate a 
steady and fairly rapid development (259), and social researches
into the matter. One of the latter postulated that nsatisfaction
with life provides th^bread and butter basis'for identification 
with a livable social system” (260). The study revealed that
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90^ o of the sample.' called themselves Singaporeans, that 74$ 
preferred being called. Singaporeans'father than Chinese, Malays, 
Indians, -Eurasians or Europeans, that 4-8. percent, considered 
Secession a good thing, while 32 percent were '.undecided and ,20 
percent preferred Malaysian identity, and 74- percen-t declared, 
that they were fairly willing to fight and die for Singapore.
As for ethnic integration, "tolerance was|iigh hut acceptance 
was low". "The electorate x>erceived and endorsed equal 
treatment for all groups, hut rejected the governments’ language- 
policy" (261). A 1968 sma.ll sample of peasants showed a shift 
in their-vote from generally supporting' ;fhe- BhS. to a substantial 
support for the P.A.P. (262), indicating the extension of P. A.P. 
political work into the rural areas of the island, and also 
perhaps popular response to the improvement in 'peasants conditions 
The rehousing projects in Singapore accomodating 35 percent' 
of the population or. 760, GOO people, improved', dwelling conditions ■ 
by decreasing the average occupancy of dwelling, units from 6.4-. 
in 1966 to 5.7 in 1970, the average being 10 in. 1954- (263). A 
research into the attitudes-of the rehoused people, as reflected ' 
from a 10% sample,'demonstrated .a marked improvement in 
satisfaction over their condi tions ( 264-) . Rehousing further, 
decreased residential segregation and created.-better -prospects 
for group integration. Eigures concerning the Chinese speech- , ■ 
groups show a population distribution in which^ub-ethnic 
concentrations, on a project area basis, are only marginally
discernible (265). . ■ i.
It still remains to be seen whether the P. A. P. premise that'
socio-economicsatisfaction will override primordial ethnic
sentiments in bringing about a unified state culture , is a, valid' : 
one. .
The P.A.P. Environment Conception of'Singapore. 'Projections in . 
time of the re source;-to-population ratio of states, have had 
various impacts on the dominant elites’, environment conception,' 
Generally .speaking, in .its time, it created stress in colonialist 
European, countries, which practised tariff harriers', leading 
them to invade adjacent countries or to acquire colonies.
However, after W.W.II., nationalism in the. Western World declined 
' in intensity, and. the dominant elites became aware thatjnew 
technologies, cooperation, and free trade could produce better 
economic results and less injustice than colonialism and 
economic segregation. As a result', more' extensive politico- 
economic entities.were created, and governments1 concern diverted 
to population and. environment control in relation to their effect 
on the quality-of-lif e,. fliis- is not to assert'that such 
considerationsljhad not come under governments1 judgement before 
that period, yet their evaluation .tended: to "be guided more by 
military strategy'and economic production principles than by 
quailty-of-life precepts. The modern change in guidelines has. 
been brought about more,-by popular pressure\jbhan by government s’ 
initiatives’.
In a sense, contemporary Singapore 'has-.reached a stage 
where its projections for fufece economic development may become., 
crucial in determining its politico-economic .policies. With 
almost 10,000 people to the square mile .and with one of the 
world1 s highest population to resource ratios., it seems that 
even open space, unoccupied shorelines, fresh water and 
unpolluted air will become scarce in the future; D?hat danger 
had lain in the back of thejminds of some people in the pastj 
nevertheless, since the 1960s, when industrial production was 
expanding, only conventional measures to minimize xoollution were
taken. However, land reclamation proved very successful on the 
Jurong and the Changi shores. The.shallow continental shelf 
around Singapore facilita/bed such undertakings o$tit, when it 
comes to filling material calculations,the island is lacking 
even in this because of its fairly subdued relief.
Industrial development has remained the government motto 
for the 1970s. Foreign investment is flowing in-creating almost 
unselective labour shortage, which the contemporary- 60,000 
foreign labourers from adjacent countries (266) have only 
partially satisfied, Industrialization has brought about'an 
increasing demand in labour, tswmimd Mf rapidly
increasing Tshare- in the G-.D.P. ( 267). There is no
doubt that the P.A.P. fostered industrialization has improved 
employment and living conditions in Singapore, as improvement 
in economic conditions had been badly needed and has remained a 
P.A.P. tenet. By andjjLarge,. pollution considerations were 
neglected by the government, without popular reproach. 
Traditionally, both the Chinese and Indians in their "lower 
culture" used to regard living conditions as secondary in 
importance to business and occupation. ' Quality ox life meant 
wealth rathei" than leisure,and central location in busy areas 
prevailed over quiet and wide space in marginal location (268); 
only when reaching a fairly high economic status quality-of-life 
considerations became.important. The Malays had a different 
attitude towards that question but,remaining politically less 
influential than the majority in Singapore, the government had 
not come under public pressure in that matter until it made 
quality-of-life a public issue. If industrialization progressed
at the present rate and selectivity considerations.for new 
industries had remained those of the 1960s conducing to a
m i
maximum rate^of economic progress, there could arise an 
irreversible situation of an industrially polluted area ( 269)-.
Public' acceptance of a proposed government ''minimum 
pollution" policy has not been verified, yet some reasons may 
lead to expect a future positive response from the public against 
traditional values* In the first place, there Is the Modern 
World concern about the problem with the acute example of Japan's 
deteriorating conditions. With more and more people in 
Singapore coming under the cultural influence of the West new 
values substitute the traditional ones. In the second place, 
there is a growing proportion of the population in wage earning . 
jobs, which have more leisure than ever before, and which real 
standard of living is improving. These, the majority of the 
population, constitute a potential pressure-group for quality- 
of-life improvement in Singapore.
(i) The Socio-Economic Environment Conception of 1980. 
Singapore.- The government concern with quality-of-life in 
Singapore found its expression in speeches delivered by ministers
IrtU&c/
in 1972. XM/directly tackled the problem of regulating the 
economic progress in rate and quality so as to minimize pollution.. 
Types of industry and an optimal rate of economic growth would 
be chosen according to the image of Switzerland rather than of 
Japan. Lee spoke (270) of "comfortable homes", "green spaces", 
unpolluted beaches and aesthetic amenities. However, he added 
that a clear"cut decision had not been reached by the government, 
which is perhaps deferring its commitment until a technological 
breakthrough in "depollution" is proved to have failed, or 
until public opinion becomes conditioned.
The theme of quailty-of-life in its socio-cultural 
meaning, without relation to specific geographical conditions had
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previously been mentioned in speeches and addresses (271). 
Artistic and aesthetic expressions were encouraged: "let us 
not provide our critics the opportunity to say that we are a 
successful nation, hut have no aesthetic value” (272) said the 
minister for Home Affairs. The defence minister attacked the 
continuous pursuit of wealth and its non-cultural expenditure on 
hig. houses, entertainment and jewellery, recommending art, 
literature and music /ito'~"elevate the quality-of-life, as well as 
sports and daring pursuits (273). The building of the^aational 
theatre and an unsuccessful hid to create a philharmonic 
orchestra had heen undertaken in the same vein. Cultural drives 
reinforced by suitable laws were intended to decrease the evils 
of a rapid urbanization. Tree planting, litter disposal, orderly 
queueing became the subject of these drives which were followed- 
by severe punishment for law breaking to an extent which gave 
rise to murmurs of infringement on personal rights . The 
government image of quality-of-life excluded modern socio­
cultural eccentricities which had sprung up in the West such as 
”hippyism” (274)? sexual promiscuity in wider circles, or even 
a fully developed welfare state wft&h. had perhaps brought about 
these phenomena as by-products. They would rather adopt an image 
of sober, thrifty hard working Switzerland (275).
That image remained in line with the principles of a state-
idea as had been adopted by the government even before Secession.
The stress on aesthetic expression and enjoyment could produce
stronger sentimental attachment to Singapore, and especially to
distinguish, it from other places in Southeast Asia. 
Embellishment/of Singapore and the cultural refinement of its
it
people could make more attractive to tourism which, in 
pollution terms, has been a clean industry.
Family planning had "been of great concern to the 
government in previous years, "but since 1972 it has been 
qualified and quantified in connection with the general theme 
of quali ty^of life. The decrease in natural growth, experienced 
since 1957 (276), has been already mentioned. The significant 
drop in death rate.preceded .a considerable and continuous 
decline in birth rate, which between 1966 and 1969 expressed 
itself in an absolute loss of 10,000 births annually and in 
relative terms from 28.6 per thousand in 1966 to 22.1 in 1970.
The aim for 1975 was fixed at 18 per thousand, bringing about a 
1,3 percent annual growth rate (271) • One of the maiijjfveasons for . 
advocating birth control was tcj/reduce the unbalanced living 
densities which had been inherited from the Chinatown and^which^ 
to some degree were transferred to the new H.D.B. houses: l!0ur 
problem is that while families who live in 3”4 room public 
housing flats have two to three children, those in the 1-2 room 
flats have six to seven children” (278). The downward trend in 
birth rate affected the Chinese and Indian communities, but much 
less so the Malays. The government, rejecting any idea of 
becoming a Western style welfare state and in line with its 
toughness policy, reduced income tax relief to big families , 
increased accouchement charges and reduced paid maternity leave.
Perhaps the first quantification of the quality-of-life 
policy could be found in a suggestion concerning economic 
conditions in late 1970s Singapore (279). According to that 
paper, the 1970s growth rate of Singapore’s G-.D.P. per capita, 
could produce a G-.D.P. per capita in 1977 Singapore similar to 
that of the U.3£. in .1970. It was recommended that industrial 
growth should stop when half a million workers would, be engaged 
in industrial production. The anticipated date for that to occur
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was 1978, involving an estimated import of 180,000 foreign’ 
workers in 1977-78 alone (280). But workers’ remittances and 
overseas companies’ profits drawn out of the country, would 
perhaps delay the achievement of a 1970 European standard of 
living to the 1990s. The aim of achieving that level without 
incurring the damage of pollution seems to underlie the 
proposed selectivity in industrial expansion.
(ii) The Politico-Economic Environment Conception of 
Future Singapore. Although from the British point of view, 
Singapore has lost much of its trategic importance, the island 
still remains, hy nature of its location, one of the strategic 
loci of the world. The land configuration of pelagian Southeast 
Asia, ^ ensures its strategic status, which will he enhanced in ■ 
the future hy increased shipping through the Straits of Malacca. 
Japan, China and most of peninsular Southeast Asia depend upon 
this maritime route for their external trade. The modernization 
of shipping and trade services which has heen introduced into 
the region hy Singapore, still remains a great asset of the 
island in its economic competition with its neighbours. Thus, 
in 1965 Singapore's government embarked on its policy of 
independence with increasing confidence developing its shipyards 
and refuelling facilities.
affairs (281), some recent politico-economic developments fltteustm
existence. To this effect a reformulation of Singapore’s 
economic destiny seems to have heen adopted hy the P.A.P. 
leadership. From 1961 to 1971, Singapore’s trade with Southeast
Besides the natural will'to lead independently its own
tv
fymfflikfilfi the uniqueness of Singapore and its independent
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Asia in general, and with Malaysia in particular, relatively 
declined (282) in proportion to that: with the rest of the world. 
Trade with Western Europe, the U.S.A. and Japan, nearly dabled 
during that period (283)• Moreover, most of the foreign 
investment and technological knowhow came from those sources,
and visitors from those *'countries significantly■increased their,
share in arrivals at Singapore (284). The changing trend in
Singapore1 s "hinterland” did not-'..escape the notice of the ^
government, and it received a sort of official formulation and
ideological approval around 1972. The minister for Foreign
Affairs elaborated,, on the concept of the Global City, the
Ecumenopolis - a world embracing city. This future city spreads
its control through electronic communications and the jet
airlines, and is supplied by supertankers and big craft. Thus,
it will be. the global hinterland and not the regional, which
will decide.whether Singapore will prosper or decline: "Once
you see Singapore as a global city the problem of hinterland
becomes unimportant because for the global city the world is
the hinterland" (285). To prove his case, the foreign minister
could, base his assertion on links with international and multi- 
-r
national companies which supplied most of the 1 ,700 million 0 
foreign investment in -Singapore, in addition to external trade 
figures. For example, between 1968 and 1970, American companies 
increased in number from 60 to 262, in personnel employed:fl?om 
1,500. to 10,000, and in output value*from 100 million S.$ to 300 
They invested 150 million S.0 in fixed 'assets- and were committed
to invest another 400 million (286)'.
For obvious political reasons, the changing balance
0JI.UU
of trade between the regional and the global- 
strengthened Singapore’s politico-economic viability. However,-.
Hi-
political changes, in the region'may greatly affect foreign 
investment in Singapore a„s this capitalis Highly ./sensitive to 
political instability before■ and'after its-investment. ■ This is 
only one reason--why Singapore is still strongly demanding that 
free regional trade and goodwill-.continue. -Though,, after 
Confrontation, relations with.Indonesia have improve A, and though' 
the trade with Malaysia did-not decrease after Secession, both 
countries-prepare alternatives to their trade with Singapore.1 
This is why in January 1970, Cloh Keng .Swee deplored the state 
of regional trade by saying that "greater freedomaf movement of 
goods, people and capital {had existed^ during the" Colonial, times' 
than there jwasj .today”, and that because of the attitude of 
Malaysia and Indonesia towards Singapore, regional trade would 
maintain a low level •.of activity (287). '
The extra-regional polibico-economic attitude of Singapore 
manifested itself in its - disagreement to a "territorial" division 
■of the Straits of Malacca among the three bordering states as 
suggested by both Malaysia and Indonesia (288)^ Singapore feared 
that the division would lead to a cold war situation (289). 
Neither the 20 Hunter jets. (290) nor' its guided m'issile patrol 
boats (291), could enable Singapore to lead a political policy 
of its own in the Straits. Leaving the question of the Straits 
open, Singapore is trying to improve relations with both her 
neighbours and to agree on any reasonable, project for regional
cooperation. Lee declared (292)-: "YFe shall-play our part in . -
regional economic cooperation" as "the better off £the neighbour­
ing- state sj are the better It is for us", he however, left 
some sort of way out:"We will participate in all joint projects ■
for mutual benefits. Provided. ;there is no sudden deterioration f. 
In the-stability .of the area".
(iii) Resource Limitations and its politico-geographical 
Implications; The Case of Water. The discussion on water 
resource limitations in Singapore serves as .an illustration of 
the politico-geographical situation of Singapore within its 
immediate environment. Size, location and land configuration 
may.serve as other good case studies to that same effect. These 
are more basic than the "conventional" economic resources such 
as raw materials, in the sense that It is harder .to find 
substitutions for the natural setting than to the conventional 
resources’ distribution.
Resource limitation in its basic^manifestation dictates 
Singapore's policy of controlled population growth and conditions 
Singapore’s politico-economic policy. Being a small country^ an d^  
as yet, of unconsolidated national spirit, resource limitation 
has been an important factor preventing the development of 
nationalistic aggression (293). Nevertheless, resource shortage 
awareness can be discerned in political declarations as well as 
in actual political and economic moves* even In thosf^nrelated 
to the matter. Singapore’s direct-policy in relation to the 
resource shortage may be defined as naturally ambivalent. On 
the one hand, it adopts an attitude' favouring regional 
cooperation, on the otherfIt strives to acquire;freedom of 
‘political action by trying to resolve the problem through 
developing Its own resources.
in his 1971 new year’s message, the prime minister of 
Singapore found it proper to deal with the water supply problem 
of 1975-1980. He envisaged the collection of 25-35 percent of 
Singapore’s average daily rainfall of 700 million gallon in 
that period. But previous studies into the matter of water 
resources in Singapore, revealed the folloowing facts: ground
rap 1-c,
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water was scarce? evaporation reached 67 .'inches while annual 
rainfall averaged 95 inches ( 294-), morphology and soil texture 
favoured silting and land reclamation, rather^than water storage' 
(295)* -Even the older alluvium of the eastern part of the island 
.provided poor aquifers. Daily water consumption for all 
.purposes rose from 31.3 million gallons in 1950 to 64.5- million 
in I960 and to 102.4 million in 1970. During 1970, domestic use 
accounted for 41.8 percent of the total consumption, commercial 
and industrial for 21.0 percent, government and statutory 
hoards to 18.8 and armed services - 2.1 percent, while shipping 
consumed 1.3 percent of the total. It was expected that hy 
1984 , 1 Singapore’s" water consumptioon would exceed 200 million 
gallons a day far a population of 2.7 million ( 296).
In 1965, the three Singapore reservoirs had a catchment 
area of 7,573 acres, while the four Johore reservoirs had 6,456. 
fhe river intakes of Tehran and Scudai' in Johore, had a combined 
catchment area of 78,080 acres (297). This did. not include the 
extended Selgtar reservoir opened in 1969.^ . (298)^ nor did it take 
into account the johore River Scheme. At present, only 24-3 
square miles, or 11 percent of Singapore island area, are 
utilized for water collection. The three existing reservoirs, . 
Seletar, Peirce and MacRitchie comprise 12.3 square miles, while- . 
the remainder constitutes the unprotected catchment area of eight, 
streams in the partially pumped storage area of the Seletar 
Scheme. There is a theoretical possihility to utilize 75 percent 
of the island’s area., or 156 square miles, as a catchment area, 
which may satisfy needs from own resources up t o ■1980 (299).
For instance, the Kranji Padan Scheme with a catchment area of 
.4-1 square miles could store 4,600 million gallons and yield 
40 million a day (300). on 29 Dec. 1970, the Straits Times
wrote..that th e Kr an ji'P ad an S ch.dm e was to be built at a cost of 
• 51 million S. 0. J
Shortage in.land for other.economic projects will increase ■ 
with time, and. it seems that the allocation of 75 percent of the 
island area for water catchment purposes will limit the economic 
possibilities in that area. As desalinization is unlikely to 
produce revolutiinary techniques until 1980, the water pipeline
fpom West Malaysia to Singapore will constitute-, perhaps more
: • eii
than trade, or more than the,. causeway, their umbilical chord. ;
Hrom an economic point of view., it would be profitable to
continue to use and even further develop the water sources in
Johore.- If ' the- entire.- increment--of 100 million gallons' a year
■ were to be brought fromMalaysia at the present cost of SO
Singapore1 cents per 1000 'gallons, it would cost Singapore
approximately 29 million S.-0 a year. In view’ of the area under
water .of thejpro j ecte’d reservoirs, and the costs of special
drainage and land use limitations, in the catchment areas,' the
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decision to develop Singapore’s own resources seems to result
from concessions to strategy rather than from pure economic
judgements. In fact, Lee Ewan Tew (301) expressed the strategic
background of the water resource development plan, when he said
that in case of subversive.attack on the waterworks of Johore or
a unilateral stoppage of water supply, Singapore’s proper resources’
would be able to supply 20 million gallons a day for domestic
use and 10 million gallons.for high priority industries.
However, should it occur, he thought that. Singapore would only
react by diplomatic means' and not by the use of force. The 
development of Singapore’s proper resources to maintain limited
water supply for a''fairly long period, during which^ eventual 1
repairs or diplomatic reconciliation' can be effected/ seems a
Hu/S/’' g
balanced - solution to , $r politico-economic prcblem. Singapore’s 
dependence, on. Malaysia in water supply may produce (orfhas already 
produced) a sobering - effect on the former1 .s^olitico-geograpiiical 
conception, .directing it towards more regional cooperation and 
averting any extremist, inclination of its present or future 
leadership. 'While Hong Kong’s dependence on. Chinese water supply 
only superficially resembles that of Singapore-Malaysia.relations, 
Hong Kong’s image of a hostage in Chinese hands may affect future 
investment in that city.- Singapore., anxious to maintain capital 
inflow must simultaneously .ensure uninterrupted water supply from 
Johore and maximize its own resources. The- continuous operation 
:,.and even the extention of water supply along the causeway has ;. 
withstood all the vicissitudes of Malaysia-Singapore relations.
}lh,e Central. Government' and the State of Johore..have honoured 
■--their, obligations inspit.e.of sporadic extremist Muslim pressure . • 
to. cut off the water supply,. The S.A..P. and Singapore’ s 
’’nuisance value” in the■ context-of the Chinese community of 
Malaysia, may have proved their efficiency by their-potential 
reaction. Historical instances,.however, have shown that an- 
■ima.ge, fallacious: or real,' of economic insufficiency and 
dependence on anther country-for vital resources,' sometimes '- 
lead to dix^lomatic stress and wars, but sometimes also to 
enriching cooperation. ' .
Regional Cooperation, In view of resource scarcity of the most 
fundamental ■ nature ^ .-Singapore' s role as a Global City will be ■ 
greatly modified or put within a reasonable context. In the 
first place, there is no such pure entity in the world and it 
. i s' unlikely that . one -is' going to function that way. in the 
national world scene as, for example, the:Provincial Town had
developed in its specific environment. in file-' second, place, a 
, development b'yiwhich a .'City State’.will flourish, while its' 
immediate political neighbourhood impoverishes, or remains 
economically stagnant, leads to-political instability especially' 
when there is ethnic strife between'the' city and its neighbour- 
. hood (302). .
■ (i) Singapore’s ffuture Cooperation with'its Immediate
■ ■geighbourB.f-. While Singapore's capital accrues, .and foreign
investment adds to modify its, industries into capital intensive
enterprises, "development .in neighbouring countries (Malaya
excepted) .is slow and does not’- produce conditions to ease socio- =,
political pressure. Besides the lack of efficient administration
and', knowhow, those countries- are short of capital. If the
process o f ' capital intensification'.of' Singapore' s industry is
not reasonably parallelled in Malaysia and Indonesia, the
political and cultural alienation of Singapore would increase.
But Singapore is-in a position to-maintain its...historical lead
in per capita income - and still invest capital, Ihiowhow and
entrepreneurship abroad.
Singapore1s avowed 
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publicly announced orb condition that stability, does not suddenly
deteriorate. .Stability in relations with Southeast Asia h a s :been
achieved, at least as regards the attitude towards Singapore on
governments level. As it is rather1 good administration that
Malaysia and Indonesia lack^-corruption and mismanagement 
constituting a hindrance to. effective cooperati onjrr there seems to
be a wide field for- cooperation, which
does not irretrievably fix capital. Generally speaking,
SingaporeMias done very little in joint regional projects, -even
willingness to/cooperate . has been
the airline, company MA.S, jointly owned with Malaysia was split 
between the partners in 1972, and almost nothing, has been done 
in common with Indonesia. In view of the high economic risks 
involved i n ,territorial capital fixation, regional cooperation 
mast begin by joint government projects. Ihese must in their 
early .stages transcend pure economic considerations of profit 
realization, and must serve.‘.as an investment In building the 
"human infrastructurefor further development. It seems that to 
begin with, those projects where minimum capital will be 
definitely territorially fixed, are mostly suitable until success 
and mutual understanding reachw# a certain degree. Shipping and 
airline companies, technological aid, tourism and construction 
companies seem to have the better chances of success (303)* 
Corruption and nationalist favouritism may render cooperation 
difficult, yet Singapore,, which is likely to lose more than 
others if .cooperation is not achieved, should undertake to 
suffer some financial loss as its initial contribution to the 
project. '"'In addition, there may be also moral justification for 
Singapore leading the way in taking economic risks a
Between 1961 and 1972. customers’
deposits in commercial banks /increased from 893 million S.$ to 
4,171 million (304).. Some part of that money must have come 
from countries where "non indigenous" private enterprise has 
little scope for profitable reinvestment, as a result of 
government monopolization, discrimination or restriction, lhat 
capital if secured by the Singapore government, perhaps with 
international financial organizations' backing, could gradually 
be reinvested in the Southeast Asian countries and mainly in 
Indonesia. U n l e s s  this matter is--' delicately handled, it may 
backfire and produce political tension instead of economic benefit
-f The nature olthe economic cooperation "between Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Singapore, as proposed for the initial stages of 
the process, may in the long run spread to industrial production. 
As Singapore is progressing in that direction/it is very likely 
that its developing skills in technology and management will 
enable It ,to serve the other countries as well (305). It will 
be only fair if the three countries themselves exploit the l o w  : 
wage advantage for industrial production of their proper 
ownership. In the meantime/however, toux^ism (306), can be 
attractive if several conditions combine to add to the natural 
suitability of the region. In that i*espect, a wider cooxoeration 
in S.Qutheast Asia may be preferable to the narrower ane among 
the thx,ee countries.
Distances from Europe and the U.S. to the region may
x'ender fares prohibitive to the average-income ti'aveller, unless
several countries are included in a tour. The countries involved
should have, fairly equal- facilities and thus be in a position to
distribute the tourists among all Thus, for. example, each
-^uvct
country could build onlyNwa*® of the needed capacity in
hotel accommadations. Also, favourable weather conditions,
(from the- viewpoint of the tourist) will permit the spread of 
tours all over the year, which may also reduce costs for the 
Industry, and the ethnic diversity of the countries can produce 
low cost attractions for visitors. Joint air companies can 
participate in tourist transport between the countries and
also presumably from Jaqpan, Europe and the U.S. (307).
Becoming less and less economical to opex*ate by countries 
of high standard of living, shipping and eventually high-seas 
-fishing may become attractive tojoperate and invest In for 
Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. The use of flags of
k %
convenience is widespread, yet the traditional-seamanship of the 
people in the;region, the experience of Singapore in "maritime 
transport .and a., governmental: control on personnel' quality, 
safety regulations...and perhaps regional cooperation, in maritime
insurance, may prove'such a joint project promising for the 
three . c o u n t r i e s '
(ii) The P. A. P. Anticipation of Future politics in 
Southeast Asia* Anticipation. of future political developments, 
especially those excluding one's ability to interfere with, may 
prove incorrect, sometimes' in,direct relation to the time span a 
-.under consideration. However., short period evaluations may 
he of-no practical use, as political developments of 
substantial importance talce time to unfold themselves.
According to lee Kw:ah Yew’s appreciation of future 
developments- concerning the region (308)* the recent, developments, 
in,Sino-American and Sino-Japanese, relations, foretell the 
peaceful reintegration’oi Taiwan.into China, a,peaceful though 
tense, agreement in .Vietnam and a possible. Chinese intervention 
to, safeguard the independence- of Laos ;and Cambodia, .placing- both 
on the .side of Thailand and’ against. Vietnam
The latter Apart:of his appreciation concerning Laos and.
: Cambodia, '.may at; .first seem wishful thinking, blit not so after . 
a second thought. - : Vietnam had opposed Chinese occupation and 
withstood Chinese assimilator.y influences during almost a 
thousand yearsL--.;, It exhibited independent policies during almost 
. the entire, following millenium, expanding south at the expense 
of the-Chains and the .Cambodians. The Horth Vietnamese come out 
of the' war well; organised-, ■ self assured, -and in tli'e ' event that 
Horth. and South Vietnam -reintegrate, they possibly, could overrun
Laos and Cambodia, occupying the economically rich Mekong Basin.- 
As two adjacent strongly nationalistic countries'may eventually 
develop friction!across their common border, the political 
principle ,-that "my neighbour is my enemy and hence, my 
neighbour’s neighbour is my friend?’., may.govern the three-partite 
relationship of Russia,, China and Vietnam.- This contention is 
supported by Russia’s aid to Vietnam as well as by Chinese 
political'support to Suphanowong and to Sihanouk. The:Chinese 
.newly built road from Yunnan toLaos may have been built 
eventually to support Laos against Vietnamese encroachments. ‘ The 
Chinese-support-to Rorth Vietnam in-its war with the U.S., may 
prove to have been undertaken in a period when idealism 
prevailed over economic and political pragmatism, or as a , ; 
concession tc^what:might - have proved an inevitable development 
without Chinese support. Moreover, China’s political image might 
have : been damaged.had if remained-.-impartial to what was defined - 
as , the post W,~W. II . most important, anti-colonialist war.
Lee 'also anticipated continued American presence, in 
Thailand (309) and named it the key- to .' Southeast Asian stability 
on which Malaysia, -Indonesia and Singapore must depend. He also 
foresaw the establishment of'diplomatic relations'between China 
and the three former, of which. Singapore would be the last one-to 
do so. ,
-It seems according to early 1973 events'that Lee’s 
anticipation.of the peace,agreement in Vietnam:may prove correct. 
American presence.- inyThailand may/materialize, .only in air po\¥er 
-.presence* As thejfre shape ■ their army to be based on regulars, . 
they may or may not share Lee’.s views that^their -presence is the 
key to Southeast Asian stability. In any event, the efforts 
: that they will:-be ready to make in order' to maintain stability is
an ”unkriown quantityM.
The G-eographico-Qultural Centrality of Singapore. The 
significance of Taiwan and Iiong Kong as Chinese cultural centres 
..outside China in relation to the Han Yang communities was 
discussed in B.38. . It is now pertinent to asses Singapore’s 
centrality in this respect.'
The officially promulgated state-idea of Singapore is 
multi-racial and the Indian community’s success there proves that 
it is generally applied de facte. As already discussed earlier, 
that same state-idea perpetuates the cultures of each ethnic 
group hindering the cultural integration by letting primordial 
sentiments of ethnic solidarity transcend the state’s boundaries. 
The statement is true for all three major ethnic groups, and not 
the least for the Chinese majority.
Blood ties between the Chinese of Singapore and those of 
Malaysia, and to some extent with those of Indonesia, make the 
conditions of the Chinese communities in the latter countries, 
a sensitive issue of paramount importance for the Singapore 
Chinese. Primordial sentiments ofjfamily, clan, speech-groups and 
ethnic group still exist between them and other Southeast Asian 
Chinese communities. These sentimental links sometimes underlie 
business partnerships and other economic relations. As 
Singapore’s government is democratic, it cannot disregard public 
pressure from its majority group, when Chinese lives are 
endangered in the Han Yang communities. The government being 
conscious of its own population problem and anxious of a Third 
China label can do practically very little to save those Chinese
lives. A labelling as a Third China is undesirable to the 
Chinese opposition in Singapore no less than to the government.
Bothy however, will support rescue operations at least of 
relatives from Malaysia and Indonesia. In recent years, Singapore 
accorded refuge to Chinese who had fled riots in Indonesia, and 
it also granted visas to the Yuitung Brothers, unfortunately 
after their deportation to Taiwan (310). Luckily for Singapore, 
most of the Chinese refugees from Indonesia during the post 
1965 pogroms were accepted hy China or put in concentration 
camps in Indonesia. Thus, Singapore provides a potential safe 
haven for at least;the wealthier Chinese in the Han-Yang and 
for those having relatives in the city-state. , In politico- 
geographical terms this Issue of refugees proves one aspect of 
Singapore*s centrality In relation to the Han-Yang Chinese. It 
transpires that uncontrolled ethnic solidarity may conduce the 
government to pursue a policy, which in normal circumstances 
seems undesirable to it.
The Han Yang Chinese have found Singapore a most desirable 
place to invest part of their capital, because of the mild 
capitalistic economic policy, the commercial and industrial 
development, the strength of the currency and the financial 
facilities. Most of the money comes from countries where Chinese 
capital cannot be safely invested, as liquid capital smuggling 
is not difficult in a region of such traditional practices. In 
addition, family links across political boundaries make it easy 
for one company to !,loseM money to another in Singapore. This 
attraction for Han Yang Chinese capital constitutes yet another 
aspect of Singapore's centrality. Again^this aspect concerns 
the bourgeois layer of the Chinese groups.
Singapore also imports cheap labour mainly from Malaysia
but also from Indonesia. As already mentiioned, the majority 
of these are Chinese, the preference for Chinese workers being
hko
understandable as most of the employers are Chinese and as these
workers are considered, more efficient than those of other ethnic
groups. However, the workers do not acquiie a Singaporean 
citizenship even after a long period of service in the city as,
not unlike Switzerland, Singapore maintains a strictly selective
policy in that respect, preferences "being given for the wealthy. •
H o w e v e r ,  the. n u m b e r  o f  f o r e i g n  w o r k e r s  e n v i s a g e d  f o r  t h e  l a t e
1970s is 180,000, as already mentioned (511).
I n  v i e w  o f  t h e  u b i q u i t o u s  s u p p r e s i o n  o f  C h i n e s e  c u l t u r a l
institutions in Southeast Asia, the) role of Singapore Am -$&&&
may augment in the near future. Hong Kong still provides
a much greater variety of Chinese cultural needs, from
newspapers through films, books and educational facilities, to
specific Chinese foods, religious objects and clothes. Taiwan,
however, rapidly loses its former position as the shade of China.
looms in. the bac3^round. With the creation of the 17an Yang
University and with the practical closure of Chinese high schools
in Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore's location seems
preferable to that of Hong Kong, for those Chinese who still
endeavour to give a Chinese education to their children (512),
Other cultural services may also flourish in Singapore for the
benefit of the surrounding- countries’ Chinese communities, for
the same locational reasons. This is to imply that some imports
of cultural goods will be permitted in the Southeast Asian
countries. The reasoning for that latter statement is based on
an apparent contradiction in those countries’ policies towards
the Chinese minorities. On the one hand, they seem to favour
Chinese assimilation by abolishing Chinese education and 
newspapers; on the other\hand/their dominant elites’ connivance
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with Chinese big business/and lower officials' collusion with 
Chinese smaller businessmen^in bypassing anti-Chinese laws^_ 
indicate a symbiosis financially beneficial for both sides. ‘ 
This seems the reason for the indigenous "subconscious" interest 
for the perpetuation of the Chinese identity in those countries, 
a sort of unwillingness to kill a laying hen (313). The 
existence of a scapegoat in form of an alien group also 
sometimes serves inner political ends diverting publiGr opinion 
from governmental failures.
As already mentioned, Singapore's centrality in Chinese 
cultural matters is a. process in which ethnic sentiments contest 
the government official policy, sometimes with certain success. 
This could not be done once Singapore remained within the 
Malaysian Federation because of certain Ma^ay opposition. 
Singapore's independence becomes thus a major factor in that 
specific centrality. Moreover, independence and democracy may 
generate a hope in the Chinese Educated non-communists, that 
the government may be less selective in accepting Chinese 
refugees and immigrants in the future.
Anxious as it is about the Third China image of Singapore, 
the government can justify its activities in accepting the 
refugees by humanitarian reasonsf it is^however^ more difficult 
to find a pretext for accepting smuggled capitalj therefore 
no official statistics are issued concerning that matter. 
Apparently, it would be difficult to ascertain the source of the 
money even if the government wanted to find out its origin.
The issues, of the refugees, foreign workers and. of Chinese 
capital, are loaded with an ideological weight as well. Denying 
citizenship from the workers andjpractically accepting the
km
wealthier Chinese, and their money, emphasizes Singapore’s 
centrality in almost a unique relation to the Chinese 
bourgeois class. This is true'from an opposite aspect, as 
Communist China and its followers abroad deny any cultural 
importance of Chinese extra-territorial centres. Moreover, 
they do not accept the political breach of Malayftand Singapore 
as final. It seems that the non-communist Chinese Educated of 
Singapore, may acquiesce to the political reality that an 
independent Singapore serves an important role in the Nan Yang 
Chinese life and may become supporters of the government state- 
idea.
The selective and ambivalent nature of Singapore’s 
centrality in relation to thijNan Yang society does not stem only 
from its own policy. The non-conformity of the Chinese identity 
group in the Nan Yang with the Chinese solidarity group in that 
area, is no less responsible for that pehenomenon. There are 
the dichotomies of Pelting supporters and non-communists, 
between the wealthyjand the poor and between the culturally 
devoted and the semi-assimilated. There is also the division 
of communities according to state boundaries, which seems most 
harmful if the Nan Yang Chinese are expected to show overall 
solidarity. The waves of Ghinese persecutions do not coincide 
in all the countries together and economic benefits blur 
memories of past experience. China is not benming a centre of 
attraction for resettlement of the Nan Yang Chinese, and its 
policy explicitly favours Chinese political integration into 
their host states. This not only decreases Singapore’s moral 
obligations towards the Nan Yang Chinese but also its Chinese 
population’s solidarity with them. In the future, this may lead 
to a selective acceptance by Singapore of Chinese refugees
and immigrants, favouring those who have relatives in 
Singapore.
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and Singapore.
185) See Mezerik (ed) 1965, p.33, quoting Sudjarwo.
186) See Lee Ewan Yew, 1967.
187) Osborne, 1964, p.14.
188) P.E.E.R. Yearbook, 1970, p.259*
189) Ohan Heng Chee, 1971, p.34.
190) Y.S.S. 1971/1972, pp.79-80.
191) Development Plan 1961-1964, 1961, pp.13-14, tables 1.12 
and 1.13.
192) Y.S.S. 1970/1971, p.46.
193) Development Plan 1961-1964, 1961, p.35, table 3.1 and 
Birst Development Plan 1961-1964, 1964, p.3.
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Y.S.S. 1971/72, pp.146. Also in I960 fixed prices, there 
was an increase in per cajoita Gross Domestic Expenditure. 
See Abrahams and Tan, 1970, p. 46, tables 1 and 2.
Y.S.S. 1971/1972, p.149.
ibid, pp.81-82.
On the efficiency of the P. A.P. see Bellows, 1970, p.101 
and Pang Oheng Lian, 1971, pp.23-28, 58,
Chan-Heng Chee, 1971, pp. 21-22, 25"27.
labour legislation while - aiming at the workers welfare, 
also projected an image of Singapore among foreign 
investors as a disciplined country, where they could 
expect economic success. G-oh, 1972, p. 265.
In education, housing, public works etc.
Josey (compiler) 1968, p.III.
Lee Kwan Yew In ibid p.41, also Lee Kwan Yew, 1966 (A) on 
social stratification according to leadership capabilities, 
also Lee Kwan Yew, 1967, pp.47-49 on leadership of the 
working-class,
Josey (compiler) 1968, p.III.
Pang Cheng Lian, 1971, pp.27, 54, 58, on hierarchy, 
discipline and secrecy in the P.A.P.
Osborne, 1964, p.55 and Wurfel, 1971, p.11.
Yet the increase in enrolment was from 266,625 to 
536,163 during 1959-1963. Goh, 1972, p.259.
Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.154.
ibid, p.166.
ibid, p .33. The man-day lost in 1969 pertain to 
stoppages which began in 1968.
ibid, p.12.
ibid, pp.18-19 *
Between 1946- and 1957, the birth rate was on the increase. 
You Poll Seng, 1963, tables 1, 6. The birth rate was 
declining since 1957.
Computed from Y.S.S. 1971/72, pp.14-16. 
ibid, p.31.
In 1963, more than 200,000 people lived as squatters in 
Singapore according to McGee, 1968, p.60.
Goh, 1972, p.260,
Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.74. 
ibid, p.139.
Abraham and Tan, 1970, p.46, table 1.
Lim Kim San. in Josey (compiler) 1968, p. 44.
Lee Kwan Yew, 1967, p.45, and Lee Kwan Yew, 1966 (B).
Lim Kim San in Josey (Compiler) 1968, p.47. 
ibid, p.45.
The Plebeian, 6 Sept. 1966, and 25 April 1967.
Lee Kwan Yew, 1966 (A).
Deutsch and Dominguez, 1972, pp.463-465.
Lee Kwan Yew, 1966 (A). Yet, in Holland and Switzerland 
national identity preceded compulsory military service. 
Daalder, 1971, p.360.
(228) Among other arguments this may be supported by the 
proportion of Chinese in Malaysia. Also in the 1950s, 
the trade with Indonesia resembled in value that of , 
Malaya, yet there was no question of merger with Indonesia 
with 2.5 percent Chinese. Merger with Malaysia must have 
produced among the Chinese some thoughts about their 
relative weight in the population.
(229) Lee Kwan Yew, 1966, (B). But, according to Kristoff,
in Pisher (ed) 1968, p.345, national cohesion operating 
from below supplements the state-idea which is imposed 
from above. In Singapore no such national cohesion 
combined the three ethnic groups.
(230) See Daalder, 1971, pp.359-360, 367, regarding the 
process in the plural societies of Switzerland and Holland.
(231) The B.S. state idea resembled that of the M.C.P.
(232) Kwa Chong Guan, 1971, p.35, and Soh TIan Keng, 1971.
(233) Centrifugal tendencies of local governments are well known 
in the Philippines,* Indonesia and practically to some 
extent in most other countries.
(234) Tan in You Poh Seng and Lim Chong Yah (eds), 1971, ■
pp.386-417.
(235) Q.E.R. 1970, pp.8-9.
(236) Goh, 1972, pp.210-212.
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By the end of 1966, out of a total of 7,836 acres acquired 
or undertaken to acquire By the government for industrial 
development, 7,340 acres were in Jurong. Lefeher and 
G'hudhuri , 1971, p. 182.
According to Bee Kwan Yew, 1969, pp. 1, 3. 
ibid,
Lee Kwan Yew in S.T. 1st May 1972.
S.T. 2nd and 6tli May 1972.
Y.S.S. 1971/1971, p.47, for establishments of more than 
9 employees.
A-Average per capita worker remuneration in current prices 
Singapore $. B-Average per capita worker remuneration in 
I960 fixed retail prices. See Y.S.S. 1970/71, p.139.
0“ Aver age Value Added per worker, in current prices.
Dr-Capital expenditure per added worker in S. p.
In 1970, Amnesty International claimed that over 100 people 
were administratively detained. Alexander, 1973, p.218.
On governmental involvement in the economy as owners, see 
Lee Soo Ann in You Poh Seng and Lim Ohong Yah (eds) 1971,
pp. 81-100.
Y.S.S. 1971/72 pp.81, 82.
M.D.S.S. vol. XI, No. 8, 1972, p.35.
Both Malaya and Singapore had no interest in diplomatic 
relations with China before 1972.
Sun. I. 3 Sept. 1972. ,
Por example, "Singapore is Afraid that Time is Running Out", 
Emery in Peng-Khaung Chong (ed) 1968, pp.106-109. “Politics 
of Survival", Chan Heng Ghee, 1971, Some milder allusions 
regarding Singapore's existence in the midst of a Malay 
World. Wilson, 1971, p.238.
"The Crucial Yeax's Ahead". Josey ( compiler) 1968, pp. 49-51.
See especially Lee’s demands and hopefulness, ibid, passim. 
G-oh’s good planning; of economic and strategic problems, but 
also a*c&fjseasfcht* mood of Rajaratnam, ibid, pp. 11 and 
Toh Chin Chye, pp.4, 22.
The 1957 Percentage distribution of ethnic socio-economic 
classes was as follows:
Malay Chinese Indian Others
Upper Class 0.5 1.6 1.8 16.6
Middle Class 15.6 17.9 20.3 56.6
Lower Class 83.9 80.5 77.9 26.8
Macdougall, 1968, p.25.
H U
(254) M.D.S.S. vol. XI. No. 8. p.3.
(255) Computed from M.D.S.S. vol.XI, No.8, '1972, pp. 62-63.
(256) Tan Seong Chee, 1971, pp.5? 14-17.
(257) Men’s hair should he short cut by statutory law, and 
hippies find difficulty in visiting Singapore.
(258) The drive for cleanliness was very effective, making 
Singapore one of the cleanest cities of its size.
( 259) In 1959-1969, the compound rate of G-.D.P. increase reached 
9.4 percent. G-oh, 1972, p. 254.
(260) Ohiew Seen Kong, 1971, p.IV. This is a premise of the P.A.P.
(261) ibid, pp.V-VI. It was postulated in that research that 
national identity varied directly with: social integration, 
integrativve attitudes, bilingualism, legitimation of 
government policies of nation building, mobilization and 
satisfaction with life.
(262) Gibbons and Chan Heng Chee, 1971, pp.101-102, 112.
(263) Yeh and Kwok Chuow.Wei, 1972, vol.Ill, pp.2-5.
(264) ibid, p.5, table III. For a detailed report see Yeh, 1972.
(265) Yeh, 1972, pp.14, 205. This Indicates integration within
the ethnic group and not a national Integration, but it
proves tbsfc the traditional sub-group segregation is fading
out.
(266) Largely of Chinese ethnicity. Personal communication from * 
Jek Yeun Thong, minister for culture, 14 Oct.1972. The 
figure is from G-oh, 1972 (B).
(267) Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.149.
(268.) The indifferentiation of classes in residence areas in
Chinese and Indian towns partly resulted from that
cultural environment conception. Caste differentiation in 
India only changed that situation.
(269) The three booming economic fields in the late 1960s were
the hotel industry, ship building and offshore oil
prospection. She Lim Chong Yah and Ow Cbwee Huay in 
You Poh Seng and Lim Chong Yah (eds) 1971, pp.30-34.
(270) Lee Kwan Yew, 1972.
(27.1) .For example, Toh Chin Chye, 1971.
(272) Wona Lin Ken, 1972.
(273) Goh, 1972 (A).
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Rajaratnam, 1972.
Goh in S.I, 9 Aug. 1971.
It was not planned, yet when the government later "became 
aware of it, it helped to reduce it. G-oh, 1972,pp. 151-153.
Chua Sia Chin, 1972.
ibid.
Goh, 1972, (JB).
Most of whom would he Chinese, thus enhancing Singapore’s 
centrality.
World diplomatic recognition of Singapore undoubtedly adds
to the political executives self esteem. If future
conditions favour a new merger with Malaysia, relinquishment 
of the independent state status may prove the hardest 
obstacle to overcome.
Also the relative decline in air ma.il and air freight
in proportion to the rest of the world during that period,
is indicative of that trend, Y.S.S. 1971/72, p.93.
Y.S.S. 197.1/72, pp.81-82.
ibid, p.'97,
Rajaratnam, 1972.
Q.E.R. No.3, 1970, p.10.
Goh, 1972, pp.122-123, 125-126.
S.G.P.S. 16 Nov. 1971.
Rajaratnam, 1972, (B)*.
S.T. 4 July 1968.
,S.f. 10' Aug. 1970.
S.T. 9 Aug. 1971.
Not by sheer laclc of resources, but by:' the need to 
compromise inprder to get substitutes.
Chou Tai Choong, 1972, p.5 and pasam.
Wong in Ooi Jin Bee and Chiang Hai Ding (eds) 1969, passim. 
Also Geno-Oelilers and Wikkramatileke', 1968, p. 194.
Khong Kit Soon, 1972, p.3-
(297) Geno-OeJalers and Wikkramatileke, 1968, p. 192, tables 1,2.
(298) S.I. 10 Aug. 1969.
(299) Soong Tsoon Tub, 1972, p.4.
(300) ibid, p.8.
(301) S.T. 8 May 1971.
(302) See Wilson, 1967, p.50, for hatred to the Chinese in 
Singapore expressed by inhabitants of a remote village in
(303) N.N. 21 Oct..1972 on'cooperation in building projects and 
tourism. Also S.T. 22 larch 1971 and 10 May 1972 on 
joint training: of Malaysian and Indonesian armed forces, 
and on Malaysian and Singaporean' military cooperation 
respectively.
(304) Y.S.S. 1971/72 p'.115 and M.D.S.S. vol.XI, No.8, 1972, p.78.
(306') for prospects in Indonesia see Withington, 1961,pp. 418-423.
(305) While industrial cooperation will help Malaysia and 
Indonesia, it will not damage Singapore, as by strength 
of its economy it can shift to more sophisticated low- 
pollution industries.
(307) In fact, Singapore had anticipated a possible increase in 
tourism and business trips, for which it provided the most 
extensive facilities in the entire region.
(308) Lee Kwan Yew, 1972 (A).
(309) ibid.
(310) Alexander, 1973, p.139-
(311) In the event of' a* deterioration in the conditions of the 
Chinese in their countries of origin, they may remain in 
Singapore as refugees.
(312) Non Singapore citizens* enrolment In the Nan Yang University 
(mainly from Malaysia axid Indonesia) was as follows:
Year Total Students Non Singaporeans.
Malaya.
1965/66 
19 66/67 
1967/68 
1968/69 
1969/70 
1970/71
2,273
1,851
1,750
1,991
2,242
2,039
1,431
1,006
666
525
615
457
Source: Nan Yang Univ. Calenders for the appropriate years. 
Although the number of non-Singaporean students greatly 
declined during that period, they were still impressive in 
respect of the level of education concerned.
(313) The corrupt; government of 
suggest that ■ anti-Chinese 
at Chinese expenses.
Southeast Asian countries 
laws are devised to he broken..
Appendix a .
The abnormal sex ratio of the immigrant; Chinese 
communities '-palls' for a special discussion concerning its" 
relation to permanent residence and to attachment to the 
place of residence.
It is assumed here, that within a society where . 
migratory figures, greatly exceed;natural population growth 
and mainly involve young males, the sedentary .part of the 
population is represented by families, while the bachelors, . 
as much as they are not integrated into families, usually 
constitute the unstable element of the population both 
socially and demographically, They will normally have 
much less sentimental attachment to their temporary place 
of residence (1); It is further assumed that Chinese 
families had a 1:1 sex ratio during the 19th and 20th 
centuries. The assumption may be justified by the following 
reasoning:. Malay women .married to Chinese, who might not 
have appeared as Chinese females in the censuses, could 
be balanced, as it were, by second and third wives of those 
wealthy Chinese who had more than one wife,, by Chinese 
prostitutes and by mui tsai servant girls (2).
A normal society with,a -1:1. sex ratio is entirely 
organized, in -families, except for marginal anomalies. A 
society with less than 1:1 female to male (P/M) ratio, will 
have a lower percentage of the population integrated in 
families, the non integrated males constituting the 
unstable part of, the society. Prontier towns and "G-old
4 c £ t i i 4 t i £ s u $ d ~  '
^Rush11 a good example of such communities
Assuming that a normal society has a 1 :1.sex ratio in
its families and that a 1:1 sex ratio indicates full 
integration into families^we.get the following function 
representing the ratio of the number of people integrated 
into families stable population. over the-, total population:
for P ^  H 
'for- P >  M
M denoting the number of males, and p of females. ',
'The range of^he function extends over fractions in Q),ij 
The proof is trivial, and since no assumption has been, made 
as regards the size of families,- the function is independent 
of it. Por the ratio of the non-integrated persons over the 
entire population we get:
‘ „ Vtne Sum
Now,  ^ iif for^ each specific sex ratio, equal 1,\lwf6"
•f tlic
the non-integrated proportions of the population.
. The graph representing the function ,!fn -follows, and
(iU
may, houseful in research of communities, where only1 sex 
ratio, is known, to decide the proportion of integration 
into families and hence to stability of residence and the 
territorial values attached to the place.
Two samples from 1947 Singapore m a y ^ ^ w ^ t h e  validity 
of the function. The first one^ (3) returned 961 single­
person households out .of■ a total 15,698 persons or, 
approximately a 6.1 percent proportion, of people non-
2P
M+ P 
2M 
M+ P
4(pjL
i i i l  into j §
tjrr 
: F u  H l i
. . ' . ' T O
integrated- into families* The contemporary Chinese 
0.882 (F/M) sex ratio indicates according to the "fw 
.function ,a 94 percent integration into families. * The 
second sample (4) involved 19,380 persons of all. ethnic 
groups with an (jjffc) sex ratio of 0.865, while the average 
sex ratio' for all the ethnic groups in 1947 was 0.822.
The former figure indicates a 7*2 percent of non-integrated 
population, and in fact, the sample included 1,343 persons 
in' single person households, or 6.9 percent of non­
integration.
\
FOOTNOTES: APPENPIX A.
(1)..This is where residential stability becomes a 
concept in cultural geography.
(2) Purcell, 1966 (19651 pp.274-275 and Song. Ong Siang, 
1967 (1922) pp.391-395. ;
(3) Figures from Freedman, 1970 (1957) p.30,
(4) Singapore Department Social Welfare,., 1947, p . 28 
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